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CONTINUITY AND C!fANGE IN MEJ<EO SOCIETY, 
1890-1971 
(Precis) 
by 
Michele Stephen 
THIS study describes the response of the Mekeo, a Papuan 
people numbering approximately six and a half thousand, to 
e:igli:y years of European control. It combines three different 
types of evidence - documentary material (mainly government 
records), ethnographic data collected during the author's 
field work and oral history collected in the same manner. 
Chapter One briefly describes contemporary Mekeo 
society and then works back, identifying points of comparison 
and contrast with the society at the time of first contaQt 
in 1890. It demonstrates the strong continuity between past 
and present observable in local grouping, leadership, family 
life and kin relationships, and social values. 
Chapters TWo to Eight trace the history of contact 
from 1890 to the present. The Mekeo's first reception of 
mission and government, and their attempts to reconcile the 
new regime with the traditional structure of authority, are 
described in Chapter Two. The effect of the pre-war 
administration's policies of enforced labour and compulsory 
cash cropping are discussed in Chapter Three. Chapter Four 
outlines the background of social stability in the pre-war 
period. 
The effects of the Second World War - the breaking 
down of the former isolation of the village community and 
the arousing of new desires for economic and social 
advancement - are discussed in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Six argues that the failure of the 
administration's post-war developmental schemes resulted 
from its inability to provide the necessary economic 
infrastructure of transport and marketing facilities. Though 
discouraged by these failures, villagers were not deterred 
from experimenting with their own business ventures in the 
late 1950s. 
The struggles of the Mekeo Local Government council, 
and the opposition encountered by aspiring political and 
business leaders from their own communities, are outlined 
in Chapter Seven. 
Chapter Eight analyses the present obstacles to 
development in terms of the traditional 'ocial ethic and 
the ambivalence underlying social relationshi~s, th~ direction 
of change since the war which has weakened the society's 
capacity to deal with the new developments, and the history 
of relations with the white regime. It is suggested that the 
present social values, which are only just beginning to be 
questioned, will continue to influence the immediate future 
and that villagers may have to chose between their desire 
for advancement and the social values which, up to the present, 
have given dignity and purpose to life. 
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NOTE elf SPELLING 
The 1973 Village Directory is the authority used 
for the spelling of village names. In other cases the 
mission orthography has been followed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PACIFIC historians, reacting against the ethnocentrism of 
old-style colonial history, have stressed the need to 
understand not only the policies and activities of Europeans 
in the Pacific, but also 'the indigenous forces that have 
similarly contributed to the making of the contemporary 
Pacific.• 1 In Africa, a similar reaction has turned attention 
to the refining of techniques to expand knowledge of pre-
contact African history. 2 Historians writing of New Guinea 
have, until recently, confined themselves mainly to the role 
played by Europeans; but the increasing interest in 
3 
non-documentary approaches, the firm guide lines for a 
'people's history' indicated by Professor Denoon of the 
University of Papua New Guinea, 4 and the aspirations of the 
people of an independent nation leave little doubt that 
future historical studies will focus on the village rather 
than the metropolitan powers. 
The present problem for New Guinea historiography, 
which is as yet only in an exploratory stage, is how to 
achieve this new emphasis. Up to the present, most scholars 
who have attempted detailed time-depth studies of the impact 
of European contact on indigenous New Guinea societies have 
1 Davidson 1966: 21. 
2 Vansina 1969; Vansina, Mauny and Thomas 1964. 
3 This interest is reflected in the section devoted to 
non-documentary approaches at the Second Waigani 
Seminar, 1969. 
4 Denoon 1973. 
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been anthropologists, not historians. The anthropologist, 
according to Firth, aims at identifying and describing the 
changes that have taken place in a society by making an 
analysis of it at two separate points in time. 5 The historian, 
on the other hand, attempts to trace the processes that 
link the two, to describe and explain them: he wants to 
know how the institutions, attitudes and ideas of a particular 
society have developed over a period of time. Whilst many 
studies of social change in New Guinea fit Firth's 'dual 
synchronic' model, a few have demonstrated how the historical 
processes of contact may be reconstructed through a 
combination of documentary, oral and ethnographic evidence. 
It is not surprising that until recently historians 
have preferred to leave such studies to anthropologists for 
in New Guinea: 
••. the normal units of historical observation 
are, on the native side, virtually absent. 
There are no large political formations, no 
collective entities or representative spokesmen, 
no well-defined large-scale events or consolidated 
policies. The white man's action bears directly 
upon the small institutions of social life. the 
clan, the hamlet, the family, and is not mediated 
through large-scale political entities. A great 
deal of the native side of the situation therefore 
becomes visible only when the techniques proper 
to the social anthropologist are employed. 6 
Though these problems are not confined to New Guinea, they 
combine with the fragmentation of linguistic and cultural 
units to provide a special challenge to the historian. It is 
not simply a matter of adopting new techniques: the historian 
5 Firth 1959. 
6 McAuley 1954: 819. 
xiii 
who forsakes his archives to set out with note pad and tape 
recorder for the village can have no confidence that the 
material he gathers will represent 'New Guinean attitudes' 
in general, or even the opinions of the next valley. Above 
all., the problem is of dealing with unaccustomedly small 
units. 
The following study is based on the conviction 
that a deeper understanding than we now possess of New 
G·1 i'1eans' response to European contact can best emerge frcm 
detailed area studies of single cultural units, or of small 
groups of contiguous, closely related cultures. 
Probably the most decisive among my many reasons 
for selecting the Mekee, a Papuan people who have experienced 
eighty years of European control, was their reputation for 
a die-hard conservatism - a characteristic which seemed to 
offer an interesting contrast to the positive response to 
econom1c and political change recorded by anthropologists 
elsewhere in New Guinea. The Mekee are reputed to be 
indifferent to progress and opposed to European ways in 
general. J.P. McAuley wrote in 1954: 
It is certainly the fact, acknowledged by all who 
have had dealings with the Roro and Mekee people, 
that they have no liking for the white man's 
regime and do not mind making this plain by their 
demeanour. 7 
Over two decades, this reputation has, if anything, increas~d. 
Refusing to accept the anonymity of cropped hair, shorts 
and shirt now adopted by most New Guineans, the Mekee, with 
his ankle-length red rami, his elaborate, bushy hairstyle, 
7 Ibid: 818. 
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hi1 bead necklace and woven armband1, cut1 a flamboyant and 
arrogant figure. The very confidence of his bearing contrasts 
with the more self-effacing manner many New Guineans still 
a1aume in the pre1ence of expatriate1. The failure of 
expensive post-war development plans in the Mekeo and the 
struggles of the Mekeo Local Government Council suggest that 
con1ervatism ia not in appearances only. I was interested 
to find out more about the Mekeo's attitudes to economic and 
political development and about the pattern of change over 
the period of contact. My aim was not to point out simple 
differences between past and present Mekeo society but to 
understand its existing attitudes and problems in terms of 
the historical interaction between the Mekeo on the one 
hand, and the European agencies of influence on the other. 
Though these basic aims were not changed, my 
initial a1aumptions had to be completely revised. After 
examining the government records, I arrived in the village 
convinced that the impression I had of harsh, repressive 
pre-war policies and post-war bungling provided most of the 
answers to the Mekeo's indifference to progress along the 
lines set out by the administration. A few weeks of field 
work undermined my admittedly naive expectations that 
villagers' opinions would merely serve to illu1trate the 
picture I already held. The Mekeo, I discovered, did not 
regard themselves as anti-government, or anti-European, or 
indifferent to the attraction1 of European goods or ways. 
The consistent interpretation of their contact history which, 
despite my mi1conception1, eventually emerged from villagers' 
accounts was very different from what I had originally expected. 
In one re1pect, circumstances forced me to modify 
my original aim1. I had intended to give equal empha1is 
to government and mi11ion policies - there have been no 
_j ----------- --- ---· ----------------
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private aettlera on Mekeo land and very few in the inunediatc 
area - but after atartin9 the project I discovered that most 
of the misaion documents had been sent to France and were in 
the personal posseasion of Father Dupeyrat, author of the 
mission history Papouasie. 8 consequently, attention centres 
on government policy, which in any case has been far the 
more significant in the fields of economic and political 
development. 
The Mekeo are the main focus of the work. It must 
be recognized, however, that my view point and emphasis are 
necessarily those of an outsider, writing for outsiders. 
Despite my efforts to present the Mekeo's side as fairly as 
pos~ible, my conclusions will not necessarily be theirs. 
Methodology and Field Techniques 
My reconstruction of Mekeo contact history rests 
on three bases - written sources, ethnographic material and 
oral history. The scholar who attempts to combine these 
sources, as Dening remarks, 'tends to be a historian who is 
an amateur anthropologist, or an anthropologist who is an 
amateur historian, and in consequence the object of suspicion 
of anthropologist and historian alike.• 9 It is reasonable, 
therefore, to expect that both camps will want to know the 
sort of techniques used: although in this instance the only 
real novelty of the approach is that it has been carried out 
by someone trained in historical rather than anthropological 
methods. 
The historian regards it as axiomatic that, before 
he can talk of change in a particular society, he must learn 
8 Dupeyrat 1935. 
9 Oening 19661 23. 
_ __tj 
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as much as possible of its institutions and values. The 
medievalist steeps himself in the whole literature of his 
period. In the case of pre-literate societies, the historian 
may make use of existing ethnographies, but his only direct 
means of contact with the minds of the people he is studying 
is to live among them. If the society has experienced 
generations of contact and disruptive social change, he 
cannot make direct inferences about the past. In New 
Guinea, however, the first contacts occurred less than one 
hundred years ago, and recent studies, even of groups who 
have rapidly adapted to the new ways, demonstrate the 
persistence of traditional patterns of behaviour. 
As no full account of contemporary Mekeo society has 
yet been written, I have had to collect my own ethnographic 
data. In any case I wanted to obtain first-hand knowledge 
of the people and their society. In order to acquire it, 
I borrowed the field techniques of the ethnographer, 
concentrating on gaining a detailed understanding of one 
village community. Between May 1970 and December 1971, I 
spent fourteen months (in three separate periods) living in 
Inawi, the second largest Mekeo village, which in 1971 had 
a population of 879. By direct participation and observation, 
by means of genealogies, maps and a detailed household census, 
I attempted to collect concrete, quantitative data to compare 
with the statements informants made about their society. 
Though my interest centred on leadership and economic ,. 
&ctivities, I took advantage of whatever opportunities offered 
themselves to observe different aspects of village life. 
During the first six months I struggled to learn the language: 
when at the end of this time I had not gained sufficient 
proficiency to conduct thorough investigations, I used an 
interpreter. It was not until the last two months that I 
___ 1_ _____ -- -- - ------- --- ---- -- -------
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attempted a few independent interviews: nevertheless I was 
able to follow and direct most of the exchanges between 
interpreter and informants. As most younger people speak 
excellent English - a circumstance which made learning the 
vernacular even more diff ic'Jlt - many conversations and 
interviews, particularly with business leaders and local 
government councillcrs, -wete conducted in English. 
My starting point in Chapter One is the present 
society. Anthropologists rightly stress the dangers of 
attempting to 'reconstruct' a society at some point in the 
past: I have worked back from the present, identifying 
continuity and change at certain easily identifiable points, 
without offering any overall picture of the functioning 
entity which existed at the time of first contact in 1890. 
The brief accounts of the society in the late 1890s and early 
1900s given by Seligman, 10 and a few other observers, provide 
useful points of comparison. 
Chapters TWo to Eight, which trace the events 
linking 1890 with the present, derive their factual framework 
and chronological arrangement from written sources, primarily 
government records. The documentary evidence, which was 
examined first, also 
h l . l 11 t e ora materia , 
provided the guide lines for collecting 
at least in the first stages before 
any clear interpretation emerged from villagers' accounts. 
Rather than trying to gather oral evidence from as 
many villages as possible, I have aimed at building up a 
complete picture from one village and then testing this 
interpretation against a detailed comparison with one other 
10 Seligman 1910. 
11 Cf. Valentine 1958. 
·------------------ ----------------• 
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village. Aipeana, the third largest Mekeo village, and the 
most economically progressive in 1971, seemed to offer an 
ideal comparison with conservative In,awi which, though less 
than three miles distant, was isolated by rough tracks. 
Despite these differences, there was very little variation 
in the overall view of contact presented by the two villages. 
Though some information was collected in other villages, I 
confined systematic enquiries to Aipeana and Inawi, and 
used the results to give insight into the overall picture 
presented by the documentary evidence. 
Oral evidence consisted of three types - traditions 
passed down from one or more generations, hearsay, and 
eyewitness accounts. The use of traditions is ~onfined to 
Chapter Two and is discussed there. Chapters Three to Eight 
present the opinions of leading participants in the events 
described - eyewitness accounts which, critics of oral history 
should perhaps be reminded, would constitute court evidence 
under oath. Problems of dealing with retrospective accounts 
are discussed where they arise in the text. 
The question of selecting informants is one which is 
largely decided for the field worker once he is well known 
in a Mekeo community. While it might logically appear that 
in a village of more than 800 people there would be dozens 
of possible informants on a topic like the rice scheme of the 
1950s, villagers expect and direct you to consult those who 
were office bearers in the rural progress societies, the men 
·~ho were trained to be mill hands and tractor operators, and, 
of ~uu1·se, the clan chif;fs and elders. People who have not 
taken a leading part in events, or at least directly 
participated in them, are reluctant to describe their 
experiences: most Mekeo will simply refuse to discuss a topic 
rather than make up some rigmarole to placate the outsider. 
-•. 
• 
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I was, of course, well known to the people I consulted, while 
the people of Inawi were my close friends and neighbours. 
During the first six months field work, I made no 
systematic historical inquiries: at the end of that time 
I drew up questions on different topics, guided by general 
impressions of village opinion and the documentary evidence. 
These 'questionnaires' were intended only to provide a 
flexible plan, ensuring that the same information was covered 
with each informant, but modified to sui! each particular 
situation: later they were revised when it became clear that 
many of the assumptions on which they had been based were 
false. Naturally the collection of ethnographic material and 
of information derived from general conversation and social 
contact continued throughout the whole period of field work. 
When informants are quoted in the text, statements made at 
formal interviews are acknowledged in footnotes giving the 
informant's name (or in some cases initials), the place and 
date of the interview; in the case of comments made in general 
or private conversations, no reference is made. 
The Wider Relevance of the Mekeo's Experience 
Mekeo society defies many of the assumptions usually 
held about Melanesian societies. Instead of the highly 
competitive big-man style of leadership familiar from many 
other parts of New Guinea, 12 the Mekeo possess a complex 
structure of hereditary chieftainship and a social ethic 
that condemns competitive, aggressive behaviour. In other 
New Guinea societies which, like the Mekee, have stable local 
grouping, sorcery accusations are usually directed against 
outsiders and thus help to preserve the group's sense of 
12 Berndt and Lawrence 1971. 
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'd . 13 soli arity. Yet the Mekeo, who are obsessed by sorcery 
fears, always suspect close kin of using sorcery against 
them. Though the direction of accusations is suggestive of 
the ways in which fears of witchcraft operate in many 
African societies, 14 the Mekeo sorcerer, unlike the African 
witch, holds a socially sanctioned position as the punitive 
force behind authority. 
The apparent singularity of the Mekeo, however, is 
largely the creation of current trends in ethnographical 
research; over the last two decades interest has centred 
on the Highlands and little attention has been given to the 
long contacted areas of the Papuan coast. The Mekeo are 
surrounded by tribes known to have ascribed status and 
hereditary leadership: the Purari of the Papuan Gulf to the 
west 01 them, 15 the Kuni to the east, 16 the Mafulu to the 
17 18 
north-east, the Roro to the south and the Nara to the 
19 
south-east. Further to the east are the Motu who, though 
they have no hereditary leaders at th~ village level, have 
hereditary 
'11 20 vi age. 
heads of the clan sections which comprise the 
Malinowski's Trobriand Islanders, perhaps the 
13 Lawrence and Meggitt 1965: 17-18. 
14 Marwick 1965; Mair 1969. 
15 Maher 1961. • 
16 Van Rijswijck 1967. 
17 Williamson 1912. 
18 seligman 1910. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Groves 1963. 
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best known example of a society with hereditary leadership, 
also had sorcerers who functioned as the enforcers of law 
21 
and order. Mekeo sorcery charms and stones shown to me 
,. . 
appeared to be identical to the Koita charms illustrated in 
1 . f . . 22 Seligman's Me anesians o British New Guinea: both the 
Mekee and the Mailu, a people of the eastern Papuan coast, 
had war magicians known as 'cinnamon men' (faia in Mekee) 
23 
after the cinnamon bark which they used as a charm. 
Further research among these coa.stal groups is necessary to 
correct the present imbalance in our ethnographic picture of 
New Guinea. 
Not surprisingly, the Mekeo's response to European 
contact has also been different in many respects from the 
experiences so far recorded in other areas of New Guinea. 
The parallels which can be drawn with other groups are, 
therefore, all the more interesting. Yet it is obvious 
that the validity of my interpretation, and its usefulness 
as a comparative example, rests largely on its ability to 
stand alone. For this reason I have, in the chapters that 
follow, avoided arguing by analogy, presenting the Mekeo 
case in its own terms as far as possible. 
One respect in which contemporary Mekeo society 
cannot be regarded as unusual is the strong continuity 
observable between past and present. 
24 d. f . 1 out, recent stu ies o soc1a and 
As Mcswain points 
economic change have 
emphasized the ways in which traditional patterns of behaviour 
21 Malinowski 1926. 
22 Seligman 1910. 
23 Abbi 1964. 
24 Mcswain 1971. 
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and concepts have enabled progressive groups like the Gorokans, 
the Chimbu and the Tolai to readily adopt new ways. The 
traditional flexibility and fluidity of Chimbu society, .,... 
Brown argues, has allowed it to take rapid change in its • 
stride; 25 the highly developed economic concepts of pre-
contact Tolai society, which T.S. Epstein describes as a 
form of 'primative capitalism', were easily adapted to new 
economic stimuli; 26 the competitive, aggressive style of 
s traditional Gorokan leadership provided the model for emerging 
~ business entrepreneurs. 27 In the case of the Mekeo, however, 
' " their system of hereditary leadership, the social condemnation 
' .· 
t 
' 
' 
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of competitive behaviour, and the strong conservative force 
created by sorcery fears, operate against their own desire 
for progress. Further problems are created by the ambivalence 
underlying social relationships, which makes co-operation in 
the new situations difficult, even among close kin; and this 
ambivalence has been underlined by the process of social 
change over the last thirty years. 
Some scholars argue that the conservatism of coastal 
societies like the Mekeo has been conditioned by several 
decades of European contact during which the traditional 
order was 'uneasily and unproductively stabilised'; whereas 
the more progressive Highlanders, contacted only in the 1930s, 
were almost immediately introduced to 'an inter-communicating, 
highly technological and aggressively developmental modern 
28 
world'. Yet the Mekeo's pre-war experiences of repressive 
25 Brown 1973. 
26 T.S. Epstein 1968. 
27 Finney 1973. 
28 Mead 1967: 4; Finney 1973. 
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government policies did not prevent them from welcoming the 
post-war developmental projects. The miscarriage of these 
plans - largely because of the administration's inability to 
provide the necessary economic infrastructure of transport 
and marketing facilities - has damaged the administration 
in Mekee eyes, but it has not deterred them from experimenting 
with cash cropping and business ventures on their own. 
Rai 
Many New 
29 Coast, of Kar 
the people of Manam 
Guineans, for example the people of the 
30 31 Kar and Manus Islands, the Tangu and 
32 Island, have sought in cargoism the 
progress which eludes them. The Mekeo, despite the outbreak 
of two short-lived pre-war cults, have pursued practical 
rather than ritual means of satisfying their desire to share 
in the white man's wealth. The acquisition of cargo had little 
prominence in the Mekeo cults, which, I argue, should rather 
be understood as a means of achieving sudden social change -
the mass hysteria producing a state of mental and physical 
abandon during which cultists dared to defy even the most 
terrible traditional taboos and sanctions. 
Possibly the most interesting aspect of the Mekeo's 
contact experience is the consistent moral interpretation 
they give to their relationship with the white regime. From 
the beginning, the government was accepted and judged according 
to the traditional ideal of authority. Impressed by the 
fabulous possessions of the white men, which were regarded 
as undeniable proof of their supernatural powers, and reassured 
29 Lawrence 1967. 
30 Mcswain 1971. 
31 SChwartz 1957. 
32 Burridge 1960. 
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by their protestations of friendship and future benefits, 
the Mekeo calculated that they had more to gain than to lose 
by the presence of the new-comers. Accepting the new order 
more or less as an extension of the traditional structure 
of authority, villagers expected that in return for their 
allegiance, the white regime was morally bound to confer the 
benefits it promised. Their response over the subsequent 
eighty years of contact was based on the premise that if they 
met the government and the mission's demands - for tax, 
converts, carriers, rice or whatever - they would eventually 
fulfil their promises. Within this moral framework, the 
actions of government, mission and the people themselves 
assume a very different character. While mission and 
government complained because villagers did not co-operate 
more enthusiastically with measures designed to promote 
their welfare, villagers themselves regarded the same measures 
as duties imposed by the new regime in its own interests, 
and having carried them out to the best of their ability, 
expected some recompense for their labours. When the post-war 
developmental projects, which villagers had hoped would 
benefit them, failed, they were convinced that the government 
had perpetrated a base and deliberate deception. 
Despite obvious differences in interpretation and 
experience, the Mekeo's version of their contact history has 
certain similarities with the intellectual response of the 
33 . 34 Tangu and the people of the Ra1 coast. Each group has 
struggled to fit the white man into a moral order which he 
will not accept. Their experiences underline the danger of 
33 Ibid. 
34 Lawrence 1967. 
l ______  
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imposing upon New Guinea history a simple stereotype of 
oppressor and oppressed. Neither the Mekeo, the Tangu nc:r the 
people of the Madang coast, accepted domination based on 
force, but were determined to establish a morally acceptable 
and understandable relationship with the colonial order. 
The Tangu and the Madang people never succeeded for long in 
convincing themselves that a satisfactory arrangement had 
been reached but the Mekeo believed for several decades that 
the government recognized their expectations of it and would 
honour them. These responses suggest that Melanesians in 
general probably did not realize the full extent of the 
white men's military and technological superiority, at 
least until the Second World war: in their own societies, 
technological and military differences were not sufficient 
for one group to subject and dominate another; any interaction 
apart from constant warfare had to be conducted on a 
reciprocal basis. The relationship assumed by the colonial 
order had, therefore, no meaning to those it claimed to have 
subjugated. Whether or not this proves to be true in all 
instances, for the Mekeo and for others, the concept of 
oppressor and oppressed is an external interpretation of their 
history which obscures their view and the rationale for their 
actions. 
' ! 
j 
/ 
,--- ...... '- .. / 
' 
' 
KAI RU KU 
SUBDISTRICT 
NOITM· 
MI K f 0 
'WAIMA· 
KIVOll 
MAP 1 
KAIADI 
• 
' 
' ' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' ' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
20 
' '., 
' 
' 
•,, 
' 
' 
' 
' ' 
\ 
' 
' \ 
' 
' ', 
•, 
' 
) 
' 
' •, 
_'\.__ _____ _._ 
·~· . 
• 
MAP 2 
MEKEO VILLAGES 
AND COAST 
0 
"······ I I 
I 
I 
\ 
,' 
... 
L..._ ......... rt ' 10 
• -.J~.=1 .... -~--.. · .... '
MI l I I 
I 
.., 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I ~' Z·····. . . ., , v--~ ... •• 
... zv·~ .. ...~··:: ......... . 
lr1•• • 
-
MAP 3 
ME KEO VILLAGES 
AND COAST 
IN 1890 
Ai,1•11•• 
.......... 
... ~ .. 
-o,,,., •.• ". 
-·-· 
-·"····· 
·---~ ... 
-
Taken from British New Guinea Annual Reports 1889-90: 
Appendix Y. 
' 
CHAPTER ONE 
MEJ<EO SOCIETY PAST AND PRESENT 
PART I: THE PRESENT SOCIETY! 
THE Mekeo inhabit an area of flat alluvial country approximately 
seventy miles to the north-west of Port Moresby, lying within 
the Central District of Papua. The Roro and Waima people 
occupy the coastal strip to the south of the Mekeo; to the 
east are the Kuni, and to the south-east the Nara and Kabadi. 
A group formerly known as the Inaukina, or Bush Mekeo, and 
now as the North Mekeo, lives in the swampy country north-west 
of the Mekeo proper; though similar in many respects to the 
~ekeo of the plains, these people constitute a distinct 
cultural and linguistic unit. 2 
1 The following description of contemporary Mekeo society, 
except where indicated in the text or footnotes, is 
based on my own field work carried out principally in Inawi 
village during 1970 and 1971. 
2 Until a full ethnographic study of the North Mekee is 
made, it is not possible to determine their exact relationship 
with the Mekee 'proper'. Seligman notes that 'A small 
but uncertain number of villages on the middle reaches of 
the Biaru River must be considered to constitute an 
ethnographical annexe to Mekeo, for physically and in 
their customs generally their inhabitants resemble the 
Mekeo folk among whom they have formed many colonies and 
with whom they intermarry to a limited extent.' Seligman 
1910: 311-12. According to linguists of the Sacred Heart 
Mission, the Mekeo 'proper' (composed of two tribes, the 
Pioufa and the Ve'e) and the North Mekee (composed of 
three tribes, the Amoamo, the Inaukina and the Kuipa) 
speak dialects of the same language, though the difference 
is so marked that the two groups can only understand each ~ 
other with difficulty. Si.t Grammaire Mekeo: 1-2. 
---------------------------~--
2 
Situated on either side of the St Joseph River, the 
Mekeo villages occupy the plain behind the low coastal hill9 
which extends to the foothills of the OWen Stanley Ranges. 
Vegetation consists of heavy forest interspersed with 
stretches of cane grass, and t!-e rich alluvial soil produces 
3 
an abundan~e of indigenous food crops. During the wet 
season, which usually begins in ~tlcember and continues until 
May, much of the region is subject to flooding. 
Local Groupil2S 
~ 
The significant unit of local grouping is the 
nucleated village. The present population of 6,421 is 
divided between fourteen villages, 4 forming units much 
larger than those considered typi~al of Melanesian societies: 5 
seven of the fourteen villages have over 450 inhabitants and 
6 the largest has 1,000. Seligman points out that the people 
known as the 'Mekee' constitute two tribes, the Pioufa and 
7 the Ve'e. Belshaw, writing in 1951, 
as a purely mythical association with 
dismisses this division 
8 two ancestral groups. 
Whilst no corporate functions can be observed today, people 
still identify themselves as being Pioufa or Ve'e, and there 
3 See Anas 1958: 80: Spate 1953: 160-61. 
4 1971 census statistics, Bereina Patrol Report 11, 1971-72. 
5 Hogbin and Wedgewood 1953: 242. 
6 1971 statistics, Bereina Patrol Report 11, 1971-72. 
7 Seligman 1910: 311 refers to them as the 'Biofa-Vee'. 
8 Belshaw 1951: 2. 
j "J 
3 
9 is a slight difference in dialect between the two groups; 
roughly speaking, the traditional division is reflected 
today in the distinctions made between the East and the 
10 West Mekee. 
The village, the pagua, 11 is composed of a number 
of named units called ikupu, which I term 'clans'. Houses 
belonging to members of the same ikupu are grouped together, 
dividing the village into several wards. Membership of 
the ikupu is determined patrilineally and all its members are 
considered to be related, although in many cases this cannot 
be demonstrated by a known genealogy. Unlike the Motu iduhu, 
which it resembles in many other respects, the ikupu insists 
strongly on the principle of agnation. Genealogies of"'the 
ikupu comprising Inawi village gave no indication of the 
1 f f d b . 1 . 12 c usters o non-agnates oun y Groves in Motu genea ogies. 
The ikupu is the land holding unit, is ideally exogamous, 
and has its own hereditary leader. 
9 SHM Grammaire Mekee: 2. ' ••• la langue des Pioufa et 
celle des Ve'e presente quelques divergences: racines et 
tournures differentes. Plus accentuee (no accents are 
are marked on the manuscript] pourtant la predominance 
du "G" en VE'E, tandisque cette nasale s'adoucit souvent 
en "N" ou meme "L" chez les PIOUFA •••• ' 
10 However Rarai, Inawauni and Imounga, all Ve'e villages, 
are situated west of the river and Oriropetana, a Pioufa 
settlement, is on the east bank. Cf Hau'ofa 1971: 153. 
11 The word 'paqua' which Seligman incorrectly equates with 
'clan' means 'village' or 'settlement' and is used in a 
verbal form to mean 'make a settlement'. Desnoes vol. 11: 
9J. 7 defines 'pagua' simply as 'village' • 
12 Groves 1963. 
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4 
Like the Motu iduhu, the ikupu may be dispersed 
through several villages, each village division functioning 
as an independent unit. Villagers regard such groups as 
fragments of one original clan, which has been dispersed by 
warfare and migration over a long period of time: clan 
histories relate in detail the processes whereby the present 
distribution of groups has come about. In contrast to the 
Motu, members of an ikupu are usually 
genealogical ranking of its different 
well aware 
13 branches 
Of the 
and some 
interaction between them occurs. On important occasions, 
such as the installation of a new chief or a dispute over a 
marriage, interaction takes place between certain Inawi clans 
and their branches in other villages: but naturally 
circumstances vary - groups may be on bad terms and refuse 
even normal social intercourse with each other. Regardless 
of the degree of contact, the village branch of the ikupu 
retains its essential independence and is the significant 
functional unit. 
The size and composition of this unit varies 
considerably, ranging from one or two households and a single 
lineage, to thirty or more households and several lineages. 14 
Large ikupu usually display a formal threefold division into 
smaller units, which are also referred to as ikupu. Houses 
of the members of one se~tion15 are built together, forming 
13 Groves refers to the dispersed fragments of a clan as 
'sections': I refer to them as 'branches' of the one 
clan, reserving the term 'section' to describe the 
divisions which exist in each branch or village based 
unit. 
14 See diagram following: 3. 
15 See fn, 13. 
5 
a spatial division of the ikupu, with the parts ranked in 
order of seniority. The three sections are believed to be 
descended from three brothers: the fa'aniau or senior 
section being founded by the eldest brother, the ~ or 
junior section by the second brother and the iso or war 
section by the third. This formalized explanation of the 
~rigin of the sections indicates the relationship between 
them: they are seen as three separate lineages which 
originally sprang from a common ancestor, the founder of 
the clan. 
Today people can remember the names of clan founders 
but the names of ancestors linking the founders with known 
genealogies have been forgotten. Even relationships within 
a single section cannot always be demonstrated by a known 
genealogy. Oaisaka, the largest ikupu in Inawi, comprises 
three sections: the senior section, Lopia Fa' a, consists of 
~ single lineage which can demonstrate its relationship: 
the junior section, Lalae, consists of three separate lineages, 
and the third section, Iso, of two lineages. No one alive 
•:oday knows the precise genealogical links between these 
sections, but the members of Oaisaka insist that they are 
descended from a single common ancestor. Genealogies 
collected by the Sacred Heart Mission shortly after it was 
established in the area in 1886 reveal that at that time 
1 ld . d . l' k b 1 . 16 peep e cou provi e precise in s etween c an sections. 
In the case of Oaisaka, for example, the mjssion genealogies 
record the links between Lopia Fa' a, one l~neage of Lalae and 
the two lineages of Iso, revealing that their relative 
seniority accords with the stated norm. Lalae includes a 
number of unrelated lines, some of which have now died out. 
16 SHM Mekee Genealogies. 
' 
-- . - - - - _ _1.olllll 
6 
The three largest ikupu in Inawi - Oaisaka, 
Paisapaisa and Ogofoina - are divided into three ranked 
sections. 17 One clan, Afai, consists of two sections, a 
fa'aniau and an~· The seven remaining groups are not 
formally divided into sections, though some are composed of 
more than one lineage. Villagers explain that all clans 
should possess three parts but that many groups have been 
divided and scattered by tribal fighting and migration, 
hence they no longer retain their original structure. 
The structure of Authority 
The conventional threefold division of the ikupu 
reflects the structure of authority within it. Ideally 
each ikupu possesses three chiefs: a lopia fa'aniau, a 
senior chief who is the head of the senior section of the 
clan and the direct lineal descendant of the clan foundPr: 
a lopia eke, a junior chief who is head of the ~ section: 
and an iso lopia who heads the l!2 section. The lopia fa'aniau, 
as the direct descendant of the founder of the clan, takes 
precedence over the lopia eke, who acts as his assistant, 
• 
and the iso lopia, who formerly acted as battle commander. 
The senior chief is also assisted by important specialists 
in harmful magic, the faia, the war magician, and the ugauqa, 
the sorcerer, who provide the punitive force behind his 
commands. Not all clans, however, are expected to have these 
specialists. Any chief is said to be able to call upon the 
services of the uqauga, regardless of his clan: likewise 
those chiefs who have no .!!!! experts of their own can turn 
to the faia of certain allied clans for assistance. 
17 See diagram following: 3. 
.. 
7 
Although tribal fighting ceased eighty years ago, 
the titles of war chief (iso lopia) and war magician (..!!i!l 
continue to the present day. A new iso lopia was installed 
., in Oaisaka ikupu of Inawi only three years ago. In the 
past, the ..!!.!.! was greatly feared as he was believed to be 
responsible for deaths which occurred in battle and while 
hunting dangerous animals such as wild boars and cassowaries. 18 
Though the faia has little opportunity today to demonstrate 
his powers, men claiming the title and known to possess 1!!! 
knowledge are still respected and feared. The iso lopia, 
who formerly led his clan to battle and was responsible for 
all the ceremonies and feasts associated with warfare, today 
acts as a junior civilian chief, as head of his lineage or 
clan section and as assistant to the senior chief. Three 
Inawi clans claim an iso lopia - one, in fact, having an 
iso lopia fa'aniau and an iso lopia eke. 
It is evident that in a large village like Inawi, 
which is composed of several clans, there are many claimants 
to chiefly office and high status. The number of chiefs a 
clan has depends as much upon its composition as upon its 
size. A small ikupu, which is not large enough to form the 
conventional three sections but nevertheless comprises two 
or more separate lineages, may claim more than one chief. 
Ugo ikupu, consisting of only four households, nevertheless 
has a lopia fa'aniau and an ugauga lopia; while Paisapaisa, 
which comprises three sections and more than twenty households, 
claims only a lopia fa'aniau and an iso lopia, the line 
of the ~ chief having died out. A lopia is usually head 
of a separate lineage, no matter how small, but two examples 
18 See below: 54-5. 
I } 
, . 
.. 
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can be found in Inawi of lopia eke existing within the 
fa'aniau chief's lineage: both positions have been created 
within the last fifty years to solve unusual situations in 
which two prospective heirs were put forward for the 
. . f . h' f 19 position o senior c ie • The title lopia eke is also 
claimed by the living descendant of the original chiefly 
line of Oaisaka which was removed from office several 
generations ago: 20 people state that this man is not 
'really' a chief but seem more or less content to allow 
him the title in recognition of the noble origin of his 
line. 
Three clans in Inawi claim no chiefs. Ogofoina 
Lopia Fa' a, which broke away from the senior section of 
Oaisaka about forty years ago, has been unable to fully 
establish its separate identity and install its own chief, 
19 In the first case, the adoption by a childless chief 
20 
of an heir who grew into a foolish and irresponsible 
man prompted several members of the clan to put forward 
the son of the chief's younger brother as a more suitable 
candidate, thus creating two strong claimants to the 
succession. In the second case, a childless chief took 
a third wife in the hope of producing an heir. The 
young wife bore him a son and a little while later, the 
senior wife also gave birth to a son. Since the child 
of the senior wife was considered to have valid claims 
to the succession, he was eventually installed as a 
lopia eke, while his elder brother was made the senior 
chief. This is an interesting example of the functioning 
of the important principle of seniority (see below: 
10-11; 35-6): one heir was thought to have precedence 
by virtue of being the first born, the other because 
of the seniority of his mother's position. 
More than sixty years ago, Seligman 
the existence of this deposed line: 
that deference is still paid to his 
(1910: 344) noted 
it seems remarkable 
head. 
9 
though it is quite a large group. Okope, which now consists 
of two adopted families, the original line having died 
out, claims no chief, The third clan, OUgo, is said to 
be too small to afford the expense of installing a 
successor to its deceased chief. 
Small, weak groups like OUgo and Okope, though 
retaining their separate name and in some cases possessing 
their own chiefs, do not function as independent entities 
but rather as parts of larger and more powerful clans. 
Inawi can be roughly divided into groups or clusters of 
clans centering around the three largest ikupu - Paisapaisa, 
Oaisaka and Ogofoina. 21 Paisapaisa shares its clubhouse 
with two smaller groups, Afai and Ipage, whose members 
have built their houses on land originally given them by 
Paisapaisa. contained within the l!g_ section of Oaisaka 
are four small groups, Okope, OUgo, Ipage Ugo and Ugo; 
only Ugo has its own chief and, until recently, its own 
clubhouse. A third, though less tightly knit cluster is 
formed by Ogofoina, Ogofoina Lopia Fa'a and Gagai. Gagai 
maintains a fairly independent existence, having both a 
senior and junior chief and its own clubhouse; but it often 
interacts with Ogofoina as it is settled on Ogofoina land 
and, being a small group, it often requires extra labour 
and assistance for feasts. Ogofoina Lopia Fa'a, which is 
also settled on land given to it by Ogofoina, is in the 
awkward position of having obligations to both Ogofoina 
and to Oaisaka, from which it originated. 
The smaller groups are dependent on the dominant 
clan, since they live on land originally belonging to it, 
21 Hau'ofa 19711 155 describes a similar arrangement in 
Beipa. 
~: 
10 
share its ufu and may need its chief to officiate for them. 
The cluster functions as a single unit more often than 
not. Feasts may be held jointly, even when the smaller 
groups have their own chiefs, and food brought back from 
feasts is distributed to all the members of the cluster. 
Members co-operate with each other in house building and 
similar tasks. An intra-clan argument spreads to the whole 
cluster but does not involve the neighbouring one, and all 
members of the cluster support each other in inter-clan 
disputes. community work required by the local government 
council, the parents' and citizens' association and the 
church committee is always apportioned to a cluster as a 
single group, and the representatives of the various village 
committees and associations are selected according to this 
division. 
The lopia fa'aniau of Paisapaisa, Oaisaka and 
Ogofoina take precedence over the chiefs of the other 
clans comprising their cluster, as weU. as over the subordinate 
chiefs of their own clan: of the three, the chief of 
Oaisaka, the founding clan of Inawi, is the most important, 
being regarded as the 'first' or 'head' chief of the 
village. The many holders of chiefly office and high rank 
are thus carefully ordered in a hierarchy of influence. 
In principle the senior chief of the founding clan is 
regarded as the most important chief in the village and the 
other chiefs are said to defer to him, but this is not always 
the case owing to various circumstances. Beipa, the largest 
Mekee village, claims no head chief because the family of 
the senior chief of its founding clan later migrated to 
another settlement: at present Aipeana lacks a head chief 
as the previous lopia fa'aniau of the founding clan, Aivca, 
died leaving no male heir. 
r. 
L 
11 
A chief's direct influence may be confined to a 
single lineage or encompass a whole village but it never 
extends beyond the village unit. Chiefs have rights to 
demand labour from all individuals married to members of 
their ikupu but these are rights over individuals, not 
other groups: and though a certain amount of interaction 
can be observed between branches of a clan in different 
villages, on the whole village branches can be said to 
function independently of each other. 
The extent of the Mekeo chief's direct control 
cannot be considered exceptional for a Melanesian leader, 
though the units of local grouping are unusually large. 
Yet the ordering of authority, despite its limited scope, 
contains elements suggesting a style of leadership and 
social organization which Sahlins argues to be typical of 
Polynesia. 22 A system of •ranked lineages', in which 
descent lines are ranked according to their distance from 
a common ancestor is well developed within the ikupu, the 
senior chief being the closest agnatic descendant of the 
clan founder. The same pr.inciple ranks chiefs within the 
village and within the tribe: the chief of the founding 
clan ranks above the other chiefs of the village: and of 
all the chiefs of the Pioufa tribe, the senior chief of 
Oriropetana village ranks above the rest, as he is the 
most closely related to the founder of the ancestral 
village, Isoisofapu. Yet above all, it is the Mekee concept 
of authority, the rights and privileges possessed by the 
22 Sahlins 1963, 
t 
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lopia and their relationship with their people, 23 which 
brings Mekeo leadership closer to the Polynesian stereotype 
described by Sahlins than to the 'big-man' style of 
politics familiar from so many studies of Melanesian 
societies. 
The Nature of Authority 
Authority is conceived of as having a supernatural 
origin. A'aisa, the deity believed to be the originator 
of the traditional social and moral order, created the 
first lopia, iso lopia, .f!!! and ugauga, and laid down 
their functions. By virtue of its supernatural origin, 
authority is removed from the level of petty human competition. 
Men do not compete against each other for positions of 
authority, they are born to them. All rank and office are 
hereditary and follow a strict primogeniture succession. 
Genealogies taken in Inawi show few deviations from this 
principle, the few which do occur being always carefully 
covered by formalized explanations which exclude the 
23 Cf. Hau'ofa 1971: 152-3, In its basic outlines, the 
=oncept of chieftainship delineated by Hau'ofa corresponds 
closely with information I collected in Inawi. 
_. ___ j ____ --
24 pos1ibility of political rivalry. The man who aspires to 
a position which is not hi1 by birth i1 looked upon with 
contempt. To 'beg' for office is1 beneath the dignity 
of re1pectable men. The holders of authority owe their 
positions not to the 1upport of any faction or party, but 
to the established order of society - a circumstance which 
the chiefs like to impress upon the elected local 
government councillors. 
In keeping with its 1upernatural origin, traditional 
authority is enforced by means of supernatural sanctions. 
The holders of authority, through the knowledge entrusted 
to them by A'ai1a, are believed to exercise formidable 
supernatural power1. Despite the eighty years of mission 
influence and the growing familiarity with the products of 
modern technology and science, the traditional system of 
belief maintains a validity which for most villagers is 
superior to that of the imperfectly understood new knowledge. 
People attend church regularly, but in private invoke 
A'aisa and the ancestral spirits; few hesitate to seek 
24 Appendix 1, a genealogy obtained in 1971 of the senior 
section of Oai1aka clan, illu1trate1 the adherence to 
a primogeniture 1ucce11ion. Deviations are always 
explained a1 being the re1ult of a voluntary decision 
made by the legitimate heir or incumbent. For example, 
one clan claimed that the tran1ference of it1 
chieftain1hip to a junior line had come about 1everal 
generation• ago when the real heir, who was short, ugly 
and unfitted phy1ically to play the public role expected 
of the lopia, asked hi1 younger brother, a tall, well-
favoured youth, to take hi1 place. Another example was 
given of a chief who relinqui1hed his po1ition to hi1 
younqer brother becau1e he preferred to go hunting rather 
than bother himself with the affair• of 1tate. Undoubtedly, 
the1e and similar tale1 are intended to disguise the 
ugly realitie1 of internal 1trife which lay behind such 
transference• of power. 
• 
J 
l 
I 
I 
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medical aid when necessary, but the traditional cures are 
never neglected and the outcome, whatever it may be, is 
always aeen aa a vindication of the powers of the village 
sorcerer. Likewise the powers which buttress traditional 
authority are never questioned. 
25 In co111110n with other similar cultures, the 
traditional Mekee world view postulates a universe which 
men can control by means of ritual and magic. Within 
this conceptual framework, no event is seen to occur by 
accident; even minor successes or misfortunes are attributed 
to the deliberate manipulation of supernatural forces by 
a human agent. Some knowledge of minor magic - spells and 
charms to invoke the ancestors' aid in gardening, hunting 
or courting - is possessed by the majority of villagers. 
A flourishing garden, numerous pigs, luck in gambling 
and the like are attributed to such knowledge. Practical 
effort is taken into account, but the ultimate result is 
believed to be brought about by magical means. For example, a 
villager will concede that his neighbour's pigs are fat and 
healthy because they are well treated and well fed; but 
he will add, in confidence, that the real reason lies in 
the neighbour' a posaeasion of some special charm, since 
another neighbour, in spite of all hia efforts, recently 
lost hia be1t animal• through di1ease. 
Major magical power1 depend upon the possession 
of special object1 and knowledge which were entrusted by 
the diety A'ai1a only to a high ranking few. The magician 
must have special atones (~) which are regarded as a 
repository of supernatural power (iaaPI.!) and were originally 
25 Lawrence and Meggitt 1965. 
__ j__ -- j 
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given to men by A'aisa and have since passed down from 
generation to generation. He must also know how to 
prepare certain concoctions from leaves, blood and other 
'powerful' substances (fua) which serve to release the 
-
power within the stone, and he must know by heart elaborate 
rituals and spell• (mega). The magicians' object is to 
create sufficient power to enable him to attract and then 
control spirits of the dead and non-human spirits which 
will do his bidding. Certain spirits are capable only of 
certain tasks, thus the relative power of the magician 
h mb f . . h 1 26 depends upon t e nu er and type o spirits e can contro • 
In order to withstand contact with the forces of the 
supernatural world, he must carefully prepare his body for 
the ordeal, submitting himself to severe dietary and sexual 
taboos. 
The possessors of major powers are believed 
literally to control life and death: the imu auga, the 
rain magician, can create drought or flood or ensure a 
good season; the magician who controls crops (isani ugo) 
can cause famine or plenty; others can inflict a variety 
of fatal diseases which they can also cure, and cause death 
in numerous ways. Though these powers can be used either in 
a negative or a positive way, it is their destructive potential 
which remains uppermost in people's minds. Indeed villagers 
26 Each class of spirit has a particular type of stone, 
fua, and spell appropriate to it. The magician's range 
of powers depends on the number of different stones and 
types of knowledge he has inherited (or bought). Also 
the severity of the dietary, sexual and other restrictions 
he imposes upon himself varies according to the relative 
power and dangerousness of the spirit or spirits he is 
attempting to invoke. 
l 
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might be said to be obsessed with fears of harmful magic: 
the force of fear at times becoming so strong that even the 
• 
outsider senses it as an almost palpable entity. Nor is 
this dread confined to the unsophisticated and uneducated: 
neither mission nor secular education has succeeded in 
providing arguments which invalidate the basic premises of 
the traditional view. One educated young man reasons: 
Disease is caused by germs. But what causes 
the germs to come to my child and make it sick, 
instead of your child or someone else. I say 
the reason is sorcery. 
The chiefs themselves are supposed to have no 
destructive powers. In theory only the faia and the ugauga 
employ harmful magic: that is to say, they play a socially 
recognized role as the punitive force behind authority. 
The faia has lost prominence with the disappearance of tribal 
fighting and today the ugauga, the sorcerer, is the more 
important figure: he is said to act as the chief's 'policeman', 
punishing any offender against the chief's laws with sickness 
or death. In this way the actual execution of punishment 
is taken out of the chief's hands, though it is he who 
commands it. That the chief punishes only through the agency 
of the sorcerer is most carefully insisted upon in public. 
By the very nature of his rank, the chief is said to be 
incapable of any harsh or cruel action: 
Lopia means in our language one who is kind 
and good and does not cause harm or sorrow. 
ugauga is the one who can cause harm and sorrow. 
Yet secretly this is admitted to be but a convention, people 
in fact believing that the lopia have their own destructive 
powers which they can employ without the agency of the 
sorcerer should they wish to do so. Like the sorcerers, 
the chiefs are believed to have been granted supernatural 
powers by A'aisa, and they possess their own special stones 
j 
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and relics. The more important chiefs are said to be great 
magicians. One Inawi chief is believed to control the rain 
and to summon dangerous water spirits (faifai) which drown 
human victims or make them seriously ill. Another has 
control over village food crops and game supplies. The 
senior chief of the village is known to command numerous 
powers, including a special type of magic for killing 
infants and the ability to inflict incurable sores which 
. 1 . d h 27 swiftly resu t in eat • 
There are many types of harmful magic which are 
not the exclusive prerogative of the sorcerer, yet people 
often loosely refer to such activities as ugauga and 
invariably, when speaking in English, use the term 'sorcery'. 
This usage naturally leads to confusion for the outsider. 
It is necessary in each case to determine the specific 
attribution of a death before one knows whether the sorcerer, 
the chief or some other high-ranking man is the suspected 
protagonist. For example, the man who states that his 
child died by 'sorcery' on closer questioning makes clear 
that the death was caused by a type of magic known as 
imoi ieapeee penia, which is used not by sorcerers but by 
chiefs. It should be kept in mind that when government 
reports or European observers refer to the practice of 
'sorcery' and the fears associated with it, the term 
should be interpreted in the wider sense of harmful magic 
which can be inflicted by chiefs and other high-ranking 
men, and not only by the sorcerer. 
27 Inawi informants stated that, within living memory, 
the grandfather of the p1·esent senior chief of Oaisaka 
clan challenged Aufo Afulo, the head sorcerer of Eboa 
and the most famed sorcerer of his day, to a grand 
contest of powers - and won. 
• 
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The tenacious hold of traditional authority must 
largely be understood in terms of the persistence of 
belief in the supernatural sanctions which enforce it: 
while the intense fear and suspicion which today 
characterizes villagers' attitudes towards their chiefs 
only becomes fully intelligible in the light of the chiefs' 
direct possession and use of destructive magic. The fear 
which the chiefs inspire, even when not deliberately 
directed by them, becomes a most effective means of social 
control which the village community may unconsciously operate 
against the individual. 
The Proper Use of Authority 
The proper use of authority (and the supernatural 
powers concommitant with it) is for the good of the group, 
not the aggrandizement of the individual. The importance 
of this principle is emphasized in the careful ordering 
and separation of roles observed in the traditional structure 
of authority. 
The lopia fa'aniau, the senior chief, is represented 
as the very embodiment of the benevolent aspects of authority: 
any tasks likely to conflict with this altruistic image are 
delegated to the subordinate roles of the sorcerer, the 
faia and the war chief. It is untt.inkable that the lopia 
should desire to cause harm or injury, hence the public 
denial that he holds destructive powers. He must be generous 
and hospitable to all, one of his most important duties being ~ 
to see that travellers are provided with food and shelter. 
He must be tolerant and understanding with his clansmen, 
and always available to talk with them and offer them 
advice. In his dealings with other clans he must 'think 
on peace and not on war'. Within his own clan he settles 
.... 
disputes and disturbances but is seen as a peacemaker rather 
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than a stern disciplinarian. As is proper between close 
kin, his relationship with his people is based upon mutual 
affection and trust. The chief's first and only concern 
is to 'look after', 'to care for' (~) his people: they, 
in return, furnish him with the material means for holding 
feasts and providing hospitality, respect his advice and 
obey his commands. Essentially the relationship is regarded 
as a familial one: the chief's position as the senior 
member of the senior lineage of the clan is seen to ensure 
his responsibility and concern for all members of the 
group. 
The public role of the lopia is placed above all 
possibility of self-interest or the abuse of power. In 
contrast, the sorcerer's (ugauga) role is allowed an open 
ambivalence. As the embodiment of the harsh and cruel 
aspects of authority, the sorcerer is an object of fear 
and hatred even though his actions are said to be controlled 
and legitimized by the chief. People do not find it 
difficult to imagine the sorcerer using his powers for 
ends not entirely or even primarily altruistic. sorcerers 
are said to undertake to kill merely for the payments they 
receive for their services. Nevertheless, death or misfortune 
are not usually attributed merely to the sorcerer's malice 
or greed: the cause is commonly sought in the victim's own 
sins and omissions, or those of his immediate family. 
sorcerers do not kill without reason, nor do people commission 
them without cause. A sick man will search his conscience 
to find those whom he has wronged or offended: if he has 
not completed his bride-price payments he will conclude 
that his in-laws have commissioned a sorcerer to make him 
ill: if he has refused to provide a pig for a feast he 
will assume the chief has ordered his punishment. 
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Sickness and death are seen to be part of a logical 
pattern of moral retribution rather than the result of 
arbitrary personal malice. Consequently, though the 
sorcerer plays a role which provokes hostility and suspicion 
(as indeed do the police and other law enforcers in 
different societies), his actions within the total framework 
of authority do not contradict the basic principle that power 
and authority are used for the good of the group as a whole. 
The Functions of Authority in Theory and in Practice 
In principle, the management of village affairs is 
left to the chief, the sorcerer serving only to police his 
commands. The lopia is responsible for guiding and directing 
all the activities of his ikupu: he is the centre of the 
clan's ceremonial life; he is the maintainer of law and 
order within his own clan and of peaceful relationships with 
the other clans of the village; he is the guardian of the 
clan land and possesses rights over food crops, tree crops, 
hunting and fishing which make him virtual controller of 
the traditional forms of wealth. Today these functions are 
divided between many: ultimate authority lies with the 
government and even within the village numerous officials 
impinge upon the role of traditional authority - local 
government councillors, a local government council committee, 
a church committee, a parents' and citizens' association 
and a land demarcation committee. The active role the lopia 
plays today is much narrower in practice than it is in 
theory. Likewise the observable interaction between 
villagers and their chiefs bears only a strained resemblance 
to the stated ideal. 
Traditional ceremonial is the only sphere of 
activity which remains entirely the chief's responsibility. 
Even so, new occasions for feasting and celebrating - church 
·,:, 
. 
' . 
.~ 
' 
' 
' 
• 
21 
• 
festivals, the opening of a new co-operative store, the visit 
of an important mission or government dignitary - now 
absorb villagers' interest and energy. Indeed such events 
often arouse greater enthusiasm and more elaborate preparation 
than traditional ceremonies; in many instances practices 
now omitted from traditional ceremonies because of the 
expense and effort involved are revived to form part of a 
non-traditional celebration. An episcopal visit to Inawi 
was the occasion for reviving an elaborate form of greeting 
high-ranking guests no longer insisted upon in traditional 
etiquette. Traditional dancing (geva) has virtually 
disappeared from village ceremonies in recent years, though 
geva was performed for Bishop Vageke's ordination and for 
the opening of the Mekeo Local Government Council Chambers 
in 1971. 
Th& chief's responsibility to organize feasts and 
furnish hospitality to strangers is seen al~ost as a sacred 
trust. Clansmen provide the food and labour for feasts, 
but all hospitality is given in the chief's name. Likewise 
food at feasts is presented to the chiefs of the guest clans, 
who themselves divide their share amongst their own people 
when they return home. In his ceremonial role, the lopia 
embodies the spirit of generosity and liberalicy which is 
so highly valued by the Mekeo. Another important duty is 
the maintenance of the clan ~. or clubhouse, where 
strangers are received and guests entertained on public 
occasions. Feasts must be held by the chief to mark such 
events as the installation of a new chief, the opening of 
a new ufu, the death of a clansman and the termination of 
a period of mourning. Celebrations associated with a 
marriage, the payment of a bride-price, the building of a 
new house and the like are considered to be private affairs 
I 
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and not the concern of the chief. Public feasts are held 
on a reciprocal basis, each clan being involved in a 
ceremonial relationship, known as ufu apie, with one or 
.more other clans. A clan's ufu apie are the guests of 
honour at any feast it gives and are presented w.th the 
major portions of meat and other food. When the ufu apie 
hold a feast they must reciprocate in kind. 
An elaborate etiquette surrounds the division 
and distribution of food at feasts and several ceremonial 
functionaries exist to assist the chief in these matters. 
The most important assistant is the aiva auga, the knife 
man, whose task is to divide the meat once the chief himself 
has ritually cut up the skin and fat of the slaughtered 
pigs. Another assistant, the uve auga or string man, ties 
up the portions of fat and skin as the chief cuts them. 
The mafe afi auga is responsible for providing the assembled 
guests with betel nut and drinking coconuts. When the 
chief attends a feast as a guest he should be accompanied 
by his functionaries, who wait upon him and receive food and 
other gifts presented to him, but this custom is rarely 
followed today. Much of the etiquette and pomp formerly 
surrounding traditional ceremonies is fast disappearing. 
The 'feasts' held in Inawi are usually small, dispirited 
affairs, preserving only a modicum of dignity and ritual. 
Villagers admit, shamefacedly, that they no longer give 
proper feasts (gaku), they merely make a small 'tea' to 
mark important occasions. Many Inawi clans have allowed 
their clubhouses to fall into ruin; not one maintains the 
impressive traditional structure properly known as an ufu 
but improvise with a simple platform, iaua, under a flat 
roof of corrugated iron or palm fronds. 
, 
' l
A 
t 
I 
r 
! 
i i 
' 
• 
23 
The chief is responsible for law and order within 
his clan and for maintaining peaceful relations between his 
own and other clans: yet according to informants this duty 
never entailed the holding of public courts to settle 
disputes. People did not look to their chie~ to provide 
redress for individual wrongs, rather his function was to 
stop the quarrels and open violence which personal grievances 
might provoke. Disputes within the clan were regarded as 
family matters. The chief, as head of the family, would 
warn persistent trouble makers to mend their ways and would 
remind those involved of their close blood ties, urging them 
to forget their grievances and forgive each other. When a 
quarrel occurred between members of different clans, the 
chiefs of the groups involved attempted to pacify their 
clansmen and end the dispute. Publicly the chief played 
the role of peacemaker, his very presence is said to be 
sufficient to stop a fight as people say that they are 
'ashamed' to fight in front of their chief. If fighting 
should continue after the chief arrived on the scene, he 
would break his lime pot, scattering lime over the combatants 
28 
who then retreated in shame and fear. 
The public role of peacemaker has its darker side. 
Through the supernatural powers the chief commands, he has 
the power of life and death over his people; those who 
commit serious crimes or who are constant offenders can 
expect punishment in the form of sickness or even death. 
The matter is never openly debated; the chief alone decides 
28 Any man who persisted in fighting would have to give 
to the chief a large, village-bred boar with tusks, 
in compensation. Since few possess such an animal, 
people are anxioJs not to incur this penalty. 
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who is to be punished, his decision being conununicated in 
secret to the sorcerer. The chief's justice can thus 
neither be questioned nor appealed against. Within the 
traditional framework, the individual could expect no 
recompense or revenge which he himself did not take, but 
ultimately evil doers were believed to receive their just 
deserts and within the group as a whole justice was maintained. 
The individual who had been injured or offended could 
not expect his chief to act on his behalf, he had the choice 
either of taking no action beyond publicizing the injury 
done to him, or of seeking revenge through sorcery or other 
means; but in doing so he left himself open to the chief's 
displeasure and possible punishment. 
Today any serious offence attracts the attention 
and action of the administration, whether villagers desire 
it or not. People may have their disputes settled in court 
or they can appeal to their local government councillors to 
mediate. The chiefs, where they act at all, act behind the 
scenes and the exact part they play is thus difficult to 
assess. 
Amongst the Mekeo a minor disturbance can fast 
develop into a major one resulting in injury or death, for 
tempers are quick and weapons are always at hand in bush 
knives, arrows, spears and shotguns. A domestic quarrel 
between husband and wife can easily lead to serious injury . 
Yet most outbursts of violence are stopped by the people 
' ~1 themselves without recourse to the chief or any other higher 
< ~ authority. When a fight starts in the village it is usually 
• 
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stopped by the relatives of those involved: the noise of 
the fighting soon attracts a large audience and before things 
go too far the men forcibly separatP the trouble makers and 
take them off in different directions to calm them down • 
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Many grievances go no further than public abuse, which 
allows the offended party to 'let off steam' and provides 
a topic of conversation for the rest of the village. 
Early in the morning or in the evening, when most people 
are in the village, someone will begin to hurl accusations 
at his neighbours: a response is made and soon everyone 
joins in the argument which is shouted from one side of 
the village to the other. Usually the matter is soon 
forgotten, though the councillors may decide to take some 
action. Presumably in the past the public airing of 
grievances was intended to draw the matter to the attention 
of the chiefs. 
The local government councillors, like their 
predecessors the village constable and councillors, do 
hold informal courts. Villagers occasionally bring to 
their councillors such matters as a disputed bride-price 
or stolen garden produce, but often things are settled by 
those involved or are simply allowed to become one more 
grudge to be held against an unpopular neighbour or a hated 
~ival. It is evident that in some cases the chiefs use their 
influence to persuade the parties concerned in a dispute to 
accept the councillors' decision and not cause further 
trouble; but since this is always done in private, evidence 
relies on second-hand statements. Yet it seems clear that 
the chiefs have no desire to take upon themselves the 
judicial functions of the councillors. When Inawi was 
~ithout councillors for three months in 1971 owing to a 
disputed election, no attempt was made to deal with the 
various petty disputes which occurred and the new councillors 
had quite a backlog to handle when they were finally elected. 
sorcerer and chief still retain their roles as 
executioner and judge, despite the other changes. Villagers 
.. 
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point out that the prison sentences imposed by the 
administration's courts are nothing compared with the 
punishments inflicted by traditional authority. Many 
26 
deaths are still directly attributed to the chiefs even 
though villagers say that nowadays the sorcerer can act 
without permission since the chiefs are no longer powerful 
enough to control them. Undoubtedly fear is the predominant 
element in people's attitudes to their leaders, regardless 
of the fact that their powers are said to be waning. The 
introduction of new authorities and practices has overshadowed 
the chief's role as peacemaker but has done little to affect 
the darker aspect of his judicial role. 
In theory, the chief possesses rights which make 
him virtual controller of the clan's economic resources. 
He controls the clan land; no land can be sold or given 
away without his permission, though the individual owners 
may allow friends and relatives the use of their plots at 
their own discretion. Day to day subsistence activities 
are not the concern of the chief but his functions as 
ceremonial leader impinge upon them. When planting their 
subsistence gardens, people must take into account the 
chief's demands for vegetable foods for his feasts. If a 
very large e~ent is planned, the chief can require the clan 
to prepare a special garden to be set aside for the purpose. 
Coconuts and betel nut, which are important items at any 
ceremonial occasion, were subject to strict restrictions in 
the past. The chief could pldCe prohibitions, enforced 
by magic specialists known as the kaiva kuku, on the use 
of tree crops which, according to informants, might last 
for a year or more. 
Domestic animals - pigs, fowls and dogs - can at 
any time be demanded by the chief for a feast. No man can 
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kill a large pig without first consulting his chief, even 
if there is no feast inuninent. Hunting is also subject 
to control. All large game should be presented to the chief 
so that it may be smoked and kept in readiness for a 
future feast. Small game like birds or rodents may be kept 
by the hunter, but he is courtesy bound to offer the best 
part of his catch for the chief to eat with the men assembled 
with him at the ufu. Fishing is permitted at any time in 
the river but is restricted in ponds and streams; no man 
may fish in these places, even though they are on his 
land, until the chief has given express permission to the 
whole clan. 
Traditional valuables, which consist in the main 
of feathers, shells and ornaments made of animal teeth, 
are not directly controlled by the chief. Nevertheless 
the wise man is said to present valuables to his chief 
whenever tm opportunity arises as a sort of insurance 
against future troubles. The chief is expected to protect 
those who give him especially generous and loyal support, 
discounting any criticisms made of them by others and 
refusing to allow their enemies to attack them through 
sorcery. 
In practice many of these rights have been allowed 
to lapse or are not fully exercised. Chiefs no longer 
impose taboos on tree crops. All hunting, except of wild 
pigs, is now unrestricted. Fishing is no longer controlled 
in Inawi, though some Aipeana clans maintain the old custom. 
Clansmen are still obligated to provide food and labour 
for feasts, but villagers state that the demands made on 
them now are much lighter than in the past. 'Mle chief's 
function as the controller of land is now of far less 
3ignificance than in pre-contact times, when land was 
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constantly changing hands through warfare and intra-village 
struggles. Today ownership is fixed and people refuse to 
part with their land permanently; the chief thus acts 
symbolically rather than practically as the 'guardian' of 
the ikupu land. 
One important chiefly function never directly 
stated as such but unmistakably implied in statements and 
reactions made in specific situations, is the ensuring of 
the welfare of the group by supernatural means. He is 
expected to ensure successful hunting and good crops: when 
crops fail or villagers are unable to secure game for their 
feasts, they do not blame sorcerers of another clan or 
village bur their own chiefs. The chiefs themselves often 
intimate that they are punishing the clan for some offence 
by spoiling crops or withholding game. Responsibility for 
protecting the clan against sorcerers from other groups 
also lies with the chief. 
When practice is separated from theory, it becomes 
evident that the chiefs play a far less prominent role than 
that described by informants. With no intention of deception, 
villagers do their best to impress upon an outside observer 
the dignity and importance of the lopia. 29 Chiefly office, 
in the abstract, symbolizes ideals and values which are very 
precious to most villagers. Nevertheless, at a more concrete 
level, people are acutely aware of the fact that their chiefs 
do not live up to the stated ideals. Fear of arousing the 
chief's anger does not allow much open discussion of the 
29 This is reflected in the idealized account of 
chieftainship reported by Hau'ofa (1971: 152-69), which 
was based on information gained during his first 
contacts wit_h __ t:J1~ __ peo1Jle __ o_f_Be~oa.._ __ 
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matter, but in private villagers bitterly complain of the 
chiefs' failure to play a more active part in village 
affairs. 
Though the chief is not responsible for organizing 
mundane daily tasks, he is expected to watch over and 
guide the activities of his clansmen, publicly reproaching 
the man who is too lazy to keep his house in proper repair, 
reprimanding another for letting his womenfolk go to the 
garden without proper escort. He is also expected to spend 
his free time at the~· so that he can discuss the day's 
affairs with his clansmen and offer them advice. Villagers 
say that this was the normal practice until only a few 
. years ago. Now the chiefs are rarely to be found at their 
ufu, and those who publicly offer advice and reprimands are 
the councillors or members of the church committee - the 
chiefs sit in their houses and remain silent. Deploring 
the present situation, people blame it not on changing 
circumstances but upon the moral weakness of the present 
lopia, whom they castigate as ignorant, lazy, selfish and 
irresponsible - a very mockery in fact of the ideal. 
Criticism thus goes much deeper than mere 
dissatisfaction with the narrowing role of traditional 
authority. People feel that the present incumbents arc 
chiefs in name only, claiming a title which is neither 
merited by their actions nor their personal qualiti@s. 
By evading their obligations to entertain strangers, by 
neglecting their ceremonial duties, by permitting tlwir 
clubhouses to fall into ruins, by avoiding their role <1s 
peacemaker and by demonstrating no interest in th£' d<1y IP 
day affairs of their clans, the chiefs are seen to rt'V<'ul 
a complete disregard for the welfare of their p<>opl<'. Nt>t 
only are they no longer trusted to act in the bps! int'",.,,,,. 
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of the group, they are actually believed to be opposed to 
them. The people of Inawi are firmly convinced that the 
failures of various recent economic ventures lies in the 
malicious opposition of the chiefs. Aipeana, which is 
currently the most economically progressive village in the 
area, is deeply suspicious of its chiefs' attitudes to this 
new development and fear of their jealousy and possible 
reprisals is rife. A sense of frustration and lack of 
achieve1 .. ~t pervades both villages. People hanker after 
the 'better way of living' which they see in the towns and 
are anxious to acquire for themselves its visible, outward 
signs - money, machinery, trucks, stores, electric lights, 
better houses and the like. The obstacles in the way of 
a swift realization of these desires are believed to arise 
from a deliberate check imposed by the chiefs. But in 
blaming the chiefs for this lack of achievement villagers 
are not implying that the traditional form of authority 
~nd leadership is inadequate to meet the new needs. The 
present incumbents, as individuals and in concrete situations, 
are objects of scathing criticism and at times contempt, 
but the validity of the institution of chieftainship is not 
questioned. Traditional authority, in the eyes of villagers, 
has not been weaken~d so much as perverted: the lopia still 
hold power but are misusing it. 
It would be naive to assume that the actual practice 
of chieftainship ever exactly coincided with the ideal; 
nevertheless villagers' claims that it was closer to the 
ideal in the past seern only reasonable. It is evident that 
the ideal is still highly valued and that the gap between 
it and reality is cause for bitter criticism, suspicion and 
distrust. If this degree of tension and strain had always 
been present, it seems unlikely that the elaborate ordering 
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of traditional authority could have survived the long 
period of contact - in many other similar societies the 
pattern of traditional leadership has been completely 
effaced: it seems far more probable that the existing 
tensions have been created by the process of change. 
Relations Between Kin 
The village branch of the ikupu controls the 
inheritance of rank, property and land, it regulates the 
marriages of its members and imposes obligations on members 
to support and obey its hereditary chief. Marriage within 
the ikupu is said to be forbidden but a few exceptions occur: 
of a total of 115 married couples in Inawi, nine belong to the 
same clan but there is not one example of a marriage between 
members of the same clan section. Residence after marriage 
is patrivirilocal, only four exceptions being found in 
Inawi. 30 The household is usually composed fa nuclear 
family which, when possible, has its own separate residence. 31 
The basic unit may be extended to include the immediate 
relatives of the head of the household - his widowed mother, 
unmarried sister, and married son or nephew and their wives; 
only rarely do more distant kin or the wife's relatives 
form part of the household. Married brother often share a 
house, as well as gardens and tree crops, but the house is 
usually divided by some sort of partition and the wives cook 
separately. Twenty-one brothers and their families share 
30 Figures are based on a household census I took of Inawi 
in 1971. 
31 The following description of household composition is 
based on data from the 1971 household census. Approximately 
two-thirds of the houses in Inawi are occupied by nuclear 
families. 
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houses in Inawi and two other families live with the widow 
and offspring of a deceased brother. In a few cases 
unrelated families share the one house. The actual 
composition of households comprising the clan reveal that 
the strict insistence in principle upon agnation seen in 
the genealogies is borne out in practice. 
Maternal kin have certain formalized rights and 
obligations to the individual at the time of his marriage 
and his death. Marriage into the mother's clan is also 
forbidden. 32 and maternal kin assist in paying bride-prices 
and share in their division, though they give and receive 
less than paternal kin. When an individual dies his 
clansmen must pay his mother's clan the unia afa, the 
bone price, for the right to bury his body in their land: 
this payment apparently symbolizes the rights of a clan 
over the offspring of its female members. Close maternal 
kin are expected to take a special interest in the individual 
and can be looked to to provide assistance and support in 
times of need. Men can approach their mother's clan for the 
use of land but because of its ready availability this is 
rarely, if ever, necessary. All Inawi men possess and use 
their own land, 33 though some may cultivate plots belonging 
to other people for it is a common practice for a man to 
ask relatives and friends to make gardens on his land if he 
has cleared more than necessary for his own needs. Widows 
using plots belonging to their deceased husbands are the 
32 Of the 115 married men in Inawi, not one had married 
into his mother's clan section, though seven had taken 
wives from a different section of the same clan. 
33 1971 household census. 
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only householders who depend on land which is not their 
own. 34 Relations with the mother's clan appear to be ruled 
by personal preference and choice rather than strict 
obligation. Williamson observed that though all paternal 
relatives are called by terms denoting blood relationship, 
maternal kin, apart from close relatives, were referred to 
as 'ekefaa', meaning 'friend' •35 This usage, which still 
applies today, seems to suggest the general attitude to this 
group of kin. 
Relations with affines are much more formalized 
and demanding. TWo continual sources of quarrelling and 
grievance between in-laws are bride-price payments and 
the payments made to the wife's clan when her children 
reach 'the age t.o wear clothes' . The bride-price in 
particular, since it usually involves a comparatively large 
exchange of valuables, pigs and cash, and may not be completed 
until the couple have been married several years, becomes 
a protracted, nagging cause of annoyance which often leads 
to mutual recriminations and sorcery accusations. 
-All those married into the clan, the ipa qava, have 
important obligations to provide labour for feasts held by 
th& chief of their spouse's clan. In the case of men married 
to women from the same village this duty causes no great 
hardship, but even ipa gava from distant villages are 
expected to assist at important feasts and many complain 
of their obligations for this reason. At feasts the ipa gava 
are always rewarded for their labour with a hearty meal and 
34 Ibid. 
35 Williamson 1913: 270. 
: 
I 
I 
_ _I 
: t· 
·'· 
'," 
,, j_ 
• 
• 
•• 
34 
they are treated in a friendly, joking fashion, but this 
surface heartiness covers an underlying resentment which 
is allowed full rein in the practices associated with 
death and mourning. Clansmen of the deceased treat the 
widow or widower as if he or she were responsible for the 
death. DJring the period of mourning, which lasts for 
several months or longer, the activities of the widow or 
widower are ruled by their in-laws, who impose severe 
privations upon them. 
The widower is forbidden all normal social intercourse; 
he is no longer allowed to go to the ~· nor may he visit 
friends and relations; being banned from gardening and 
other village activities, he is expected to seclude himself 
in a hut (gove) set apart from the rest of 
h d 1 ' h 36 ouses an to venture out on y at n1g t. 
black and is expected to fast rigorously. 
the village 
He may wear only 
Driven by the 
desire to avenge the death of their wives, many widowers 
are believed to seek out a practising sorcerer, offering to 
act as his assistant in return for help in obtaining 
revenge. In doing so the widower exposes himself to dangers 
and terrors that no ordinary man would face: the practising 
sorcerer is believed to be trafficking directly with the 
supernatural and spirit world, consequently he is shunned 
by the rest of society. 
' 
Though the widower's position is unenviable, that 
of the widow is much worse. She is confined for months in 
36 During my fieldwork there were no recent Inawi widowers, 
though there were several old men whose wives had died 
some years ago. These men continued to dress in black 
and to live apart from the rest of their family in a 
small gove, but were not excluded from village affairs 
in general. 
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the house where her husband died, being forbidden to go 
outside or to receive visitors: until express permission 
is given by the women of her husband's clan, she may 
neither cook, nor wash herself, and is dependant upon her 
female in-laws to bring her a little food and drinking 
water. Like the widower, she dresses only in black and 
fasts continually. Villagers quote examples of women who, 
widowed in their youth, refused to marry a second time for 
fear that they might have to suffer again the same confinement, 
starvation and ill-treatment at the hands of their in-laws. 
This is no exaggeration, judging by the harsh treatment given 
today to Inawi widows. Early in 1971 a young woman, 
pregnant, and with a child of twelve months, was confined 
in the house of her deceased husband; for two or three 
weeks her in-laws refused to bring her water to wash the 
child and she was allowed virtually nothing to eat, nor 
was she able to leave the house to fetch water or food. 
Finally, under pressure from the parish priest, relatives 
took charge of the child, but the women of the clan were 
adamant in refusing the widow permission to leave the house. 
The lot of the young wife who goes to live with her husband's 
parents is also an unhappy one. Mother-in-laws commonly 
treat and regard their sons' wives as little better than 
work-horses who will take the heavy load of domestic chores 
from their shoulders. A shrewish mother-in-law appears to 
be the rule rather than the exception and young wives expect 
little better, nevertheless an unusually difficult one is 
often the cause of early separations and of wives returning 
permanently to their own people. 
Relationships with all kin are ordered by respect 
for seniority of birth and age. The first born of a family 
is naturally accorded respect by the other members. 
36 
Bride-prices are divided on this principle, the father of 
the bride receiving a smaller share than his elder brothers 
and sisters. one calls the children of one's father's elder 
brother 'my elder brothers and sisters', though they may 
be chronologically younger. The principle which determines 
the position of the chief thus orders all relations within 
the clan from the nuclear family upwards. Old people are 
treated with respect: old men have considerable influence 
· l in the community as the younger men and chiefs consult them 
'.~ 
' on matters concerning traditional etiquette and practices. 
' ., 
... ~.J .. 
Being regarded as the preservers of traditional knowledge, 
old men are usually believed to have acquired some knowledge 
of harmful magic, which inspires fear in addition to respect. 
Economic Organization and Attitudes to Wealth 
Subsistence agriculture based on shifting cultivation 
is the primary occupation of the majority of villagers. 
In addition, most families earn a cash income from periodic 
sales in Port Moresby of betel nut and garden produce, and 
some make small quantities of sun-dried copra which is 
sold locally. 
The traditional system of land tenure and inheritance 
is still followed. Land is passed from father to son, the 
father distributing a portion of his land to each of his sons 
as they marry: on his death they inherit the land. Each 
~an possesses a number of small plots scattered over the 
area belonging to his clan. ownership of a particular piece 
of land is said to depend upon its having been previously 
cultivated by a direct agnatic forbear. Villagers explained 
that in the past members of the clan were allowed to cultivate 
as much of the clan land as they wished and what they 
succeeded in cultivating was regarded as their property. 
This process continued until all the land had been claimed, 
' 
37 
consequently various inequalities have come about: those 
whose fbre'tears cleared large areas of land and had few 
successors have plenty of land, while others whose forebears 
cleared fewer plots or had innumerable offspring have 
proportionately leas. Villagers agree that it is possible 
to sell land, providing the chief and other members of 
the clan give their approval, but they know of no one who 
has actually done so. No objection is made to relatives 
or friends being given the use of land for gardening 
purposes but permanent crops may not be planted. 
Overall there is no shortage of arable land, though 
some clans, owing to their past histories of migration 
and dispossession, have little in excess of their subsistence 
needs. No alienation of Mekeo land to private individuals 
or companies has occurred, apart from one block of freehold 
originally leased to the Hall sound Company in 1902 and 
later taken over, but never really developed, by Burns Philp. 
This land was bought back by the administration in 1962 
for re-distribution to villagers. 37 A block of 11,000 
acres, part of which has been leased to the Sacred Heart 
. . . 1 d 38 . M1ss1on, is Crown an • Various groups from three Mekeo 
and one Roro village claim this land, which separates the 
two tribes and was the object of constant fighting in the 
past. Though the administration would like to return most 
of it to villagers, as Bereina, the Roro village, is short 
of land, the Mekeo have opposed all attempts to have the 
area surveyed. Land was the main reason for warfare in 
pre-contact times and it has continued to be a touchy issue 
37 Kairuku Patrol Report 14, 1969-70: SUbdistrict Office 
File 34-6-2, 
38 Subdistrict Office File 34-6-1. 
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and the subject of endless inter-village disputes, despite 
the fact there is no shortage of it. 
The principal food crops consist of bananas and 
taro: in addition many varieties of indigenous and introduced 
fruits and vegetables are grown. Gardening and other daily 
chores are organized at the level of the individual household, 
assistance being sought from kinsmen and friends for tasks 
requiring extra labour. The women bear the brunt of 
subsistence toil, to them fall all tasks requiring constant 
daily effort: they prepare the ground for planting, plant 
the crops, tend and weed them: and since the daily diet 
depends on bananas, tubers and other garden produce, they 
must carry large quantities of food from their gardens which 
are usually two miles or more distant from the village. 
In addition to working in the garden, they must collect 
and chop firewood, fetch water, feed the domestic animals, 
cook, clean the house and its environs, and care for their 
large families. The men are responsible for house building, 
fence construction, clearing new gardens, hunting and like 
activities which are usually carried out in a group to the 
accompaniment of much merriment and frequent rests for 
refreshments and gossip. Though the energetic man finds 
plenty to occupy himself, the same cannot be said of the 
lazier onP.s and the leisurely activities of the majority 
provide a sharp contrast to the constant drudgery expected 
of the women. 
A weekly market is held with the coastal Roro. 
I'he traders, all women, exchange betel nut, bananas and 
other garden produce for fish, crabs and shellfish - cash 
rarely being part of these transactions. Purchased food 
items, apart from tea and sugar, are not part 0f the daily 
diet: tinned meat and fish, flour, bread, rice and similar 
~"'- --- ------------- ------ ---------- ---- -- ----
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commodities are only eaten on special occasions. Food 
crops grow rapidly and abundantly in the rich alluvial 
soil, and there are plentiful supplies of game and fresh 
water fish, consequently people see little need to pay for 
food when it can be so easily had 'for nothing'. 
Villagers' attitudes to wealth seem to reflect 
the natural abundance which surrounds them. Despite the 
careful ordering of rank and authority, men .i:e considered 
tohave equal opportunity to satisfy their material needs. 
Chiefs do have special rights to certain ornaments and 
building materials, but even they are not expected to be 
richer than other men - wealth is not the basis of their 
power. The principle is borne out in fact in Inawi: the 
richest men are not chiefs, nor could any corr~&pondence 
be found between chiefly rank and wealth. 39 
39 This conclusion is based on the 1971 household census. 
Land, coconut palms, betel nut trees, estimated cash 
income (from copra, betel nut and other local produce), 
domestic animals (pigs and fowls) and items such as 
bicycles, radios and shotguns were taken into account. 
No attempt, however, was made to question people 
concerning the amount of cash or traditional valuables 
(~ - feathers, dogs' teeth, shells etc.) they possessed, 
as such matters must be kept secret for effective 
bargaining on bride-prices and other traditional payments. 
sorcerers are said to amass large quantities of traditional 
valuables, and nowadays cash, as they must be paid for 
their services by all except the chiefs. A sorcerer is 
reputed to accept payments from the party who wishes to 
have a particular individual killed or made seriously 
ill, while at the same time accepting payments from the 
victim's relatives to cure him. Whether the victim 
lives or dies, neither party will dare to ask for their 
payments to be refunded. Since these matters are 
conducted in the strictest secrecy, it is extremely 
difficult to determine actually how much wealth a 
sorcerer amasses in this way. 
, 
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Few inequalities of wealth probably existed within 
the traditional system, since the level of technology did 
not allow of a great differentiation of types of material 
possessions. The introduction of a cash economy and access 
to European yoods has radically altered this situation. 
Inequalities of wealth and goods do exist now, though 
people choose to act as if there were none. There is a 
marked avoidance of conspicuous spending and behaviour: 
the man with a large cash income indicates it neither in 
his house, his clothes, nor the food he eats. Neighbours 
are quick to notice and condemn behaviour which flouts the 
convention of a common equality of material possessions: 
and those guilty of such a breach fear reprisals in the 
form of sorcery. 
PART II: THE PRE-CONTACT SOCIETY 
MEJ<EO society displays so intricate a pattern of continuity 
and change that no account of it can be given without 
reference to the past. Likewise, in the absence of any 
full study made at the time of contact, the only firm datum 
line is the contemporary society, and any discussion of the 
past naturally stems from it. A complete picture cannot be 
attempted: one must work back to scattered references and 
information - identifying change at one point, survival at 
another. Assisting in this process is the memory of living 
informants, who furnish detailed and lucid, often eye-witness, 
accounts of old customs and practices. Documentary evidence 
alone shows that the radical rejection of tradition 
40 
experienced by some New Guinea peoples has been avoided, 
40 For example. the 
people of Manus: 
1957. 
Purari of the Gulf of Papua and the 
Maher 1961: Mead 1961: Schwartz 
·• 
41 
' and that the former pattern of life haa neither been effaced, 
41 
nor blurred beyond recoqnition, by the intenaity of contact. 
The impreaaion of continuity is so strong, in fact, that 
one must guard againat carelessly assuming that all which 
is not ostensibly the result of outside influence, accurately 
reflects the habits of the past. 
The units of local grouping have remained 
substantially the same since 1890. The 1973 Village Directory 
officially lists fourteen Mekeo villages - Aipeana, Amoamo, 
Bebeo, Beipa, Eboa, Imounga, Inawabui, Inawae, Inawaia, 
Inawauni, Inawi, Jesubaibua, Oriropetana and Rarai. A 
government map prepared in 1890 marks the position of 
fifteen villages, twelve of which are identical with those 
42 
existing today. Three settlements - Auratona, Taina 
(Kaenga) and a second Amoamo (situated to the north-west of 
Inawauni) - no longer exist. Neither Auratona, which 
comprised only three or four houses and was virtually 
deserted in 1890, 43 nor the northern Amoamo are listed by 
Seligman: both presumably were abandoned by the early 1900s. 
d 1 . 44 . f Kajinga is referre to by Se igman: in ormants state that 
many years ago its inhabitants migrated to Inawauni. Two 
present-day villages - Jesubaibua and Imounga - are not 
marked on the map. Jesubaibua was founded shortly after 
41 All, for example, many features of the traditional ways 
of life in Busama village, near Lae, had become blurred 
even by the 1940s: Hoqbin 1951. 
42 British New Guinea Annual Reports 1889-90: Appendix Y: 
see Map 3. 
43 Ibid1 78. 
44 Seligman 19101 371. 
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1890, followinq miaaion and qovernment efforts to persuade 
Inawaia villaqe, from which the new settlement was an 
offshoot, to put an end to tribal warfare. 45 Imounga is 
not marked nor ia it mentioned by SP.ligman. Possibly Imounga 
was not at firat reqarded aa part of the Mekeo proper, 
beinq separated from Inawauni, the next northernmost Mekeo 
village, by more than six miles of rouqh, swampy country: 
references to it occur in patrol reports from 1920 onwards, 
but it was often omitted from maps even after this date. 
Differences, apart from those already discussed, between 
the villages recorded by Seligman and those listed in 
recent village directories arise from the fact that Alo 
Aivea, Ififu and Ngangaifua are now treated by the 
administration as parts of larger, neighbouring settle'ments. 
With only two exceptions, the existing villages are identical 
with those observed by Seligman. 
Likewise, little variation can be seen in the clan 
composition of individual villages. An intimate knowledge 
of each village is necessary, however, before its composition 
can be accurately determined. If one attempted to question 
people briefly concerning the clans in their village, the 
information elicited would be misleading and certainly 
different from that provided by Seligman. People may omit 
to mention smaller groups aa they are regarded as part of 
a clan cluster rather than separate entities. Sections of 
large clana may be quoted aa if they were independent 
~ntities: someone inquiring about the present clans of 
Aipeana would probably be qiven the names of Fua, Faila 
and Faguopa as if these were separate clans, when in fact 
they are the three sections of the clan Seligman refers to 
as Oala Aivea. 
45 BNG Annual Report• 1892-93: 16. 
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A detailed inveatiqation of the ikupu composition 
of Inawi, which aeems to be representative of the situation 
in other villaqea, confirms the initial impression that 
few chanqes have occurred since the early 1900s. Seligman 
states that Inawi was composed of eiqht clans - Waiaka, 
Paiapaia, Ongofoina Kipo, Ngangai, Okope, Ungo, Ipange and a 
group of people 'who practically speaking belong to Afai•. 46 
There are at present eleven ikupu - Oaisaka, Paisapaisa, 
Ogofoina Kipo, Afai, Gagai, Okope, Ugo, !page (Ugo), OUgo, 
!page (Paisapaisa) and Ogofoina Lopia Fa' a. The last three 
ikupu are not referred to by Seligman; it seems probable 
that two of them existed at the time of his investigation 
but were overlooked. Informants state that OUgo was founded 
before the Europeans came, and since it is a very small 
group associated with Ugo and very similar to it in name, 
it may have been accidentally omitted. Seligman includes 
only one !page: today there is an Ipage included in the 
Paisapaisa clan cluster and an !page associated with the Oaisaka 
cluster. Villagers believe that both groups settled in 
Inawi before the arrival of the government. Possibly 
Seligman treated 
villagers assert 
the two Ipage as one group, though 
• 
that they have different origins, one 
coming from Beipa and the other from Rarai. In any case, 
the numbers involved are so small that their presence or 
absence makes little real difference to the overall picture. 
Only two other changes have occurred. Okope, 
47 which in Seligman' a time was a small, weak group, has now 
died out. The only living descendant is a woman who is 
46 Seligman 19101 371. 
47 Ibidr 340. 
• 
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married into another ikupu. Though the original line is 
extinct, the clan is being perpetuated through adoption 
since it owns a large amount of land, a member of the 
Iso section of Oaisaka having been adopted into it as a 
child. One new group, Ogofoina Lopia Fa' a, has come into 
existence. Originally part of the Lopia Fa' a section of 
Oaisaka, the group broke away because of an internal 
dispute, moving to another part of the village and settling 
on land belonging to Ogofoina ikupu; the split appears 
to have taken place in the 1930s. Despite its comparatively 
large size, Ogofoina Lopia Fa' a has never really succeeded 
in establishing itself as an independent entity; it has no 
chief of its own, but recognizes obligations to the chiefs 
of both Ogofoina and Oaisaka. 
The appearance and physical layout of villages 
has scarcely altered, judging by the descriptions given by 
Seligman48 and Guis, 49 and the photographic plates which 
illustrate their works. At first glance, Inawi (or any of 
the larger villages) - its long, dusty village street lined 
by parallel rows of houses built from black palm, bamboo 
and thatch, and silhouetted against a green background of 
tall coconut palms and breadfruit trees - seems identical 
with scenes photographed sixty years ago. Only a scant few 
galvanized iron roofs - that ugly, ubiquitous symbol of 
progress throughout Papua - mar the initial impression. 
While the general layout of the village remains the same, 
48 Ibid: 312; Plate XLII. 
49 Guis 19361 17-19; plates facing pp.16, 17, 144. Though 
not published until 1936, Guis' work was based on 
material collected between 1894 and 1897: the plates, 
presumably, date from the time of publication. 
,. 
45 
closer investigation reveals that housing styles have 
changed but the difference is not immediately apparent to 
the outsider, as the materials used are still local 
timber and thatch. This is but one example of the dangers 
of too easily assumir.~ unbroken continuity with the past. 
Though the units of local grouping have remained 
stable, the total pop~lation was significantly smaller at 
the time of contact. The first official reports on the 
area wildly overestimated its population: MacGregor 
enthusiastically claimed a total of 10,000, with several 
villages comprising more than 1,000 inhabitants. 50 Even 
in 1895, the two largest villages were reported to have 
900 inhabitants each. 51 Figures provided by the Sacred 
Heart Mission are much more reliable, as immediately 
following the establishment of government control it 
placed priests and teachers in a number of villages: these 
resident representatives were keenly interested in the 
number of their flock and the rate of baptisms and conversions. 
Mission figures for 1895 give the population of the two 
largest villages, Beipa and Aipeana, as 615 and 386 inhabitants 
respectively -
statistics for 
figures 
1949. 52 
slightly under government census 
Available evidence indicates that 
the leV(!l of population remained more or less steady from 
the tim(• of contact to 1949. Pre-war government estimates 
50 BNG Annual Reports 1889-90: 80. 
51 Mekee Station Journal,Dec. 1895. 
52 Navarre, Notes et Journal: 141-2. Aipeana was recorded 
as having a total population of 424 and Beipa of 653 
in 1949. 9.lbdistrict Office File, Census and 
Statistics. 
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tend to be erratic, being based on a count of houses, 
or a rough count of heads of those present in the village 
at the time of a patrol: but apart from the initial 
exaggerations, the numbers recorded are less than the 
1949 totals, and patrol reports make no mention of any 
significant decline or increase. Since 1949 the total 
53 population has risen by seventy-five per cent. 
Relationships and obligations between kin appear 
to have been little different in the past - though evidence 
is fragmentary. The accounts of family life, marriage and 
death contained in Guis' La Vie des Papous indicate that 
observances of the various rites de passage were once 
54 fuller and more elaborate. 
The birth of the first child was the occasion of 
some festivity, a small feast being held for the women of 
the village, who came to sing and dance in honour of the 
new mother. This custom is no longer observed but the 
restrictions imposed upon a woman during her pregnancy 
continue to apply. She is forbidden certain foods and 
53 Figures based on Subdistrict Office File, census 
Statistics. Figures for each year are available from 
1949 onwards. Records of births, deaths and marriages 
kept by the mission for all villages since the 1890s 
contain the information necessary for a detailed 
demographic study of the Mekee. At the time I was in 
the field, another researcher, Mrs Barbara Hau'ofa, was 
working on this material. 
54 Guis 19361 43-85: 118-49. 
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may not wash in cold water; 55 following the birth she is 
considered to be 'dirty' (£!!!) and likely to contaminate 
others, hence she may not eat from communal dishes nor 
cook. For several days after parturition she is made to 
lie on a platform built over a fire; moat births now take 
place at the mission hospital, but when the mother returns 
to the village she still undergoes this ritual cleansing. 
The maleficient actions of sorcerers are particularly 
feared at this time; relatives and neighbours sit up all 
night, with lamps brightly burning, to ensure that no 
sorcerer dare approach the house. Sometimes, to keep 
themselves awake, the boys and girls sing a~d play their 
trade-store guitars. The relatives who keep this vigil 
must be fed at the expense of the family concerned but it 
is not considered necessary to kill a pig for them. 
No lengthy or arduous puberty rites were undertaken. 
When a boy assumed the perinea! band his father held a small 
feast. The feast is now omitted, but payments of pigs and 
traditional valuables must be made to the relatives of the 
mother of the child. Guis also refers to a ceremony 
celebrating the completion of a girl's tatooing56 but there 
SS At this time the woman's body is considered to be 
'hot'; contact with cold water and the consumption of 
foods classified as 'cold' are thought to be extremely 
dangerous to her. Her physical state is analogous to 
that of the magician who deliberately builds up heat 
(isapu) in his body by avoiding contact with all 'cold' 
things. See below:l07- 8. It seems that in the case 
of the woman, the act of parturition automatically 
generates the heat in her body. Normally, a woman's 
genitals are considered to be 'cold' and therefore 
sexual intercourse is forbidden to the practising 
sorcerer or magician. 
56 Guis 19361 85: Williamson 1913: 269, 
48 
is no trace of it today, tatooing having gone out of vogue. 
The life once led by unmarried youths provides a sharp 
contrast with the present. The carefree dandies depicted 
b . 57 h . . y Guis, w o spent their time in self-adornment, dancing 
and love affairs, have vanished from the village scene. 
Few gove, the houses specially reserved for bachelors, 
are built today, since the majority of young men are either 
away at school or exploring the excitements of town life. 
The mission has had a significant influence on 
~arriage customs. Plural marriage has virtually died out. 
The formal arranged marriage of the past, which was accompanied 
by much ceremony and mutual exchanges between the kin of 
h b d d 58 . t e ri e an groom, is now ignored in favour of a simple 
elopment, following which the boy's parents agree to pay 
the bride-price and settle matters with the girl's relatives. 
Elopements were not common in the past, being looked on as 
irregular arrangements: they appear to have gained popularity 
as a result of the mission's support of matches hindered 
by parental opposition. Previously young people had no 
choice but to bow to the wishes of their parents: the mission 
provided a new refuge and support - once a couple had been 
~arried in church, the parish priest would do all in his 
power to prevent them being separated. Today church weddings 
usually take place after the bride has spent some time with 
her husband's family and the union has proved to be stable. 
Except in a very few oases, the religious rites do not 
involve any feast or public celebration. 
57 Guis 19361 19-42. 
58 Ibid: 43-57; Bgidi 1912:217-29. 
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Though marriage takes place with little or no 
ceremony, it is usually followed by a period when the 
bride is excused from all physical work and appears in 
public only to display herself in traditional finery. 
She is first confined to the house and fed as much as she 
can eat, under which conditions her skin lightens and she 
soon becomes very fat; only then is she permitted to sit 
each evening on the verandah of the house, decked in all 
her finery. Neighbours come to offer their compliments, 
her sleek, well nourished appearance being considered a 
formal demonstration of the affection and solicitude shown 
to her by her new relatives. The exogamous rules governing 
marriage continue to be obeyed, as do those applying to 
'd f . 59 resi ence a ter marriage. 
Observances relating to death and mourning were 
. d . 60 Th . . h formerly more stringent an exacting. e mission as 
attempted to mitigate the more extreme customs and, to a 
certain extent, its efforts have been successful: mourners 
no longer cover themselves from head to foot with soot and 
ashes, instead they dress in black clothes; a widow is 
not shut up in a tiny hut built directly over the grave, 
she is confined to her house. custom has been modified 
but not compromised. 
The introduction of European goods and a cash 
economy has not yet radically altered the manner in which 
,9 See above: 31-2. Evidently the laws of exogamy have 
remained strong despite the efforts of the mission to 
support and legitimize unions between couples whose 
,.;Jegree of relationship is acceptable according to cannon 
law. See Egidi 1912: 217-29. 
6J Guis 19361 128-49. 
.. 
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the average villager satisfied his subsistence needs. 
Guis' description of everyday domestic chores applies as 
well to 1971 as to 1901 - the only noticeable difference 
being the time previously spent in the manufacture of 
tools, weapons and clothing. 61 Cheap trade-store goods 
have replaced the products of traditional skills, and 
most of the old arts and crafts are fast disappearing. The 
arrival of new possessions has reduced the time spent in 
handicrafts, steel tools have greatly lightened the labour 
involved in clearing gardens and felling timber; yet many 
tasks, particularly those performed by the women, have been 
little affected. Once women carried their water from the 
river in large gourds, today they fetch it in metal cooking 
pots - the actual labour involved is no different. 
More time was formerly devoted to feasting and 
ceremony, while warfare added another dimension to life, 
the actual nature of which can only be surmised. Regular 
trade took place with the coastal Roro, as it does today, 
and there were sporadic contacts with the mountain tribes; 
no ritualized trading complexes, such as those engaged in 
'' by the Motu and the peoples of South-eastern Papua, existed. 
·~ 
The present structure of leadership is immediately 
recognizable as the system observed by Seligman, though 
the rights and functions which he attribues to authority 
more closely resemble the ideal than present reality. A 
brief article by R.W. Williamson, published in 1913, provides 
additional evidence to show that villagers' statements 
concerning the former powers and grandeur of chiefly off ice 
~ 61 Ibid: 58-64. 
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, . 
are not fanciful exaggerations. 62 The great feasts of 
• 
former years are mentioned by both writers. The summary 
Seligman gives of a feast to terminate a period of mourning 
(umu pua) substantiates details provided by informants, 
presenting a clear picture of the lavish display, and the 
grand scale on which such events were organized. 63 Williamson 
outlines some of the ceremonies distinctive to the war 
chiefs:
64 
informants give fuller and slightly different 
details, but both refer to the amount of food involved and 
the elaborate nature of the festivities. It is evident 
that such occasions must have required, as informants claim, 
months, even years of planning and preparation: the brief, 
perfunctory affairs held today involve weeks spent in 
hunting and preparation in the gardens, followed by sever,_:il 
days of intense activity building platforms, collecting 
• large supplies of firewood, bringing food from the gardens 
and cooking. Clearly the chief's ceremonial duties put a 
far greater demand upon people's time and labour, and 
encroached far more upon their everyday activities. The 
chiefs' rights to impose food ~aboos are briefly mentioned 
b · 11 · 65 d l' 66 . th . . . y W1 iamson an Se igman: ne1 er mention restr1ct1ons 
over hunting or fishing but the survival of the old custom 
in some villages can leave no doubt that they existed. 
62 Williamson 1913. 
63 Seligman 1910: 359-63. 
64 Williamson 1913: 279-81. 
65 Ibid: 270. 
• 66 Seligman 1910: 314 refers to the kaiva kuku who policed 
the taboos. 
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The outward signs of rank and magnificence that 
once surrounded the chief - few traces of which survive 
today - are described in some detail by Seligman. He provides 
photographs and descriptions of the impressive and 
elaborately adorned clubhouses which the chiefs used to 
. . 67 f f . 
maintain - a ar cry rom the simple platform structures 
which now serve as clubhouses in most villages. He also 
discusses the special decorative devices which were the 
chief's hereditary possessions and might be used to adorn 
his residence; but no reference is made to the special 
building materials and siting which formerly distinguished 
. fl 'd 68 1 h 1 a chie y resi ence. On y t e opia were permitted to 
build their houses of afa (black palm) and opogo (a type 
of hard wood); commoners had to be content with flimsy 
structures of bamboo and thatch. A chief's residence was 
also set apart by its position, being built on an axis 
parallel to the village street; other houses were built 
facing the street. These rights and prohibitions have 
~ow been relaxed but not entirely abandoned. It is no 
longer possible to easily identify the house of a chief: 
even in villages where restrictions ate said to still 
apply. most people use at least a little afa on their houses; 
commoners do not employ the 'chief's position', but neither 
do the majority of chiefs, and the distinctive decorations 
have not been seen for many years. 
Some of the personal ornaments and insignia of 
chiefly rank are described by Seligman. He refers to the 
67 Ibid: 333-4; Plates XLIV, XLV. 
68 Ibid: 347-8; cf. Hau'ofa 1971: 162. 
----~ 
53 
uma pa'o, a necklace made of pigs' tusks, and illustrates 
the special lime pot and stick, faoga and lekeleke - all 
ornaments of the fa'aniau chiefs. 69 Villagers state 
that the fragments of bone and teeth which are affixed to 
the faoga are not animal bones, as Seligman alleges, 70 
but relics of ancestors; it is thus a potent source of 
supernatural power and is used as such at important feasts. 
The war chiefs, the .!!,!! experts and sorcerers have their 
own distinctive insignia. Some of these ornaments are very 
inventive and beautiful, in particular certain shell ornaments 
and strips of finely made net covered with intricate 
feather-work. Though these objects are still carefully 
preserved and treasured, they are not to be seen in public 
today, even on important occasions: villagers explain that 
the wearing of them is permitted only at very large feasts 
at which many pigs are killed, so there is now little 
opportunity for display. 
Perhaps most importantly, Seligman lends weight 
to claims that the lop!a formerly conducted themselves with 
a dignity and were treated with a respect and affection 
that has now been lost. The splendour of the great umu pua 
feast recorded by Seligman, the solemn, stately procession 
made by the chiefs of the ufu apie, the bearing of the 
hosts and audience, all provide a striking contrast with 
scenes from a contemporary umu pua: a carelessly dressed, 
straggling mob of villagers, accompanied by their chief, 
trudge down the middle of the village carrying food to the 
ufu apie; as they approach the clubhouse, shouting children 
69 Seligman 1910: 348; Plate XLVII. 
70 Ibid: 343, 
I 
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playing ball block and cross their path - no one makes 
a move to silence the children or rebuke them. Seligman 
stresses the dignified deportment of the lopia and the 
unusual degree of respect and affection demonstrated 
towards them: 
There is no doubt that among the Mekee clans 
there was a feeling of affectionate consideration 
for their lopia faa and a ready recognition 
of the pre-eminence of the families to which 
these chiefs belonged, that in many cases may 
be i~irly described by saying that the ikupu 
most nearly related to the lopia faa were 
intensely loyal to their chief. This naturally 
fostered a sense of dignity, importance and 
responsibility on the part of the faa chief 
71 which is quite uncommon among Papuasians, .•• 
Only two traditional authoritative roles are of 
functional importance today - that of the civilian chief 
and the sorcerer. The division of authority and 
responsibility was originally more complex. According to 
Seligman, the faia expert was responsible for ensuring 
the success of warriors in battle. 72 Informants contend 
that a specialist from the iso clan, the iso auga, who 
was usually the brother of the iso chief, devoted all his 
time to preparing protective and offensive magic for the 
war party, and that the powerful stones, spells and charms 
necessary were the hereditary possessions of the iso clan. 
The ~·s special importance is said to arise from his 
supernatural powers to have his own men killed in battle; 
his ability to foretell who would die in a raid and his 
71 Ibid: 343. 
72 Ibid:• 345. 
'· 
• 
' ·~ 
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effort• to aaaiat the aucce•• of the war party were of 
leaaer aignificanc~. He uaed his powers at the command 
of the lopia fa'aniau, to kill any man whom the chief 
wiahed removed. Like the uqauqa, he was an agent of 
supernatural power enforcing the chief's commands, and as 
such, he waa directly controlled by the senior chief, not 
the war chief. The difference between the faia and the 
uqauqa lie• in the meana by which they cause death: the 
faia's victims died in battle or by violent accidents, the 
sorcerer's by snake bite or some internal ailment. 
Villagers emphasize that the faia were feared far more 
than the sorcerer. 
The role of the war chief, in keeping with his 
military function•, waa the antithesis of that of the 
generous, peace-loving lopia fa'aniau. He was expected 
to be wild, fierce and bloodthirsty. Famous war leaders 
of the past are said to have acted like 'savage beasts', 
roaming the countryside alone seeking enemies to kill; 
invariably they are deacribed as being very hairy of body 
and face, a phyaical characteristic thought to be peculiarly 
repulsive. While aafety and hospitality were guaranteed 
to the stranger at the civilian chief's clubhouse, should 
he enter, by miatake, that of the war chief, he was 
immediately killed. 
Prior to the ceasation of tribal fighting, the 
war chief obvioualy played a prominent part. In peacetime, 
he waa responaible for a aeries of feasts to repay those who 
had been hi• allie• in war: he also gave feasts to celebrate 
the building of a new ,!!.2 clubhouse and the installation 
of an _!!2 chief. It might well be supposed that he was 
originally more influential than the lopia fa'aniau; but 
such an asaumption would be based on a misconception of their 
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relative role•. The fa'aniau chief was in ~Q sen•e merely 
the civilian counterpart of the war chief - ultimate authority, 
even for war lay with him. Informants •tress that the 
senior chief'• permis•ion had to be sought before the clan 
could engage in ho•tilities, moreover it was he who was 
responsible for terminating them and making peace. The 
war chief's functions thus were limited to that of battle 
commander. 
The primacy of the lopia fa'aniau is established 
in the myths which explain the origin of authority. He is 
not seen as sharing authority but rather as delegating it 
to subordinates, while maintaining for himself the controlling 
power. This hierarchical concept is strikingly illustrated 
in the simile of the five fingers of the hand used by some 
informants to explain the relationship between the different 
parts of authority. The informant, holding up his hand 
with the fingers straight and held together, points to the middle 
finger, the longest, saying that it r~presents the lopia 
fa'aniau, who is set above the others: the index and third 
fingers, which are below the middle finger and support it 
on either side, represent faia and the iso lopia, who are 
placed below yet asist the •enior chief; the little finger 
and the thumb •uggest the faia eke and the iso eke, who 
support the faia and the i•o and, through them, the fa'aniau 
- -
chief. 
Since the lopia fa'aniau symbolizes the beneficient 
aspects of authority, the traditional emphasis upon his 
primacy is also an affirmation of the essentially benign 
nature of authority. It i• impossible, of course, to know 
how the sy•tem actually functioned in pre-contact times, 
but the supremacy of the senior chief, in principle, is 
beyond doubt. 
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The present society is noticeably secretive and 
~epressive. People deliberately hide their real thoughts 
and emotions from each other, and are habitually suspicious 
• 
of what lies behind the public assertions of others. 
Rarely do serious matters spark off open violence: men 
who harbour the most horrible mutual suspicions can calmly 
sit down and converse together as if they were the best 
of friends - when people actually come to blows it is 
usually over something trivial. Competitive actions arc 
frowned upon: the man who is so imprudent as to out-do 
his neighbours in any way soon suffers from their jealous 
opposition. Harmful magic and sorcery are the means by 
which people seek revenge and dominance over each other. 
Behaviour of this kind is commonly regarded as typical of 
societies experiencing the strain imposed by contact and 
denied the free expression 
h 'b 1 73 t rough tr1 a warfare. 
of aggression formerly allowed 
Nevertheless, several features 
suggest that the avoidance of aggressive and competitive 
behaviour is not a new, but a traditional concern of Mekco 
society, which has perhaps been exaggeraced under cond1ti.irs 
r,: change. Indeed, when examined frorr this angle, the whr.!. 
system appears to have been stru~tureci to remove the 
. . . p::issibility of open compet1t1on and aggrc1;s1on, ex ··'P'' 1·1 
war. 
The traditional concept of authority is far 
removed from the highly competitive 'big-man' style of 
lea1ership found in many other Melanesian societies. 
The hierarchical nature of authority, the mythical 
·xplanatic1ns of its origin and its method of transmission, 
73 Kluckhohn 19621 115: Belshaw 1955: 6: Marwick 
1965: 221, 247ff. 
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all remove it from the arena of public contention. So 
important is this principle, that genealogies and historical 
accounts never even concede the possibility of political 
rivalry within the group. The relationship between the 
chief and his people does not depend upon the fashioning 
of a complex network of obligations and debts: unlike 
the 'big-man', the chief does not sponsor promising young 
men nor provide food and financial assistance to poorer, 
less influential men, in the hope of creating a coterie 
of dependents and s..ipporters. Obligations lie with his 
clansmen to furnish the chief with material goods, though 
these are used for communal ends. There is no element of 
a sponsor-client relationship between chief and people, 
the bonds linking them are kinship and family ties. For 
this reason there little opportunity open to the chief 
to extend his range of influence: he could not attract 
new supporters and spread his sway over a wider area ~y 
means of the competitive feast-giving and food exchange~ 
employed by some Melanesian leaders. 74 
Even in the past, feasts were organized on a 
reciprocal, not a competitive, basis. Though other guests 
were invited to important feasts, the major presentations 
of food were limited to one group, the ufu apie, who were 
obliged to reciprocate in kind at a later date. Informants 
observe that it was essential that there be enough food 
to lavishly entertain the ufu apie and other guests; but 
there was no intention to deliberately outmanoeuvre rivals 
by the munificence of gifts made to them, as was the case 
in competitive feasting. The principle of reciprocity appears 
74 For example, the Siuai mumis: Oliver 1955. 
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to have been developed to the point where each specific 
type of feast had, in a sense, a known 'price': so many 
pigs would be counted upon by the chiefs of the ufu apie, 
the singers and dancers would expect a certain number, as 
would the other guests. The chief who could not satisfy 
these expectations would not dare to hold a large feast: 
villagers aver that this is the reason elaborate 
ceremonies have been abandoned. 
The present manner of holding feasts justifies 
this view. Ceremonies have been ruthlessly stripped of 
former embellishments. A single pig and a quantity of 
vegetable food is considered sufficient today to present 
to the ufu apie on the occasion of an umu pua ceremony; 
the uncooked food is taken to the clubhouse of the ufu apie, 
the chief of the ufu apie speaks briefly to the principal 
~ourners, asking them to put aside their grief and resume 
normal life, and the whole affair is over in less than an 
hour. Villagers confess that the present observances arc 
tcio:en gestures rather than true feasts: some food is given 
to the ufu apie and the chiefs of the village are invited 
to partake of a meal together - that is all. Apparently 
nothing more is necessary to satisfy custom and convention. 
If competitive giving had been the central purpose of the';" 
f•rnetions, it seems unlikely that they would have followed 
this pattern of simplification and reduction. 
The traditional importance of the principles of 
reciprocity and equivalence is underlined by the existence 
of hereditary officials whose special function was the 
dividing of food at feasts - the aiva auga, the uve auga 
a,d the mafe afi auga. The duties of the aiva auga, who 
remains a key figure at any public feast, are crucial, for 
each guest must be given exactly what is deemed proper 
---~ 
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according to a complex ritual and etiquette. Deliberation 
over the division of food, even on an occasion for which 
only two or three pigs have been killed, usually takes 
up most of an afternoon or evening, and it is always done 
in public. Should a mistake be made, should a guest receive 
more or less than his rank merits, a sE\rious insult has been 
offered which in the past might have led to warfare. It is 
not necessary for every guest t~'!ie lacien down with gifts 
of food, what is important\ is that each publicly r~ceives 
I 
a portion in keeping with his rank Ind the part he played 
at the feast. 
• 
Mekeo society creates a social order in wh.i,.ch 
every man's share of worldly goods, rank and position is 
clearly and firmly fixed by custom. Each knows his 
entitlemt•nts and proper place: just as the chief's position 
is determined by seniority within the lineage structure of 
he clan, and hereditary succession, so ordinary social 
relationships between commoners are ordered according to 
seniority of birth. No ~pen defiance or challenge of the 
' •2stablished ~rder is tolerated. Fear of sorcery J.nd the 
supernatural ~owers of the traditional hold.: rs of authority 
_'reate an irr~sistible Social force compelling conformity . 
• 
?1blic competition and a~gression have no pluce in this 
S/stcrr., except 'in times of ':'ar. Yet secret rivalries 
\ ~ot only exist but might ~ven be said to be irstitutionalized. 
Feasts did have a c,ompetitive element, but not at 
tho public level of exchanges of wealth - covertly, they 
.J•2re trials of supernatural ikiw•,rs. Cnief ly guests and 
:v)sts fasted for months before important feasts to fit 
therrselves for the exercising of their powers. Each chief 
also called upon the aid of his sorcerer, who accompanied 
n1m to all impoPtant events, adding his powers to those of 
\ 
'• 
• 
' 
\ 
' I 
• \ 
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the chief. During the procession of the ufu apie chiefs, 
and ~hile the high-ranking quests were seating themselves 
in the clubhouse, a trial of supernatural strength was 
taking place as each tried to break through the protective 
magic of the others, causing them to faint or become ill. 
The most daring would take the seat next to the opogo -
the central carved post of the clubhouse - and if he 
succeeded in maintaining his position without collapsing 
or otherwise becoming indisposed, he had demonstrated his 
victory. In addition to the magic exercised on his behalf 
by his sorcerer, the chief carried on his person two 
important repositories of power - the lime pot, foaga, 
studded with the relics of ancestors whose spirits helped 
to defend him: and, hidden within his net bag, a special 
stone, ugauga kepo, combined with certain leaves and other 
• 
substances to activate its power. 
survivals of these practices can be observed today 
in a seemingly insignificant detail of behaviour. When 
men sit together on the ~ to gossip or partake of a meal, 
they carelessly drop in front of them the bags in which 
they carry ~~~ir lime pot, knife, betel nut and similar 
necessitiesJ. on feast days, when the chiefs and other 
high-ranking men are seated together, each deliberately 
places his b•g so that it stands between his body and his 
neighbour's bag, for on such occasions people carry with 
them powerful objects and protective charms. 
A ful~ battle of aupernatural powers is said to I still occur du~ing the installation of a new chief. At 
the moment when the old chief hands his aon the knife with 
which to ritually cut the akin of a slaughtered pig, all 
the sorcerers present gather around the young chief, 
testing their atrength againat his in a concerted effort 
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to overcome and kill him. The crowd always stands well 
away from the chief at this moment for fear of entering by 
mistake the field of power being directed against him. 
These ritualized expressions of secret competition 
strongly suggest that the underlying current of hidden 
rivalries and hostilities evident in the contemporary 
society was also characteristic of traditional society. 
Since an open competitive spirit was banned from all 
normal social intercourse, some other outlet, apart from 
warfare, was necessary. 
The values which are fundamental to the present 
society - the avoidance of public competition and aggression, 
the beneficient nature of authority, equality in relation 
to material goods and reciprocity and equivalence in economic 
dealings, the pre-determination of rank and position by 
birth - are traditional values. Being abstract entities, 
values, in a sense, are more impervious to change than 
actual behaviour.• People may be compelled to act in a manner 
directly opposed to their ideals but still preserve them, 
or they may choose a course of action, discovering only 
later that it leads to a contradiction of values. While 
the general configuration of Mekeo society remains much the 
sa~e as in the past, it is evident that the traditional 
system has been slowly eroded, reduced and simplified during 
the eighty years of contact. But though actual behaviour 
has been forced to yield at least a little to new 
circumstances, the traditional values and ideals have 
remained intact. 
.. 
' 
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CHAPTER 'lWO 
THE FIRST YEARS OF CONTACT: 'We didn't see 
these things ourselves, our fathers told us about them' 
.. 
THE Me~o's first dbntacts with Europeans are just beyond 
• I the reach of living memory. The oldest men alive today 
have heard eyewitness accounts of the events of the 1890s 
from their fathers and grandfathers. over several decades 
.. 
of telling and re-telling these accounts have become 
formalized tales which, nevertheless, display concern for 
accuracy and reliability. For those who preserve the 
histories, the knowledge passed on to them by their fathers 
is a truthful description of the recent past. 
Only a few men, perhaps one or two elders in 
each village, are considered by the rest of the community 
to be reliable sources of such information. Though the 
stories of the coming of the white man are known to almost 
everyone in the village, usually only those who are 
recognized to be authorities can be prevailed upon to tell 
them in public. The old men sometimes become flustered, 
their memories occasionally falter and they make mistakes 
whi~ are observed by the younger people, but their 
reputations as the most knowledgeable informants are well 
1 deserved in most cases. They distinguish carefully 
1 I attempted, of course, to collect traditions from 
as many informants as possible but invariably found 
that the fullest and most consistent came from the 
acknowledged authorities. In the case of the Mekee, 
it is not the number of traditions collected from 
each village, but the source of each that is 
significant. 
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between what they were told and what they themselves 
witnessed: they scrupulously refuse •.o go beyond the 
information which has been handed down to them. In reply 
to requests for further details on a certain point, they 
will admit the limitations of their knowledge, explaining 
that they have related all that was told to them and can 
2 
say no more. 
Certain villages are known to possess the most 
authori~ative accounts of particular incidents, as they 
played a leading part in them. Aipeana, for instance, is 
acknowledged to have the fullest history of the arrival of 
the government, while Inawi boasts the most elaborate mission 
history. One group will not tell a history which properly 
'belongs' to another: such knowledge is regarded in a 
decidedly proprietary manner. Essentially, each village 
is interested in recording only those events in which it 
directly participated. 
The purposes and viewpoint of the village history 
are, of course, very different from those of modern 
historical research. Since each village is concerned only 
with the events thattocj( place in its immediate vicinity, 
and mention is rarely made of what was going on simultaneously 
in other places, the historian would find it extremely 
difficult, on the basis of tradition alone, to build up a 
clear picture of the extension of European control over 
2 In this chapter two types of oral testimony are used -
formalized tales, which have a set content, and 
information given in response to specific questioning. 
See Vansina 1969: 27-30. Where the term 'tradition' 
is used, I refer to a formalized tale or tales. 
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the region. Even within one village, no single continuous 
narrative of early contacts exists: different topics -
the arrival of the mission, the appearance of the 
government, the activities of the first government agent -
are dealt with in separate stories which give few hints 
of the connections with other related events. The story-
teller, if he is carefully questioned, c~n usually explain 
the chronological order of the stories he knows but he does 
not do so voluntarily, and some he is unable to place. 
A set sequence of events and descriptive detail is expected 
by the audience but the histories do not have an absolutely 
fixed form1 3 recitations by the same teller on different 
occasions do not employ the same wording or phrasing and may 
omit certain elements or confuse the sequence. These 
variations do not inspire confidence in the accuracy of 
transmission. 
Yet the historian would be foolish to dismiss the 
traditions simply because they do not serve all his purposes 
. 
or satisfy all his standards. Their unique value, for him, 
is that they isolate the incidents which were of the greatest 
significance to villagers and describe the responses to them. 
If the most au~~oritative versions are compared with documentary 
"vidence, the general outline, and even the details {wh1'rc 
these can be verified) are shown to be accurate. Taken 
alone, the histories would prove very awkward to handle; 
an outline of the first years of contact, drawn from 
ccnventional sources, furnishes a conveni1!nt framework upon 
which they can be organized and evaluated. 
3 See vansina 1969: 22-3. 
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In view of the Mekeo's post-war reputation as 
an arrogant, aggressive, intractable people, their first 
meetings with the white man, as described in official 
reports and mission histories, seem unexpectedly friendly 
and peaceable. Villagers' experience of Europeans had been 
brief and intermittent prior to 1890. Being situated a 
few miles inland from the coast, they avoided all but a 
few of the many explorers, traders and missionaries who 
reached Y\Jle Island and the nearby coast during the 
nineteenth century. The flamboyant Italian explorer 
D'Albertis was probably the first white man to travel far 
enough inland to encounter them: he is certainly the first 
to leave an account of his experiences. 4 In 1875 he spent 
. 
several months on Y\Jle Island, making excursions to the 
mainland and to an inland village called Naiabui which was 
inhabited by a tribe distinct from the coastal people. 
There is little doubt that this village was Inawabui, the 
~ekeo settlement nearest the coast. Two LMS teachers 
were placed on YUle Island in November of the same year but 
were removed only a few months later, when fears for their 
safety were aroused by the murder in Hall Sound of two 
5 European naturalists, James and Thorngren. This early 
missionary activity had no direct effect on the Mekeo, 
though Chalmers visited the inland villages during the 
6 early 1880s. The Mekee was to become a catholic, not an 
LMS preserve. 
4 D'Albertis 1880, vol.I: 336-46: 358-60; 364-72: 
390-99. 
5 Chatterton 1969: 285. 
6 BNG Annual Reports 1889-90: 76. 
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Ten years after the LMS's fruitless attempts 
to establish a mission on Y\Jle, three representatives of 
a French catholic order, the Sacred Heart Mission, arriv~d 
on the island. The protests of the LMS forced the 
catholic~ to relinquish their foothold for a few months, 
but they returned in February 1886, quickly extending their 
activities to 
' 1 7 Th 
the mainland despite the opposition of their 
r1va s. e first expedition to the Mekeo was 
in November by two priests, Verjus and Couppe. 8 
undertaken 
Travelling 
overland by foot they reached Inawabui, where they were 
greeted enthusiastically and urged to stay. The next day 
they continued on to Eboa and Inawaia, discovering a large 
river which they reasoned must provide access to the coast. 
A few montha later the mouth of the St Joseph River was 
accidentally found in the mangrove swamps of Hall Sound. 
In May 1887 Verjus and Couppe made a second expedition to 
the interior, ascending the river in a canoe. Inawae, 
Inawi, Aipeana and Beipa were contacted for the first time, 
and Inawaia revisited. The missionaries were delighted 
to find so many rich, populous villages and were amazed 
by the cordiality of the welcome they received everywhere. 
The mission historian, Dupeyrat, describes their final 
departure, from Inawi, as 'une veritable marche triomphale' . 9 
Land was obtained at Inawi, but hopes of founding a station 
in the Mekeo had to be temporarily abandoned, as the 
resources of the young mission were scarcely adequate to 
deal with the difficultiea it was experiencing on Yule Island. 
7 Dupeyrat 1935: 87-115. 
8 Ibid: 119-27. 
3 Ibid: 124. 
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Many visits to the Mekeo followed these initial contacts 
and villagers began coming to Yule to call on the 
missionaries.
10 
During the 1880s a few prospectors also 
penetrated inland, but their numbers were not sufficient 
to disturb the friendly relations between villagers and 
h . . 11 t e mission. 
The first meeting with the government took place 
~ . in April 1890, when MacGregor made an official inspection 
of the region after receiving reports from the Sacred Heart 
Mission of a 'great feud' raging between several villages. 12 
MacGregor was elated to find an extremely fertile region 
supporting a large, concentrated population. The people 
appeared to him to have reached a higher stage of 
civilization than other tribes, practising neither cannibalism 
nor head-hunting, and possessing chiefs of real influence. 
Yet despite the evident wealth and power of most of the 
villages, they quietly acknowledged the government's claims 
to a superior authority without any attempt to try its 
strength first. MacGregor was able to conclude a formal 
,, 13 peace with several v~la~es in May; by December a 
government station was being built between Beipa and Aipeana. 14 
10 Navarre, Notes et Journal: 29-30. 
11 BNG Annual Reports 1889-90: 76; Dupeyrat 1935: 132-3. 
In regions such as the Lakekamu goldfield clashes between 
prospectors and villagers appear to have been frequent. 
See Nelson 1973. 
12 BNG Annual Repccts 1889-90: 13. 
13 Ibid: 91. 
14 Mekeo Station Journal, Dec. 1890. 
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Bi•hop Verju• of the Sacred Heart Mission acted 
as guide and interpreter during MacGregor's first tour of 
inspection, introducing him to the people as their 'Grand 
Chef' •
15 
MacGregor attempted to impress upon the local 
leaders that he repre•ented the highest authority in the 
land, the government, and explained that all tribes must 
t d t f d 1 . . 16 h h . d pu an en o war are an 1ve in peace. T oug ra1 s 
had taken place just before his arrival, he wa• received 
peacefully in all villages including tho•e involved in the 
recent hostilities. The large villages on the western 
bank of the river - Aipeana, Amoamo, Beipa and Inawi -
treated the government party in an openly friendly and 
20-operative manner, and their chiefs readily agreed to 
obey the government's wishes. Observing the influence 
wielded by the local leaders, MacGregor hoped it would be 
possible to work through them. Maino, the chief of Aipeana, 
had made a particularly favourable impression: his 
intelligence, influence and obvious support for the government 
seemed to promise much for the future. Before MacGregor's 
departure, Maino addressed a large crowd assembled at Inawi, 
urging the people to obey the government and make peace 
among themselves. 
Not long after leaving the area, MacGregor received 
i word that Rarai, one of the villages concerned in the recent 
troubles, had been attacked by a northern neighbour and 
was urgently appealing for the government's protection. 
Anxious to use this opportunity to consolidate his initial 
' 15 Dupeyrat 1935: 175: BNG Annual Reports 1889-90: 76. 
16 The following account is based on BNG Annual Reports 
1889-90: 76-80. 
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effort• to .. k• peace, he returned to deal with the aituation 
pereonally. 
The fighting that had broken out juet before the 
firet tour of the dietrict centred around two village• -
Inawaia, on the • .. tern bank of the river, and Rarai on 
the weetern bank. Inawaia had raided Inaw&bui, killing four 
or five people, while Rarai had been attacked by two of 
its neighboure, Amoamo and Beipa. MacGregor had vieited 
all the villagee involved in the fighting, warning them not 
to initiate further hoetilitiee. Beipa and Amoamo agreed 
to make peace but argued that Rarai would not do eo until 
revenge had been taken for the defeat euffered at their 
hands. Likewiee, Inaw&bui explained that though it would 
welcome peace, Inawaia would not reet until it had eettled 
the score for a previoue raid. The very day after MacGregor 
visited Rarai, it wae attacked by a eecond Amoamo to the 
north. 
MacGregor wae determined to uee force if 
neceesary, to eettle mattere. Muetering a party of eighteen 
men, including thirteen Europeans, he proceeded to Aipeana 
where he wae met by the chiefs of the eurrounding villages, 
anxious to aeeure him that they had taken no part in the 
fresh outbreak of fighting. 17 The chief of Rarai arrived 
the following day and explained that if MacGregor would 
approach Amoamo on Rarai'• behalf, peace could be made, for 
the score between the two village• wae now eettled. 
Accordingly MacGregor and hie party marched north to the 
new Amoamo which had not been eighted on the first visit. 
17 The following account i• based on BNG Annual Reports 
1889-90: 87-91. 
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Alfu, the chief, calaly accepted NacGreqor'a d-.nda and 
though too ill to -ke the journey himaelf aent aeveral 
of hia men to neqotiate with the chief of Rarai. Peace 
on the weatern bank of the river waa achieved without ao 
much aa a ainqle ahot or arrow being fired. Before leaving 
the di1trict, the government party viaited Inawaia and 
Inawabui, warning them not to attempt to break the peace 
which had been agreed upon by the other village1. 
The achieve.~enta of the aecond expedition had 
been gratifying but MacGreqor waa aware that they would 
be of no laating aignif icance unleaa a permanent repreaentative 
of the government could be placed in the diatrict. Within 
a few month• a Mekeo government agent waa appointed; by 
December a 
was nearly 
atation, built on land 1old by Maino of Aipeana, 
18 
completed. 
Villager• enthuaiaatically co-operated with 
Charles Kowald, the government agent, during his fir1t 
few month1 in the di1trict. He had more labourers than he 
~0eded to a11i1t with the con1truction of the station, as 
not only local villager• but people from a1 
~otumotu and Leae in the Gulf cmne to offer 
·• 
The local chief 1 encouraged their people to 
far away a1 
h . . 19 t e1r serv1ce1. 
work for Kowald 
by making a 
. 20 
station. 
point of themaelves a11i1ting with ta1lt1 on the 
A band of Aipeana and Beipa men and their chief 1 
always escorted him when he toured other village1, acting as 
18 Melteo Station Journal, Dec. 1890. 
l9 Ibid: 31 Dec. 1890. 
~ 20 Ibid: 1ee for example entrie1 for 11, 18, 30, 31 Dec • 
.. 
• 
. 
21 hi• henclllen. 
ror more thara •ix month9 he encountered no 
oppo•ition what•oever, but in June 1891 •iqn• of 
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22 underlyinq ten•ion• in certain villaqe• bec: .. e plain. 
A court ca•e over theft• froa the •i••ion had been held 
at In-ae in May. A fw W..k• later Kowald received vord 
from the mi••ion that more thefts had been c:om111itted at 
Inawae: when he att..pted to enter the villaqe to arre•t 
the culprits, he and his ... 11 band of Aipeana men were 
driven out by araed warriors. Pollowinq i11111ediately upon 
this incident, a party of prospectors travelling inland 
were menaced by Rarai and forced to return to the station 
to seek assistance. Kowald escorted the three prospectors 
back to Rarai, recovered aOllle property which had been stolen 
from them, and •aw that they were allowed to continue 
their journey without further harassment. Though matters 
had been easily •ettled at Rarai, Kowald decided not to 
attempt to deal with Inawae unti~ he had a larger force 
at his command. 
Piqhtinq between Inawaia and Inawabui erupted 
late in August. MacGreqor left Port Moresby on 1 september 
. 23 for a routine inspection of the district. At Y'Ule Island 
he learnt from Bishop Verju• that Inawaia had attacked 
Inawabui a few days before, killing nine or ten people, and 
was now boaatinq that it would destroy both mission and 
21 BNG Annual Report• 1891-921 90: Mekeo Station Journal, 
June 1891. 
22 The followinq ia ba•ed on Mekeo Station Journal, May, 
June 1891. 
23 The followinq i• ba•ed on MG Annual Report• 1891-92: 
15-20. 
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qoverment if they tried to interfere. aaapectinci that the 
new outbreak of violence had been inapired by In_, .... 
defiance of Kowald in .Jlane, MacGregor decided to deal with 
it firat. Only a brief reaiatance waa offered1 warrior• 
lined up aa tha qover1111ent party entered the villa9e but 
they fled when one of their number, who had raced forward 
brandiahing hia apear at MacGreqor, waa ahot in the le9. 
Eboa, which waa alao involved in the conflict, waa handled 
next. A great feaat waa in progreaa when MacGreqor and hia 
men arrived but, deapite the large number of fully armed 
warriora preaent, no fighting took place. People beqan to 
run in all directiona and only aix of the fugitive• could 
be captured. TWo daya later MacGregor marched upon Inawaia, 
to find it deaerted. 
Biahop Verjua then approached the three defeated 
villaqea in an attempt to cal.Jn them and perauade them to 
accept the 9overnment'• terma. He reported to MacGregor 
on 19 September that he waa aatiafied they were ready to 
make peace. The following day MacGregor left the diatrict. 
On reaching the coaat, he aent back aome of hia men to make 
a aurpriae attack on Inmwaia by advancing from the eaat, 
travelling up the lthel River and then overland from 
Inawabui. Aaaiated by a large force of Inmwabui men, the 
party attacked Inawaia but aucceeded only in capturing 
a few priaonera - the re1t of the inhabitant• eacaped into 
the bush. 
For 1011e time all available govern11ent force1 
were kept in the diatrict again1t another outbreak of 
fighting. A further claah with Inmwaia occurred a few 
weeks later when a party of government officera, patrolling 
the villagea on the eaatern bank of the river, accidentally 
came upon an enc : int of Inawaia warrior1 hidden in 
• 
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24 
the buah. In the brief atru99le that followd two lnawaia 
men were injured and one killed - the firat and only death 
25 to occur duri119 the CJOYern.ent'• 'peac ... ki119'. 
Kowald received word frOll liahop Verjua in 
26 November that lnawaia viahed to aee him to make peace. 
Thouqh Kowald vaa diatruatful of Inavaia'• real intentiona, 
and wa1 loath to be placed in a poaition where he had to 
depend ao heavily on the •iaaion, he realised that he had 
little hope of directly approachinq the people after the 
recent violent claahr reluctantly he accepted the bi1hop'a 
27 
offer to mediate. Deapite hia •iaqivinqa, he waa received 
~uietly and reapectfully at Inawaiar he aa1ured the people 
~hat the qover11111ent had no wiah to puniah them further and 
told them to r•turn frOll the buah to their homea. When 
MacGreqor inapected the diatrict in Dec,..'Qar, he found that 
..... --...... 
a mi11ion teacher had been placed at Inawaia anc: that part 
24 
25 
Ibid1 21. 
Dupeyrat'1 (19351 19') claim that there were ii8uelque1 
tue1' durinq.the September attack on Inawaia II not 
borne out by the official report1 • 
• 
.. 
26 Mekeo Station Journal, Nov. 1891. 
27 Dupeyrat'1 (19351 194) account of the peac ... kinq~d 
the event1 leadi119 up to it are not con1i1tent with the 
official reporta. He a11ert1 that after the attack by 
Inawaia,• the qover1111ent party had b9cn'torce4~ retreat 
down river to the coa1t and that Kowald, the ~vernment 
agent, would not return to the Mekeo Station until Bi1hop 
Verju1 prepared the vay for him. Accordinq to the 
qovermient report1, the party returned to t.~ 'lekeo 
Station where Kowald later received word ft011 Biahop Verju1 
that Inawaia waa ready to make peace. ~ld vent to 
Yule I1land to di1cu11 .. tter1 with the bi1hop and finally 
aqreed to follow him up river to lnMfaia. BllG Annual 
Report1 1891-921 2lr Mlkeo Station Journal, Nov. 1891. 
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of the vill..,. .,.. buildint a .,.. .. ttl...,..t called 
28 Jeaubaibua - 'the peace of .Jeaua' • 
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The CJOVernment .,.. to encounter no further 
reaiatance. Control had been achieved with the •inimw. 
of difficulty. The initial atte11pta to ll&Jte peace in April 
and May 1890, and the buildint of the CJOV•rrment atation 
in Nov911ber and Decellber, .. t no oppoaition. Many villa9ea 
• • ll!lllediately dellonatrated their friendahip and support. 
Other•. which atill had account• to aettle with their 
enemiea, reaented MacGregor'• inaiatence that they !lake 
peace, but they liatened reapectfully to hi• d .. anda and 
ahowed no overt hoatility. The people'• firat reactiona, 
therefore. do not au99eat that they reqarded the qoverrment 
aa an invader or an ene11y. 
The outbreak of fi9htin9 in 1891 wu not an 
IEt.npt to deatroy or drive out the 9overn-nt and waa 
confined to three villa9ea. The brief reaiatance made by 
villa9era waa defenaive not offenaive, and too'k place on 
home 9round. Yet the outbreak de11enatrate• that the people 
did not timoroualy or paaaively accept the 9overrnent aa a 
force too atron9 to reaiat. Some villa9•• had welcomed it 
in it1 •elf-appointed role of peacemaker, other• did not: 
their acceptance waa to be on their own terma and not merely 
those of the 9overrment. Jtarai waa forced to capitulate 
followin9 it• defeat by the northern Allo...o: but Inawaia had 
not been militarily weakened and waa •till deterained 
to exact ita revenqe, even thouqh thia involved it in a 
conflict with the 9overrment. 
Thou9h MacGreqor waa pleaaed with the reaponae 
of Inawaia and the other• to their chaatia ... nt, he felt 
28 BNG Annual Report• 1891-921 20. 
• 
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it be•t to Jll'OC••d c•tioualy. Kowald wu in•tructed not 
to atta11pt to extend hie control but to concentrate effort• 
29 
in the llakeo. llow a permanent peace h.s been achieved. 
JCowald re8\19ed the taek of eceu•to11in9 villater• to the 
routine func:tione perfo~ by the 90verN1ant. Hi• fir•t 
ta•k wu to davi .. a .. thod for deali119 with internal 
diaputea and crimar the 8ec:Ond wu the enforci119 of the 
burial reCJUlation•. 
Villa9er• already had .oma experience of the 
role the CJOV•rNlant .. ant to play in relation to 1., and 
order. J<ovald held the fir•t court ca•• in April 1891 
over a di•pute at Aipaana c•eed by the victim of a theft 
JO burninq down the thief'• hou•• in retaliation. More than 
2,000 people qathered to watch the proceedinqa. which 
Kovald deliberately .. de u illpre•aive a• po••ible. 
Villaqera aoon bee ... uaed to hi• intervention in •uch 
matter•. They were •o U•iduou• in reporti119 crime• by 1893 
that he vaa forced to tell them ha could not deal with 
offence• coi.itted before the 90ver1111ant • • arrival in the 
diatrict.
31 
The .. n of leipa and Aipaana enerqetically 
asaiated J<ovald in ll&kinq arreata and owinq to the .. all 
number of police at hi• di•poeal he had CJOOd reaaon to be 
grateful for their help. 32 
29 Ibid1 22. 
30 Mekeo Station Journal. Apr. 1891. 
31 Mekeo Station Journal. Jlay 18911 BlrG Annual Reporta 
1892-9]1 37. 
32 Mekeo Station Journal, 24 Jan., Mar.. Jl May. Jl JUly. 
Auq. 1893. In 'lllCJU•t Jowald reported he had only tvo 
armed men on the atation. le• al•o lllG Annual Report• 
1893-941 43. 
' 
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lapid profr••• .,.. aleo ~ in enforcinq the 
rec)\llatione which required that the dead be buried in 
c .. teri•• ••t 9PU't from the vill..,e. Sldaulatione and 
a11ceta were neceeaary at firet, but within a ehort ti .. 
chief• were reportinq culprit• free their own villaq•• and 
co-operatinq in their arreet. 11 
-Kowald'• 
the .. initial objectivee, 
next tuk wu to cut a network of roade linkinq the 
Mekee villaqee with each other and the coaet. ll.lch of hie 
time durinq 1893 and 1894 wae epent in eupervieinq road 
J4 c~arinq. Paid for their labour in tobacco, villaqere 
worked willinqly1 even when rec)\llatione were paeeed which 
• 
compelled villaqere to clear and aaintain tracke in their 
]5 
vicinity without payaent, there wu little proteet. 
MacGreqor coneidered roade illportant not aierely to facilitate 
adminietration of the dietrict but aleo to prepare the way 
]6 for econo11ic 4evelop19nt. He optimietically looked 
forwair;d to a time in the near future when villaqere could 
be pereuaded to uee their rich lande to produce crope for 
export. With MacGreqor' • encouraq•ent, Kowald devoted a 
9reat deal of time and effort to developinq the Mekeo 
Station ae an experimental nureery for many different typee 
33 Mekeo Station Journal, Auq. 1893. Mac:Greqor reported 
in May 1893 that the ban on villaqe buriale wu 'eo nearly 
accomplished that there ie """' no likelihood of ite beinq 
attended with any eerioue reeietance.' Deepatchee1 
Britieh llew Guinea to the Governor of Queeneland, vol.21 
498. See aleo lllG Annual Report• 1892-931 51. 
34 Mekeo Station Journal, Sept., Oct., Nov. 1893. 
35 Mekeo Station Journal, llay, June 1895. 
36 Deepatchee1 lritieh llew Guinea to the Governor of 
Queeneland, vol.21 498. 
------------------------------------------------ --------------~~ 
37 of tropical produce. 
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Liu the CJOYermient, the IAcred Heart Miaaion 
'l'lickly conaolidated it• poaition. The firat •i••ion 
38 atation vaa founded at J~i late in 1890, vhile the 
gover..-nt 1tation va1 bei"9 built near Aipeana. ly 1894 
the Inavi •i11ion boa1ted a fine church, two 1chool1 and 
a •taff con1i1ting of a prie1t, a brother and two nun•: 
two 8111aller 1tation1 h.t been 1tarted at leipa and 
39 
Jeaubaibua. Only thr .. y.ar1 later there were •i11iona 
in ten Mekeo vill&991 and conver•ion1 totalled 861. 40 
In contra1t to the UU, the Sacred Heart Mia1ion relied 
as little &1 po11ible on Polyne1ian or local teacher1, 
manning it1 e1tabli1hllent1 vith luropean •i•aionarie1. 
Strong empha1i1 V&I placed on education from the very 
beginning and a1 each 1tation opened, a village •chool waa 
·1 41 bu1 t. 
The •i11ion h.t play.d a vital part in llllOOthinq 
~he way for the government. If MacGregor and hi• police 
:,ad arrived unannounced and unexplained in an area which 
had had no experience of luropeana, or only violent contact• 
with them, the reepon1e might have been very different. 
The dependence of the government on the •iaaionariea' 
37 Con•tant reference• are llade in the 1tation journal to 
Kowald'• exper.iJlent1 with different cropa1 Mekeo Station 
Journal 1890-96. See alao BNG Annual Report• 1892-931 37. 
39 Dupeyrat 19351 182-3. 
39 Navarre, Note• et Journal1 116-7. 
40 Ibid1 142-3. 
41 Dupeyrat 19351 402. 
7t 
influence w ..... ,. II :11etrated in the peac:..Ui"9 with 
Inawaia in lMl. ""9 ~nt placed only one 
repreMntatiYe in the diatrict, while the aiaaion aoon 
had repreMntativea in a•.,.t eYery villa1Je. ..turally 
villa1Jer• deYelasi111 cloeer relationahipe with their pari1h 
pri••t- who •poke their i.n.,u..,., lived in their villDCJ9 
and concerned h'-elf with the •inuti .. of their livea -
than with the toYer .... nt .,eat. ltovald plainly re .. nted 
the •iaaion'1 preative and their perv .. ive control, which 
42 he felt detracted fraa hie own aathority, Mia1ion 
activity on the Jlltkeo plain bee: ... a .. tter ot routine by 
the late 1890a. 
ltovald'a death in Deceaber 1896, fre11 injuri•• 
received when a atick of dyn .. ite exploded in hi1 hand 
cilrinq an expedition to the Gulf, 43 diarupted the 1teady 
proqreaa achieved ainc:e lMl. Hi1 audden removal •e-d to 
shake villaqera' confidence in the qovernaent, and a 
succe11ion of leaa able replace .. nt1 did little to reaaaure 
them. When Br ... 11, Kowald'• 1ucce1aor, arrived at the 
Mekee Station in January, he found villaqe1 deaerted and 
rumour• rife that the CJ0¥9rnaent had come to an end and 
44 
all -re frff to do aa they plea .. d. The chiefa of Beipa 
and Aipeana, who had been Kowald' a ataunch 1upportera, 
reported that their .. n refuaed to work on the road1: the 
s•ght of Br ... 11 aarchi"9 into the village with hie police 
soon induced the people to work, but other diaturbancea followed, 
42 See for exaaple Jlekeo Station Journal, Nov. 1891: Mar., 
Auq. 1895: 23 Apr. 1896. 
43 BNG Annual leporta 1896-971 xiii. 
44 Ibidr 62: llakeo ltation Journal, Jan, 1897. 
IO 
One of 1r-.11 • • police vu ... ~lted at Aipeana 
in Jlerch. -.Ml tbere .. re llOre proteete frOll other villACJe• 
aqainet road "°rk.45 ftw people'• une .. ineee turned to 
panic a f.., weeke later when 8r-.11 atte11pted to recruit 
carrier• to CJO to l'ort Jloreeby. 46 ftw chiefe of Aipeana 
and Inwi llMACJed to brinv eixtffn •n to the etation to 
•iqn on •• recruit• but tbe .. jority of villac,ere, fearinq 
that they would be taken by force, fled to the bueh. 
ar-.11 wu COllpelled to •ll•nd the next f- weke tourinq 
the diatrir.t atte11pti119 to pereuade the llekeo and eoaetal 
47 tribe• to return to their villac,ee. 
On occaeione ICowald had experienced difficulty 
in obtaininq bearer• and 9ettinq road work COlllpleted. 
In Auquat 1895 he had had to put five of the principal 11en 
_) f Inawaia in irona before villaqera would aqree to act 
as carrier• to Inwabui1 the .... attitud~ waa taken at 
Inawabui until people learnt whet had occurred at Inewaia. 48 
rhe pari•h prieat of Jeeubaibua warned ICowald in May 189& 
of a threatened 'revolution' if the r9911lation• concerninq 
49 
road work were put into force. JCowald ca111ped for a niqht 
i:. the villac,e and the next day every .. n waa out workinq; 
as there wae no further trouble, JCowald :oncluded that the 
~rie•t had panicked over a trifle. Several •inor diaturbancea 
4) Mekeo Station Journal, Jler. 1897. 
4 ') Ibid1 May 1897. 
47 Ibid1 June 1897. 
48 Ibid1 Au9. 1895. 
49 Ibid1 May 1196. 
11 
Md occurred duriDI lfaWeld'a time but he wu alwys able 
to aettl• t.IMm quickly and without fuaar vill ... ra 
evi .. ntly accepted bia .. tbority and "'9re prepared to 
co-operate with hill. 
Purther rapereuaaiona frC111 ar ... 11•a clUllay effort• 
at labour reervitint wre felt later in the year. lteporta 
wre received in l'art llDreaby in leptember of an 1-inent 
• • 
attack on the CJOV•rnment atation by all the Mekeo 
so 
•orcerera. A lar99 force of police waa aent to the 
Mekeo and thirty aorc:erera .Mre arreated. The cireu•atancea 
1urroundincJ thia incident are far frClll clear 1 the atation 
Journal for the month• concerned ia •iaai119, and ao event• 
mu•t be reconatructed frClll the annual report for 1M7-98. 
It appeara that reaentllent over ar ... ll'a actiona in May 
wa• atill .-oulderin9 and that there had been talk of 
reven9e. Winter, the aetint ~iniatrat~r, toured the 
d1•trict in December and January, reporti"9 that there waa 
no rebellion afoot and that certain officer• had acted 
Sl raahly in arreatin9 the thirty aorcerera on little evidence. 
ar ... 11 wu replaced by c.w. Monckton in May 
1898. 52 Four month• later A. Guilanetti took char9e of 
the atation1 like hia predeceaaora, he found v4llagea 
deaerted on hia arrival and it waa aCllle ti.lie before he could 
SO BNG Annual Report• 1197-981 86. 
51 Ibid1 xv. 
52 Ibid1 19. Acf:prdint to Monckton, 1r ... 11 wu an 
accountant anti hie aervie•• wr• needed in Port 
Moreaby by the Treaaurer. Monckton 19211 113. 
pin the people'• coafidenc1. 51 
• 1 are of MIOther •revolution' epread in 
lloumher ltol, after Guil1-etti vu found ehot deed in tti. 
hou1e of the U. •ieeion•y. Deunc:ey. at Delena on the 
cout. ftw eulprite,Aiai Cbuft90, a lk>ro from Cbiria villaqe 
on Y\lle Jeland, M'll Ai•ai, a llekao from Aipeana. wre 
S4 c•9ht and aaeh Mfttenc.d to fourt"" yeer1' 9aol. 
loth •n w.re Guilanetti'• prieonere at the ti• of the 
murder, Aiei having been arre1ted for refu1inq to act •• 
a carrier and Ai-ai for adultery. OUilanetti'• per1onal 
•ervant, a boy from Aipeana related to Ai-ai, va1 at fir•t 
1u1pected of having aeaiated the •rderera but char9e1 
a9ainat hia were later di .. ia .. d. 55 'ftie official report• 
on the caae concluded that the llOtive had heen peraonal 
revenge and 
a9ainat the 
that there vu 
56 90Yernment. 
no evidence of any 'plot' 
Deepit• the varioua diaturbanc:ea of the late 
18901, the *kao vill..,.• were conaidered to be vell diapoaed 
57 to the government and firaly under it• control. Other 
part• of the dietrict were delllnding 110re attention. Both 
miaaion and 90Yernment w.re heginnin9 to explore the 
mountain r•ft91• behind the Jllkeo plain1 tti. •iaaion ••de 
tvo exploratory tripe in 1197 and 1899, vhich -re quicklr 
Sl Mekeo Station Journal, llpt. 1898. 
54 Report on OUilianetti'a murder, PM Archive• Gl21. 
ss Monckton aaHrt• that OUilanetti'• Mrvant, CJUided by 
a 'aorc:erer', wu the murderer1 hie account of event• 
Nara little relation.hip to the facta preaented in 
the official report of the trial. Monckton 19211 127-8. 
56 Report on Ot.ilianatti' • murder, ftl Archive• Gl21. 
>7 llllG Annual a.port• 1901-021 161 ltoS-061 28. 
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followed by 90ver111ent expedition• late in 1899. 58 The 
Mekeo Station va• an inconvenient point frOlll which to 
~ 
admini•ter the whole diatrict1 travel to and from the 
coa•t wa• awkward at any time and extremely arduou• durill<} 
the wet •eaaon: tran•portinq equipment and •upplies 
re•ulted in lo•••• and fru•tratinq delay•. Aa the Mekeo 
cea•ed to be the centre of qoverraent intere•t and activity, 
there ••emed to be little point in pre•ervinq with the•e 
difficultie•. In 1906 the qovernment •tation wa• transferred 
to Kairuku on YUle I•land. 60 
THE smooth e•tabli•hment of &iropean control depicted by 
official report• can be partly explained in terms of the 
circumstance• of contact. No rapaciou• traders and labour 
recruiter• or land-hunqry settlers preceded the government: 
the few contact• prior to 1890 were mainly confined to 
missionarie• who were intent upon winninq the people's 
friendship and confidence. Previou• experience of the 
white man had qiven villager• little reason to see the 
government a• a potential enemy or invader. The ways in 
which they did •ee the new-comer• are not revealed by the 
documentary evidence: nevertheles• it provides an independent 
description of villaqers' action• aqainst which the accounts 
they themselve• qive may be checked. The two sources of 
information prove to be complementary rather than 
contradictory. 
58 Ibid: 1899-1900: xviii: Mekeo Station Journal, 
correspondence: A. JUllien to Government Secretary, 
24 JUne 1899: Resident Maqistrate, Central District to 
Government Secretary, 11 Sept. 1899. 
59 BNG Annual Report• 1904-05: 11. 
;o Ibid: 1905-06: 26. 
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The old people, if queationed about th• earlieat 
impreaaiona of the white 11an, will invariably exclaim, 
'When you IUropeana firat c_. here our father• thouqht 
you were faifai:' Paifai are aupernatural beinqa which 
live under water and can aaau11e at will the form of certain 
fiah, eela, tortoiaea, anakea, and of .. n and women with 
white akin, pale eyea and lonq, atraiqht hair: they can 
cauae aerioua harm and even death to humane, but may alao 
be controlled for beneficient enda. The village hiatories 
reiterate that at firat people did not believe the white 
men were human beinqa. The fact that the stranger• had come 
from the aea, their pale akin• and peculiar physical 
appearance, all indicated that they were water apirits: 
and they brought with them curious and wonderful objects 
entirely different from anything possessed by mankind. 
Formalized descriptions of people's reactions to the 
new·comer~ goods - the amazement, or consternation, as they 
tasted salt and rice, looked into a mirror, or found one of 
the faifai removing part of his 'akin' and offering it 
to them - are the liveliest and moat popular features of 
any recitation of the traditions. 
Villagers are said to have formed their first 
impressions of the white man from their meetings with the 
Sacred Heart Missionaries and government officers. The 
few earlier contacts have left little mark on tradition, 
though it seems likely that people did learn of contacts on 
the coast from the Roro as the news of the arrival of 
the missionaries is said to have been received in this 
manner. It is hardly surprising that these earlier 
communications, which were of no lasting significance, 
should be passed over. It is infinitely more important for 
villagers to explain how the present agencies of mission 
-~ 
• 
es 
and 9overrment c-. to aaMrt control over tham, Traditiona 
do not alwaya clearly indicate which of the two arrived 
firat, larqely bec.aae the activitiea of the •iaaionariea 
are deacribed in one atory, thoae of the qovernaent in 
another, with nothinq to a1199eat the relationahip between 
the two ••t• of event•. IUt people are well aware of the 
pioneerin9 role played by the •i•aion, An Inavi elder, 
while relatinq hia experience• of the exploration of the 
mountain ranqea to the north of the Mekeo, declared1 
It wa• juat like here - the Miaaion went f ir•t 
and made friends with the people, then the 
Government followed.61 
Inawi, the f ir•t villaqe in which a mi••ion 
•tation waa built, i• acknowledqed by other• to preserve 
the mo•t caaprehen•ive and authoritative hi•tory of the 
cominq of the •i••ionari••· Unlike ver•ion• told in other 
villaCJlll.which deacribe only tho•• event• that occurred in 
their i11111ediate locality, the Inawi tradition open• with 
Jesus commandinq the Pope to ••nd mi••ionarie• to Papua, 
and then proceed• to tell of the landinq on Y'ule I•land and 
the fir•t journey inland to the Mekeo. It relate• that 
news of the arrival of •tranqer• on the coa•t wa• pa••ed on 
to the Mekeo at a market held with the Roro. An Inavi 
woman, C>aeke Aipa, who had •pent her youth in the Roro 
villaqe of Mou waa told of the peculiar happeninq• on 
Yule I•land by one of her Mou friend•, who also qave her 
some •alt obtained frOlll the •tranqer•. When the Inavi 
women returned home they informed the men of what they had 
61 When quotinq informant•, I retain capitals for 
'Government' and 'Miaaion' •ince villaqer• u•e the 
term• a• proper nouna. l 
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heard. the ehief. 0pa911 O<Jl:F M. •" :Hied <>eek• to the 
ufu ~~~~toryr •he then prepared .,.. food for hill 
••UOned wi •alt. Di8COWerin9 how 900d the 'white 
earth' tuted. OpUCJU'• eurio•ity concerning the bringer• 
62 
of •uc:h a de•irable «:1c:~o:dity vu 1-diately arou•ed. 
A while later two aoro .. n c: ... to the villa9• 
to tr~ for betel nut. They gave OpufU a 'b4t9 of •alt, 
explaining that it waa a pr•••nt froa the faifai people 
who -r• •119•r to vi•it the Mekee> and ... t their chief•. 
Decidinci it vu time to detenine whether the rumiour• he 
had heard wre true. OplfU a•ked if any of hi• .. n -r• 
brave enou9h to llAk• the journey throu9h ene•y territory 
to Yule I•land, obe•rv• the atranci•r• and report back 
to him. 'l\IO volunt .. ra "t off the next day with the Roro•. 
They reached the ialand aafely and were introduced to 
the miaaionari•• who 9ave the111 nu .. rou• preaent• to take 
back to their chief. After iaakinq the r•turn journey 
without miahap, the two .. n proudly related their exploit• 
to the aaa.Wled vill119e. They preaented the 9ifta to Opuqu, 
explainin9 that he wu to ahare th«11 with th• other chief• 
of the diatrict and pa•• on the newa that the miaaionariea 
would aoon viait them. The atran9er• -re indeed faifai, 
the acouta reported, but their intention• were clearly 
friendly. The •iaaionari•• had aaaured th.in that they would 
not kill or harm anyone, their reaaon for c0111in9 w .. to 
teach the people new thing• and a different way of life. 
When the atranqera at lut arrived in Inawi they were 
warmly welc:omed. OpufU conducted th• to nei9hbourin9 
villa9ea, and before they left he 9ave them land •o that they 
mi9ht aettle in hie village. 
62 The tradition paraphraaed here waa related in 1970 
by Maino Peafuau (now dec:ea•ed), the aenior chief of 
Oaiaaka and 9randeon of OpuCJU Oqopae. 
• 
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Ill» reference ie ..- to the 11th«> contmplati119 
violence ..,aiut the •ieeionariee1 a loro chief ie Mid to 
haw wanted to kill the etr....,.r• but vu •t~ by hi• 
fellowe. 'ftle lnewi hietory, like other ver•iou, •tre• .. • 
two thint• - the hifhly de•irable po•H••ione of the 
new-COiier• and the friendly intention• they profe•eed. 
To becJin with vill~er• ....-ar to have been 9D•twhat 
apprehen•iw but their fear• -r• eoon overCOIN by their 
curio•ity concernift9 the •tr1"9er1 and the intriCJUinq 
qoodt which they dietributed with •uch qenero.ity. The 
Mtkeo vwre not prepared to •it back and allow their 
neiqhbourt and ofttilltt ene11i1•, the lk>ro, to be the only 
one• to benefit from the n.w-comer•' pretence. The 
tradition reveal• that the eventual appearance of th• 
mi11ionari•• w .. •••n aa the d•tired cul•ination of a Hriet 
of earlier contact• and neqotiationa1 -11 before the 
mi11ion'• repreHntativ•• arrived in their villaqe•, people 
had •atitfied themeelve• that clo•er contact• with it 
wete de•irable. Dupeyrat •ake• no •ntion of a vi•it to 
YUle by Mekeo villa99r• before 1887, but it i• not unlikely 
that such a vi•it w .... de without the •i11ionarie1' 
knowledqe, that the 1cout1 ob1erv.d th .. frOlll a di1tance 
and obtained aOll9 trade CJOOd• from their trtdinq partner1 
on Yule I1land. In any c .. e, thi1 prior experience of the 
mi11ionarie1 aaltea underatandable the enthu1i .. tic 
reception qiven to Verju• and couppe in 1887 - an encounter 
which ••-ed to Dupeyrat •o r-•rkable that he cho1e to 
63 
explain it in term1 of divine qrace. 
63 Dapeyrat 19351 132. 
• • 
• 
ft9e pe.a1'-al 1t•11ion of tbe CJOWr-nt i• 
attributed br tr .. ition to tbe influence of one man. Maino 
Piii•• a r......,.d wr lesd1r of Aipew - the .- Maino 
vllo fi911re1 eo prominently in the doc:\mentary account1. 
Accordint to the Aipeana traditioni. 64 people'• fir1t 
experience of tbe 90ftr-nt wu of a 9roup of armed men 
Nrchint into their villllf• demandint to '" the war chief, 
Maino r111au. Aa the 1tranc,er1 w.re evidently prepared for 
battle. Maino at once ..at word to all the Piouf a war 
chief• who haatily u1mbled at Aipeana. While plan• -r• 
bein9 ude to kill the intruder•, a loro actiftCJ a1 a 9Uide 
to the 9over-nt party interjected, ur9iftCJ the Mekeo chief a 
to recon1ider their po1ition. a. warned that if the white 
men wr• killed there would be no way to obtain 11c>re of the 
9ooda they brou9ht. and other• would ccme to aven9e th• 
deatha, killincJ .. ny people with their 9'1na. Maino Pa9au 
i11111ediately reCOCJniaed the 109ic of theae ar9'1 .. nta and 
proceeded to per1uade the other chiefa that it would be 
wiaer not to f i9ht - a r...rkabl• rever1al of role1 for a 
man reputed to be a fierce warrior and an i.alplacable en•y. 
Maino'• action 1erve1 to dr ... tiae the dec:i1ion 
·.thich vill19er1 w.re now forced to lllJl:e. The earli••t 
arrival•• the •i11ionari••• aid• no •how of force and no 
d ... nd1 upon the people. With the appearance of MaCOr•CJC>r 
and hi1 police. leader• like Maino realiaed that the 
64 The tradition• paraphrued here w.re related in 1971 
by Aufa lfoaka of the Pua 1ection of A.lvea iJtueu of 
Aipeana. Aufa bel0ft9• to a junior line of Maino ra9au'1 
clan - hi1 9raadfather wu Maino'• fir1t cou1in. Aa 
an elder of 1harp intelli9ence and clear 1a1110ry. he 
ha1 coae to be r99arded u rua' • authority on 
tradition and hi1tory. 
.. 
aituation W alilnptly ckan11111 the ....,..camera wre now 
iaaiati119 tbat C9rtain lln1nlla be •t •d were clearly 
prepared to uM force if they wr• refueecl. hople were 
faced with the choice of either driYiD9 out llnd killing 
the wllite 11a11, or of wlcoaiftlJ hill u a friend, accepti"9 
hi• dellanda alor19 with the benefit• ha offered. 
It .... unlikely that auch an illlportant deciaion 
WU llade on the spur Of the ... nt, by OM .an. Pr••UllU>ly 
acme conHnwa of opinion Md already beer. reached. Maino' a 
audden challpioni"9 of the IJCW•r_..t ahould probably be 
interpreted .. a public te•ture of CC11111it1111nt to a coura• 
of action omich ... knew to be favoured by th• .. jority. 
By au11110nincJ all the Pioufa chief• to aaaiat hill aqainat 
the 9overnmient, he had aaaumed leaderahip in any conflict 
which w .. to follow• th• ito lORit who initiated a battle 
waa r99arded •• the leader and tho.. who joined hill acted 
a• hie alliaa. Maino thu• held a poaition of conaiderable 
authority at the tu.a, and hia reputation aa a aucceaaful 
war leauer 911aranteed hill the reapec:t of hie alli•• -
he h.c! recently led all the Pioufa villaqea aqain•t the 
\'e • e in r•••"9• for the death of hi• •i• tar at the hand• 
o~ Inawaia. 65 circu•tanc:ea allowed hill to -.ke a darinq 
and unconventional CJe•ture, providift9 it reflected the 
1entimenta of the .. jority. Made in th• face of the other 
war chiefa' oppoaition, tha .... action would have been 
• 
65 mia Annual .. port• 1891-921 19 relate that durin9 the 
attack on ln.,aia by Lmwe•' party in leptllllber 1891 
Maino of Aipeana had to be reatrained f rcm killinq an 
Inawaia un who, ...a tille before, had killed hie wife. 
AccordiftCJ to Aipeana inforaanta, Inawaia had been 
reaponaibl• for the death of Maino'• aiater, not hia 
wife. 
to 
unlikely to 'hne cerriecl ti. day. 
'IW rMllOft• for the deci•ion in favour of tl'w 
9cwerrment are 9iwn1 fear that thllr• would be little 
c:hanc• of wc:ce•• in a VU' etainat thll white .. n and 
reluctanc. to be cut off fro. their CJOOd•. Tradition 
lay. •tr••• on the we-.iona carried by tha white •n. 
Moat villaqe hi•tori•• include a deacription of the police 
firinq their CJllfta at a pi9 - or in SCllll veraiona at a bird 
or aOlle coconut• in a tr .. - to dellonatrate the power of 
their ve19POna. lllplanation of thll 90Yern.ent'• eaay 
penetration of the area. in the•• teraa. ia ao obvioua and 
readily under•tandable to the outaider that it ia difficult 
not to •iainterpret the •ifftif ic:ance of thia point. and 
thua greatly cwer•implify the iaaue. 
The people'• fir•t reac:tione to the white man 
bear little re•ellblanc• of a tillid aurrender to a auperior 
enemy. and even l••• of a patiaive reai91lation to fate. The 
way in which villet•ra eagerly welc:c•ed the •iaaionariea 
into their territory and actively comaitted tti.llaelvea to 
support th• 90vern11ent. •uqqeat rathllr that they had 
poaitiv• reaeona to deair• the n.w-c:Ollera' preaence. 
The traditiona reveal that P'UPl• accepted misaion 
and 90vern11ent at their own ••~illation of themaelvea -
altruiatic bearera of a auperior ~'lllture and a better way 
of life. llut there vu. of courae, a wide qulf bet-n 
what th• "9f-cmle• •ant by their pr011i••• and the terms in 
which villaciera interpreted th... Unknowinqly the white 
man had choaen to play a col• which waa not without precedent 
in Mekeo experience. The hi•torian trained in llOdern 
111ethoda of hi•torical analymia •ff• the arrival of Buropeana 
in an unexplored pert of P..,ua aa a unique hiatorical event. 
PrOll the people' a point. of vi-. the event waa neither 
• 
91 
unique nor 11atore ... Mle1 in the paat there had been 
other•. epuite and hllmllD MiftlJ•• tllM) b.rou9ht technoloqical 
and eoeial c>ian11•. in1tr\ICtiftlJ the people in new vaye 
and knovle&,.. A' ai1a wu the 110et Ulportant. brinti"9 
aorcery and chieftain1hip. and there had been other• before 
him. liu the t1llO brother•• 1tae9a ~ .. a and ltipo A11aka9a, 
who tauqht people to aak9 fire and to 9ive birth to children 
in the pre1ent aanner. Mtti"9 down the ritual• now 
aaaoc1ated vith pr99nenc:y and birth. The•• event• vere and 
are no le•• real to vill ... re becau1e an outeider cl .. eifi•• 
them ae '•ythol091cal'. All technical and eocial innovation• 
are explained in terae of a revelation of knovle"9e by 
s ~pernatural bein9e or by •n from dietant plat:••. 
The arrival and actione of the vhite man were 
=onaiatent and explainable vithin thit traditional fr...-vork 
:f reference. The pow.re of the faifai people vere undeniably 
proved by their enjoy.nt of all manner of fabuloue object• 
:otally unliu anythin9 known to ma.an beinta: they had 
shown themeelvee villin9 to ehare the•• richea and pr0111iaed 
:hat they vould reveal their knovled9e. Like the earlier 
benefactor•. their powere were naturally aeau111ed to be 
supernatural. their knovle&ie ritual knovledqe. People 
evidently expected a revelation of eupernatural knovledqe 
b.it they could have no clear idea of the nature of theee 
secreta or the manner in vhich they would be diecloaed. 
:;everthele••· eince they had benefited frOlll aimilar event• 
in the paat. there v .. fOOd re .. on to expect th•t they would 
Jo ao aqain. MQreover. at 11 .. t until thl advent of the 
.Jovernment. the circuaatance1 of contact had 9iv1n no cauae 
:o doubt thl 1incerity of the 1tr.r19er1' promiaee. 
I 
I 
I 
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hople wlc 1d the wit• w a.c .... they 
" 
belieftd they WUld .-111 fro. hi• •19 them. 
Had it been O~iM, hMI people decided that the •trancier• 
bod8d we ewil tMn fOOd, they would have fou9ht th-
what.,,.r the odda. !lw outcome of a battle wa• belin.d 
to be deterained not by the warrior•, but by the relative 
power• of the .!IAI• the wv ..,iciana, •uPPortillf the 
OPPo•illf •ide•r eftn mo, -.plain the old •n. werrior• 
did not •top to worry that their fate vu pcedeter.ined 
but went •-verly to w.r. llW!weia heel •hown thi• pertin11eity 
1n 1891. Paredoaically, the ailitary MIP91'iority of the 
white aan w .. not mo auch a r1e9ative reaeon to •urrender, 
•• a po•itive reaeon to accept hia, for it wa• proof of hi• 
power•1 if he were not invincible, hi• ritual knowledc)e 
could be of little account and not worth acquirillf. 
llliYillf cho•en to 11ecept the new r991- repre••nted 
by the 90YerN1ent, vill-ver• pcoved their readine•• to 
work in harllony with it. IYen when it b99an to intrude 
upon the dome•tic affair• of the vill99e coimnunity, the 
lopia actively MIPPorted it• .. a•ur••· includinq tho•e 
which Ulpir199d on their own authority and cut at ba•ic 
practice• and beliefe. Public court• had never been held 
by chief•: in thi• ••nM the 9overnmnt'• ••ttling of 
di•pute• throu9h the .. an• of public hearing• did not u•urp 
a recoqniaed function of the chief. ..verthele••· chief• 
66 New Guinean• often • ._ to have identified the f ir•t 
white .. n with ance•tral orbeni9n epirit•. X.Wrence 
19671 63-8 ob•erv•• that the people of the Rai coa•t 
•••ociated Niklouho-Macl•y with their diety Anut: 
accordillf to Van lij.wijck 19671 74, the ICuni (the 
Mekeo'• ... tern nei9hbour•) had at fir•t thought that 
the •i••ionariee were their 199endery hero Akaia rcturrwd 
to thea. ... also Brown 197 la 7~9: Wor•lcy 1970. 
tJ 
wre ultimately r111 a•il»le for tlw •intaininv of lMf and 
order nv tlleu awa people. fteir wtllinvne•• to 
1eknowledfe a Mp.r •tllocity in tlleM Mttera M19991t1 
• very deterained effort to c ;rmaiae in order to ... t 
the 90Yer1111ent'1 r .... i,...nt1. 
8"a 1111'• r-.rkable i1 the chief•' bacUnq of 
the burial r-.ulatiOM. The dead wre alway• buried 
under or cloee to •ill ... hou .. 1 10 that the relative• 
of the deceued could keep con1tant watch owr the 9raw, 
quardift9 it froa Mraudift9 eorcerer1 until they were 
1ati1fied that the corpee .,.. CC111pletely decayed. If a 
1orcerer 1ucceeded in r9llOYift9 part of the body, or even 
in thru1tift9 hit apear into th• 9rave and cmift9 in contact 
with it, he 9ained powr over the apirit of the dead .. n 
and could uae it to hara hi• livift9 relative•. ta.ian 
braina, ••xual or9an1 and the liquid produced when a whole 
body ia placed over a fire are i119redient1 nece11ary for 
many of the sorcerer'• 1pell1. The 90Yern.ent'1 propoaal 
o leave the dead in a c-t•ry aet apart frOll the vill19e, 
where they ~ld beca11e the open prey of 9r1ve-robbinq 
sorcerer1, mu1t have 1.-d horrifyi119, even U.Oral at 
first. ICowald 1U1pected that jealouay played a lar9e 
. 67 part in the rapid enfor~nt of the reC)\llation1. llo 
doubt inter-vill~ rivalri•• prOllpted one aettl ... nt to 
spy on another but the 1tation journal reveal• that .. ny 
. 68 
ch1efa reported culprit• from their own villaqe. It ia 
~oat unlikely that jealou1y waa the motivatift9 force in 
such ca1e1, for if chief or c< >ner had atte111pted to 
• 
67 BNG Annual -.port• l"J-941 St. 
68 Mekeo Station Journal, Au9. 189J. 
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Mftil*late tlle MW nl .. to aatiaty pH90Nl fr'ldle8 
within the •illafe c a1ty. the elw e- s 1 ialat it 
would haYe bMll •t at .-. other•' throat•. 
Tred1tion Me aotlli119 to MY of people'• re.ction• 
to the burial 1'99Ulatioaa or the firat court c ... a. 
Info&'941ftt• atate that the ..., lwa were .ccepted bee•H 
the chief• were perauMed that their people would benefit 
fr'09 theu. In eecorct.nee with the 90YerN11e11t'• inatruction•, 
the dead .. re buried .,.y from the villafer but the 9raw, 
of eourae, atill had to be fllarded ao people ~ted the 
practice of bllildi119 a 1111&11 ahelter over it where relative• 
'' could keep their vi9il. The eldera di .. ia• aa non•enae 
any au99e•tion that .. aaurea introd\lced by the 9over1W1ent 
m1qht have been opposed by the chi•f• or eau••d conflict 
within the vill999. they patiently explai~ to the outaider 
that thi• i• a nonaenaieal propoaition for the •iJlple and 
ci>viou• rea.on that 'the l•• of the fOV•rnment are the 
70 lava of the ehiefa'. Ttwre could be no po••ibility of 
friction or of •iaunderatandinq !M.tw•n the two •tt'°riti•• 
since they •tood for the .... thinq• - for thia rea•on the 
lopia always upheld the 90Wrrment'• •uure•. 
Thia inaiatence Oii the eloH identity bet-•n the 
3ima of the CJOVerrment and the alma of traditional authority 
69 See below• 111-2. even today th• dead are aa.eti•• 
secretly interred under vill99e ~ ... - particularly 
infant• and .all children. lleV 9rave• in the e-tery 
are •till 911arded by relative• who take turna aittin9 
up all ni9ht with ahot911na. 
70 1'1i• point wu carefully elaborated in reapect to 
the village conatable and hi• relation• with the 
9overr111eat and the villate aathoritiea. ... belows 
1~·2. 
• 
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rneala tM wr ill '*! .. ,...1e c- to r..-d tbe _. 
r .. 18e. Tr .. itio9 relate• tlaat tltouth Yillater• at firat 
thoutht tbe w- • wn epirtu. they later d111Co•ered 
that tbey wwe -· ftle wt'-8 or tbe new ruler• befan 
to be intel'J*eted ill t • term. IM role they played vu 
not difficult to ncaa:ile witt. traditional ideala1 they 
h.:! c:o-. u pea:sr•era. oae of tbe laly Ca' •i•' a wt 
illpOrt•t hnctionar they E'MiMd tbe pr•s ay of their 
•uthority. 1 •1atretinf •perior pGW9ra II)' their •-.on• 
•nd poaaeaaionar wt •.,•tently tMy ¥1CN1d tlaat tlleir 
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only deaire _. for the pea:. Md wJf er• of the people. 
~ently there wee little differenc:. between the old and 
the new1 the 90Wr.-t ...,. .... •rely to be .ii eatenaion 
ot tr•ditional aut9'or1ty. 
Joweld. tlle fOYIS&•••nt ... nt • .,... traated ••a 
chief, •lbeit one wbo held ..,_y a.er a territorial unit 
cinprec:edented in the peat. llany 1natanc:•• deec:ribed in 
the atation journal r..-al the local leader•' attitude• 
~ow•rda ICowald. llhenewer M irportant feaat vaa IMld in 
• nearby vill .... a pi9 would be brou9ht to the atation and 
72 preaented to hill. .. encourafed chief• fra. diatant 
settl•enta to 
t 1r1t they tad done ao of their own 
• 
chief• from near and far would 
infoi'll his of affair• in their 
71 See above I 1 .. lt. 
72 Mekeo ltation .Journal. Dec. lltOr 1119 •• Oct. 11tl1 
Sept. 18t5. 
73 Ibid1 Dec. lltOr Jan. lltl1 Oc:t. lltl. 
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Yill..... CW.fly IUIDlllDll Wl'e alwye p&'eWlted to 
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the fOUWF It .... t - n:cr11a.-. fte .-...i ~itmeftt 
.... to a: al• b 0 tM alaMfe Of lllpe _. Aipe9N - their 
• .,.ne11 to •ne Ilia by wrllint oa tlae 1tatioft Md 
acti119 .. Ilia lwact n - w cancret• affir-ation of their 
acceptwe of tlae ... •ttuority he repreMnted. 
fte 90wer-..t'1 ori9inal policy of dealint 
• the local le1tsr1 ••t ha¥• helped them to identify 
with it. llac:OrefOr'e init~al eontact1 •ith vill.,.r1 were 
conducted Minly tll&'OQ9h the clliefe, OI' at le .. t thoM known 
to the •i111onari11. the ..,,••tint pereonality of llaino, 
the Aipeana lMC.r, Md the IYident influence and ability 
of •any of the vill ... di911itarie1, 9ave ll9CGr990r reuon 
to hope tllat the fOMl'Wllt could eucce11fully deal with 
th• people throutll their chief1. Ill predicted tllat llaino 
would eoon 91in control ewer leipa, 76 and expected tllat 
qoverrwent patron..- ..ould 9rMtly inere ... the pow1r1 of 
77 th• 1110r• iJllportant leadere. A fOV•r .... nt chief wa1 
appointed in eacll vill ... and in 1197 Maino wa1 !Ude head 
78 qoverrwent chief of the di1trict. 1e.c:Gr990r deliberately 
•ttetapted to u1e the influence of tlM friendly chief a to 
74 BNG Annual a.port• 1192-931 17, l7r 1893-941 4l. 
75 See for •XISIPl• Jlekeo Station Journal, Jllay 18911 BllG 
Annual aaporta 189l-M1 4l. 
76 l!lllG Annual .. porta 1189-901 78. 
77 Ibid: 1895-961 51. 
78 Jllaino' a -..oint81tnt .. bead 90Yenment chief wae in 
re<:09nition of the .. ai1tanc• he 9ave durint the arreet 
of the 90rcerer1 in October 1897. '*i Annual .. porte 
1897-981 17. 
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perauade the other• to .Ue peace. When he left the 
diatrict in May 1890, after concludinq a formal peace between 
the villa9ea on the w.atern bank of the river, he 
optimiatically left inatructiona that the leadera of 
Inawabui, Maino of Aipeana and Opugu of Inawi ahould go 
79 together to negotiate a aettlement with Inawaia. Though 
the chiefa, eapecially Maino, did all they could to meet 
his demanda, it ia plain that MacGregor overestimated 
their powera. 
Neither miaaion nor government had a very clear 
idea at thia ata9e of the actual atructure of leadership. 
For example, Maino Fagau waa not the head chief of Aipeana, 
but the war chief of its founding clan, Aivea. 80 He took 
the initiative in dealing with the government because it was 
assumed that the new arrivala, who came armed and demanding 
-to see the iao lopia, were intent upon war. Though Maino 
continued to hold a poaition in Aipeana far more important 
than a war chief would uaually have held in time of peace, 
he did not extend hia away over any other village. If 
the original policy of creating government chiefs had been 
pursued, a new hierarchy of chiefs with greater powers and 
new function• might have emerged, as happened in other 
colonial aituations: instead, governma'lt chiefs were 
almost immediately replaced by village constables. 81 
79 BNG Annual Reporta 1889-901 91. 
80 Aipeana informant• explained that Maino Fagau was the 
younger brother of the chief of Fua (the iso section 
of Aivea clan), Aufa Fagau. 
Bl BNG Annual Reporta 1893-94: 58 notes that in most 
villagea 'the chiefa are also constables'. See also 
Miles 1959: 63-4. 
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Chief• continued to be appointed a• con•table• but by the 
late 1890• 9over1111ent a9ent• be9an to r~ard the villa9e 
con•table merely a• their aPPointee, payi119 •cant attention 
to hi• traditional •tatu•. 82 But the effect of thi• •hift 
in policy wa• not felt until later. 
one respect in which the action• of the new order 
were difficult to reconcile with traditional ideal• was 
its method of tran•ferrin9 office. Chiefly office, like 
other position• of authority, wa• inherited: the appointment 
of a succes•or required an elaborate public ceremony which 
was usually held duri119 the lifetime of the old chief. 
It is not surpriain9 that J<ovald's death, in the ab•ence 
of any apparent 'heir', cau•ed villa9ers to believe that 
the government had come to an end: nor is it remarkable 
that Kowald'• •ucce••or, who arrived without any formal 
introduction or ceremony, wa• not i11111ediately accepted. 
The rapid turnover of 9overnment agent• between January 
1897 and September 1898 compounded the unea•e and confusion 
which followed J<ovald'• death. When the chiefs of nearby 
villages came to farewell Bramel! a• he was leaving the 
station, he wa• di•concerted to find Maino of Aipeana 
83 hanging on to hi• hand and wailing. It is little wonder 
that this faithful •upporter of the government was distressed 
at the apparent impermanency of its authority. 
82 BNG Annual Report• 1897-981 93; 1898-99: 70 note that 
all the Mekeo village con•tables were chiefs. The 1899-
1900 report makes no reference to their status. After 
1898 references in the station journal are to village 
constable• rather than to chief•. 
83 Mekeo Station Journal, 11 June 1898. 
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Villater• eventually learnt that the CJOYernment 
perpetuated it• rule in it• own unner. The lenqth of ti9e 
each officer spent in the di•trict 800ll c ... to be explained 
in term• of traditional llOral concept•• thoH vho •erved 
only brief teraa w.re 'bad' officer• vho w.re quickly 
removed by the 90vernment in Port More•by, thoae who looked 
after the intere•t• of the people w.re allowed to atay 
longer. 
In tradition, 'Chiale' - Charle• "1vald - and 
'Amadeo' - OUilianetti, the 90ver1181ent a9ent i.irdered in 
1901 - have beccu 1 the archetype• of the '9ood' and the 
'bad' government officer. 1CcNald'1 entrie• in the 1tation 
Journal reveal ht. •• hevin9 been 1tern but juat in hia 
dealing• with villaqera. Tradition •peake of him •• a good 
man who looked after the intereat• of the people - juat aa 
a chief ia •aid to do. He i1 particularly remembered for 
the many nev varietie• of plant1 he introduced to villager• 
and for hia 9enero•ity to thoae 'Who worked for him. In 
contraat, Amadeo i• nmemblred u a harah, cruel man who 
abused the people and hi• labourer•. In aqreement with 
official report• on the matter, informant• inai•t that the 
I 
motive for hi1 murder wa• per•onal revenge but admit that 
he 'deserved to Ai•' becau•e of the ill will he conatantly 
displayed to the people. 
The mi••ion appear• to have quickly a••umed in 
villagers' eye1 the role it had deliberately cho1en and 
was beat fitted to play - that of mediator between the 
people and the qovernment. • Since the •i••ionarie• 1poke 
their lanquaqe, lived in their villaqe• and under•tood much 
of their way of life, it w .. natural that villaqer• turned 
to them to act •• interllediarie• betw.en them•elve• and the 
new reqime. The old .. n explain that durinq the early yeara 
.. 
-~ 
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of cont.ct people tlllOUld c:oneult their pariah prieat 
concerning any CJO'Nrlment •a.urea. nch aa the burial 
requlatione. which they found difficult to underetand. 
The mieeionariee are aleo eaid to have intervened on 
occaaione when CJOV.rnment officer• were too ~arah or 
demandin9 on the people, reportin9 their action• to the 
gover11111ent in Port Moreeby. Today the •iaaion ia etill 
expected to perform the .... functione1 the pariah 
priest'• advice i• aou9ht on 11any practical matters relating 
to dealin9e with the outeide world, and euch advice ia 
almost certainly more valued by the majority than the 
spiritual quidance he offere. 
Miaaion and 9overnment record• provide ample 
evidence of the rivalry exietin9 between the two 
organization• durin9 the early years. 'ftle qovern~nt aqent's 
:omplaints aqainet the 11iaeionariea find their counterpart 
in Archbishop Navarre'• euepicions of villaqes, like 
Aipeana, wh>ch appeared to him to shun the mission in 
• • 84 
favour of the 9overrwent. It is difficult to say whether 
·:1llagera were aware of this aituation, or how much they 
attempted to talte advantaqe of it. It seems, however, that 
~ ~.e;· were far more concerned with their own jealoue iea. 
~ach villaqe waa ea9er to be the firat to have a mission 
:r government etation. 'ftle preatiqe that such an eatablishment 
,a·1e the connunity ie reflected in the emphasis placed by 
~radition on the fact that a particular villaqe waa the 
'first' to receive the white man - attitudes which were 
; :onditioned by the importance the aoeiety qavr to bcinq th• 
first, the 'eldeet', and by the riqhte thie position 
::nferred. Maino of Aipeana wae ewift to realize the 
34 Navarre, Not•• et Journals 126-7. 
• 
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the wprracy of tbe C)CWeii int and wea deteniined to 
• become ita aupporter. yet he wea not unintereated in the 
mi11ion. Ila told lllac:Gr.,or in April 1890 th•t he ~ already 
1el~ted a aite on hie land for the •ia1ion and v .. lookinq 
IS forward to ... ilMJ it aettled there. Po11ibly ttw coolM11 
whicfP Arc:hbiahop ..,,arre l•ter obMrved in Aipeana aro1e 
from dia..,.,ointment that the •iaaionaria1 had choMn anoth<.·r 
vill~ for their firat baH in the llakeo. 
One adveraary of vhic:h the •ia1ion had frequent 
cau1e to C091plain vaa the vill•qe aorcerer. !xtrac:ta 
from Archbiahop •avarr•'• di•ry refer to aeveral inatanc:e1 
of the 1orcerera' deliberate .. lic:e and ttw intriquea they 
86 plotted aqainat the •iaaion. Except for the falae alarwi 
rai1ed durinq ar ... 11•a tiale aa qovernment aqent, there 
u little 
from thi1 
reference 
87 
aourc:e. 
in 90vernment rec:orda to oppoaition 
Sinc:e the •iaaion conaidered the eradication of 
sorcery one of ita aoat illportant t•aka, it inevitably 
provoked the anta90ni• of the aorcerera: the 90vernment 
_ook the -.tter leaa aerioualy. thouqh it later paaaed lav1 
85 •BNG Annual ... port• 1889-901 78. 
86 Navarre. tlotea et Journal. 
87 Monckton. vho apent four aontha in the llakeo in 1898. 
qive1 an extr ... ly hi9hly coloured narrative of enc:ounter1 
with 1orcerera in hia book SOiie l!!p!riencea of a Kev 
Guinea ... aident l!!CJiatrate. Little confide11ce c:an be 
placed in hia ac:c:ount 1 the even ta de1cril'Od are ao 
numeroua and aenaational that it ia very difficult to 
believe they all occurred in the brief period he apent 
in the diatric:tr aoreover, aoat of the incidenta • ._ 
to owe their inapiration to D'Alberti1' experienc:ea 
on YUle Ialand. 
•• 
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llaki119 the pr9Ctioe of eorcery ill ... l. A direct 
confrontation ... 800ll ·>1ndan1d by the aiaaion for aore 
aubtle •tllode. A cwef\11 in¥eaticJation of the nature of 
belief• aurroundi119 aorcary ._. undertaken. acme pri••t• 
aueeeedift9 in penetrati119 far into the aecr•t• of the black 
art by perauadilMJ aorc:erera to inatruc:t t'- in it. 88 
one in ,.rtic:ular. rather ti99lar. earned hi ... lf • 
reputation u • redoubtable eorc:erer :1'19 tlw loro and the 
Mekeo. ltoriea, told only by eorc:erera. deac:ribe how tlw 
notable practitioner• of the put proved the efficacy of 
tlwir P<J'Mr• to the aiaaionariea - either by c.uail'lf aoeie 
•eriou1 •i•Mp to befall a z ber of the •iaaion, or by 
teaehi119 certain individual• a<me of their apella. The 
•orcerera interpreted the •i•aionariea' deaire to acquire 
their knowledc)e u an aciaiaaion of it• validity. If thi1 
wa• an unfortunate reault froa the •i••ion'1 point of view, 
it at leaat allowed the develop1ant of a autual tolerance. 
The 1oreerer bitterly re .. nted any effort to diacredit hi• 
power1 but once the •i••ionariea •ho-ad t'-•elvea prepared 
to reapect t'- he wu ready to acknowledge. and no doubt 
hoped to learn, the apecial aecreta poaaea1ed by the white 
man. 
Tradition and the opinion of knowledgeable 
infonianta provide no evidence to au999at that any of the 
rumoured 'rebelliona• ..,ainat the 90Yern.ent had foundation 
in fact: and the rapid pr09reaa zade by the ziaaion leavea 
little doubt that, whatever annoyance the 1orcerer1 zay have 
cau•ed it, they put no real obatac:le in ita path. lven if 
there had been detenaination in certain quarter• to throw 
88 Dupeyrat 19351 213-14. 
• 
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off the yolre of ~ control. tr..Sition would 9iw no 
hint of the feet. llo contr..tiction of the ideal of haniony 
and co-operation - ... 11d upon the identity of intere1t1 
•hared by the old and the nw re,ime - i• tolerated1 
tradition ..-. ... over. and the old 11e11 diaaia1 aa unimportant 
any incident• wllich are inconaiatent with their overall 
interpretation of event1. Tiie f.., in1tanc:ea of counteraction 
recorded in official reporta after 1191 reveal that villa9er1 
were not able to .-Orb the •hock of chante without 
experiencint ea.a atrainr ywt the eaae and rapidity with 
~ which any re1iatance waa OYerC0111 1u9991t1 that for the 
maJority the ideal waa. at leaat for a ti... a reality. 
' 
' 
IN retro1pec:t. it i• l!fJel'ent to villa91r1 th .. 1elve1, aa 
to outaider1. that the cc.int of the wllite man proclaimed 
the e1tabliahmlent of a new order which waa to tran1fona 
the old. But at the time of contact. people had little 
comprehen1ion of the way1 in which the new-eo119r1 would 
re-direct their live•. and the chanfea takincJ place were 
not 1-ediately perceptible. llo obviou1 break with the 
past occurred. For a time it appeared that nothincJ had 
really altered. 
Tradition laya .. ch empha1is on people'• de1ir1.• 
for the white man'a f00d9. but make• little reference to 
the effect• of tec:hnol09ical innovation• 1uch aa the u1e 
of steel tool1. lali1bury'1 1tudy of economic chan9e maonq 
the Siane of the la1tem HiC)hland1. carried out 1hortly 
after the e1tabli1hmlent of 90vernment control over the reqion. 
h11 hi9hli9hted the re1ulta of introducincJ 1t .. 1 tool• into 
1 stone aqe ICOllOlly." ly carefully obeervi"9 the time 
99 Sali1bury 1962. 
I 
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Siw .... .., ... t 1a •llleietSDI .niYitiea .... by c ;ui119 
the renlta witla tll9 time • calculeted they fonerly 
•pent ill IUCb t1ell1. lal•r,ny we eble to e1tiute thet 
•t .. 1 tool• r1tiac1d fraa eitlaty per cent to fifty per c:.nt 
the proportioa of total t1- • Ii-. ... devoted to 11Ulllei•tence 
90 
labour. fti• nctlc:tioa affected tile .... onlyr f ... le 
occupatione IUCb u 10Wi119. wedillf ud han91tiftlJ ..re not 
affected by tile ll8W tool1, for twlw )'8KI before the 
inipo•ition of a&rop1111 CODtrol. tile liene hacl receivwd 
reqular nppliff of 1teel tool• tbroutll traditional tr..S. 
rou te1. The 1ipificance of tile c.._.. to 1teel tool• vu 
that people channelled the t1- freed fnm l\lbei1tence 
activitie1 into ll8W clirection1, lftlte.S of llellinf l•CJH 
qarden• to produce mre food. people clnoted the extra tiJle 
to an elaboration of cer..any and wafare. 
Unlike tile liane, tile Mmkeo ti.cl little opportunity 
to acquire European trecle 9DOc11 until a 90Yer ... nt 1tation 
wa• eatabli1hed in the area, D' Alberti• obMrved in 1175 
that the people of .. iabui uMCI illlpl .. ntl of b•hoo, •hell, 
bone and atone, 91 The raity of •t"l tooll 810re than a 
decade later i1 revealed in lli11ion recordl1 in 1119 the 
mi••ionarie1 pre1•ted Maino, tile war chief of Aipeana, with 
a 1t .. 1 axe which had been prmiMCI hia more than twillve 
'Tiontha before (tile powrty of the youftlJ •i11ion allow.cl the 
'.h1tribution of trade fOOcl• only on a very .. 11 1cale), 92 
90 Ibid1 110, 
91 D'Albertie lllO wl.11 JM-5. 
92 Navarre. 11ote1 et J1Durnal1 J2. 
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--In S'!!u u11na1 of u1 pri.,at• trader• or plantation owwr1. 
the 90¥•--t bee- tM wt import•t .ouree of Daroi-an 
9J 9ood1. lacacd8 of 1tatioe expenditure clarint the fir1t 
ffllW year1 ahaw tM local ......, for to~ac::co. 1t .. 1 knive1. 
cloth and 
labourer• 
1iail• item. which -r• uHCI to pay ca.al 
94 
and 9i...n aa pr....,t1 to viaiti"9 chief1. 
11nee accea1 to a r9911lar eupply of the nev 900da 
coincided with the end of tribal fi9hti119. 1t .. 1 knive1 an<' 
•••• had no effect on *keo warfarer other circuiutanc•• 
al10 1u99e1t that their adoption we1 of le11 con1equence 
for the *keo than for the S1ane. lali1bury &r9U•• that 
1teel ue1 cut by ~third1 the tiae involved in axe 
work. which wee the mo1t t1-c:onaw1i119 •1-nt in cle&ril'ICJ 
land. fence llaki"9 and hou1e buildint. 95 Preeulllbly thi1 
reduction appli•• to any 1iailar aoc:iety. but the lllOUnt 
of axe work nec:eaaary - the requir....,t1 of 9arden clearin9 
and fenc:e buildint - varie1. The *keo i1 far le11 
burdened in thi1 reapect than hi1 liane counterpart. 
AccordiftCJ to lali1bury. the liane mu1t clear • 
new 91rden every thr .. 90l'lth11 onc:e • plot h11 been u1ed 
for one 1e11on it doe1 not reg1in it1 fertility for several 
1ear.J,6 A Mekeo hou1ehold clear•. at the mo1t. one nev 
garden • year and 1paic:ed plantin9 will en1ure that it 
produce1 crop1 continuou1ly throu9hout the year. Bach 
hou1ehold u1ually u1e1 more than one garden plot at a ti ... 
93 BHG Annual a.port• 1192-931 51. 
94 Nekeo Station JcNrnal, 1190 onward1. 
9S lali1bury 19621 109. 
96 Ibid1 47-1. 
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T'hou9h induetrime f•ili• prefer to .U a MW ,.,..., 
every y.H, the luy indi•idual f"l• no neceeeity to .Ue 
thi1 effOrt, .. a plot i• .. id to retain it1 fertility 
for Mveral ,.are. Gardm fencee are not ueually nee.11ary, 
11 11e>1t ... keo CJAl'den• are 1ituated 1111fficiently far from 
the vill.,. to a.oid the depredation. of dolleatic pi91. 
In contra1t, the liane build elaborate fencee U'OUnd each 
qarden 'llhich require an 'mrnH 9!0Unt of tileer and 
97 
labour. Aleo the ac:tivitie1 of the ... keo U'• lillited by 
• aeaeonal cycle, which i1 not the cue •a."19 the liane. 
Dllrinq the -t ••uon no 9U'den cleari"9 or hou1e buildinq 
can be undertaken, llew land •Ult be cleared durinq the 
dry 110nth1, llO•t f .. ili•1 leavinq it until the lut •inute, 
when there i1 frantic activity to 99t the job fini1hed 
~fore th• rain 1tU'te. 
'ft'9 fac:t that the liane combine a1 lineaqe 9roup1 
91 to clear and fence their 9uden1, while the Mekeo perform 
the aanie taek• a1 individual hou1ehold1 a11i1ted, if 
nece11ary, by a f.w relative• or friend1, 1e ... indicative 
of the different de9r .. of labour required in eac:h ca1e. 
The 1eaaonal cycle and the fertility of the Mekeo'a alluvial 
land produced a pattern of eubaiatence activity much l••• 
oneroua than that which a different enviro,..nt i.llpoaed on 
the Siane. lince l••• tille va1 needed for primary 
1ub1i•t•nc• t .. ke, a proportionately le11er allOUnt of time, 
which •iqht be channelled in other direc:tiona, vaa freed 
by the uee of et .. l tool1. 
97 Ibid1 47-lr 54-5. 
l8 Ibid1 54-5. 
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A =tan11 Wicla 11191tt lie • ., 11:ted to ha- 9Dre 
far-re.c:llinf effect• we tile c:eeMtion of werfare. It 
ia extr ... ly difficult to .. in eny eccurate idea of the 
part war fo,..-1y plapd in ._ Guinea eocietiee. 1'le 
cla11ical etlmolfr•ic etudiea of llalinowaki, *ad, fortune 
and othera wre ll8de after eocietiee bad adju•ted to an 
i111p<>1ed peace. l¥ell tbe •re recent 1tudie1 in the Hi9hland1, 
made ahortly after 8'1ropean cont11et, are not baaed on direct 
obaervationa of wer .. a functioninci inetitution. 99 'ftle 
·,ark of the llarvard-,.abody bpedition of 1961 a.onci the 
Dani of W.at Irian hae provided vivid and dr ... tic in1i9ht1 
100 into thia .. tterr but •inc• the other inatitutiona of 
Melane•ian 1ocietie1 dieplay eo rich a variety, it a.tat be 
expected that war, and the pr11etic:e1 uaociated with it, 
aaauined a like .. ltiplicity of foraa. 
Mekeo inforaant•, none of vhom are old enou9h 
to have vitnea .. d pre-contact tribal fi9hti11CJ, clai• that 
men once apent all their time in fi9htinci and prep&ration 
for war. The ritual preparation• involved weeka or .antha 
'1 ab1tainin9 frOll certain fooda and total avoidance of 
sexual cont11et with women. Durin9 battle the warrior 
carried upon hi• peraon pow.rful protective char .. 1 in 
order to withatand contact with the•• objecta, hia body 
had to ba carefully prep&red befo1ehand. Any -n - aorcerer, 
chief or cc ~ner - who wi•h•a to uae or call upon the aid 
of auparnatural pow.ra .. ,t firat under90 a period of 
preparation (J!i!I!!), durin9 which he f11t1, avoidinq all 
• 
99 Thou9h there i• no 111ek of .. terial on Hi9hland1 
warfare - ... lerndt 1964 - .aat of it ia baaed on 
secondhand ac:counta. 
100 Matthie11en 19621 Gardner and Heider 1969 • 
• 
l~ 
1 (.1 
" 
\ ..
I 
' j 
I 
i 
• 
• 
lOI 
hdYy. 'cold' food9 MIClll ..... t. fiu. taro and the like. 
He .. Y not drink cold wter or allow it to touch any pert 
of hi• body •iDt tllli• t1-. and he i• forbiddeft M•al 
intercourM .. thi• ia beli~ to !lake the body 'cold'. 
The object of the preparation i• to build up th. body'• 
re.ource• of heat or pawer Utp) •e that it wil I 11<,t 
be hanaed by contact with an object cortaini"'I 
•upernatural power ( itm). If a .. n ao .. ch •• touchea 
an object charcied with aupernatural paver without the 
nec•••ary precaution•. it• 'heat' will pierce hi• 'cold' 
body, cau•int ' 1diate illneaa OI' death. The wurior 
who allow.d no t1- for ritual Pl'.-r•tion vu thu• 
compelled to 90 to battle without the benefit of 81&9ical 
protection. lnforaanta •ay that the .. n were 110 fearful 
of beillCJ cau9ht unwar•• that they would •ec:lude theluelve• 
1n the ~ at the firat 1'\&91CNr of 80lle future conflict, 
and illlllediately be9in their ritual ob•ervanc••· 
Durint the •n'a •ecluaion. the we.en would qo 
to the 9ardena alone, or ••corted by the old .. n and boy• • 
When nec•••ity forced the •n to clear • new 9arden, they 
would complete the tuk a• quickly •• poa•ible and hurriedly 
return to the ufur mo•t are aaid to have attended to .uch 
-
task• before their •eclu•ion. In peace tU.. th• .. n lived 
with their wive• and helped thell in the 9arden•, but it is 
said that •any, after they had fathered one or two children, 
spent the reat of their active live• at the ~· in con•tant 
readine•a for var. 
The picture inforiaanta paint ia no doubt an 
exaggerated one. inapired by the rouaillCJ talea of fo~er 
victoriea and valour told thell by their fathera. ..vertheleaa, 
lt ia apparent that the aeaaonal cycle would allow the •n 
to devote aeveral montha • year to warfare, without diaruptin9 
lOt 
the pettera of ..... iat1•c1 .etiviti••· Gardetl cleariftl), 
houH c:onathction Md tM like tMre 11ndertu.n oaly 
durint the dry montMr otMr .. 1. ectivitie1, l\lch &1 
cloth and f11hioaincJ the 
v1riou1 •18borat• or.,.....t, carried in battle and the 
-.cinificent f .. tber ba1ddre1H1 worn for danci"f, could 
have been performed .. rlftl) the HCl111ion in the yfu. 
ft'9 IYl\Dll' in '*ich wv ,... ~cted eppear1 
to have allowed ttloae wtlO wi1hed to do eo, to find conetant 
.mploymnt in wer. Oeneal09ie1, pertiC11larly of ,!12 
clan 1ectioa1, often record the ,,..., of 1nce1tor1 who 
either never -.cried, or el1e •vried but had no off1priftl), 
bec1u1e they devoted their live• to war. ltori•• of the 
f.inou1 Inawi wv leader, Ai•• OU'u, tell of how he vould go 
alone in 11vch of ICl9le battle: if he could find none, 
he would prowl tba no-11111• 1 land betw.en Jlekeo and lloro 
territory, •talkiftl) 11neu1pecti"9 victial. righting took 
pl1ee between indivi .. al vill99e1, between the two Jlekeo 
tribe• (the fioufa and the V•'•I and -.•in1t the coa1t1l 
tr1be1. The truly wvlike ito loeia and hi• lien could 
usually be 1ur1 of findiftl) 90lle fight they •iqht join in. 
A w1r chief would not liCJhtly initiate • battle, for if h~ 
were the in1tig1tor he w11 obliqed to repay tho11 who c .. ~ 
to hi• 111i1tance with an expen1iv• 1eri11 of fe11t1. 
In addition, he fir1t had to 1ecure the perai11ion of the 
fa'aniau chief, who w11 1lw.y1 reluctant to 1t1rt • wv. 
The fa'aniau chief could aleo refu1e per•i••ion for the 
war chief to act u the ally of another, •• any auch 
involvenient could rel\llt in repri11l1 upon hi• own villaqe, 
but he w•• unlikel:t to do eo provided he waa 11ti1fied 
that a 1Uitabl1 payment, in the fora of • 9rand f1a1t, 
had been prmi1ed, for whatever ••t w11 earned by the 
iso lOfi• w .. 9iven to him. 
• 
• • 
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Oii tM ~i• of 8"ailaltle .. 1d1nce it i• not 
po••ibl• to eetw.te •• tlr tlae praplll'tion of time 
allocated to .,... •t it u -idmt that ritual preparation 
and the feute ti.et follDI 1d tlae bettle, in ecldition to the 
fi9hti,,. it .. lf, co.ld totally 1b1art a ...,. •• 
plaf9d en ' racteat pen in the lt ... of all. 
eneqi•• and 
"'8 9ap left 
by the r.-ovel of tllie ec111plex of aetivtti•• ..... a large 
one to fill, llllt it ••t be r•eliMd thet the ce1eation of 
tribal fi9hti .. hell• eumuletive, not en •nz1diate effect. 
Tribel f'9hti119 hell been r.aved at a blow, but 
th• ritual• and cere110ni•• of wer, ..tlieh accounted for 
mo1t of the time occupied by it, 1ttll r ... ined, and 
continued for 11any year1 to play a 1ignificant part in the 
life of the e •nity. "'8 peace llade with tlw government 
can have .. 1r1d no different, at fir1t, to other 119r....,,t1 
111ade in the puts vill ... r• r••umed their nor11al peace time 
occupation1, without reeliainv that they would never aqain 
qo out to blittle. "'8 9reat feaat1 held by the i10 lopia 
continued lOftCJ encMMJh for the old .. n alive toct.y to have 
·.itne11ed ther in their youtll. b!I mpec:iali1t1 er• Hid 
t0 ~ave emploY9Cf their protective ehanla and 1pell1 during 
the Second 9'orld War. 101 a.our1 wr• abroad in December 
1971 that all the .f1i1 end war chief• 1hould ~· ready to 
90 to Port J1Dre1by to counter a po111bl• invaeion of Papua 
by Indone1ia. War 1N9ic end ritual are •till pre1erved 
a9ain1t the day when they will ac,ain be needed. Villager1 
say that all that di•• ... • th• from Httli119 1core1 in 
the old sanner i• the proxillity of the 9QYer ... nt. 
101 See belCM 22>-•• 
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lillch of the tille formerly 1pent in preparation 
for war wa1 eventually converted into lei1ure. The rituals 
nece11itated by war .. ant that the men were confined to the 
~ for lonq period1 durinq which they re1ted, qo11iped 
or occupied themaelve1 with handicraft1, The1e times of 
c~se and lei1ure were 1piced by the thouqht of the coming 
conflict or the po11ibility of an enemy raid, and were 
inter1per1ed with 1horter periods of intense activity in 
fightinq, clearinq qarden1, building hou1es, hunting or 
preparinq for a fea1t. Even when it finally became obvious 
that the ju1tification for long interval1 of comparative 
inactivity no lonqer exi1ted, it i1 under1tandable that the 
men continued to follow, or to prefer, a mode of behaviour 
to which they had alway1 been accu1tomed, 
Possibly, for a time, more energy wa1 devoted to 
feasting and peace time ceremony, but it seems unlikely 
that any elaboration of these practice• took place. The 
feast1 observed by Gui1 in the late 18901 are such carefully 
embellished and finished products that it seems impossible 
to regard them as a brief flowering of ceremonial following 
102 European contact: certainly the pattern observable 
from that time on is one of decline. Whatever time was 
immediately available for other pursuits was probably 
absorbed by the new demands and activities introduced by 
the white man. Mission and government relied heavily on 
villagers to provide bearers to transport their 1upplies and 
to furnish timber and labour to build their stations. The 
~ission needed labourers, teachers and catechists. The 
government insisted that villagers build roads and enforced 
102 Guis 1936: 136-45. 
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new •tandarda of villege cleanlineaa1 hou•e• had to be 
replaced more often and ce11eterie• had to be cleared 
and maintained to aatiafy ita ideaa of health and hyqiene. 
Official reporta llalte brief reference• to incr••••d 
garden• and to the enthu•ia•tic planti119 of the new varieties 
103 of veqetable• and fruit introduced by the 9overnment. 
Thouqh it ••e111• likely that the population would 
have increa•ed after the impo•ition of 9overnment control, 
there i• no evidence of increa•e until the late 1940s. 
With the endi119 of warfare, the death rate mu•t have 
dropped: and it aeemm hi9hly probable, a• informants claim, 
that the birth rate incr•••ed a1 men found it no lonqer 
necessary to be in perpetual readine•• for war. The 
introduction of more efficient tool•, combined with the 
fact that there wa• now more freedom to work in the 9ardens, 
would su99est that people were able to produce more food 
to support a larqer population. There were, however, certain 
limitation1 actin9 a9ain1t any 1udden increa1e. The death 
rate in Melane•ian warfare i• known not to have been very 
great, a sinqle death bein9 sufficient to sati1fy a raiding 
party or to terminate an open confrontation. Any increa1e 
in the birth rate wa1 limited by traditional re•trictions 
over sexual intercourse until the previous child wa1 
approximately a year old. If the parent1 cohabited before 
the stipulated period, it wa1 believed that the child 
would never develop properly. The fact that many people 
103 BNG Annual Report• 1892-93: 51. 
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•till obey theM re•tric:tion• i• evidenced by the age• of 
. 104 
their children. Pood prOduction w .. dependent not only 
on the c~ity of the .. n but al•o upon the VOllen: thouqh 
the .. n •iqht have been able to clear lar9er qarden• with 
steel axe•, the V!Clllen'• ability to plant and .. intain 
them had underqone no c"-nqe. In cc 1>n with other 
similar proc:•••e•, the ri•e in population wa• the re•ult 
of a •low acCU1111lation of chanqe. 
Lik-i•e, the re110val of warfare •truck no 
immediate blow to the •ocial or political •tructure of 
the society. Thouqh it waa an i111p<>rtant in•titution, war 
did not a••ume for the Mekeo the •iqnificance which it did, • 
for example, mong the Purari of the Papuan Gulf. When 
tribal warfare wa• forbidden to the Purari, the whole 
political and cere110nial •tructure of their highly complex 
society withereda even before the Second world War, much 
of the old way of life wa• already qone ..-.~ the traditional 
105 political and •ocial unit• were di•inteqrating. 
In contra•t to the Purari, war did not provide 
the cohe•ive force in Mekeo mociety, nor the centre around 
which the re•t of the •ociety was •tructured. The po•ition 
of Mekeo leader• did not depend in any way upon war, their 
special power• c ... from an entirely different •ource. 
War involved elaborate ritual and ceremony, but it wa1 not 
the only focu• of such activitya a rich peace time culture 
104 The aqe1 of children recorded in the Inawi household 
cenau1 bear this outa these aqea were only eatimate1 
but firm statistical data could have been obtained 
by checking the eatiaated ACJ•• against the •i•aion 
records of births. 
105 Maher 19611 36-55. 
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exiated which centred uouncl the 1oeit ft'!!!ie. 
Ultilltte •thority htd tlwya been held by the pe~ chief. 
•nd petceful tctiYiti••· tt l.,.t in theory. were held 
to be auperior to war. Ptr from irreptrably dm19inq 
the fabric of aoc:iety. the ceaaation of var •lloved t~ 
reinforc ... dt tnd underlininq of certain iaportant valuca. 
The laatinq petce which hAd been ••tabliahed enhanced 
the ideal concept of tuthority. repreHnted by the lORi• 
fa'aniau tnd the aoc:ial vtluea 18aociated with it - peace, 
harmony. 99neroaity tnd CJOodlitill. The preaent concept of 
ch1eft1inahip, tnd the .aphttic inaiatence on ita beni9n 
a•pecta. ia, no doubt. ltr9ely • crettion of the chtnqinq 
empha•i• in vtluea which the new aituation brou9ht !bout. 
Previoualy the concept htd been 11e>re COllplex - the dtrk 
and liqht •idea of tht chieftainahip beinq repreaented by 
the qualitiea exeeplified in the wtr chief and the peace 
chief reapectively. 
'ftle tr!ditiontl atructure of le!derahip vaa able 
to adjuat without • qreat deal of difficulty to the 
impoaition of control by • hi9her authority. Hlvinq turned 
the new aituation to their ~dvantaqe by uainq it to underline 
the benef icient aapect of their role, the traditional 
leader• adopted the attitude that nothinq had really chanqed. 
They retained their authority and the new reqime poaed no 
threat to them, aince it cletrly ahared the •ame aima. 
Thi• illuaion of atability and per111nence wa• to aurvivc 
several decade• of alow ..... inqly unillpOrtant chanqcs. 
• 
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!11.ATIC!!l !mm •n •p1 • 1,.1M11 'l!for• 
the !IE th! qoyvg nt ••!J!d th! ptople to do 
too •=b !OQ - now itt 90t 19 bed.' 
vII.LMJDI r·••-lll'Dl•ur that in th! year• before th! lecond 
world War, in ~tieular th! 1920! and 19JOa, th! CJOY•rn.ent 
treated them harthly and ll9de exce11ive demand• on t"-. 
It ,,,.. that llMy, if not the .. jority of •~an• wre 
left much to th telvea duriftCJ thete yeara, Md that th! 
wh1te re9ille only occa1ionelly intervened in vill..;re affair•. 
For IOllle the •'9rant labour ay1t• provided more knowledve 
0f the white llM'• world than th! intermittent contM:t! 
with mi11ion and 9overnment1 1 otbtra had clo1e relation1 
w1th mi11ionariea, but rarely • ., a patrol officer. 2 
Whatever the acc:urM:y of thia general iflpre11ion, it i1 not 
true of the Mekeo'a experience. They were 1ubjected to 
~onatant pre11ure, particularly from the government. 
Convin~ed that th! Mekeo'a 'chronic lasinea1' alone 1tood in 
~r.c way of econo11ic develasment, the government wa1 
determined to u1e force to inculcate the nece11ary habit• 
0f indu1try and enterpriae. Probably nowhere el1e in Papua 
l was Murra~ 1 doctrine of 'ealvation throu9h enforced labour' 
more stronqly adbtred to or more 1tri114J!ntly applied • 
•• 
-· 
1 For ••maple, th! Purari of the PllpUan OUlf. Maher 1961145. 
2 For ex111ple, th! JCaani who inhabit the foothill• of the 
a.ten Stanley bncJe• to the nort~eut of the Mekee>. 
Van Rijawijck 19671 77-8. 
3 Healy 19621108. IH alao Kil•• 19561318-28 • 
• 
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"'9 r cal ~ tM dietrict ltas 'cuartU'a to YUie 
Ialand 1n ltol all1111 •• a Wlef rupit•r for we than a 
decede the n 'eo ••en • camfortaltl• .... lniatrative 
b.c:kvater. "'9 nti.oa we aow oanaidered to be firaly 
1nder control', requil'iftlJ at the llOSt a routine ,.trol 
once every fflW -th8. Uftl••• - vill.,. dispute erupted 
into violence, ..,,.ral llDl'lth8 •i9"t pas• without a ein9le 
patrol dieturbinf the no&"llal pattern of •ill ... life. 
Since 90Yernment demande were fflW, people Md little 
difficulty in ... tin9 thea1 providint prior warnin9 waa 
given, road• could be quickly cleared, pi9 feneea repaired 
and the villate ..-.pt in readineaa for the ,.trol officer'• 
inap.ction. leport• of the early 1900• uaually Coll 1nted 
favourably on the state of villatea and the conduct of the 
villaqe conetablea. 4 "'9 etandarda of individual officer• 
varied, of COUl'Hr lliut •hould the newcomer find fault with 
5 the diatrict, he eoon .. ttled .. ttera to hi• own aatiafaction. 
The exploration of the rMC)ea north of the Mekeo 
plain had bec)un in the late ll90e. Carriere froa the coaat 
and the Mekeo wre used on aountain expeditiona, which 
became 11e>re frequent ae new areu wre opened up. The •iaaion, 
lackinq the .. an. to coapel vill~er1 to carry for theta, 
4 
5 
Papua Annual a.port• 190S-61 281 1~07-81 57r 1908-91 
60; 1913-141 27. 
Thi1 ie aleo true of later yeara. When A. Liaton-Blyth 
took over u AM ICalruku 1n 1923 he coapared the Mekeo 
unfavourably with the llOrthern Dietrict1 Patrol to 
~ivori and Wailla 17-19 Feb. 1923. A fflW aonthe later 
he COllCJl"atulated lt••aelf, 'J n aore than plea .. d with 
the preeent condition of Melleo vill ... • and roada - they 
nearly ....-oximte the I .D. and the advance lately ia 
qood.' Patrol to the Mekeo 22-27 IOY. 1923. 
• 
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cut trail• Md .. i.o,red pea •'•la to llllfPlY ita wanta1n 
' 1t•tiona. TM fOUW t. bauaw•. ooati•ed to nly 
1olely on hma· porter ... .atil tbe i.te lNO.. fta119h the 
co•etal men did DOt ._.,_. •11 under wantain ooaditiona, 
'.hey wre .,... nli•l• t.._ the newly coeUc:ted -nta1n 
. 7 
'.nbe.-n ....t heavy calla .._. • ..- oa tham. Oee .. ionally 
·he Jllekeo wuld ebow tbeir dialilse of tbia duty by deMrtirMJ 
t patrol, but until tbe lt20. the IOftr.-.nt' a requir-.nta 
"ere u•u•lly •t without proteat. 
Little attention wee paid to the eeono.ie develosi-ent 
)f the r99ion after llac:Gr990r'a retir-.nt in lltl. '!'tie 
Hall Sound COllpally acquired a bloc:k of fr .. hold in 1902 for 
a pl•nt•tion - the only privately owned plantation ever 
I ~1tabliahed on llekeo land. Though fertile, 1111eh of the 
;: la1n w•• 8Vmp, and the arable land waa not auffieient to 
9 
allow European devel0Fm9nt Oft any 1U'99 aeale. Deaultory 
"!fort• -r• Mete to enforce C00011Ut plantincJ under •ative 
Rt>qulationa in the early ltooa. A report of 1912 obaerved 
·hat tr•eka on both aide• of the river were now lined with 
10 
c.ewly planted eoc:onut palur but it •••• that for the 
• ime beinq theH tr .. 1 Mrftd a deeor•tive rather than an • 
"Conomic purpoae • 
• , Dupeyrat 19351 322-3. 
See, for umple, Patrol to Mt YUl• 16 llay-15 .July 1911. 
Subdiatriet Office Land Fil••· 
Mac:Gr990r reported after hie firat viait to the r99ion 
that land w .. not available for a&ropean ••ttl ... nt. 
Britiah •ew Guinea Annual lteporta 118C)..901 19. 
,, Patrol to Wailla and Mekeo 27 llov.-15 Dee. 1912. 
• 
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fte u.trodllctioe of Mti" tautioe in 1919. COllbined 
with tbe .. ti" •1-tetione Ordinance of the pr-ioue ywar, 
aarkecl tM t of • new policy toward• native 
.,ric:ulture tbr0U91'Dut ... a. 11 The tu wu conceived 
prillarily .. an incentiYe to en1111 vill.,.re 110re actively 
in the cuh eca y. lel)ulatione 11nder tllich the plantirMJ 
of •co-ic crope could be enfarced had uieted eince 
Mac:Gr990r'• timer the •lantatione Ordinance wu introduced 
ae an alternative ••• of -.urint that vill.,.re paid th• 
tu. It provided that the CJOVU._t could eetablieh 
plantation• on Cron or native land. the produce of which 
would be ehared equally by the cultivator• and the CJOV•r ... nt. 
All able-bodied •n would be c .,..11ed to writ on the 
plantation for eixty daye a year and tw -the work would 
entitle a 11an to a full r..Ueion of hie tu. DurirMJ the 
1920• field etaff in 11any part• of fapua attellpted to 
pro.ote indi1•ou• cuh croppint 11nder the new ordinance 
and earlier retUl•tione. 12 The reeult• of thi• well intentioned 
but c11188y policy were not 1111preeeive. lxperimente with 
n- crope euch u rice and cocoa had to be abandoned in 
mo1t ca .. •r llOl'e e11cc••• wae experienced with copra but the 
dieaetroue fall in copra price• in the late 1920• dieco11r~ed 
villa9ere and field etaff alike. lefor• the outbreak of 
war, nearly half of the 112 htive Plantation• procla1-d 
ll in the 1920. and 19JOe had been reecinded. 1Vo project• 
aurvived the war - the l9n9ara coff .. plantationa of tho 
11 Milee 19561 Jl~21. 
12 Ibid I J21-6, 
ll Ibid I J24, 
14 llortMra Di•triet ... u. n I eo rice indu•try • 
lit 
.... U. tam .... fir.t iMra•cad •ny 91'GU .. tMra 
&11 ;ted. or penitted to .-y at r9dlaced rat••· u the only 
way for thmi to._. nab-. by w ... l9our. The llakeo 
tMra alwym ,..._ired to .-y the full mount and the MXimm 
.. naltiea ware • r~••d on defaaltera. The toV•rwnt was 
c01Winced that fiMPle wuld haft no difficulty in rai•i"9 
their 11 .. r air 1r 1 they could •ka eopra, Mll 9arden 
produce or cultivate rice. 15 The •i••ion had introduced 
rice cultivation in the early ltoo. and by ltlt Mny 
villat•r• tMr• pl .. ti"9 rice for dalleatic uae. 16 The 
90Ver1111ent w.e keen to ... it becc•• • caah crop but field 
1taff tMre doubtful whether the tax alone would be auff icient 
110tivation. CDnnelly, the acti"9 Alll. warned that the 
Nakao had 10"9 been accuatmed to an indolent way of life 
and -ld not reedily undertake the labour to increaa• 
rice production when other, euier, Mana to earn caah 
17 
were available to thmi. Ilia au99eation that the crop 
1hould be br011CJht under •.tive Jletulationa waa in line with 
18 the prevaili"9 policiea of enforced develop119nt and waa 
14 Mair 19481 to. 
15 Patrol to the llakeo 12-17 JUly 1924. 
16 A patrol report of 1911 not•• that a atore houae had 
been built at In•i to atore 'a lar99 quantity of rice' 
9r°"" under the •i1aion'1 directions Patrol to Mt Y\lle 
Di1trict 6-28 Oct. 1911. Villa99 tradition• alao record 
the fact that rice cultivation waa fir1t introduced by 
the •i11ionarie1. Patrol officer• e1tiaated that 
approxillately tw.nty ton• of rice tMre harveated by 
villaC)e 9ro 1r1 in ltl9. Patrol to the coaatal villate• 
6 llov.-16 Dec. 1919. 
17 Patrol to the coa1tal villat•• 6 llov.-16 Dec. 1919. 
18 Mil•• 19561 31~27. 
• 
uo 
ertdccMd "1 ._? 'c .-re. 
tlaroufl9out tile 1120. a nc:ce .. loa of a-. per.-ered 
with e SJlW'y rioe powiaf. Yill ... r• Md produced. without 
aupervialoa. betll 11n tllirty-five and forty t:ou of pad~ 
rice ~n tile ltl ... 20 aeallOl'l.lt TM next ye• wy aub•tantially 
increued pl•ti ... 1 JftMri Md tan acre• pl•ted in •il 
lt22. while laipe 1'911 fifteen to twenty acre •• 20 A •lllllP 
in intareat ooiac:idad witll tile _,.ointmmnt of a new MIC. 
Li•~lyth. faople ecmplainad in lt2J that tlley previou•ly 
21 planted a lot of rie. blat tot nothi"9 in return for it. 
InllWabui vill ... W9a ao diatU•ted with tile •ituation that it 
would not even take tile trouble to harva•t it• crop. 22 Aa 
tile _..ini•tration 1'911 !lade no •ran91r1nt• to ••11 th• rice, 
whatever people produe.d u c.,. their aubei•t•nce requirwnt 
-nt to weata. llyth'• •c:ce•aor. Fawler. wu not prepared 
to li•ten to exc:uM• and took a mch harder lines patrol 
report• of tile a1d-lt20. are f\111 of reference• to 
23 pro•ecution• 99ainat defaulter•. TM threat of 9aol kept 
villa9•r• workinci. but there wu no otller incentive. not 
•v•n the tu. to produce a .rplu• which could not be aold: 
19 Patrol to Waiaa. ltivori and llakao 4-25 May 1920. The 
crop vu planted in Dec:eabar or January. at the beC)inninq 
of the -t Ma.on. and harv••t•d in JUne. 
20 Patrol to Waiaa. ltivori and llakeo 1~28 Apr. 1922. 
21 Patrol to IDilloi and llakao 1-10 reb. 1923. 
22 Patrol to tile llakao 16-26 JUly 1923. 
23 '"• for a z la. Patrol to lliddle llekeo Di•trict 
J-1 JUna 1t25r Petrol to tile llakao 29 JUly-4 Au9. 
1926. 
Ul 
in theM year• people Mr-4 their tu -.y not fr. rice, 
but by .akint copra or workint u W1J8 labourer •• 24 De8Pite 
the deteninatioa of ... like Fawler, plantint• .... to 
Mv• dec:reaMd. lwi, ffX ex z le, h-4 
but only five in lt27, vhile Aipea11a h-4 
ten acre• in lt22 
25 
only three. 
'ft'9 tu w.a a very artificial •tilllllu• at be•tr 
thou9h it fore.cl Yill ... r• to participate in c .. h croppinq 
and VacJe labour, it failed to create any inter••t in the .. 
nev activitie•. VillaCJer• llade no eecret of their di•lilte 
of th• -anre. 'ft'9 Mii reported in rebru•y lt24 that the 
Mekeo a• a body, convinced that the 90ve~nt could not 
26 
qaol th .. all, intended to refu•• to pay their tax. luch 
ru1110Ur• -n « "' enou9h but appear to have had little 
foundation in fact. People parted vith their 90ney 
reluctantly, it i• true, but the tax va• alvay• paid in the 
end. The fir•t tax patrol of the year, .. nt out in .January 
or February, u•ually collected only a frKtion of the 90Unt 
due but all had paid up by the •econd or third patrol. 
The edllini•tration'• att .. pt• to force econo11ic 
developMnt coincided vith it• 9rovint dependence on the 
Mekeo and other coa•tal people for carrier•. As control 
over the •eattered 110Untain tribe• va• •trentthened, patrol• 
27 
la1tin9 from tvo to five 810nth• beew c;cr •n, and in 1925 
24 Se• belov1 136-B. 
25 Patrol to the llekeo di•tlict 14-20 llay 1927. 
26 Patrol to 110U 19-20 Feb. 1924. 
27 Patrol to aoilala Di•trict 20 reb.-6 Au9. 1918r Patrol 
to ICUnillaipa valley 15 Jlay-·7 Jilly lt22r Patrol to 
1Cunillaipa valley 31 llay-2 Dec. 1923r Patrol to Jlafulu, 
Goilala, Ononthe• ICallbi•i, ltailapa and Ollali 6 reb.-
ll Apr. 1924r Patrol to Onoft9he, ~i•i and O-li 
17 llov. 1924-31 Jan. 1925. 
' 
U2 
21 
• police c.., wa Mt 11p in the OOilala. The neceaeity 
of eupplyi"9 the police c.., and estended patrol• fram the 
coaet, dianapted routine adlliniatration in other ..-rt• of 
th• dietrict and placed an intolerable burden on ti.. llekeo 
and lloro, who wen oblited to provide carrier• in ner 
increaai"9 llUlllbera. A diatruatled Ull proteated in 19271 
'IUYlllll' c.., requir....,t• interfere 
conaiclerably with aiy other won in thi• 
diatrict, and the native• are utterly 
di9911ated over ti.. continual call for 
carrier• to the llaiuntaina.29 
Coaetal carrier• tranaported eupplie• over the firet 199 of 
th• journey fra11 the coaat until the firet llOUntain 
••ttl ... nt• were reached. ••trol officer• att.-pted to 
••cur• local carrier• wh~••ver poaeible, but often none 
could be found or proved eo ue•l••• that th• C089tal Mn had 
to be retained tor the entire trip. 
TIMM demand•, in addition to cc ; Llleory rice 9rowi119 
•nd th• tax, 'be9an to •train villacJere' patience. Por two 
dec•d•• they had supplied tranaport to th• 110Untaina1 now 
they be9an to object. fatrol officer• of the 1920• conceded 
t~t there •i9ht h•v• been• 
••• wore• carrier• than the ICEICBO • aoao. but 
they would indeed be hard to find.JO 
C•rri•r• deeerted patrol•, if 9iven th• leaet opportunity, 
•nd were likely to bolt •t the firet •i9ft of daft9•r: they 
qrulll))led about poor ration• and heavy loade, and fuaeed 
28 Papua Annual leporte 1924-251 ll. 
29 Patrol to the llekeo Dietriet 14-20 llay 1927. 
30 fatrol to •ara la-24 llay 1929. 
UJ 
owr •irar lnjuiee ••t•tr1ll dlri .. t._ joaner. Jl 8uap1• 
officer• chMrtally ridiculed ~ t. 11e-.tour tlllicta 
•• d undi91tifW md effete. 9- tone of the follawi .. 
•xtr.ct la typlcal1 
I we able to diep•••• with the whole of llJ 
Mekeo carriere. 9- wether ... vvy cold, 
and eo 9lad wr• the llelceo people to be 
reliev.d, that they toolc to their heel• 
1 diately I Md announced the fOOd we 
to them, and there tollowed the ep1ct.cle of 
r./cpl ler..,a chuint the•• •n with a btll) of 
rice for their uplceep, but hie call• only 
.. de them run futer. The llelceo people haft 
a real ~ror of the cold .:>rninf• in the 
Mountaine, aftd I ~211 .. to t•t rid of them. They have no heart. 
Yet the ... report• reveal that the carrier• -r• often 
expoeed to appallint conditione1 
The rain continued heavily and cold blaet• 
of wind from the llUlllMIPA did not illprove 
the intenH cold. IVeryone euffered 
coneiderably, .:>re ••pec:ially the carriere, 
who in the eneuint thrH houre before c.-p 
wae pitched at 7,000 ft,. bee-. eo -ak 
bee .. •• of the cold and hunter that number• 
collapeed and had to be relieved of their 
loade,ll 
Followin9 the COllPl•tion of euch patrol•, the dietrict 
office often received ru110Ur1 of ••riou• illne•••• or 
14 even of death1 occurrint allOnt•t the returned carriere. 
ll See, for exa11ple, Patrol to Goilala 14 Jan.-10 Peb. 19221 
Patrol to the llUnillaipa Valley ll llay-2 Dec, 19231 
Patrol to <>nonthe• -..biei and O..li 17 llov, 1924-ll Jan. 
19251 Patrol to JCaru ... and Loloipa 29 lk>v.-22 Dec. 1925. 
32 Patrol to llUni, Dilava and llafulu 15-25 Oct. 1925. 
• 
Jl Patrol to llUnillaipa, Loloipa and Mt Ylll• 19 Dec. 1929-
l Peb. 1910. 
34 Patrol to Jtaru ... and Loloipa 29 llOV.-22 Dec. 1925. 
lU 
UndOubteclly tbe ooutal -.. ,._ wn 9CC:Uetamecl to flat 
country ...S • bot. lulid cl~•. fOUDd tbe 9INll•aaae 
very hard 90iaf1 the full effect• of ..,.•••tion. •••• .. n 
and of injuri•• c•••d tty fall• on tbe euep. •l'rr1ry 
track• wr• prolluly often not eYident 1&11til tbe .... 
returned heme. lcme officer• _.. lifht of tMM claim 
but it i• evident that deathe and injuri•• did occur. 
Durint a .. trol to tbe JWliaai .. and a.ru .. dietrict• in 
December 1921, one carrier wae killed end one WO\lnded in 
1kinai•he• with newly eontact•d mountain tribe ... n.>5 
Field etaff wr• conc:erned priaarily with 99ttint 
a job done and had no time in -r99ncie1 to 981Ploy 99ntl• 
,.,.thod1. Heedqllartere wu .,.re, how9ftr, that ite polici•• 
had placed an unreuonabl• burden on the people of the 
di1trict, in particular the Jlekeo and lloro. Jt.irray ~itted 
that he had alwye looked upon the 1yet• of tauNn po/t•r..,. 
J6 
u1ed in Papua a• 'rather a die9race', ltepe to alleviate 
th1 1ituation wre taken in 1926. taarray .,..-,need in the 
1926-27 aJbdietrict Annual leport that carrier• employed in 
the JCairuku ..Wietrict would in future be paid for their 
1ervic•• and that a mule traneport eyet .. would •hortly be 
l~ Patrol to ICuniaai .. end JCaru ... Dietricta J-JO Dec:. 
1921. The previou• year the Alll inve1ti9ated an incident 
in which eipt carrier• died on patrol. It 11ppeare that 
a 110untain villAIJ• afflicted by an apid9ic of .... 1., 
v .. raided at ni9ht to obtain carriare. !Walva .. n 
var• taken end a fMt hour• later aipt of thell died, 
apparently frOll the effect• of th• di••••• cOllbined 
vi th expoeura1 Patrol to Pana 1-20 Apr. 1927. The 
officer raepon8ibla for the raid later ra•i9fted, Papua 
Annual bpe>rta 1926-271 12. 
36 taarray to liahop De loi...,.u J •· 1926. Pll Archive• 
G69, 
• 
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37 introduced. ..ither .. aaure aucc .. ded in aolvin9 the 
probl ... and the uaual eo11plainta concernin9 carrier• continued 
Villa9er•' attitude• were little chan9ed by the inducement 
of caah payment• for llOUntain journeya. 
complaineds 
One haraaaed officer 
Even at the rate of 1/- or 2/- a day they 
run -ay. I would adviae that all future 
partie• who may wiah to CJO up the mountain 
road. come here with 1i9ned-on carrier• 
from elaewhere.38 
The e1tabliahment of the mule aervice in 1927 afforded aome 
relief, but the pack animal• alone could not cope with the 
growing traffic between Kair~ku and the mountain diatrict1. 
In the mid-19301 ARM Thompaon, who wa1 anxious that hi• new 
rice project ahould not 
39 
on mountain patrol1. 
be diarupted, employed only pri1oner1 
But it was not until the late 1940s, 
when air 1ervice1 to the Goilala cOlll.'llenced, that the Mekeo 
and Roro were finally freed from thi1 wearisome and unpopular 
' corvee. 
New efforts were made in the 19301 to eatabliah a 
Mekeo rice indu1try. The haphazard method• of the previou1 
decade were replaced with an organized plan under the 
guidance of one man, W.H.H. Thompson, who waa AIM JCairuku 
fr an 1929 until after the Second World War. When the 
world-wide fall in copra prices began to affect village 
37 Kairuku Subdi1trict Annual Report• 1926-27. 
38 Patrol to Nara 18-24 May 1929. 
39 Patrol to Roro and Mekeo 14-23 May 1935. It is not 
clear how long Thompaon continued to use prisoners 
on mountain patrols; another reference to the uae 
of priaonera occur• in Kairuku Patrol Report ll, 
1939-40. 
126 
producer• in 1930 and 1931, 
found difficulty in raiaing 
the Mekeo, like 110at other Papuana, 
40 their tax. In •ny part• of 
the country there wu no alternative to copra: the earlier 
effort• to prOllOt• native aqriculture had to be alac:kened 
41 
or abandoned but no auch reapite frOll the qovernmient'• 
heavy-handed econo11ic policy waa allowed the Mekeo. 
Thompaon waa ad..ant on thia points 
I let the MEX!O know that they would alwaya have 
to pay the Tax. Ric• ia no trouble for the11 to 
plant and they can alwaya make their nioney that 
way. That ia the aolution of their difficulti•• 
in the future over the TaX, they MUST PI.MIT 
more rice or qo to qaol.42 
Previoualy villaqera had qrown rice in their qardena: 
Thompson inatructed them to clear apecial rice plantation• 
or 'companiea' which he pl~ed in the charge of the aenior 
43 
chiefs of each villaqe. To ensure that every ataqe of 
the cultivation waa properly carried out he kept a cloae 
watch on the people, sending out hia police to auperviae 
the work when he himself could not do ao. The firat crop 
was harveated in JUne 1932. Villaqera aold ninety-four 
tona of paddy rice to th• qovernment, which ahipped it to 
44 Port Moreaby for millinq1 after tranaport and millinq 
45 
costa were deducted, qrowera received a total of £389. 
40 Patrol to the Mekeo and Roro Diatricts 9-17 Jan. 1931. 
41 Milea 19561 323-6. 
42 Patrol to Mekeo and Waima 8-18 May 1931. 
43 Patrol to the Mekeo Villaqes 10-19 Nov. 1931. 
44 Kairuku SUbdiatrict Annual Reports 1931-32. 
45 Ibid1 1934-35. 
(.I 
U7 
Field 1taff optiai1tically e1tillated that the 2JO acre• 
46 planted for the nut Haeoft would yield JOO ton1 of P9dcfy. 
'ft'9 1Upervi1ion of the project h.il now becc.e eo 
47 
t1-con1uai119 that a aaropean manager waa appointed. 
The 1Upervi10r' 1 1alary and the co1t1 of a truck (purchaled 
to collect rice froa the vill19e1) wre to be deducted from 
th• llllOUnt paid to 9rower1. 48 In llay 19JJ villager• hU'Y91ted 
u ~ 300 ton1 of 9rain but eold only 191 ton1 to the CJOY•rftllent. 
The additional co1t1 now borne by the 1chelle, plu1 a fall 
in pric:e1 re1ulted in 9rower1 receivinq an 11110Unt 1li9htly 
amaller (tJJ6) than they wre paid the previou1 year, thou9h 
51 
they had 1old nearly twice 11 naich rice. People 'llMr• now 
holdinq back a large proportion of the crop for their own 
use, •• the wanen had di1covered that it va1 a highly 
profitable and ea1ily portable c:Qlllll!Odity to exchange at the 
regular market• held with the Roro.52 
• 
46 Patrol to Wai .. , Kivori and Mekee JO Jan.-2 Feb. 193J. 
47 The manager v11 appointed in ti .. to 1upervi1e planting 
for the 1932-33 1eaaon. The fir1t reference to hi1 
pre1enc:e in the area occur• in Patrol to the Waima, 
Kivori and Mekee 30 Jan.-2 Feb. 1933. 
48 Patrol to the Mek•o 13-20 Dec:. 19341 Kairuku SUbdi1trict 
Annual Report1 1933-34. 
49 Patrol to the Mekeo 18-20 JUly 1933. 
50 Kairuku SU6'1i1trict Annual Report1 1933-34. The 
figure• given tend to vary from report to report •• 
1ome quote figure• for milled rice, other1 for unmilled 
grain. 
51 Kairuku SUbdi1trict Annual Report1 1934-35. 
52 Patrol to the Mekeo 18-20 July 1933. 
-------------- _____________________________ .... 
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l.u9e .... -r• plmited in lllW-..r end DIC Dir 
19JJ, but of u .. timted 240 ton1 of ~ harveeted in 
53 54 June, only lOI ~ IOld to tha CJOVU ... nt. After 
co1t1 were .. ta di1appointin1J total of 1251 r ... inectr 55 
•• a re.ult .any 91'ower1 found thn1elve1 without wffic:ient 
ca1h to pay thair tax. sYidently mo1t had u1-4, on the 
9round1 of pa1t experience, that if thay eold ten bacJ• of 
rice they would receive enou9h c:a1h to cover their tax. 56 
Villa9er1 were puaaled and entry when the 90vernment took 
their ten bacJ• and de9anded in addition that they pay the 
full 20/- tax. n..p.on att .. pted to explain the 1ituation 
to th-, pointin9 out that they had really brou9ht the 
cri1i1 on their own head• by not 1ellift9 1nou9h ric:e to th• 
government to allow it to c:over c:o1t1 and pay a r1aeonabl1 
57 profit to the 9rower. leverth1l111 hi fully 1ympathiaed 
with their di1appointm1nt and c:onfu1ion1 
I c:an't •••how they are 90ift9 to pay th• 
balance of their taxr they 1ay they were a1ked 
to plant rice and now the Gov1rl'll9lnt ha• a lot 
of it and 1till they want to put them in 9aol 
for not beift9 abl• to pay thair full tax of 
20/-. I .. inclined to a9r•• with the nativ11 
53 Patrol to the Mlkeo and the Mountain Road 21-28 Juno 
1934. 
54 J<airuku SW>di1tric:t Annual Report• 1934-35. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Patrol to the Mlkeo 13-20 Dec:. 1934. 
57 Ibid. ft 
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and think ..-.thing 8hould be done to '•ave 
our fM-e' in their eyea. It ia a treat pity: 51 
The project vaa allowed to lapee for a Muons 
the truck and the a&ropean auperviaor -r• r.-ed. little 
r:learinq wa1 done in ~ bar and 0ec:..-r l9J4. and no att-.pt 
59 
waa 111ade to force pl antinq. When people one• 1t9ain had 
difficulty in payincJ their tu. 'l'toemp.-on took the opportunity 
• 
to 1u99e1t that rice 'ti the odly solution to their probl .... 
Arran9 ... nt1 -r• !lade with the •i1aion to buy the crop and 
the police were Hnt out in llovellber to atart vill1t9era 
60 
c leer inq new areu. Deapite the people' 1 recent eJCper ienc:ea. 
• 61 
no proaecutiona 89ain1t defaulter• -r• neceaaary. After 
~.arveatinq a "'•apei- crop in llay 1936 9rower1 aold Mventy-blo 
62 
:ona to the aiaaion. which ran ita own •ill and purchaHd 
rice from individual• in tha vill1t9e or at ita •ill. 
cnencumbered by the eJCpena• of the manaqer'• 1alary and the 
runninq of the truck. the project now pro1pered. 
One hundred and fifty tona of 
•he mi11ion in 1938. reali•il'ICJ l520 for 
rice were aold to 
63 the 9r~r1. 
58 Ibid. Mil••' explanation of th• failure of the project 
in 1935. which ia drawn entirely fro11 the publiahed 
Annual Reporta. ia ai1leadinq. The 1ch.-. collapaed 
primarily becau1e it could not aupport the expenM of 
the man1t9er' a aalary and the coat• of runninq a truck. 
Mile1 19561 325. 
S9 Patrol to the llekeo 25-9 Mar. 1935. 
60 Patrol to the Mekeo 5-9 Auq. 1935: Patrol to Mekeo 
22-5 Nov. 1935. 
61 Patrol to the llekeo 22-5 llov. 1935. 
62 Patrol to ~ivori. wailla and llekeo 11-19 May 19361 
l<Airuku Subdiatrict Anmaal bporta 1936-37. 
63 Patrol to the Mekeo 6-10 Oct. 1938. 
lJO 
• 
Police _,.nleioa of pl•ti81. clwlnt and Mne9tiat 
continued, but fte a 1an ruely, lf ....-, had to inwall• the 
penal auc:tiona nail.a.le to Ilia."' !her• wr•...., •l9M 
that the people .. re takiJll .. indap1n~1nt intere1t in 
the crop. Th ;1an 0-.rved in January ltlt a u.n 
c0111P9titive 1Pirit bett ••n the cliffer•t vil1..-• over which 
had cleared the 1....-at pl•tation and people infoned bill 
that they bad planted l•tu areu than 9"r before. 65 
*1ch of tbi1 intereat be attributed to the action• of the 
villacJ• con1t.a>le11 
Some of the Vill ... conat.a>lea do CJOOd work in 
the rlc• plantln9 and J f .. l aure that it i1 
due to their afforta that the rice ia a 1ucee11, 
thi1 of C011r11 COlllblned with the watchful eye 
of the CIOVerNllllt." 
several private plota of rice, quite aeparate fra11 the 
cc-Alllll.lnal 'c soani••' ... r. planted for the 1939-40 ••aeon 
67 
by villacJe conat.a>l•• and other individuala. 
ThallplOn took more trouble to underatand th• Mekeo 
than hi1 predece110r1. Hi• ,reater under1tandi119 of the 
local 1ituation ia revealed by hia involv ... nt of vill199 
leader• in the rice project. Ravi119 9iven th• aenior 
ehief 1 reaponaibllity for th• plantation•, 'ftlollpaon 
explained to them that the crop waa their property and that 
they could 1ell u much of it a1 they wi1hed to the 
-64 DDS • llA to Director DASI', 22 llOV. 1946, DASP File 
l-2-6r Pt 1. 
65 Patrol to the llekeo Diatrict 25-9 Jan. 1939. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Patrol to the llekeo 30 Oct.-22 llov. 1939. 
• 
lJl • 
.. 90••-t· ...... •1111t.d tllat tMy ..,.lei place 
t.-.00• oa the rice • tMt it Wllld llOt all be ca119u1 II in 
do9e1tic ···" l•illllt.I ..eta .... ,. cllci11oa to mile a 
9ift of wt to the lllilder• of a fCW•ll rnt re1t!MluM. 
after learnint tllat title we tha practice nonally folloi 111 
by the «*118r of a .,., "°""• 70 dr •aatrate hi• deain to 
reapect local cuatOll. VndNbtedly ha attmpted to ... the 
villlC)llr'• point of viw. and ha paid clo• attention to tha 
explanation• of local attitude• 9iven by hi• aoro clerk ed 
71 interpreter. Leo. Unlike previou1 officer•. !hi.,,.on •• 
noth1n9 aeditioua in tha t11keo'1 dialia of the t-• 
I cannot help llavint a certain a.aunt of 
1ympathy with the lllkeo • aoro in hi1 attitude 
of intenee hatred of the tu. it i• of courM 
1 platitude to af f ira that no tax i1 popular 
anywhere. but thex htY! reuont for their 
dialike. Pmpaa for hill doe• not exi1t. ha 
car•• nothin9 for anythi119 outaide hi• own 
vill&CJll and hi• own tribe and probably never 
will. We come alo119 and take hi• money. a fw 
•ativ• llldical Patrol• and a ..-ar-pu1111 or two 
are the only outward and viaibl• •itn• to hill 
of any benefit• received in the lut 16 year• 
or ao of the tax. In truth they do not 9et -.ich 
.ore. apart fraa a certain ~nt of •dical 
aid frOll uaL than they did before tha tax c ... 
into bei119. 7 2 
68 Patrol to tha Makeo 1~19 •ov. 1931. 
69 Patrol to ....... and aoro 12-23 Jan. 1932. 
70 Patrol to llekeo and aoro 21-9 May 1930. 
71 &ee. for ex rl•. Patrol to wa111a. ~ivori and lllkeo 
JO Jan.-2 Peb. 19llr Patrol to tha lllkeo 11-23 
May 1935: Patrol to the lll'Uo 25-9 Mar. 1935. 
72 Patrol to the Makeo 11-23 May 1935. 
• 
1J2 
lie deplored tM 1acll of • _.. effectl•• lncentlft to Mn 
llOftey, •ell u • wll etoelled trade •tore ln clOH proalaity 
to tbe llekeo Cat till• tlM tbe near.et trade at«•• -r• 
on Y\ale laland or Oft tM cout). lJ 
ftaa~h be r.,ntted tbe UM of force, .,,... !h a eon 
did not doubt lte neceaelty ln tbe 9beenc:e of other lncentlvea. 
once tbe rlce we harfteted and aold be found that •111-..r• 
were pleaeed wlth tM reeulte1 crlea of 'lice loplano', 
74 
th• rice i• fOOd, "°"ld be heard eYerywbere. Yet police 
auperviaion wu alw.ya nec:eaaary to en•r• that the crop 
wa• planted. .. Nrvelled at tbe 'weird Mntality' of 
people who ti.d to be driven out to •tart cleui"9 tbeir 
plantation• but than carried on happily and enttueiutically 
7S with the work. A patrol officer eupervi•il'llJ the project 
in 1938 reported1 
••• I wu ••••d at the apirit of the native• after 
beil'llJ eent out to won. lnet•ad of the 
dia91'11ntled apirit one would expect, the•• native• 
invariably were enjoyi"9 the work and the areu 
could 99nerally be located by tM •il'l9i"9 and 
ahoutil'llJ of the native• at wor'll. 76 
LOnq experience convinced 'l'hollpeOn that the people did not 
reaent hi• policy of enforced plentin9, but actually 
reaponded beat to thi• Mthod. He bee- one of the atronqeat 
7J Patrol to the llekeo a-ll OC:t. 19ll. A trade atore 
vu "t up near Jenbeibua vill999 in 19ll• Patrol 
to the llekeo a-14 J\lne 19ll. A later report refer• to 
a 'well eatabliehed atore near Jeeubaibua' run by 
Ste ... hip'e Tradil'llJ Company1 Patrol to Paitana, Wailla 
and Mekee> S-lS June 19l9. 
74 Patrol to ltivori, Wailla and lle'lleo 11-19 llay 19l6. 
75 Patrol to •ta. lltivori, llMeo and ~buna 27 OC:t. l9l6. 
76 Patrol to •*• ltivwi and lle'lleo S-17 Oct. 19ll. 
lJJ 
advoc:at•• of tlle •'-' tllet the *keo h..s to be c- a 1lled to 
worll for tbeir «Mt fOOd, believint tbat CD11pUlaion -ld be 
77 
nec:eaaary for at i ... t a ,...ration. When plan• were beiftlJ 
made after tbe wr to rewiM tbe rice ac"-, he aol.-nly 
warned aqat.n.t r '¥iDIJ tba penal aanc:tiona under which it 
71 
ti.d alwaya operated. 
The llekeo are quoted 
admini1tratively 'hard' people 
by llealy aa an ea911Pl• 
79 
at thia time. It i9 
of an 
certainly true that .. ny 90Y9rn.ent officer1, particularly 
of the 1920a, conaidered the llelleo difficult to handle but 
when th• evidence ia .... ined in detail little ju1tification 
for thi• vi- can be found. Apart from one brief, violent 
outbreak of eult activiti•• in 1941, 80 one look• in vain for 
any 'incident•' or rebellion aqainat the 1JOY•r1111ent. 
Villaqera never retuMd in a body to pay tax, •• patrol officer• 
alway1 1•.-.d to fear they -ld1 individual• avoided carryinq 
if they could, but the villa,. aa a whole never att9111>ted to 
stand in the patrol officer'• wey. Aa in earlier year1, the 
only re1i1tance the IJOY•rl9eftt encountered wa1 pa11ive and 
unorqani ll9d. 
Healy obaerv•• that the acmini1tration felt that 
there wa1 1011ethiftlJ radically 'wronq' with, or potentially 
77 Patrol to waiaa, ltivori, Melleo and ltllbuna 27 Oct. 193&. 
78 DDS " KA to Director DAIP. 22 Nov. 1946, DASF Fil• 
l-2-6F Pt 1. 
79 Healy 19621 60S-07. ... below1 179, fn 26 in relation 
to hi1 ccaa1nta on the tt.keo vill•9• con•tabl••· 
80 Se• belows 154ff. 
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11 dancieroua about tM 11911eo. l'rior to the l1c:ond tlDrld War 
when c: •nicationa were alow and unreliable mMI a •re handfU l 
~t police and a.rope .. officer• controlled the entire ICainaku 
s·~bdiatrict, • c ...... atively 1-.., hi9hly concentrated 
;oopulation auch u tM llekeo wu al-ya a potential trouble 
spotr had the peopla b1c:c 1 reative it would have been 
, xtr•ely difficult to deal with thell. ,,.. c:onatant preaaur•• 
•·xerted on the llakeo and the cl1111ay, repreaaive •tl'IOda UNd 
•o impl.ment vcwernment policy, 9ave villater• CJOOd reaaon 
for diac:ontent. ,,.. .. cireumatanc:ea probably explain why 
field ataff were uaually ao apprehenaiv• about the reaponH 
'. •.ey vould encounter a .-re that their demand• -r• exceaaive, 
· '1ey -re anxioua and unaure of their ability to cope with the 
'1tuation ahould a vill.,. of four or five hundred people 
r11e aqainat thell. Consequently cloae attention wa• paid to 
,. ~'1\0ur1 of illpendint defiance, and any ai9na of unwillinqneaa 
·o comply with the 90Y9rrment'a wiahea -r• reqarded with 
:eep suspicion. Tho•• officer• who deacribed the Mekeo aa 
· c:1fficult' did ao pri.llarily becauae they felt villagers did 
·.ot respond with aufficient alacrity to their order• - an 
a:t1tude which ia clearly revealed in a cc1111nt by A. Lyston-
:il;·th, AJtM Kairuku in the early 1920a1 
The native ia a different type [from thoac 
of the llorthern diatrictl, 1110re educated, and 
lazier, and far too 11Uch inclined to try to 
evade their villaqe duti•• on the ac:ore of being 
Chriatiana, they do not underatand that an order 
is an order aa the llorthern aan doea, and it 
requirea c:ontinuoua tellint and drivint to 9et 
anythint out of th .. at all •••• 12 
~1 Healy 19621 622. 
~2 Patrol to Kivori and WaiJla 17-19 l'tlb. 1923. 
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'"'9 trec:t81• 'nati"' lulMf tbllt _.•order wu an order' mid 
did not aeek to ..-etioe it1 U.0• lia the Makeo. ~ dared 
to complain or perfocaad their dlltie• wit!I a viail>ly bAd 9race, 
were coneidered not ..rely difficult, but potentially dAngeroue. 
The ~iniatration alwaya •••• to have .. ~ that th• Mekeo 
reluctantly ahoulclered the yoke of a&ropean control and 
were only waitint for the firet opportunity to rid thell•~lvc• 
of it. 
Vill..,.r• 9ave vivid deacription1 of the pre-var 
year• - eapecially of the 1920• and 19JOa, when today'• 
elder• -r• youn11 -' in their pr1-. In reapect to detail, 
their account• atrH cloaely vith official report•• the 
difference li•• in the interpretation each 1ide put• on the 
sa111e eventa. ~ 90Yerllll8nt had been convinced that it• 
polici•• vould ultillately illlprove the people'• way of life. 
v1llaqer1, even in retroapect. could '" nothin<.J of advantaq<' 
•o th11111selv•• in the taaks i11PO•ed on thell. 
If the tax benefited anyone, it wa1 the qovernment. 
An Inawi elder en ranted• 
The <bverrment wanted to 9et 110ney, 10 they 
wanted llOMIY from the people. The people were 
aayin9 that the money i• llede by Dlropean• ao 
better to 9ive thell back vhat they rade.Bl 
A •imilar opinion wu expreaaed at Aipeana1 
Myaelf, I don't 1tnoW t!I• rea•on why we paid 
tax. Ne only 1tnoW that the Villaqe Con•table 
told ua to pay but - didn't knov the reason vhy. 
We qot nothi"9 for the tax. We -r• juat afraid 
of bei"9 put in 9aol, ao - paid it.84 
BJ o.P., Inawi1 J Mar. 1971. 
84 A.v •• Aipeana1 24 Oct. 1971. 
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r1eld etaff Md a1wy8 etnued that there wu no difficulty 
for the llelwo to find _,. to raiH caahr in contrut the 
old •n I haai• how hard it wu for them to earn -.-y 
and how unreaaorable tba CJOWti"_,t•• attitude .~ to 
They juet broutbt tba tax into our area vithout 
->tint the Wiiy for ue to 99t money. Therefore 
they wre aietaken in thie. At that tim -
had no corr ... no copra, and no other crop• to 
get 80MY but they •MPW"ted ue to pay the tax.85 
Another infonaant cleclared1 
I don't knov 'lllhy the .;.over.,..nt forced u• to 
pay tax. W. u"d to .onder vhy th•lr' _a•ked u• 
that vhen we didn't have any 80ney.• 
The oldeet ..n recalled that they -re not -de 
to pay tax until two or thr" year• after it va• fir•t 
introduced1 even eo, fw of them -r• prepared to pay vhen 
their turn c.... .... eold their docJ•tooth necklace or 
shell anal•t• to the parieh prieet in order to get the 
..,oneyr other• vere HVed frca 9eol at the la•t minute by 
relative• runnint after the tax patrol to pay them off. 
cnmarried youth• ueually earned their fir•t tax 1110ney by 
worltinq a• caeual labourer• on the aieeion plantation, Maiera, 
1r on one of the eeveral privately owned plantation• to the 
'a st of the die tr ict. Until the introduction of the tax, th<' 
~elteo had •hown th ... elv•• extr ... ly reluctant to •ign on 
u indentured labourer•. IV•n under pr•••ure fr0111 the tax, 
they would accept terae of no lol'llJ•r than •ix aonth• or a 
1ear, and then only on plantation• clo .. to heme. Mo•t -n 
. ,ere unvillint to leave the vill99• at all once they -re 
85 L.A., Inawi1 4 Jlar. 1971. 
q& X.L., Aipeana1 27 Oct. 1971. 
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marrieds wried ... ,callaa1d _.dried aopl'a or .... periodic 
tripe around ti. local p1-~iou Mlli119 betel nut to the 
worlter1. Thi • • •riw.1 related by Illa Vi' i of Aipeana are 
~ypical of thoM deKru-1 by met info1"11Mt11 
When I had to pay llY fir1t t .. rather Vital• 
lent • tl to pay llY tu t11caaM I had been 
helpiftf hill. I wa helpiaf Pather by Mki"9 
fence• for ti. pi91 and caw1. lleJlt r-• l -nt 
to worlt at Ufttabu ... plantation for thr-
.ontha and I 90t 11.2.0. Aleo - -r• paid 
with ration1. Then I worlted there for another 
thr .. mntbe bee••• ay f ir1t pay I 9a¥• tl 
to rather Vitale, to pay back the money he 
loaned •· and 2/- to ay mother. Thin the 
next y.ar I went to 'll\lle leland and 1i9ned on 
for on• y.ar to WOl'k for the aieeion. I ailked 
the cowe. I kept ..,.. money from worki"9 at 
YUl• to pay ay t... llheft I had finiehed that 
money I heard that ..,.. people -re Hllin9 
betel nut at ICanoHa, eo I took ICllle to •ell 
there. I 90t about 10/• or tl for a bet and 
that i• how I paid llY t... Thi• wa after I 
wae urried. Aleo I ..._ copra and eold it at 
livotoi and then later at fllpanina. _.ti•• 
I 9rew rice 811d eold it at lrilaftf• and 90t 
110ney to pay llY t ... • 7 
• 
rhi• continual round of activiti•• to earn t .. money wae 
.,othincJ but an j JCl9ition, an 11nweleo11e di1ruption of the 
1ormal courH of vill..,e lif•1 people hed little or no deeir• 
·o ecquir• cuh for other and1. They devoted to copra 
·croduction and _.,. la""Nr only the ain1- tiM nec:eeeary 
· c earn their tl per annw1. Pew, if any, thou9ht of aakin9 
.ar9er quantiti•• of copra, or of 1pendin9 more than eix 
·Jnths to a year on a plantation in one 1tretch. Men would 
eturn to their vill9991 after a few monthl plantation worlt, 
•avinq their w.qee to cover at leut two y.are tax. When 
~ppli•• -re exhaa1ted they would reluctantly 'ai9n on' once 
~7 Alla Vi'i, Aipeana1 24 Oct. 1971. 
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• 
.i;ain. The returnift9 wrura .,..t1-1 purchaaed trade 
s ~ore it-• auch •• a mo91111ito net, an axe or a blanltet, 
.t informant• atreaeed that llDn•Y waa far too hard to com<> 
to waat• on luxuri••• 
If we found £2 - ltept it to pay two year 1' 
tax. We didn't buy tea or euqar or flour 
but ju1t ltept the monelafor tax and we at~ 
only our villaqe f0< d. 
· c·ople were not unintere1ted in the thi119a that caah could 
them, but the effort nece11ary to acquire money wall simply 
• worth the trouble to thell. At the rat• of 11/2d per 
,•,.; nd, 
. ·. t~e 
which wa1 the price local trader1 paid for copra 
89 late 19201, 1everal week• continuou1 labour were 
· .,ccssar1· for a man to produce £1 worth of 1un-dried copra. 
~·.c :,·ounq man who wa1 forced to abandon the qay and carefree 
· "!c of an o'oae90 for th• unaccu1t0111ed drudqery of plantation 
: .iLnur, found the eaall ca1h pa}'lllC!nt he received at the end 
f •welve month1 no wort!Nhile recompen1e. 
The tax, failinq to promote any spontaneous rnt er<·>;t 
. '· ~he ca1h econ0111y, 1erved merely to create a sort of 
1c1ous circle - the threat of qaol drivinq th<· (><'<>ple to 
3r•1cipate in new ac:tivitie1 which they disliked, in order 
•.!arn money which they did not want, to pay a tax wt11ch they 
. : not w11h to pay and frOll which they aaw no advantage 
... ~.c;.iselvea. 
Compul1ory rice qrowinq wa1 1een in much the silmc 
r~s a1 the taxi it involved a lot of work ilnd in the end 
··-·· I.O., Inawi1 l Mar. 1971. 
·, Patrol to the Mekeo and loro 16-25 Jan. 1930. 
·' ___ S(!~-"~Y_e1-_~I. _____ _ 
only the qovernment profited1 
I had to wor'k on the rice, there waa too mch 
work to be done ao I didn't li'ke it. After the 
rice waa harveated, in order to keep it aafely, 
we had to collect A:!2!!, and atitch ti- toqether 
to make a container to atore the rice. Thia 
took a lonq ti• and it had to be ready before 
the harveatinq or th• rice miqht be apoilt by 
the rain. The people were tired of the rice 
and they v.re anqry with the Govern11ent for 
makinq th• qrov rice. I don't know vhy the 
Government made the people qrov rice, probably 
the priaoner and vorkera at J<airuku -re abort 
of rationa ao the Government wanted the rice. 
Before the War the Goverment aaked the people 
to do too much work - now ita not ao bad. 91 
139 
some informant• could not remember ever beinq paid for their 
rice and denied that they qrev it to pay the tax. Othera 
had clearer memoriea of the rice acheme in the 1930s: they 
recalled that at firat they -re qiven a qood price for their 
rice but after one or two aeaaona the qovernment decided not 
to pay them, thouqh it took the crop and inaiated that the 
?eople paid their tax money in full. Puzzled by the 
government'• apparent chanqe of heart, many people suspected 
~hat they had been deliberately mialed: 
We don't know why the Government didn't pay for 
the rice. We were afraid of beinq put in gaol 
so we didn't complain about it. Therefore after 
that we didn't want to qrow more rice to qive to 
the Government but we juat qrew a little for 
ourselves. Some of my people thouqht that the 
Government was trickinq ua and telling us lies 
and takinq our money. I think that too.92 
of all the taaka imposed by the pre-war adminiatration, 
~arrying was the moat disliked. The old men give lively 
91 L.A. Inawi1 4 Mar. 1971. 
~2 A.v •• Aipeana1 24 Oct. 1971. 
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de•criptiona of the horror• of the 110Untain patrol• which they 
experienced u yollftCJ -n. The cold, -t -•ther, t:he •teep, 
muddy tracka, the heavy la.da, the -•qre ration•, the lack 
of any •helter 99ainat the wind and rain at night, the 
ferocity of the llOUntain tribe• - all COllbined to make 
th••• patrol• niqhtllare journey•s 
The carqoea were very heavy, - bed to keep on 
carryinq all through the day, - hated climbinq 
the hill• and the aiddy place• and the rain and 
the cold. Solla people qo~ •ick up there but 
medicine wu given to them when they reached the 
mountain atationa or when they qot home, •o they 
got better - but aome died. I hurt my ankle, it 
was all 11WOllen up and I couldn't walk on it 
properly but the Siater gave me aome medicine. 
ourinq my father'• time one O&i•alt• man died but 
during my time nobody frOlll thi• village died but 
only got aick. People frOlll other villages did die.93 
Another informant exclaimed1 
Everythinq about the carrying •••med bad to us: 
The road wa• muddy, the loads were very heavy, 
the food wa• not enough for u•, there was no 
place for ua to •leep - ao I can't •ay which was 
the wor•t thing.94 
Villager• remember the introduction of the mule service but 
declare that it did little to help thing• as the volume of 
goods being tranaported to th .. mountain• kept increa•ing. 
Some men claimed that they went to the mountains only a few 
times becau•e they alway• hid themselvea in the bush when 
the police c.me to recruit carriers: others admitted that 
they de•erted patrol•, or prote•ted by refusing to go any 
further. But moat informant• argued that there was little 
point in tryinq to avoid carrying: somebody had to go and 
93 L.A., Inawi1 4 Mar. 1971. 
94 K.L., Aipeanas 27 OCt. 1971. 
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if one un refuaed, hi• brother or hla uncle ai9ht ba taken 
inatead: in any cue he would ba taken to 9aol when he waa 
cauqht. There w.re waya, however, to get even with an 
• over zealou• patrol officer. lnforaanta deacriba with .. ch 
lauqhter how the atronqer -n would ... that heavieat loade ~ 
were talten by the _.lleat, w.akeat Mn, and then ti-aelwa 
deliberately wallt u alowly u po••ible. Often they would • 
steal the food froa th• boxea they carried, replacinq it wfth 
stone• ao that the lo•• W011ld not ba noticed until the 
boxe• were opened. It i• difficult to determine how often 
an individual wu called upon to carry. lnforaanta' ••tiutea 
vary, but the followinq,atat ... nt, thouqh it exaqqerate• 
to empha•ize the point, accurately reflect• the •entiaent• 
of the majority1 
We alway• had to carry - up and down, up and 
down, every yaar while l wu a younq man. 
Sometime• mountain carrier• helped u•. l went 
about a hundred time•. 95 
In an article entitled 'The Di•tanc• between the 
Government and the Governed', J.P. Mc:Auley arque• that the 
pre-war reliance on human porteraqe in the J<airuku Slbdiatrict 
was larqely re•pon•ible for creatinq the 'floor of congealed 
resentment' aqain•t which relation• with the qovernment 
96 
operated in the 1950•. Clearly the Melteo had 1U11ple cau•e 
to complain of the pre-war policy of enforced labour. The 
old men make their di•lilte of the tax, carryinq and compulaory 
rice growinq perfectly plain: yet the tone of their account• 
is hardly what McAuley, or any other out•ider, might expect. 
96 McAuley 19541 815-20 • 
• 
I 
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one look• in vain for any real venom or re..n~t in their 
statement•. Infoiwiant• r~ded .. 11111•il'9 or •illply fooli•h 
sugge•tion• that the people •itht have conte111plated ..-. eort 
::if re•i•tanc• ACJaiMt the C)OWrn.ent' • ... ur••· 'ftw elder• 
lJ1si•t that the chi•f• alway• .upported the villAf19 con•table 
in urgincJ the people to ... t the 90vernaent'• deaanda. People 
~ated carrying, it i• true, but they reCOIJlli .. d th• nec•••ity 
::if the measure and did not fffl that they -r• being 
v1ctimi .. d1 
EVery village in thi• area had to carry, not 
only the Mekeo, we -r• all treated the .... 
The Governmnt h~ to 99t cargoe• carried .. 
•ome Goverrment and Ki••ion •tation• -re in 
the mountain• and who would brincJ the food to 
them to eat? lo the Government told u• to 
carry the food for them.97 • 
This acceptance of the 90vernmnt'• action• underli•• all 
accounts. one infor111ant patiently explained1 
I didn't think anythincJ about payincJ the tax -
they told u• to pay the tax, •Owe paid it. 98 
Another •uccinctly •u11111ed up forty year• experience of 
~rowing rice for the governments 
I don't know why they made u• grow rice, but 
whenever they aaked to grow rice, - did it.99 
Thompson had noted at the time that villager• did not appear 
to resent compul•ion.100 ~rpri•ingly, the view• which people 
express in retro•pect •eem to •upport hi• ob•ervation•. 
97 M.P., Inawi1 14 May 1971. 
98 Ibid. 
99 K.L., Aipeana1 27 Oct. 1971. 
100 See above 1 132. 
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Vill ... ra did not willinvly undert~ the teak• 
impoa•d on thellr they hed to ba bullied or cajoled into 
action. They t'm1alvea would not deny th• fact. What ia 
• important in their eyea ia that they ,W pay the tax, !W 
carry and ~ plant rice - deapit• their diataate for the .. 
activiti••· By 8Cknowledfinv the authority of the whit• 
regime people had both .ccepted and illpoaed obli9ationa • 
• Traditionally, thoa• in .,.thority poaaeaaed the ri9ht to 
command obedience and to require certain aervicea or duti•• 
but they did not uae the•• power• capricioualy or for their 
own agrandia-nt. The ri9ht1 of authority -r• balanced 
oy responaibilitiea. Thou9h th• chief controlled the labour 
and economic reaourcet of the clan, he .. ployed hi• privileqea 
~ot to feed himaelf and hia entoura9e, but to 9ive feaata 
which were •••n to benefit th• whole clan. In the•• teraa, 
·he government'• ri9ht to make certain d .. anda waa accepted 
but somethin9 waa expected in return. In the firat year• 
of contact the 9over1111ent had played a role not inconaiatent 
with the traditional ideala1 101 by the 1920• thi• waa no 
longer ao. Villeqert found it difficult to underatand why 
they should ba burdened with taak• which -re of no intereat 
or benefit to theaaelvea: yet if the qovernment waa 
sufficiently preaainq they finally 9ave in to ita d .. anda. 
'l'he queation of compulaory labour and the ua• of 
force need• to be put in proper perapeetive. People ll&k• 
much of their fear of 9oin9 to 9110l, atreaaing that defiance 
was unthinkable in the face of certain and aevere puniahlllent. 
Awareness of the real-politik which dominate• colonial 
relationship• tend• to obscure for the outaider tho inference 
101 See aboves 95. 
• 
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behind •uc:h •tatnrrta. It •mt be kept in •ind that the 
lopia dealt out mch harllher .ad more final retrillutlon1 
the mociety endorlled the ri9ht of .uthority to enforce it• 
102 
will. Without the pa 1r to cc O•l obedience, the 90¥erwnt 
would lwlv• .c ·nd9d ac:.at reapac:t. Jn thi• HRM, ftalpaon 
wa• correct in claiaint that vill..,.r• did not reMnt beint 
turned out to work on the rice plantation• (thou9h thia ia not 
to •ay that force Hrv.d u an effective incentin to econoaic 
develo~nt). Jn retroapect vill..,era condr n the fOY•ra11ent 
not for what it did, but rather for what it nec)lected to do. 
They did not object to the \IM of force per ·~ but to the 
government'• avoidance of it• r••ponaibiliti•• to thell. 
Thouqh they ~ •t their obli9ationa by CC1111Plyi79 vith the 
demand• of the whit• revt.. it had ahown little concern 
for their wlfar•. and had offered no recoa+en• for their 
labour•. -
The requeata of the aiaaion wre •••n a• ••••ntially 
no different froa thoM of the qovernaent. The 9overa.nt 
in•i•ted that vill..,•r• 9row rice and pay tax. the •i••ion 
asked people to 90 to church and ••nd their children to 
schools one waa CJOV•rr.ent. the other mia•ion work. Thi• 
attitude i• indicated in c< ant•• frequently heard today, 
that many of the old waya -r• abandoned aa a 'faYOUr' to 
the mi•aionari••· People uaert that tho\lqh they aw no reaaon 
to give.up their cuatoaa. the pariah pri~~ pleaded with thell 
for so lonq that finally. to pleue hill, they qave in. 
Villaqera had no intereat. on their own account, in the 
activitiea introduced by the whit• r99iae. Given th• choice, 
they would have preferred not to have qon• out to work aa 
102 See aboves 23-6 • 
• 
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wage labourer• and not to have ••nt their children to •chool1 
· 'iey did theH thint• only bttc:au•• they -r• c;ompelled or 
:~rsuaded to do llO. 
The aiaaion alao found the people unreaponaive, 
· 'iocu~h it demanded far l••• than the 9over..-nt and relied 
~ persua•ion not force to iapl ... nt it• polici••· Initially, 
-1111onariea had no difficulty in 9ainint ace••• to vill.:J• 
2o~'T1Unitie• but after a decede or llO, they beqan to feel that 
·'ie1r effort• had !lade little or no illlpact. Pariah prie•t• 
.bserved a di•concertint •lackne•• and indifference in their 
'locka. Thi• dia•atiafaction va•, at leaat in part, a aymptom 
f the ataqe of development which the •i••ion had reached. 
i·; the early 1900• ita territorial expanaion va• almo•t 
· ,:c;-ilete and the excit ... nt of openinq up new field• for 
·Gnversion ~ .. over. 103 Though the recently contacted tribe• 
.n the mountain• •till offered plenty of •cope for pro•elytizing 
1~al, the time had come to take •tock of the aituation and 
·cnsol1date the initial achievement• - a need underlined by 
• 
, cr-.ange in leader•hip. Forced by ill health to leave Pap..ia, 
Archbishop Navarre tran•ferred full executive authority tv 
·: 3oismenu in January 1908. 104 The young biahop •- .~he 
:~r:--.ation of a vigoroua, active chriatianity aa the mi•aion'a 
··•.• • important immediate ta•k. Convert•, he felt, had been 
· ·:· easily won; too little had been required of them thu• 
. rr,rluc1ng: 
••. dea chretien• indifferenta, flaaquea et mou•, 
refractairea aux devoira chretiena preaque autant 
que dea paien•.1o5 
1 r13 Dupoyrat 1935: 32~38. 
104 Ibid: 352. 
105 Ibid 1 363 • 
• 
He outlined • MW •tbod of ....-oaeh which would rationali• 
the inc:onaiatenciaa of fO&W polic:iea and re911lari• the 
10. 
method• of COIW9raion. ly prcwidint more thorou9h inatnaction, 
and by aubjec:tint exiatinf and proapec:tive eonv.rta to 
•tricter conditiona, he hoped to 9ive villa,era a better 
underatandint of their MW faith. A r9911lar prOfl'• of 
religbla inatnac:tion waa to be introduced u part of •ndav 
worahipa 9radually people were to be ac:c:uatomalt to the 
yearly cycle of clurch feativala, and 9reater effort• wiere to 
be 111Ade to encourage convert• to participate in c• •nion 
and confeaaion. llo adult in tood health would in f\lture be 
allowed bapti• until he had under9one a f\111 twelve montha 
period of inatnac:tion and preparation. lpecial 911Phaaia wa. 
to be placed upon the chriatian ideal of marriager convert• 
who peraiated in irr.,ular uniona vier• to be excluded from 
attendinq church and from workint for the aiaaion. Above 
all, n- efforta would be aade to develop Meuler edlacation 
with the aim of creatint an educated chriatian elite ..,"9 
~he youth, which would provide a aolid baaia for the faith 
in the future. 
The aucc••• of th•M -aaur•• vaa liaited, The 
~i•1ionariea th .. aelv•• v.re •purred on to 9reater endeavour, 
new 1choola were opened and a ai9nif icant increaae in attendance 
of church aac:r .. nta vu achieved but there were atill f-
sign• of any apontaneoua piety or real comait:aent to th• 
faith, particularly ..,"9 the coaatal and plain• villagea. 107 
The hardy 1110Untain tribe• proved more difficult at firat, but 
once converted they dellonatrated far qreater fervour. lven 
106 Ibid 1 361-81. 
107 Ibid 1 382-8. 
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so, ~yperat ob1uved that by the 1930. mountain tribe1 
:1vinq in cloee proxiaity to central •i11ion 1tationl had 
108 101t 1a111thincJ of their initial ardour. 
Thou9h a llOl'e vi90rou1 ca111p&i9n of .c:tion wu 
fellowed after 1908, the ai11ion r ... ined tolerant and lenient 
• :~ ita approach. Attellpt1 were lladl to di11\ladl villaC)er1 
f r0!'1 cu1toe11 which ••••d ura11ually harah or har11ful, 1uch u 
·'le reatrictiona placed on widow• and widower11 but there 
... as little in the cu1t<Jm1 of the llekeo and aoro which the 
-1ss1onarie1 found objectionable - unlike the 110Untain tribea, 
w'-.CJ indulqed in cannibali•, infanticide and other practice• 
ffen~ve to IUrnpean 1en1ibility, Traditional dancinq, 
· ~c bane of eo uny •i11ionarie1, wu not opposed and had at 
'1rst even been tolerated aa 
· ··.·:·.igh thi• wa1 di1continued 
part of religiou1 cer1110nie1, 
109 
after 1908. Thi catholic• 
·,·rre oppo1ed to 1orcery, and recoqnized the village eorcerer 
,, cir.e of their mo1t dangerous en-iea, neverthele11 they 
.·,·1ftl/ realized that any open confrontation of the sorcerer• 
i d h 1 . 110 , -" cc re likely to h n er than e p their cause. A more 
:· :lexible line wa• taken on marriaqe. An attack on plural 
arr1age wa1 made almoat aa aoon •• the mi11ion arrived in 
· c.c area: Archbiahop Navarre had tried to intervene in the 
jrital affair1 of local leader• like Maino of Aipeana and 
111 
•;. ,g,_, of Inawi even in the early 18901, The firmer action 
· .1~cr. after 1908 on thia i1aue waa not without effect a 
'.~8 Ibid1 387. 
:19 SHM Lettre Pa1toral1 lllo,5, 1908. 
: 10 See above 1 102. 
111 Navarre, Note• et Journal: 125-7. 
IDfley bu euweated that tht lapert of cllriatw 
111i11ion1 in llw ~-. c• be partly esplainad in tena of 
the .. 11ianic 9fip1al wbich the •il1ionari••' teac:hil'ICJ• held1 
they ••••d to offer 'a vay of beilllJ lib the whit• ...,. , lll 
There i1, u IDfley -.U••• • 1iailarity in the buic: 
111u11ption• llede by ... ical ~ reli9ioua etiol09i•• eonc...rnil'ICJ 
th• effect of aupernatural force• over .. terial eventa114 
but the way1 in which different culture• attlllpt to control 
and pl.cate the" force• are 1111nifold, u are tht .... of 
tran1111itti1'19 auch knowledfe, Villafera •ifht well reuon 
that the whit• llAl'I'• de¥0tion to cricket or hie preocaapetion 
with ahufflil'ICJ piece• of P9111r in mi office are Ulportant 
ritual• which fora part of hi• control over the Mterial 
world, but thia doea not naceaaarily .. an that the ritual 
which he doe• actually 111ploy - prayer, aacr ... nta and 
wor1hip - are at once r1C0911i&ed a1 auch, or are .ccepted 
to be the real .. thoda he uae1. The llakeo expected that 
the white .. n ..ould ...ablally reveal hie aeereta1 both 
mi11ion and 90V11"nmant 1\-4 arrived bearin9 proai••• of a -
way of life and their pGllMI' to fulfil theM claw waa 
proven by the infinitely auperior weapon• and .. terial 9ocd • 
they brou9ht with them, l\lt th••• hope1 were not placed 
exclu1ively on the aiaaion1 in fact people .... to have 
expected aore fro. the CJOVern.ent, which exacted aore froa 
112 l)Jpeyrat 19l51 l71 fn l, c:oabined fiCJUr•• for 
Diatrict de velfaa and Diatric:t de lnaouaia. 
113 r.ovley 19651 140. 
114 lbid1 132. 
d 
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tmm and.,.. obwi.oulr t1ae .-re 11a •hl •titr. v1111au• 
had l.ittl• rM1 • to Mlieft that tha .,.cific _,. _. 
.. ane of tha -eatu .... • ritual _,.ld be r .... led to a ct.lrch 
concir99ati,n or a claearocm full of children. 1tori•• 
(itonionU aplainint the ori9in of differ•t type• of -.ic 
are told in public but tha actual ..aN of .-cutinl t"- -
the nec••Hry epell lM1t) and potion• <m> - are pueed 
froa on• individual to ..iother in etricteet MCreoy. ueually 
in ac:c:orct.nce with tha accepted pr inc:iplae of hereditary 
1ucce11ion. In the put thar• tMe no initiation of 9roupe 
into the ritual eecrete of the clan euc:h M occurred in 
115 
the puberty rite• of 90lla ... l.,..tian tOCieti••· 
ClbHrvincJ that their effort• achieved l••• reeult 
a1 ti- paeeecl, aiteion and C)OY'er,..nt concluded that the 
fault lay in the obdurate nature of the people thvnHlvet. 
Th• Mekeo, for their part, ,., the thintt required by the 
white .an .. rely .. illpoeitiontr they w.re ttill waitincJ 
for the benefit• he had prOlliHd. They continued to hope 
that ultimately both aiteion and CJOV•r1111ent ~ld fulfil 
their pra.iHe - a hope ~ich vu not to be finally abandoned 
for another two decadee. the villat• leader• ttill 1upported 
the 9over,..nt and urfed their people to obey it, even 
thouqh the original c:onc:ept of co-operation and of a unity 
of purpote between th• t"° hierarchi•t of authority w .. 
now much aore difficult to .. intain than it had been in the 
fir1t yeart of contact. aat beneath the turfac:e, tentione 
were buildincJ up which briefly found expreeeion in a fona 
challencJint both the aaropean and the treditional order. 
115 Allen 19671 refer• to the Mkeo 75--6. 
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((.'TllU.U of tlle eo-calW 'Vllilala •*•••' occvnd ia U. 
!Viteo in ltJt ..t ... ia ia lMl, ft'9 Ml'lier aiou IRt 
or19inated on the C098t Md only briefly touclla4 tlle ialand 
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v1llaqe1, 11,arta reechad ltainaku Wi1trict Office 
ir: Au9111t lt2t tbat the Poro Md .. ,. had been cwwcw 
:01· the eharectariatic 'he~he-90-round' h11taria and 
were ereetint 'wir•l••• poat1' in their vill.,.1 to contect 
the 1pirit1 of the dead. AM 'ftlii ;•on learnt that the 
:u 1 t leader, Bare lkupu of .. iaa, had toured th• eoa1t Md 
t !le Melteo a fflW llOllthe before, preechint that fOOCla Hnt by 
•he ance1tora on coaatal at ... r1 wre beiftCJ intercepted by 
•he Europeana .. vill.,.ra could not read the 1hippift9 
~a;.,er11 when thi• deception wa1 revealed all the white 
-er. would be driven out of the country. The luro and waiaa 
· :llage1 had feted Here, loadiftCJ him with 9ift1 of pi91 
ac.d other food. 
Thompaon wa1 deterained that the•• aetiviti•• 
o~.')Jld qo no further. He prCllllptly arr••t•d lier• and hi1 
· ~h1ef di1eiple', Ar.,ai Aihi of ltivori, 1entencift9 th .. to 
f~~r and two 110nth1 9aol re1pectively for 1preadin9 lyift9 
:"port1. Under police 911ard, HU• aeC011panied Thullp1on on 
i patrol throu9h the affected villa9911 the 'wirel••• 
, · s a• -r• c:u t dolilr'I and Thomp10n explained to the people 
·•a~ the cult prophet• wre not Siad but illpo1ter1 who had 
:·,tbed them of their pi91 and valuabl••· 
Here had obtained few convert• in the Mekeo. 
'!is main 1Upporter waa Auki 117 of Inawi, who reportedly had 
:16 The followin9 account of the c:ult ia ba1ed on Thomp1on, 
Report 1929, 
117 Incorrectly apelt Auk.! in the report. 
1 
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told hi• people llOt to pay tM tu. lloUtint tJaat the 
CJ0¥9rnmnt could not ureet Ilia u the Mndc:uffe wuld fall 
fr'09 hi• wiete if ti.y tried. ft a eon took .. ti•f~ion 
1n di•pC'OYiftf tllia pcap,.cy md r ,.ied the creetfallen 
prophet to t•l. 
llo flarther dietudNlnc•• occurred. th a ion ...-•• 
to Mve dealt with the Mtter without priOI' reference to 
headquarter• and "91 careflal to juetify the neee11ity of 
hi• action•• 
I tn1t thlM forcible •uure1 to rid the 
Di1trict of tbia toafoolery will ... t with 
approval, it want• to be nipped in thl bud, 
•• e110tional people like thl llOIM) llllC.O ai9bt 
with ••M be led into a llOb frensy, with 
di1a1troua re.ult• to an iaolated aaropean.111 
An lnMli chief, Maino Peafu•, ~· an intereatin9 
e,..witn••• account of the cult which tallie1 cl01ely with 
Thomp1on'1 reporta, eaccept for the circu•tance1 of Her•'• 
puni1tw.nt1 
Here I'lwpu c ... to tbi1 vill1199 and vi•ited 
Aulti Al.If•. They heel a kind of 1icknea1, a 
headachl, and the two of thea -r• nnninv 
round the vill&9• and they 1aid, ''"'-
Government i• tellint u1 li••· Don't plant 
rice. IDOn war will 1tart and - will 1top 
carryift9 and atop thl tu.' Then lier• 11tupu 
-nt back to bia vi11&9•· 
Th• aovenment beard about it bee•• the YC 
-nt to report to thea and the oover.,..nt 
c-. to tbia villaqe and cut the f 1&9• down 
and they brou9bt Her• and Auki to ICainku and 
put thea in 9aol. They [Her• and Aukil put 
the flaf up and they put one 1tri"9 (fr'09 the 
polel and be eaid, 'I• tuift9 a •••1198 froa 
thi1 atri"9 - war will ccme and the people 
118 Ttalpeon, .. port 1929 
• 
will •tay witllo!lt tu _. carryiaf. • .. told 
the people tMe la .._t be hNrd frcm tJw 
1trint. • ee> .. a.kl, 'tlhln do you .. t tM 
an_.r frcm7• .. Mid, 'J • r.ttiag the 
an.-r from the eplrite litW • - he told 
thea tMe. All tM people -.r.... . .. 11 
qettint e ••• ... fem our 110ther1 end 
father• ""° hewe die&' . • And all the people 
beli..-d hill. IO the \IC Hid, ' .. will h..,_ 
to CJO to the ADO end e1k hi• if it ii true 
or e lie.' "-' the Gove~nt c_. end put 
t'Mm in 9eol. 
IU Th :,..on Wiit to •1- to .. re' I pl.:. and 
he cut down the flat end he ••r•lled with 
Here, llO they put handcuff• on lllr• end ftl *''"""' 
told the police to cut the flet• down. ftell 
they told lllr•, •You ... t cc.- to Jn.i to ... 
;·our friend.• lllr• Hid, •I don't want to cc.-.• 
So they hit him wery hard and picked 1cm1 
carri1r1 from Weime to brint Hare to eo111 to 
Inewi. They brou9ht him her• end Mr 'fto440n 
-nt to Aldi end they cut hi• f let pole down end 
everyone in the village qot wry frifhtened. 
Only one .,n, Ai•• ~··· did he -ld cut the 
pole down. Ila 1tarted to cut it - it fell end 
then 1tood up in the tround again. They tried 
to pu1h it down but it we• heavy end they 
couldn't, 110 he 1tarted to qat it again end it 
fell on tt. C)round. They put handcuff• on -...ki 
and they brou9ht him to the re1t houN. Then 
they took him to ICairuku end put him in CJ•l for 
two 110nth1. And they put Har• in ho1pitel. When 
he qot better, they didn • t put hi• in 9eol but 
let hi• CJO beck to hie vill8f9. 
SolM people 1eid Auki wa1 tellinCJ the truth but 
other• 1eid he wu lyiftf. They waited until Auki 
came beck from prieon and nothinCJ wry CJOOd 
happened to the people end we were 1till livint 
the ,_.,119 
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~aino'1 detached, elllOet cynicel tone i1 typical. Another 
informant 1tat11 hi1 ac:eptici .. and di1epproval 110r1 explicitly• 
119 Maino Peaf\lau, Jnawi1 14-15 lley 1971. 
The people didn't believe Auki - t'hey aaid 
he waa juat !lad or aick but they juat watched 
what he waa doin9.120 
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In fact, many people ae ... d to find Auki'• antic• almoat 
aa ridiculoua aa Thompson dida 
Auki put up a flaq pole in front of hia houae 
and he waa walkinq around it. The people -r• 
aittin9 leaning against the fla9 pole and 
pretendinq that it waa a telephone and were 
callin9 out hello, hello, hello, to it.121 
All thoae questioned, who -re old enou9h to have participated 
in the cult, declared that they had not been involved and 
that only a f- qullible people had been taken in by Auki. 
Theae comment• need to be aaaeaaed aqainat the background 
of the peraonalitiea concerned and the political iaauea at 
stake. 
Auki waa the head of a group which had broken 
away from the aenior aection of Oaiaaka clan aome yeara 
earlier. The aplit had occurred when the head of a junior 
lineage, Auki'a father, attempted to uae hi• own sorcery 
powera to challenge the power• of the aenior chief. Auki'a 
family succeeded in separating itaelf from Oaiaaka but had 
not established ita leader as a chief. Undoubtedly the 
fact that the cult prophet was alao the head of an ambitious 
breakway group muat have aroused the auapiciona of the 
established authorities, especially the chiefs of Oaiaaka. 
This ia au9geated in Maino'• statement that the village 
constable decided that Auki's activitiea ahould be reported 
to the government before hia claims were accepted& at this 
120 L.A., Inavia 4 Mar. 1971. 
121 M.A., Inawia 25 Oct. 1971. 
154 
time the vill~• con•table wa• C>aike Elopo, 122 the brother 
of the chief of Lal .. , the junior •ection of C>ai•aka. 
EVidently C>aike and the other C>ai•aka chief• had qood 
rea•on to welcome 'ftlomp•on'• proof• that the cult prophet• 
were impo•ter•. It •hould al•o be remembered that Maino 
Peafuau wa• the aenior chief of C>ai•aka and, at the time of 
the cult, the heir pre•umptive. 
One imaqine• that by 1929 the Mekeo would have been 
only too eaqer to li•ten to the culti•t•' promiee• that 
the white reqillle wa• about to come to an end and that the 
people would be freed from the burden• of the tax and 
carryinq. Yet ~ide Inawi the movement received little or 
no support. Even in Inawi no violence wa• c011111itted, thouqh 
some people had been affected by the hy•teria. Accordinq 
to informant•, only a •mall •action of the villaqe wa• 
involved and villaqe life in general was not disrupted. 
The whole affair, which wa• in any ca•e an importation 
from the coast, has a contrived air about it. Thia, combined 
with Auki's backqround, •uggests that the Inawi outbreak was 
deliberately enqineered by an ambitiou• individual who having 
failed to gain recoqnition for his group by ordinary means 
saw in the Waima cult a way to enhance his own •tandinq and 
perhaps qain the advantage over hi• rivals. 
was of 
'ftle 1941 cult in oriqin, 
123 
a very different order. 
scale and inten•ity 
New• of an attack on the 
122 Thi• i• confirmed both by informant•' •tatement• and 
documentary evidence. Patrol to the Mekeo and Roro 
16 Apr.-4 May 1929 refers to Oiake Elopo a• the Inawi 
villaqe con•table: details of Oaike'a traditional 
status were provided by Inawi elder•. 
123 The followinq account is baaed on 'l'hompaon, Report 1941. 
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1nawaia miaaion atation re.ched JCairuku on the 110rninq of · 
• 
15 February. 1hallt>i10n and hi• police imadiately Mt out 
for Inavaia. on arrival they found villaqer• in a atate 
of virtual hyateria1 
••• men and -.n r-linq around aa if drunk, 
coloured rami• di•played aa f laqa and wild 
dancinq qoinq on.1~4 
People were cavortinq around altar• decked with bird of 
paradiae feather• and aurmounted by croaaea. Thompson at 
once had the dancer• diaperaed and the altar• pulled down. 
one man waa arreated for the attempted murder of a prieat 
and two other• for aaaault. 
Thompaon learnt from the miaaionari~• that the 
attack "l\ad taken place the previou• day. A group of aeveral 
hundred villager• had gathered around the fence of the 
mission compound while one Jeaubaibua man, Iova Zlte, entered 
the compound and tried to force 
achool 
hi• way into the church, 
children had barricaded where the nurw 'Wd their 
themaelvea. Hearing the aiatera' acreama, Father Coltre, 
the priest-in-charqe, came running to their aid; whereupon 
Iova aeized a heavy conch ahell which w.. placed near the 
entrance to the church and hit him over the head with it. 
Father Coltre received a aevere cut on the forehead but 
fortunately was able to dodqe the full force of the blow. 
Iova then began to belabour him with a atick while two other 
men proceeded to punch hi.II with their fiat•. As the priest, 
with blood atreaminq from hi• wound, attempted to defend 
himself, a brother and two nun• came to hi• aaaiatance 
and together drove off the assailant•. All niqht villager• 
124 Thompaon, Report 1941. 
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ahouted threat• at the lli.aaionariea, prmiainq that in the 
morninCJ they would kill the lot of th• and burn dawn the 
atation. One •iaaion brother .. naqed to leave the ~ ound 
and travelled all ni9ht to brinq word to ICAiruku. 125 
The attack on rather Coltre waa the C\11.aination 
of four day• of hyaterical behaviour in Inawaia. The 
previou• Monday ni9ht an Inawaia achool9irl had had a dre• 
in which God told her that he would aoon ~pear to puniah 
the wicked people of Inawaia. In accordance with the 
inatructiona of the CJirl prophet, Philo, the whole villa9• 
built altar• to ~ .. e God, and then be9an to pray and 
dance around them. The outbreak of the cult had been 
preceded by rumour• that ln9land waa loaing the war in 
Europe and would aoon be invaded by Hitler. word apread that 
God would aend guna, truck• and plane• ao the people could 
drive the white 11&11 out of Papua1 at firat the ~pearance 
of the truck brin9ing Thomp80n and hi• police w.. CJr•eted 
with applauae, for villa9era thought that their pr0111iaed 
armament• had arrived. Villaqera told the miaaionariea that 
the Japaneae had already invaded Port Moreaby killin9 all 
the European•: only the MM at ICAiruku waa left and they 
themaelvea would deal with him. 
125 Ibid. Accordinq to an eyewitneaa, Siater M. Martha 
of the SHM who in 1969 wrote a ahort account of her 
experience•, the 1ituation waa 1aved by the awift action 
of one of the Papuan brother1. Seeing the 1tru9gle in 
front of the church, he •"ized a 1hotgun kept by the 
miaaion for huntin9 and pointed it at the crowd, which 
at that moment ae ... d al'OUt to 1ur9e into the church 
compound. All the crowd retreated, Brother c .. ille 
and two of the four Papuan brother• took the opportunity 
to leave to 99t help frcx.i YUlf' I1land. Martha 1969. 
157 
'!'he .,,,._nt had apread to Ina1aia • • cloM neiC)hbaura, 
Jeau'baibua and lboa, and to Jnawabl~i. Step• were ir 2 diately 
126 
taken to prevent it apreadinq fur ;her. Tt.cliit>.on a~ned 
the chiefa, village r.~u:it-1>1•• a~1d other not-1>1•• of all 
the weat Mekeo v1~.l14ea t<. a w..1etin9 at leipa, varninq 
them that no one "1aa to 90 ·,o In-aia for a fortniC)ht and 
that any InMtaia people who cmiie to their vill1199 ahould 
be turned •ay. He vaa reJ.ieved to find that all 11PP9&red 
to approve uf th•••·• -uu·:•• and that there vu little 
evidence of L"Y in•~~reat in the mov ... nt on thia aide of th• 
127 
river. 
ThoU9h no further violence vu threatened, the 
propheciea continued in the four cultiat villa9ea. In 
April, tvO month• after the ori9inal outbreak, Tholllpaon 
reported that people had abandoned all normal activiti•• 
for dancinq and •eaurd cere1110niea'1 9ardena had been 
neglected aince February, all villaqe pi9a had been killed 
and no one dared to 90 hunting for fear of beinq turned into 
an animal. 128 The mov ... nt had coincided with an influenaa 
epidemic which vaa now takin9 heavy toll llllOftCJ th• cultiata. 
A total of fifty-one death• had occurred aince January in 129 
Inawaia, Jeaubaibua and lboa, and fifteen in Inavabui. 
Other villaqea were le•• aerioualy affected by the epidellic: 
Thompaon believed that lack of food and exhauation induced by 
126 Patrol to the Mekeo 25-8 reb. 1941. 
127 Ibid, 
128 Thompson to the aovernment secretary 28 Apr. 1941 
SUbdiatrict Office File 7-3-2. 
129 Ibid, 
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the hyateria b..s .. allen1d the eulti1ta' reaiatanc:e. In the 
hope of puttin9 • end to the propheciea, he arreated the 
lJO 
cult leader, Philo, and four of her .. 1. acc0141licea. 
Moat vill-V•• r-.ined aloof from the cult and 
-re now openly acornful of it. Thallt>aon wu 91'atified 
to overhear llCllle leipa people jHrinq at the Inavaiaa1 
Any iron or atorea from Heaven for aal•7 Where 
i• your ahip from Baaven7 Aren't you turned 
into a fiah or a pi9 yat1131 
Por a time after Philo'• arreat the cult 11PP9ared 
to have aubeided1 patrol officer• reported in May that 
thinq• wre returninq to normal in Jeaubaibua and Inawaia. 132 
Juat before Philo'• rel• ... 
1iqna of the ... dne••' wr• 
frOll 9aol in early Auguat, 
133 
aqain evident. People 
believed that the prophet••• waa expec:tinq a divinely 
conceived child who•• birth would augur the downfall of 
miaaion and goverrment. A wild apate of apendinq began u 
villaqera haatened to buy new whit• clothe• to war for 
Philo'• triW1phal return. rearinq that further trouble 
would occur, the Executive Council in Port 11Dre1by officially 
declared the cult a rorbidden Act under •ative "9c)ulation1.134 
Deapite the peraiatenc• of ru110Ura concerning aecret 
cer91C>niea, all r•ained quiet on the aurface. A few wua 
after her rel•••• Philo w.. interviewd by Thallt>aon. lhe 
aaaured him that ahe had recovered from her 'llldne••'• 
130 Ibid, 
131 Ibid, 
132 Patrol to Mekee> and Paitana S-12 May 1941. 
133 Thallt>aon to the aoverrment lecretary 9 Au9. 1941 
SJbdiatrict Office rile 7-J-2. 
134 sibdiatrict Office ril• 7-J-2. 
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I .. fri9htened of 
With t}'ie 8U•peD•ion of civil ~iniatration in r.bruary 1'42 
and the r1 "'al of larte 'wber• of .. n from their vill~• 
to aerv• .. labourer• and carrier• for AllQAIJ, what atill 
r-ined of the cult wu -.pt ,,,,.Y in the flood of new 
experience• brou9ht by the war. 
The .w ... nt llitht 'be aaid to rbody all th• 
'claaaic' eleMnt• of the aillenarian cult• deacribed by 
woraely. 136 The hyateria, th• jettiaonint of tr.Sitional 
good• and tabooe, the inaiatence on a l'l9W 11e>rality, th• 
expectation• of the arrival of -alth fro9 heaven, the 
propheci•• of the U..inent deatruction of the world, 
folloved by a 9loriou• re8Urrection for 'believ•r• - all 
were preMnt. Cult 'belief• centred around th• revelation 
made to Philo that God would aoon vre~ venqeanc• on the 
world: all ainnera and unbeliever• would periah but the 
faithful would 'be re-born. The European• -re to 'be 
driven out, •• they had lied to the people and cheated 
them: CJUn• and other aramitnt• would ahortly 'be aent by the 
anceator•. No one wu to work or 90 to their 9arden for 
the anc••tor• would al•o provide them with food: inatead 
they -re to build altar• and spend their tiae in prayer 
and repentance. An eyewitne•• account quoted by Bel•h• 
relateaa 
In th• year 1942 (r.bruary 1941 in the diary) a 
9irl n..ed Ai•• Piau (Pilo) had a dr• .. that an 
old aan (A'aia, tr.Sitionally credited with 
teachint the 119keo their preaent cu•toaa) told 
135 Patrol to the 119keo 27 Oct.-2 llov. 1941. 
136 WOr•l•Y 1970 • 
• 
her to i.... ber wn Md to tell all tbe 
reat of the people u wll. Tba'y WDllld vet 
food frca the heawena • .taic~ their tr....-••ta 
who died 10D9 .,a would eend them. 'Ibey 
believed the God would tau them to heaven with 
their body and aaul. the rather• mnd li•ter• 
wr• tellint li••· eo they tried to chue 
the aiaaionariea way. and the aky would fall 
on the earth and clarkneaa would ccma. Durint 
the dark all thoM .tao did not believe would 
all die. And tho•• .tao atol• other people'• 
CJOOda would turn into a anak• or a pif. Tho•• who worked would turn into fiah and 
tho•• who did aorcery would alao turn into 
fiah or anak••· !hat atopsiad people froa 
atealint. tellin9 li••• and aorcery.137 
160 
The confuaion. or perhapa aore accurately, the ayntheaia of 
chriatian and traditional belief• ia clearly evident. 
A'aiaa ia euily tranapoMd for Godr a llOd• of thinkint 
obaarvabla today - paopl• inaiat that thou9h the •iaaionariea 
tell th• that A'aiaa ia the Devil, they know that he ia 
really God. The cult'• apocalyptic propheci•• obvioualy owe 
much to chriatian taachin9a concernin9 the raaurrec:tion 
but th• theme of re-birth and raaurraction ia a dallinant 
one in traditional aythol09y. 
The poaaibility of achievincJ i.lllortality by aheddincJ 
or aaaumincJ a new akin, aa th• anak• i• believed to do - a 
motif which woraely ahow• occur• frequently in llelaneaian 
138 mytholoqy - i• the aubject of aeveral reaarltabl• tal••· 
one tell• of a youncJ aan .tao kept a hu9• python akin in a 
clay potr every ao often he would clothe hiaaelf in the 
akin and become a anake. Other atori•• tall of wrinkled 
137 BalahaW 19511 5. 
138 woral•Y 19701 260-61. 
' ~ 
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r.~uHedNI their llkiN, reftAllnt tllnsslves to 
be )'OllftlJ mcl bemtitul. TM secret of the pa111sr to ec:hieve 
i.mlortality waa ~ to A'aisa and he attellpted to confer 
it upon -n. ..fore A'aisa left the world of the livir19, 
he stood on a hi9h mountain and threw down to the people 
waitir19 below the knowled!Je of chieftainship, sorcery and 
many other thir19sr finally he threw down a ~ skin 
(iaala). At first th• people took care to catch the objects 
but then they be9an to l.u9h and joke W>r19st thnselves, 
consequently the skin fell to the 9round and was spoilt before 
they could reach it. In this way -n lost forever the 
ri9ht to illlllortality. Another A'aisa story, which closely 
parallels the orpbeus ll)'th, reveals more of the way in 
which the llkin was to have been uMd. A' aisa, who presides 
over the spirit world, was once ?IOVed to pity by the 9ri•f 
of the relatives of a dead woman. Disturbed by the l_.nts 
of the dead wcms'l's children, A'aisa visited their father 
and, after puttir19 hill throu9h many tests of couraqe, 
finally led hill to the vill&CJ• of the dead. When they 
arrived th• ?IAft was overjoyed to find his wife dancin9 with 
many other people in the aiddl• of the villaqe, but A'aisa 
w~ned him that he mst neither spellk to her nor atte11pt 
to touch her. After a few days A'aisa allow.d the couple 
to leave his vill99• and return to the world of the livinq, 
but before they left he 9avs the laisband ~ banana suckers, 
explaininq that he met wait until thaM plants had borne 
fruit before he could touch or speak to his wife. But theM 
warnin9s -r• for90tten by the laiabluKt when they re.c:hed 
tAe 1 no sooner did he ,rasp the ~' • hand, than the 
finqers fell off and her skin beqan to fall •ay. 'ftMt 
fraqil•J new skin (i•la) which A' aisa had 9iven her was 
destroyed by the laisband's illpatienc:e and she was forced 
to return to the vill999 of the de..S. ln view of the 
• 
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iJlpOrtanc9 of mcll tll • in treditioftal mytholotf, it i• 
under•tandabl• tMt ti. chri•ti•cloc:trine• coac:erni,.. 
re.urrectioll .... ,1 a ..-cial •iiftificMCe and that tM 
declarati0ft8 of die cult pcoph8t• carried conviction. 
Likewi••· the culti•t•' .c:cu .. tion• that the 
European• had lied to tlMm and •tolen fOOd• which wr• 
riqhtfully their• bed a per.u .. ive 1091c in terll8 of 
prevailint attitude• to the whit• r99.iM. the white .. n bed 
tirat been .c:cepted a• tM bearer of new knowled9e and 
pcllliNr - aa anotMr A'aiaa who had pr011i•ed to •har• hi• 
aecreta with the people. Villager• had liatened to hia 
pr0111i•••· bcnJed to hi• will and ••rved hill to the be•t of 
their uility. ly .c:knowledqincJ the .uthority of the 
white r991118, villager• 110rally COllllitted it to protect 
their int•r••t•• by ri9ht, they expected to •har• in the 
white un'• eatate. IUt durint the 1920a and 1930• it befan 
to appear that both •i••ion and 90Yerrment -r• concerned 
only with what they could extr.c:t from the people. ln 
thia aen .. , it w .. not •illply r•vencJ8, but 110ral indi9nation 
which iMpired the violence of the cult. 
the explicit attack on the traditional order waa 
alao qiven 11e>ral juatification. The old ways were to be 
abandonedr prophet• inatncted the people to1 
••• kill all their pi9a, docJ• and throw .,.y 
all the native 9QOd8 .uch u ornwnt• and 
aorcery thint• and leeve their native cuate1119.l39 
Traditional aathority and 11e>rality war• overthrown. IDrcery, 
which provided the powr behind the lopia, bed 'bec:a 1 a 
ain, Th• aorcerer• wier• called 'devil•'• and threatened with 
139 .. 1~ 19511 6. 
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death or r~birth u ani•'• if they peraieted la U.ir ft'il 
140 practice•. The recotnlaed l•eder• of the "'°' 1ernt ..re 
not the elder•, but unmarried yauthe Md 9irl• "9ao lKked 
adult •tatua in the eataliahed order. "'ilo'• leederahip 
enea911>u•ed tha four vill .. •• • deputi•• were 11PPOinted in 
£boa, Jeaubaibua Md In•nbai, the thr .. vill .. •• Kknowledtia9 
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their subordination to It*laia. lel•"- hu pointed out 
that Philo'• aiarri ... to a clo .. paternal relative vu in 
defiance of •trict ex..it~• lav.. The MJ&Ual licence which 
aeea911>anied tha hyateria vu equally offen•ive to treditional 
mores. 
The cultist•' air vu to aweep .,.Y the old in 
preparation for the nev. The prophet• declared that throu9h 
divine revelation, they could •how the vay to achieve the 
'n- life' hinted at, but withheld by the IUropean•. Until 
the final revelation vu iaade to all, expectationa concernint 
this nev age vier• neceaaarily vaque. The acquiaition of 
'carqo' in itaelf vaa not the cultist•' primary concern but 
the qood• poaaeaaed by the suropean• - which had fir•t been 
seen as the outward aanifeatation of their apec:ial powers -
140 Ibid1 5. 
141 Ibid• 1-7. 
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now bee_. a e)'llbol of ~t the new a,e would brine). 
ft'9 1)9Mral appeal of th• cult 1n tenu of 
traditional belief and the colonial eaperi•nce ie clear 
enouqh. In order to underetand the •pec:ific c1rCll88tanc•• 
... t11ch provo'ked the outbreak in I~ia it 'l«!Uld be necee•ary 
~o have an intiaate knowledfe of the pereonaliti•• involved 
.ind o! th• network of 'kinehip and political ti•• linkincJ 
there: •1.1ch a bacqround 'l«!Uld talle .. ny monthll to acquire. 
Since thi• at1.1dy w .. fOClllled on two villa,•• which w.re not 
invol·1ed in the .ovr1nt, att9111>tincJ brief enquiriea at 
Inwaia •• ... d l••• fruitful than ex91inir19 the attitude• 
of non-participant•, who in any caae were th• .. jority. 
:::>espite the obYiou• appeal of the cult and the fever pitch 
which it reached in four villaqe1, ten of the fourteen Me'keo 
·:ill.ige1 remained unaffected - a circu .. tance which ia 
143 overlook~d by the publiahlld accounta. 
142 V1llaqer• were neither abort of caah nor lac'ked the 
means to earn more if they had deaired to do ao. 
By th• late 1930•, the rice indliatry alone provided a 
significant caah incomes the mi1aivn paid villaqer• 
£520 for the 1937-38 rice crop, while the qover11111ent 
paid £1,200 for the 1942-43 crop. Patrol to the Me'keo 
6-10 Oct. 1938; Tholllpaon, Report 1944. In addition to 
the rice, which they were compelled to plant, people 
made copra and aold betel nut and local veqetablear 
yet they theaaelvea explained that in theae y.ara they 
had little i.ntereat in money except to pay the tax. 
Any explanation of the Inawaia cult in teru of economic 
fruatratione alone, ia inadequate in view of the people' a 
indifference to the caah economy at thia ataqe. In 
fact, more than a decade later field staff arqued that 
the Me'keo'• caah need• were atill very limited and that 
they had not y.t developed the more aophiaticated taatea 
of many other lon9 contacted areaa1 Patrol to the Mekeo 
16-31 Jan. 1953. 
143 Belehav 19511 5-81 woreley 19701 121-3. 
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AcCOl'dlat to ...... .-.1e ntau.d their faith 
in the ,ca11J 1ciH, ..,_ tllolatl' tlley ._.. llot. nali_.1 
!Mn to-day tM .-.i. •11-n in the airacl• 
and in the •••tial truth of the w ..... 14' 
Thoufh thie My etill ... the fMliftlJ in l._..ia, very 
different oplniona MY be found el..,...... At the tble, 
nw.peon obaen.d thet other vill ... a wre hitbly ac.ptical 
of the propheciaa. 'l'oday non-.-ticiputa apeak of the 
cult •• a type of aberrant behaviour in which only the fooliah 
or irreeponeilale iMllfed. They deacribed it u a '•haa', 
'eickneee' or 'headache' which caueed people to nan wildly 
around the vill..,., utterinlJ 9illberieh. llot all thoee who 
Joined the cult, hoAver, were thoucJht to have euccumbed to 
the '•-4neee' I 
1eme people -re ju•t pretendiftlJ. They were 
not really lied lUw the other• but they were 
juet CJOinlJ around with the 9lrle and )"OUftlJ 
vomen and therefore ecme w 1n CJOt pracinant 
ju1t for nothinlJ.145 
The lnavaia outbreak wu not raciarded u • MW phenc•1non. 
Inwi inforwante rec09niaed that it wa no different in kind 
to the outbreak they h..s briefly experienced in 1929. The 
earlier cult ti..s achieved nothiftlJ, llO people were c.ution• 
when they learnt of what wu ti.ppaninlJ in lft9faia1 
The newa waa apread from waiM to 911•h MUeo. 
'"'9y were u'kint people of all villat•• to kill 
their do9• and pi9• but 110et people ••id they 
would wait for the tiM to ccme and ... what 
ti.ppaned. ftli• ._. aadn••• had occurred before 
at IC.er_. and then at Waiaa, and then it h-ni1nad 
at lnwaia.146 
144 BelehMt 19511 I. 
145 M.A., lnwi1 25 Oct. 1971. 
146 Ibid. 
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v111..-e u•ally ..._ of euc9' •ttere lOllf before tM 
qoYern nt .. t• Viad of t"-• linee all wre wll we of 
what vu taiaf pl9ee. tlle •••eur•• tuen by ft 51on only 
partly explain wlly t,_ cult w .. confined to four vill ... 1. 
Aceorclint to "' a eon. t"8 eorcerer1 of t"9 
affected vill ... 1 were hi9hly di1Pl•aeed with tM whole 
affair and promiled t,_ir u1i1tance in 1toppint it. 147 
The part pla)'9d by t"8 eoreerer1 i• vwy hard to judfea 
it would be intereetint to know how they r..eted to t,_ 
culti1t1' defiance of t,_ir power1. Po1eillly t"8ir attitude• 
are reflected in an explanation of the cult 9iven by an 
lnfluential lnwi eorc:erer. Ill believed that Philo had made 
hcraelf 111ed by touchinf t,_ eorcery 1tone1 and anceetor relic• 
kept hidden in Mr parent•' hou1e (tM .. re 1i9ht of which 
l• believed to briftlJ illnee1 or death to thoH not ritually 
prepared for the ordeal). h tMn ordered everyone to bri119 
out the 1tone1 and other thi1191 UMd to Mk• eorcery IO that 
they could be publicly di1played on the altar11 in thi1 
way the whole villa111 wa1 affected. When the police arrived 
to •top the lladne11. the altar1 were pulled down and the 
obJect1 di1pla)'9d on thlm burnt. 'n. eorcerer1 were very 
angry and later cauHd many deathl in retaliation for the 
lo•• of their equip11nt. IOth the ori9in and failure of 
the cult are thu1 H•n in tera1 of it• defiance of tM 
cstabli1hed orders the breakinq of taboo1 cauHd the lladne11 
and led finally to an ••••rtion of 5>0'Mr in the fora of a 
wave of death• 1•cgq the tyilty. 
No 1ane pareon could be pereuedld to look at. 
let alone touch a eorcerer'1 1tone1 and relic• - object• 
147 Thi:-...on. l1pCJC't lMl. 
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which are charqed with lethal power. Should a per1on 
accidentally meet a 1orcerer who i1 on hi1 way to place a 
1pell on a victim, he will be overcome by the de1tructive 
power of the object1 carried by the 1orcerer, even thouqh 
they are hidden and not intended to harm him. An educated 
man in hi1 late twentie1 de1cribed hi1 phy1ical reaction1 
after 1uch an encounters 
••• about half an hour later I 1tarted to feel 
very cold. I was shivering. 'l'hen I had pain• 
in my body and my limb1 started to qo out of 
joint and I couldn't walk or move.148 
Sophisticated informants often compare the power (iaapul 
residing in sorcery stones with electricity. They explain 
that isapu need1 to be built up just as electricity is 
generated and that an object becomes charged with power just 
as a battery is charged with electricity - to touch it would 
be as deliberately suicidal aa seizing a 1,000 volt cable. 
Even a practisinq sorcerer does not touch his stones with 
bare hands, manipulating them with 1ticks or coverinq his 
hands with cloth to insulate his body from the 'current'. 
It is astonishing that ordinary people could ever brinq 
themselves to handle and publicly display sorcery objects. 
Indeed only a madman would be capable of such behaviour: 
it would be impossible under normal circumstances. WOrsely 
suggest• that the physical symptoms of giddiness and hyper-
activity as1ociated with millenarian cults are the product 
of the extreme emotional tension generated when traditional 
149 laws and morality are defied. In the case of the Inawaia 
cult it 1eems that the hysteria wa1 a necea1ary pre-condition 
148 A.I., Inavi1 28 Sept. 1970. 
149 Worsley 19701 25S-9. 
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for the attack on tradition. Its primary function was to 
provide a release which allowed cultists to co11111it acts 
150 impossible under any other circumatancea1 once the 
taboos were broken, of course, new waves of emotional 
tension and excitement would follow. The situation may be 
different, however, in societies where the traditional 
order had already been discredited to some degree and where 
the psychological barriers to be overcome were not as great. 
The mass hysteria also fulfilled another important 
function. Except for those unscrupulous individuals who 
took advantage of the others' madness, the cultists were not 
considered responsible for their actions. Informants could 
not see that the movement constituted anything as serious 
as a protest against the government, even when this was 
suggested to them. Neither the Inawaia cult nor the brief 
outbreak in 1929 represented a contradiction of the ideal 
of cooperation1 they were merely the inconsequential 
foolishness of people who had temporarily taken leave of 
their senses. Father Coltre, the priest whom Inawaia 
villagers had tried to murder, stated that after the event 
was over people spoke to him and acted as if it had never 
150 The cult 'hysteria' seems analogous to the self-induced 
trances of certain shamanistic oracles during which the 
practitioner lo••• all concern for hi• personal safety. 
Nebeaky-Wojkowitz witnessed a Tibetan oracle throw himself 
backwards and dash his head against a atone wall while in 
a trance, despite the efforts of assistants to restrain 
him. Nebeaky-Wojkowitz 19561 432-40. The action of the 
Mekeo cultists in handling sorcery objects auqgoata a 
similar state of physical and mental abandon. 
• 
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happened. The 'madne11' provided a 1cap99oat1 it 
absolved the culti1ts from responsibility ~or their action1, 
allowing them, in the advent of the failure of the prophecies, 
to resume their former lives without excessive quilt feelings. 
These feature1 of the Inawaia cult 1uggest that similar 
movements should be looked on not simply as a 1pecific mean1 
of ritually obtaining the white man's wealth, nor as clumsy 
attempts to adjust to the social dislocation brought about 
by European contact, but as an efficient social mechanism 
for achieving illlnediate and radical change. Should the 
movement miscarry, it has an inbuilt 'safety device' which 
allows the society to resume its former patterns until the 
time is right for another coup. 
The 1929 outbreak in Inawi had been a half-hearted 
affair, an importation from outside which bore signs of 
deliberate staging. In contrast, the later movement developed 
within the Mekeo, reaching a fever pitch which enabled four 
villages to defy tradition and declare a new order. Yet the 
majority preferred to 'wait and see' before killing their 
pigs and throwing away their traditional valuables; and 
once the hysteria had pa11ed the force of social conformity 
soon re-asserted itself among the cultists. It seems that 
151 ~v. Father Coltre, per1onal communication. Si1ter 
M. Martha, in her account of the cult, describe• the 
same reaction, 'Later a1 Si1ter M. Zita [who wa1 injured 
during the attack on rather Coltrel had left the people 
often a1ked for her, why had 1he left and when I told 
them plainly that they had wanted to kill her they 
would 1ay, "Si1ter don't 1ay that please. We were mad. 
Why should we want to kill her. Why 1he did ••• " Then 
would come an enumeration of different thing1 Si1ter 
had done for them. "We were mad."' Martha 1969. 
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the Inawaia cult failed to gain wider 1upport primarily 
becau1e it1 iconocla11n wa1 premature1 people were not yet 
ready to break with the pa1t. certainly the old order 
was still far too 1table to be dt1credited at a 1in9le 
blow. 
• 
• 
• 
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CHAPTER POOR 
THI BACKGROUllJ) OP socIAL STABILITY 1906-19411 'When 
the Government' a lwa were the auie aa the old 
lawa, the chiefa helped the Government.' 
BY 1941 Mekeo aociety appeared little different from what 
it had been fifty yeara before, deapite the intenaive campaign• 
of mission and government to 'improve' the villager' a lot. 
The lopia stood firm in the face of externally appointed 
village officials, the aupernatural powers wielded by 
traditional authority had not been discredited, local grouping 
and population remained atable, the disruptive effects of 
the migrant labour system had been avoided and the values of 
the cash economy had aa yet gained little hold. Though the 
white man' a presence had created hopes of change and betterment, 
people rejected the new ways which were being opened to them. 
Paradoxically, it aeema, the society continued to be virtually 
impervious to outside influence. 
Thia apparent conaervati8111 did not, however, 
stem from any ingrained antipathy to innovation and change. 
1 The cultural borrowing from the Gulf obaerved by leligman 
(and acknowledged by today's elders) ia evidence of the 
society' a readiness to adopt foreign styles in pre-contact 
times. The 'new thinga' brought by the firat white men 
made a great impreaaion on villager• who were eager to 
acquire them for themaelvea. People often explain their 
initial aupport of aome government achem• by aaying that 
they thought they ahould try it aa it waa 'aomething new' • 
• 
1 Seligman 19101 314. 
f 
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'New' i• no le•• an expression of approbation than in our 
own culture. Innovations, nevertheless, must be judged 
according to their utility in term• of existing conditions 
and valuess villager• aimply saw nothing of relevance to 
their own lives in the new waya offered to them. Whatever 
the nature of the benefit• the European• were expected to 
bestow, it seems that an enhancement not a disruption of 
the establiahed order was envisaged. 
'l'he officials set up by the white regime were 
never allowed to threaten the dignity of hereditary office. 
The mission'• representatives at the village level - the 
teachers - did not achieve the influence wielded by indigenous 
pastors and catechists in many other New Guinea con111unities:
2 
and the church itself continued to remain an external force -
an appendage to rather than an integral part of village life. 
This failure to involve the community lay partly in the 
attitudes and policies of the mission itself. At firat 
the missionaries had been loath to make use of Papuan 
helpers, even as manual labourers; they found it simpler 
to perform the tasks themselves than to instruct villagers1 
Dans le personnel de la Mission, et 
particulierement parmi le» Frere• (qui ont 
le plus a aouffrir de la pare•••· de 
l'ignorance, de l'incompreht:i~on de• 
indigenea de• qu'il a'agit de lea initier 
aux travaux manuela de• blanca), ~l y eut 
tourjoura une tendance a considerer le 
Papou, aoit coane incapable de jamai• rien 
apprendre, auquel ca• il etait inutile, 
soit cOllllMI capable de trop bien apprendre, 
auquel caa l'orgueil le rendait insupportable 
et nuiaible.3 
•• 
• 
2 Lawrence 19561 73-891 Oram 19711 115-32. 
3 oupeyrat 19351 427. 
' . • 
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Bishop de Boismenu was keenly aware of the necessity to 
make greater use of Papuan assistants - a need emphasized 
by the shortage of mission personnel during the First world 
war: he urged his staff to overcome their impatience and 
4 
make greater efforts to use and train indigenous helpers. 
In religious matters, the reluctance to devolve 
responsibility to Papuana was even greater. The catholics 
had been scandalized by the behaviour of the LMS's Polynesian 
5 
and indigenous teachers. These attitudes, combined with 
the difficulty of training suitable candidates, resulted 
• in the virtual absence of catechists during the early 
6 years. In 1908, when Bishop de Boismenu took control, 
there were nine catech~ata employed by the mission, most 
7 
of them Filipinos recruited at Thursday Island. De Boismenu, 
through his educational programme, set determinedly about 
the task of creating a young, educated elite who 'WOuld not 
only provide the 'leavening' in the largely pagan, or only 
4 Ibid: 427-8, 
5 In 1895 Archbishop Navarre wrote of the seven LMS 
teachers stationed at Waima and Kivori: 'Leurs moeurs 
differaient peu de celles des aauvages, elles etaient 
peut-etre pirea. Les Europeens qui voulaient aatisfaire 
leurs passions trouvaient dana ces catechistes une 
complaisance servile. Aujourd'hui ces tribus aont 
entierement corrompuea. Un catechiste conseillait 
aux indigenes d'avoir plusiera fe111nea. Un autre 
obligeait lea felllftea et lea jeunes filles a aller 
enti~rement nuea coupant lui-meme le seul vetement 
qu'elles portent par decence: un jupon d'herbea qui 
tombe jusqu'aux genoux. Lui-meme faisait l'infimc 
metier de procurer aux blanc• des femmes contre la 
volonte de cellea-ci.' Navarre, Notes et Journal: 128. 
6 Dupeyrat 19351 434-6. 
7 Ibid: 436. 
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nominally chriatian cOlllll\lnitiea, but would also provide 
literate, well-informed catechists. 8 In terms of numbers, 
his efforts were a success: the nine catechists of 1908 
9 had increased to 219 by 1933. In theory, the 'teachers' 
(as the catechists were known since they also usually 
served as village 
'b'l' 10 respons1 1 1ty. 
school teachers) were given considerable 
In the absence of the priest they held 
prayers, church services, baptized the dying and buried 
the dead: when the priest visited the village, they were 
expected to inform the people in advance and persuade them 
to attend church and participate in the sacraments. 11 
They were instructed to be the 'eyes and ears' of the 
priest, reporting everything that had happened in the 
village and warning him of any impending scandals or 
troubles. Though their position seemed to offer ample 
scope for the ambitious individual to make himself a 
powerful figure within the village hierarchy, very few 
teachers succeeded in doing so. The mission eventually 
found that its carefully selected, youthful 'elite' made 
little or no impression upon the communities in which they 
were placed. 12 It admitted ruefully that few teachers 
had any influence at all beyond the four walls of their 
classrooms and that the missionaries themselves tended to 
look upon them as school masters, rather than catechists 
8 Ibid: 436-47: SJlot Lettre Pastorale No. 14: B. 
9 Dupeyrat 1935: 447, fn.2. 
10 SHM Lettre Pastoral• No. 191 7-8. 
11 Ibid. 
12 SHM Lettre circulaire No. 76, 10 Aug. 19471 203. 
• 
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and repreaentativea of the church. 
The realization grew that the teachers, who had 
spent a minimum of four years away from home in a mission 
boarding school, were set apart from the rest of the society 
b h . du . 13 i y t eir e cation. S nee they were not fully part of 
the,~onununity, they were unable to actively influence 
village affairs or provide the link of communication 
between the priest and his parishioners. The need for a 
more effective and influential representation for the 
church at the village level led in 1947 to the formation 
of parish councils which were to be composed of men and 
women of good character who had status and respect within 
14 the village community. 
Though the mission's representatives were of 
little consequence, those of the government constituted a 
more dangerous challenge. Anthropologists have observed 
a variety of responses to the village officials appointed 
by the administration - the luluai in New Guinea, the 
village constable in Papua. The complete disappearance of 
traditional leaders in Busama village near Lae was recorded 
by Hogbin, who argues that the luluai system was a dangerous 
- 1 d . 1 15 s 1 . bu on~, tenoing to ead to espotic ru e. a is ry, on 
the other hand, points out· that despotism is a feature 
characteristic of the traditional 'big-man' style of 
16 leadership, not a product of the luluai system. He maintains 
13 Ibid: 2. 
14 Ibid: 4-6. 
-15 Hogbin 19491 189-206. 
16 Salisbury 19641 225-39. 
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that the luluai's position, which constituted a sort of 
pressure point between the village conununity and the 
government, was not an enviable one: often patrol officers 
subjected village /epresentatives to so many punishments 
and indignities that only 'nonentities' could be persuaded 
to take office. A more complex situation is described by 
Maher among the tribes of the Purari delta, who once 
possessed a structure 
17 
that of the Mekeo. 
of hereditary leadership not unlike 
Chiefs were appointed as the first 
village constables but later selections were made without 
reference to the candidates' rank. Gradually two hierarchies 
of power began to emerge: one supported by traditional 
rights and privileges, the other by the government. As the 
two groups manoeuvred against each other, competitive 
politics of the 'big-man' type became the normal practice, 
dominating a system previously organized on the basis of 
hereditary rank. 
The Mekeo's experience provides yet another 
variation on the theme. The potential power conferred 
by government appointment assumed far greater importance 
tranits attendant difficulties and disadvantages. This 
is demonstrated by the traditional leaders' virtual monopoly 
of the position of village constable.
18 
All Inawi's 
constables were chiefs or close relatives of chiefs: 
17 Maher 19671 309-31. 
18 Amongst the Xuni, who live in the mountains to the 
north-east of the Mekeo and share a similar structure 
of hereditary chieftainship, van Rijswijck observed 
that government appointments were usually occupied 
by the chiefs, thus leaving the traditional structure 
of leadership intact. van Rijswijck 19671 269. 
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moreover, eight of the eleven appointments made were held 
by the fa'aniau and~ sections of the founding clan, 
. k 19 f . Oa1sa a. TWo o Aipeana's constables were conunoners, 
one a sorcerer and the rest chiefs. After the clan chiefs 
of each clan of Aipeana had been appointed in turn, two 
commoners held office in the late 1920s and 1930s. 
Presumably the chiefs had assessed the position and come 
to the conclusion that it could be allowed to commoners 
without posing a threat to their authority. Kavo Laua of 
Aipeana explained: 
Later the people knew all about 
so they picked ordinary people. 
what to do in the village so it 
to pick ordinary people.20 
the VC' s work, 
They knew 
was alright 
Informants stressed, however, that the two commoners 
appointed were not weak or ineffectual men. During the 
Second world War a sorcerer from Meauni clan was appointed, 
who held office until the introduction of local government 
councils in 1962. 
The chiefs' pre-emption of the office was presented 
in moral terms: 
19 The old men could recall the names of all the village 
constables who had been appointed in their village 
and the order in which they served. As a means of 
checking this information, I also compiled lists of 
village constables from patrol reports (the Mekeo 
Village constable Books have been lost), recording 
the name and village of every official mentioned in 
the reports. The lists obtained in this manner w0rc 
not complete but they corresponded closely with the 
oral information. I then carefully inquired into Llw 
clan affiliations and 1tatus of the Aipeana and Inawi 
constables, at the same time noting down any other 
details informants could offer concerning each individual. 
20 Kavo Laua, Aipeanaz 27 Oct. 1971. 
The reason why only chiefs were chosen to be 
VC was that if anybody without rank was made 
VC he might put a man in gaol just for fun, 
or he might lie to the Government, but if a 
chief is VC, he will tell the truth.21 
According to another informant, himself a chief and an 
ex-village constable: 
They picked the chiefs to be vc because the 
chiefs are the head of the people - only 
they can say what the Government said; 
ordinary people would tell lies to the 
people and not tell them what the Government 
really said.22 
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Most informants believed that the village constables were 
actually chosen by the chiefs: 
If a patrol officer picked out a man to be 
vc, he would have to ask the chiefs first. 
Patrol officers or ADCs never picked out 
VCs themselves - they asked the chiefs to 
do it.23 
A few allowed that responsibility lay with the government 
but insisted that the choice had to be made from amongst 
the chiefs: 
The Government picked out the vc. When the 
patrol officer came he always called for the 
chiefs and he talked to them in the night. 
Always he picked out the one he wanted among 
the chiefs. But before selecting one, he 
called all the chiefs to come.24 
Initially, the government had followed a deliberate policy 
of appointing chiefs but it appears that even by the late 
21 Lapu Auf~, Inawi: 16 Feb. 1971. 
22 Maino Peafuau, Inawi: 23 Apr. 1971. 
23 Lapu Aufe, Inawi1 16 Feb. 1971. 
24 Kavo Laua, Aipeana1 27 Oct. 1971. 
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1890s government officers did not concern themselves with 
the traditional status of their village constables. 25 
No hard and fast rules seem to have been followed. 26 Patrol 
officers rarely had sufficient knowledge of local conditions 
and personalities to select a man on known merits: most 
spent only a year or two in the same area and even if they 
stayed longer could never hope to gain more than a passing 
acquaintance with the many different cultural and linguistic 
units contained within the one district. Of necessity, 
officers depended heavily upon whatever local advice was 
available. It is probable, under these conditions, that 
25 See abova: 98. 
26 Healy implies that the government deliberately avoided 
appointing Mekee chiefs as village constables since it 
suspected that their authority depended on the practice 
of sorcery. Healy 1962: 606. What little evidence 
there is on this point suggests not that the chiefs 
were intentionally passed over, but rather that scant 
attention was paid to the status of the appointee. 
P&trol reports record only the names of the village 
constables, making no reference to their traditional 
status: in any case it is unlikely that many officers 
had accurate information on this point. Establishing 
the status of any individual is not the easy matter it 
might appear to be: one may live in a village for 
several months before gaining a clear idea of the actual 
status of even prominent identities. For example, 
a man functioning to all intents and purposes as a 
chief may in fact turn out to be the brother of the 
deceased chief who is acting in place of the young 
chief until he comes of age. Another man may be said 
to be a chief because several generations ago his 
family held the senior chicflainship which Wi.ls li.lt lll" 
transferred to another line. In view of the laws 
relating to the practice of sorcery, most sorcerers 
prefer to conceal their rank from outsiders, particularly 
government officers. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that in those cases where I was able to check attributions 
of rank in patrol reports (in most cases recent reports), 
they usually proved to be unreliable. 
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villagers were usually able to influence the decision, 
and that the man they wanted was nominated. In any case, 
they interpreted the circumstances to mean that the chiefs 
had control over government appointments in their village. 
The very manner of selecting village officials thus was 
seen to underline the ideal of co-operation: the government 
recognized the rights of the chiefs: in return they 
insured that only a man who would faithfully carry out his 
duties undertook the responsibility. 
The position cf the village constable pivoted 
upon the ideal of an identity of interests between the 
government and the traditional authorities. The fact 
that government's laws could be interpreted in terms of 
traditional morality provided the whole rationale for 
communication with the government and for the successful 
functioning of its village representative. Government laws 
dealing with such matters as theft, assault, adultery and 
murder could be seen to follow the principles laid down 
by tradition. An Inawi elder, Lapu Aufe, explained: 
When the Government's laws were the same as 
the old laws the chiefs helped the Government. 
For instance if a man was caught for stealing 
or adultery, the chief himself told the VC 
to take the culprit to court. This was 
because these were the old laws. What the 
Government was thinking was the same as the 
chiefs were thinking.27 
Later he added: 
The vc, the chiefs and the sorcerers gave 
the laws together in the v!llage. Whatever 
the vc said was only the law of the 
Government and of the chiefs and sorcerers. 
27 Lapu Aufe, Inawi: 16 Feb. 1971. 
The VC kept talking to remind the people, 
asking all the men not to cause trouble 
aa the laws were made by the Government 
and by the chiefs and sorcerers. 'Be 
busy in your garden ao you will have your 
own food instead of stealing other people' a 
food' - the Government kept on saying that 
to the VC and he kept on saying it to the 
people. And if the people still cauaed 
trouble after the VC had aaid this over and 
over again, then the chiefs told the vc he 
had the right to put those people in gao1.28 
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Measures such aa government regulations concerning village 
hygiene, which had no traditional parallels, were accepted 
as benefiting the people and thus in accordance with 
traditional principlea. Iaoaimo Opu, an Inawi chief and 
himself a village constable for nearly twenty years, 
declared: 
The Government asked the vc to do things 
because he waa the chief, and the Government 
said to him, 'They are your people and what 
I am asking you to do ia for your own people. 
So if I aay make a fence, do it - these are 
your thinga. I am asking you to look after 
your own things.' And for this reaaon the 
chief asked hi• people to obey the Government. 29 
Even measures like the burial regulations, which contravened 
traditional practices, were supported by 
their purpose waa urdoratood. According 
Aipeana: 
the chiefs once 
to Kavo Laua of 
..,, 
There waa never any time when the chiefs 
refused Government ordera. In the case of 
the burial regulations, the dead body had 
to be buried in the cemetery - this is what 
the vc said to the people, and the chief a 
obeyed the vc and helped him to tell the 
28 Ibid. 
29 Isoaimo Opu, Inawia 3 Mar. 1971. 
people to burybodie• in the cemetery. 
Yea - thi• was against the old custom, 
but the chiefs thought it was a good idea 
so they eupported that idea. They had to 
build a fence in the cemetery and a house 
over the body. And there was a law if the 
people did not build a fence around the 
body and a house over it. 'l'hen some years 
later they changed their minds and said not 
to build houees but juet fences around the 
graves. The Government explained that the 
body would get rotten and flies would come, 
so they should bury the body away from the 
village, so the people thought it was a 
good idea.30 
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Without this understanding of common purpose between the 
government and the traditional authorities, there could be 
no communication between them: with it, there was no 
possibility of conflict, providing each fulfilled its 
obligations. The village constable, as a chief, was not 
attempting to serve two different masters, rather he was 
doubly enjoined to uphold the standards of traditional 
morality. Likewise, government appointment gave him no 
added authority, only increased responsibility. 
Informants emphasize that the village constable 
always worked in harmony with the chiefs and sorcerers. 
The Inawi elders firmly denied that rivalry existed or that 
the village conetable ever tried to use his position to 
make himself more powerful than the other chief•. At 
Aipeana, however, some conceded the possibility that the 
chiefs had competed among•t themselves for the position 
at first, believing that it might give them added power 
and prestige. The difference in attitude probably etems 
30 Kavo Laua, Aipeana1 27 oct. 1971. 
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partly from the fact that Inawi had always had one chief 
who is recognized to take precedence over the rest, allowing 
less room for competition than in Aipeana where the senior 
section of the founding clan has long been without an 
effective head. 31 Aipeana also had before it the example 
of Maino Fagau, the war leader whom MacGregor appointed 
head chief of the district: the prestige which Maino 
gained from government patronage must have made a deep 
impression in his own village. Yet even Maino never achieved 
any lasting authority outside Aipeana. Both villages were 
adamant that should a constable succeed in attempts to 
usurp the authority of the other chiefs, his actions would 
not be tolerated. An Aipeana elder exclaimed: 
Some VCs might have tried to become more 
powerful than the chiefs, I don't know. 
But if they tried the sorcerers would kill 
them. 32 
One Aipeana village constable, Aiso Laia, died of snake 
bite - a cause of death commonly ascribed to sorcerers who 
33 
are believed to train and control their own snakes. 
His death is attributed to the fact that he tried to be 
31 See above: 10. 
32 Aufa Kaoka, Aipeana: 11 Nov. 1971. Burridge remarks 
without further elaboration that in the case of the 
Tangu, 'It is true that, were it not for sorcery, 
both Luluai and TUltul could hold the potential of 
tyranny.' Burridge 1960: 261. 
33 Aipeana informants quoted Aiso Laia's death as an example 
of the sorcerers' powers. The incident is also recorded 
in a patrol report of Oct. 1911, ' ••• last week v.c. 
Aio-Laiangu was bitten by a snake while having the old 
Govt. station at Kikimori cleaned up. This death, 
is (as usual) ascribed to Sorcery ••• •. Patrol to 
Mt YUl.e 6-28 Oct. 1911. 
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too severe with his people. The Inawi elders declared 
that it had never been necessary to punish a village 
constable in their village, but they had heard of such 
cases in other villages1 
There is a man at Beipa called Epi Kavili 
and his father, Kavili, was treating the 
Bush Mekeo very badly and even his own people, 
so the sorcerers were against him and his 
wife died. Also Opuqu Aria from this village -
he was a policeman during the war - and his 
only son was killed by sorcery during the war. 
This was because Opuqu Aria called out the 
big men's names to come out and carry and 
also he went into the houses to beat the 
women with the other police ••• in those days 
most of the sorcerers and chiefs had power 
so if the vc was too hard on the people the 
chiefs anp sorcerers would show their power. 
A man fi,:lm Aipeana, Kulavi, had his only son 
killed by sorcery because he was in the police 
during the war, and finally he himself became 
blind. Before the war he was a vc and he was 
too hard on the people so his son died. Then 
during the war he was in the police service 
and he was hard on the people again, so to 
show the chief's power he was made blind.34 
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The ambitious village constable, who tried to control the 
other chiefs or was too severe with his people, was punished 
for his deeds. The supernatural sanctions possessed by the 
traditional authorities constituted a means of enforcing 
social conformity which was far too strong for the 
individual to defy. 
Whilst it was essential that the village constable 
remember his obligations to his people, it was equally 
important that he should faithfully perform his duties to 
the government. People insist that the village constable's 
34 A.E., Inawi1 7 Mar. 1971. 
• 
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relations with government officers were always good. An 
Inawi chief, Maino Peafuau, who was a village constable 
in the 1930s, described the interaction between the 
village and district office thus: 
When the VC wanted to give work to the people, 
he went to see the chiefs first. Then the 
chiefs said, 'Yes, you must give the work to 
the people as the Government told you to do.' 
The VC would then go and give the work to the 
people. If the VC got an order from the 
Government and he told the chiefs and they 
didn't like it, then he went back to Xairuku 
to report to the Government. If the chiefs 
didn't like the order the Government didn't 
do anything to them. The Government said 
that what the chief says is for him to say, 
so they would not force him to do it. 35 
Maino, and other informants, asserted that there was in 
practice only one matter on which the government was 
opposed: the lopia would not agree to requests that 
build more solidly constructed houses, as they feared 
this would involve an infringement of their exclusive 
rights to certain building materials: 
35 
36 
I myself was told by Mr Thompson to let the 
people make better houses, but the chiefs 
said 'No, we won't let them build houses with 
afa.' I went back to Mr Thompson and told him 
the chiefs didn't like to allow the people to 
build better houses. He said 'That belongs to 
the chiefs so leave it alone.' He gave orders 
to look after the cemetery, to work on the 
roads, to make pig fences around the village. 
And the chiefs didn't say anything against this, 
they said it was very good to do this. It was 
only the houses that the chiefs didn't like -
using afa, and the post called vouvou, and the 
chief•°;;-house position.36 
Maino Peafuau, Inawi: 22 Apr. 1971. 
Ibid. 
ever 
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Under Thompson, a certain amount of give and take between 
district office and the village authorities does not seem 
improbable. Thompson endeavoured to show his respect for 
local custom and to work through rather than against the 
lopia: 37 presumably he instructed his patrol officers to 
do likewise. 
Villagers were horrified by suggestions that the 
village constables were verbally or physically abused by 
patrol officers. An Inawi elder declared indignantly: 
I have never heard of such a thing happening in 
this village. It may have happened in other 
Mekeo villages, but I have never heard about 
it. I was not told about any old VCs being 
abused by Government officers. I have never 
heard of a VC being put in gao1.38 
Aipeana informants were of the same opinion: 
37 
The patrol officer didn't call the vcs names 
or hit them. He would just come and tell 
the people to clean the village and the roads, 
and tell the vc to get the people to build 
new houses and pull down old ones. Whoever 
was not there when the patrol officer came, 
the VCs job was to take him to court. I have 
never heard of a VC being hit by a patrol 
See above: 130-1. Thompson's policy directly 
contradicts Healy's assertion that the administration 
regarded the Mekeo chiefs as opponents: though it 
is true that moat government officers appear to have 
simply ignored the chiefs. Healy 1962: 606. 
38 Lapu Aufe, Inawi: 16 Feb. 1971. 
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officer. The VCa did their work well. A 
lot of vca from Roro were put in gaol, but 
none from this village.39 
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People admit that things we~e different during the Second 
World War. An incident in which a war-time Inawi village 
constable was struck across the face for failing to get 
sufficient carriers is we\l known to the whole village: 
but the indignity associated with the event was so great, 
even after thirty years, that the man involved refused to 
be questioned about it. SUch reactions indicate that 
gross abuse of the village constables must have been a rare 
occurrence. This is not to say, however, that government 
appointment was regarded as a sinecure. People recall 
that several village policemen were dismissed for taking 
a second wife, and that one lost his badge of office after 
spearing the parish priest's cow, which he found despoiling 
one of his gardens. The government was equally impatient 
with widowed constables, who were compelled by custom to 
spend their period of mourning away from the village. 40 
Many government officers, especially those of the 
1920s, would have been bemused, if not outraged, by 
villagers' claims that the constables always faithfully 
39 Aua Vi'i, Aipeana: 24 Oct. 1971. Prior to the Second 
world war, the government did indeed consider the 
Roro, Waima and Kivori groups to be far more 'difficult' 
than the Mekeo. Thompson wrote in 1932: 'The Waima 
natives I always think constitute one of the worst 
problems of the District. They are the most idle, 
thieving, lying & superstitious in regard to sorcery 
tribe in the civilized parts of New Guinea that I have 
had the misfortune to come into contact with.' Patrol 
to the Mekeo and Roro 12-23 Jan. 1932. See also Patrol 
to Waima, Kivori and Mekeo 30 Jan.-2 Feb. 1933. 
40 see ARM J<airuku Diary Oct. 1910: Patrol to Lopiko 
16 May-15 July 1911. 
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performed their duties. Patrol reports of the 1920s rated 
the Mekeo village constable much the same as a Mekeo carrier -
little better than useless. This was understandable at a 
time when government policy had made it difficult for even 
the most astute man to satisfy the demands of patrol officers 
without alienating his own people. No constable dared to 
go beyond the limits of what he knew to be acceptable to 
his community; at the same time, he could not ignore the 
government: as a villager, he resolved his dilemma in a 
manner which satisfied village, not government, standards. 
The difference between the two is revealed in the actions 
attributed to VC Erico in Inawi, whom a patrol report of 
41 1923 castigated as 'completely useless'. When patrols 
came to the village to recruit carriers, Erico: 
••• would shout out to the village telling the 
young men to come for carriers. He said 'Who 
wants to come as carriers has to come with me 
to the mountains, but all those who don't want 
to come must run away. Five or six will be 
enough, they will go as carriers. ' But the 
police wanted ten or fifteen carriers, but Erico 
told the people to run away and only four or 
five men to come. So Erico took four or five 
carriers to Bioto and the patrol officer asked 
him 'Why did you bring only four men for 
carriers?' Erico said 'In my village all my 
people are sick, so I brought four of them 
only.' Then they took the cargoes to Kubuna 
and Erico came back to the village. Because 
of this people said he was doing a very good 
job for us.42 
In villagers' eyes, Erico had fulfilled his duties to the 
government by providing it with some carriers and his 
obligations to his people by sparing them as much as possible. 
41 Patrol to Boiboi and Mekeo 1-10 Feb. 1923. 
42 Maino Peafuau, Inawi: 23 Apr. 1971. 
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In contrast to the 1920s, official conunent on the performance 
of the village constables is usually favourable, even 
complimentary, in the early 1900s when pressures had been 
43 d . 1 44 far fewer, an in the 930s under Thompson. The fact 
that the constables managed for many years to satisfy the 
government strongly argues in favour of the sincerity of 
their efforts to discharge a dual responsibility. 
Mekeo in 
The village councillors, first introduced to the 
45 1927-28, were of so little importance in 
villagers' eyes that it was impossible to elicit much 
information concerning them. Not one informant had any 
clear idea of the duties the councillors were expected to 
perform: most simply concluded that the village constable 
was evidently the more important official as he, unlike 
the councillors, was given a uniform and paid a salary. 
Villagers' vagueness on this topic is not surprising since 
no clear official policy was ever laid down concerning 
the councillors' functions. 46 In general they were intended 
to provide a channel of communication between the village 
and the administration, advising patrol officers on local 
custom, while explaining the government's wishes to the 
people. 47 As distinct from the village constable, the 
43 see, for example, Patrol to the Mekeo 18 Nov.-2 Dec. 
1913: Patrol to the Mekeo 19-25 Nov. 1915: Patrol 
to Waima, Kivori and Mekco 18-28 Apr. 1922. 
44 Patrol to Mekeo and waima 5-12 Dec. 1933: Patrol to 
the Mekeo 25-9 Jan. 1939. 
45 Papua Annual Reports 1927-8: 27. 
46 Miles 1959: 61-72. 
47 Ibid. 
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councillors were to be representatives of the people, not 
government employees. Informants' statements make it clear 
that the village constable, in any case, acted only upon 
the advice of the clan chiefs, relying upon their co-operation 
to have the government's orders carried out. Therefore, 
since an informal council of sorts already assisted the 
village constable, the introduction of councillors was 
unlikely to have greatly altered the existing situation. 
The effect of the village authorities' response 
to government appointment was to negate the threat it posed 
to them, though this is not to suggest that it came to be 
regarded as unworthy of their attention. Though the 
position required an accomplished diplomacy to maintain a 
balance between the interests of the government, the chiefs 
and the rest of the community, the inherent difficulties 
were not sufficient to discourage the powerful from accepting 
it. By establishing their special right to appointment, the 
chiefs prevented the emergence of any new elite based on 
the government's power alone. Having been contained by the 
traditional structure of authority, government appointment 
became absorbed within it. Few village constables succeeded 
in using the office to control their follow chiefs. In 
the long run the authority conferred by the government on 
its officials proved to be of less consequence than the 
powers conferred by tradition. 
LOCAJ, grouping and population remained stable during these 
years. The few, scattered figures available in government 
reports indicate that from the 1890s to 1949 (when regular 
census statistics commence) the total population remained 
steady, perhaps slightly on the increase, despite influenza 
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epidemics in 1931 and 1941.48 The government preferred to 
see the existing village units maintained for ease of 
administration. small groups which attempted to form new 
settlements were ordered back to the main village, 49 but 
references to such incidents are few. The changing course 
of the St Joseph River often necessitated the moving 
of villages to avoid flooding but people usually consulted 
the patrol officers before leaving the old site. 50 Possibly 
fear of government disapproval helped to discourage splits, 
though other circumstances made the emergence of new groups 
difficult. The cessation of warfare had removed the means 
to acquire new land and had stabilized land ownership in 
the hands of the groups existing at the time of 
'pacification': dissidents who wished to sever ties with 
their parent group were therefore placed in the position 
where they had to appeal to the chief of another clan to 
provide them with land. Ogofoina Lopia Fa' a of Inawi 
illustrates the dilemma faced by such groups: a split from 
Lopia Fa' a section of Oaisaka clan, this lineage moved 
from their original residential site and approached the 
ctief of Ogofoina clan to allow them to build their houses 
on his land. This placed them under obligations to Ogofoina, 
but as they retained their previous garden land they continued 
48 Kairuku subdistrict Annual Reports 1931-2: an influenza 
epidemic in 1931 resulted in a 1.5 per cent decrease in 
the taxable population. Kairuku Patrol Report 17, 
1940-41: in some villages the death rate was as high 
as ten per cent. 
49 see, for example, Patrol to the Mekeo and Inaukina 
Districts 17-25 Aug. 1912. 
50 ARM Kairuku Diary Apr. 1910: Patrol to the Mekeo 
28 Apr-2 May 1914. 
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to have obligations to Lopia Fa'a. Under these conditions, 
there was little opportunity for ambitious groups to achieve 
an independent identity. Unless very serious grounds for 
separation existed, it was better for clansmen to settle 
their differences and remain together than to throw themselves 
on the mercy of another clan or village. Informants, in 
fact, state that land ownership had been stabilized and the 
present villages established long before the arrival of 
the Europeans. These statements are supported by the 
composition of clan units: larger clans usually incorporate 
small immigrant groups which arrived before European contact 
51 
and were given land by the larger group. In pre-contact 
times, however, warfare gave some flexibility to the 
situation. Land might change hands, and those clans 
possessing a large amount of land were no doubt glad of the 
arrival of other groups who would help them defend it. 
People were little concerned with the world beyond 
the boundaries of their own village communities until the 
1940s. Travel outside the subdistrict was rare - so rare 
that people claim that they would wail and mourn, as if 
for the dead, a relative departing for Port Moresby only 
eighty miles away. Patrol reports reveal that by the late 
1930s some 
sell betel 
people were travelling as far as Port Moresby to 
52 nut, but the majority did not venture beyond 
the Kanosia and Hisiu plantations. The migrant labour system, 
which provided so many Papuans with new goods, new ideas 
and a greater awareness of the white man's world, held few 
attractions for the Mekeo. The sec~lar education afforded 
51 See above: 9-10. 
52 Kairuku Patrol Report 6, 1941-2. 
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by the mission was felt to have little relevance to village 
life. 
Few Mekeo were persuaded to 'sign on' during the 
1890s and early 1900s, although the ARM Kairuku hopefully 
observed in 1911 signs of increasing interest in wage 
labour: 
The native labour being recruited from this 
district has been steadily increasing for some 
time, which is gratifying to note, & although 
at present the natives will only sign for 
six months, I am of the opinion that it is 
only a matter of time when they will sign for 
longer periods. Formerly very few natives of 
the district would go to work at all,53 
This optimism appears to have been premature: the following 
year patrols attempting to recruit labourers for the 
Department of Works in Port Moresby visited all the Mekee 
54 
villages but found no volunteers. 
The situation changed with the introduction of 
taxation in 1919; for the first time many Mekeo were forced 
to seek employment. Attitudes to wage labour have already 
been discussed in some detail. 55 Married men, who had the 
responsibility of a wife and children, and had assumed full 
adult status in the community, rarely sought employment 
away from the village. Unmarried youths, who found iL 
difficult to earn money at home as they had no gardens of 
their own and no wife to assist them, reluctantly exchanged 
a carefree adolescent life for a term on a plantation in 
order to earn their tax money. Work histories taken in 
Inawi of 157 adult men confirm the general statements made 
53 ARM Kairuku Journal, Mar • 1911. 
54 Patrol to the Mekeo and Inaukina Districts 17-25 Aug. 
1912. 
55 see aboves 136-8. 
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56 by informants concerning their experiences. By the 1920s 
and 1930s a brief period spent in wa9e labour had become 
normal for most young men: of a total of twenty-seven men 
over the a~1 of fifty-one, eighteen were employed during 
these years. Only four out of a total of twenty-thrc~ 
f individuals who worked before the war were employed outside 
the subdistrict and this was in the late 1930s. It appears 
that at the outbreak of war a handful of Inawi men were 
~ 
57 
working in Port Moresby. The tax compelled many to seek 
employment but their evident distaste for wage labour earned 
the Mekeo a bad name with employers. A patrol report Of 
1935 noted: 
The HISUI & KANOSIA Managers now fight shy Of 
them, when they offer themselves 
they are so lazy.SB 
as N/L' s, as 
groups 
Migrant labour has always been less 
who had other means to obtain cash. 59 
attractive to 
Certainly 
! the Mekeo did not lack other means, but the failure to 
exploit them supports the contention of informants that 
people had no desire or need for money except to pay the 
tax. The enterprise of a group like the Tolai, whose 
advantages were not much greater, contrasts sharply with the 
56 This information was collected as part of the household 
census taken of Inawi. 
57 A few of the men interviewed concerning their wartime 
experiences stated that they were working in Port Moresby 
at the time of the outbreak of war. Kairuku Patrol Report 
6, 1941-2 observed that fully fifty per cent of taxable 
men were absent in Port Moresby either trading or working 
as casual labourers. This estimate appears to be greatly 
exaggerated. 
58 Patrol to the Mekeo 5-9 Aug. 1935. 
59 Mair 1948: 129. 
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Mekeo'1 lack of intere1t in the cash economy. The Tolai 
were 1elling coconuts to traders in the 18701 before the 
e~tabliehment of German control: by the early 1900s people 
were increaainq their planting of coconuts to keep up with 
the demand for copra, and in the 19301 were operating their 
d . 60 h im own copra riere. Prom t e t e of first contact villager• 
had been eager to sell food crops to traders, eettlera and 
1 t . 61 Th h 1 . p anta ion owners. oug the Mekeo acked the stimulus 
provided in the Tolai'a ca1e by early trader1, they had ample 
opportunity by the 1920s to 1ell copra to local traders and 
food crop1 to the nearby plantation1. But, as Salisbury 
has shown, the accumulation of capital and credit were vital 
concerns of Tolai 1ociety before the Europeans arrived, 
while for the Mekeo the whole bu1ines1 of earning money 
was an irksome nece11ity created by government fiat. 
A similar indifference was displayed to education. 
From the outset the Sacred Heart Mission fully con111itted 
itself to the task of educating its converts. In the 1890s 
every mission etatio~ had its school, which wa1 run by the 
62 parish priest himself in the absence of auxiliary staff. 
Under the direction of Bishop de Boismenu, a more organized 
63 programme waa developed. Pariah 1chools catering for more 
able pupils who had apent two or three yeara in the villa:JQ 
schools were built in central mission stations. Children 
from surrounding vill119e1 boarded at the 1chools under the 
60 Sali1bury 19701 317-19. 
61 Ibid1 185-90. 
62 Dupeyrat 19351 402. 
63 Ibid1 405-17. 
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missionaries' supervision. English was taught in addition 
to reading and writing in the local dialect. some of the 
central schools offered elementary technical and vocational 
training: in 1924 a school was set up at Yule Island to train 
carpenters, boat builders and other tradesmen. 64 By 1934 
fifteen parish schools were teaching a combined total of 
65 535 students. The Mekeo were served by one parish school 
at Inawaia and by St Patrick's School on Yule Island. 
Though some profited from the opportunities 
offered by the mission, the majority of villagers saw little 
reason to send their children to school if this meant 
disrupting the domestic routine: and very few were prepared 
to part with their offspring for the minimum of four years 
which the mission required students to spend at its boarding 
schools. Patrol reports of these years make many references 
to complaints from the mission concerning school attendance. 
The elders recalled, with much amusement, that it was the 
village constable's duty, under the watchful eye of the 
patrol officer, to cane the truants. They shrug off with a 
laugh the one or two years they spent at the village school, 
declaring all they learnt in that time was 'to say Ave Maria'. 
Few middle-aged or older people in Inawi have had more than 
one or two years elementary education: no person over the 
age of fifty had attended a parish schoo1.
66 
This apathy to, or deliberate avoidance of, the 
channels through which new ideas and new values might have 
64 Ibid: 430. 
65 Ibid1 417, fn.2. 
66 !~formation obtained from the household census taken 
in Inawi. 
! 
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reached the village - education, migrant labour, travel, the 
cash economy - provided existing institutions with an 
effective insulation against change. The traditional order 
remained unchallenged, the standard upon which new experiences 
were evaluated. It is little wonder, under these 
circumstances, that the Inawaia cult of 1941 achieved no 
permanent break with the past. The accommodating of the 
demands of the white regime had, of course, involved a 
certain amount of adjustment and compromise - the cult gave 
evidence of the existence of new tensions - but the changes 
which were taking place were so gradual as to be imperceptible 
to those experiencing them. Since the results of these 
changes are not evident until much later, it is difficult 
to pinpoint them; the process can perhaps be most readily 
identified in the slow decline of chiefly ceremonial 
occurring during these years. 
People complain that the chiefs no longer give 
'proper' feasts; certainly those which can be observed 
today are a far cry from 
b 1 . d . 67 y Se igman an Gu1s. 
the elaborate affairs described 
By carefully questioning the 
oldest informants in Aipeana and Inawi, it was possible to 
estimate roughly when certain ceremonies, or elements of them, 
67 Seligman 1910: 359-63; Guis 1936: 136-45 • 
• 
• 
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68 
were abandoned. The Inawi elders were able to recount 
in detail the distinctive ceremonies which were once held 
by the war chiefs - the iso and faia lopia. When an iso 
lopia gave a feast he invited only the iso sections of 
other ~lans and he was expected to kill forty or more pigs 
to present to his guests. Warriors attended the feast 
clad in full war dress, each clan performing war dances 
(pani, kuriva) in front of the host's clubhouse as they 
arrived. When all the guests were seated on the J:!.!!!, the 
chiefs of each group would sing war chants (falaia) boasting 
of the enemies they and their forefathers had killed in 
battle: this performance was likely to lead to violence if 
the singer enumerated among his victims the ancestors or 
relatives of other clans present, thus charging the whole 
affair with excitement and tension. The feast continued 
all through the night, with food being served at regular 
intervals and whole pigs being presented to each of the 
invited chiefs. In the morning many more pigs were 
slaughtered and given to the guests. Each chief received 
several pigs which were not consumed by the warriors, but 
68 
• 
The method followed here was first to carefully question 
several knowledgeable elders concerning the types of 
ceremonies once held by the chiefs. Having sorted 
out this information, and having gained a clear idea 
of all the different ceremonies held by the various 
dignitaries and of the manner in which they were held, 
I then re-interviewed the same informants to determine 
whether they had actually witnessed the feasts they 
described, and, if so, when was tnc lasl time they had 
seen them held. Events were roughly dated by establishing 
whether the informant, at the tine of which he was speaking, 
was a child (mini fa'a), an unmarried youth (o'oae), a 
married man (au), or a married man with one, two or three 
children, etc:- It is possible that there were other 
ceremonies held in the past of which my informants had 
no knowledge: though they them~elves deny thi£. 
, 
' 
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taken home and given to the senior chief of the clan who 
divided the meat amongst the whole group. 
Inawi informanta explained that they themselves 
had n~t seen such feasts but had been told by their fathers 
and grandfathers how they should be held. Though the titles 
of iso and faia lopia continue to the present day, the elders 
state that during their lifetime the war chiefs have 
installed new chiefs and built new clubhouses employing 
ceremonies which were merely a simplification of those 
proper to the civilian chiefs. The last .f!!! clubhouse in 
Inawi built in the traditional manner is said to have been 
pulled down when the oldest informants were children. The 
war chiefs of Aipeana were only a little behind the Inawi 
chiefs in abandoning their distinctive ceremonial. Two of 
the oldest men in Aipeana saw the investment of a £!!.!. 
chief when they were small boys; as youths, they attended 
a feast in their own village and one in Beipa at which iso 
chiefs were installed. All war chiefs installed after 
this gave feasts similar to those of civilian chiefs. The 
last ~ clubhouse in Aipeana fell down sometime before the 
Second World War and was not rebuilt. No one from either 
village claimed that they had seen the great feasts formerly 
held to repay allies after a battle. These testimonies 
indicate that the ceremonies proper to the war chiefs were 
becoming obsolete by the early 1900s and had been almost 
entirely abandoned by the 1920s. 
The special feasts formerly given by the ugauga 
lopia (sorcery chiefs) were dying out by the 1920s. The 
sorcerers were always presented with the choicest cuts of 
meat at feasts given by the civilian chiefs and were 
therefore obliged at aome time to make a return feast. Like 
other chiefs, they alao held feasts to celebrate the investment 
200 
of a new ugauga lopia or the buildinq of a new clubhouse. 
The elders of both villaqea state that they participated in 
such celebrations in their youth; the last was held at 
Eboa in the East Mekeo and the sorcerers of Inawi and 
Aipeana are said to have undertaken to make a return feaat, 
but never did so. 
The civilian chiefs also qradually dispensed with 
the more elaborate and expensive ceremonies. The fa'aniau 
chiefs once built dwellinqs which were diatinquished not 
only by their position and the materials used, but also by 
special ornaments and insiqnia. 69 The construction of 
such a house was a lenqthy and expensive affair. Experts, 
who had to be richly rewarded for their labours and fed 
for the duration of their work, were employed to execute 
the necessary carvinq and paintinq. The decorations were 
kept hidden by screens of palm fronds until completed; 
when all was ready a qreat feast was qiven to celebrate the 
occasion. 
The oldest Inawi informants related that the 
senior chief of oaisaka built an elaborately decorated 
house when they were small boys. While preparations were 
beinq made for the openinq feast, a clansman died and all 
celebrations had to be cancelled. Consequently the house, 
which was the laat of its kind in the villaqe, was never 
lived in, thouqh later it occasionally served as a qovernment 
resthouse. Aipeana elders remembered two or three such 
69 Accordinq to informant• in both villaqea, Seliqman's 
statement that 'Al a rule there is nothinq distinctive 
about a chief'• house ••• ' is not correct. seliqman 
1910: 347-8. See above1 52. See also Hau'ofa 
19711 162. 
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houses in their village when they were children but said 
that when these dwellings fell into disrepair they were 
not rebuilt because of the expense involved, Just after 
• 
the Second World war, one chief chose to build a house in 
the old style: but it appears that this was a deliberate 
revival rather than a continuation of the old custom. 
The civilian chiefs continued to build clubhouses, 
to install their sons as chiefs and to supervise observances 
• 
for the death of a clan member but proceedings were 
simplified by curtailing the part played by the ufu apie.
70 
On all important occasions, the host clan usually called 
upon the chiefs of its ufu apie to honour them with a 
grand ceremonial procession through the village. Seligman 
describes in detail the first stage of this stately display: 
The chiefs of the ufuapie solemnly leave their 
ufu chewing areca nut, and from time to time 
~ing a rattling noise by rubbing their lime 
spatulae against the neck of their lime gourds. 
This produces a loud clicking noise, which is 
a warning to keep the track clear. The chiefs 
of the ufuapie then make a move towards the 
village whither they are bound but usually stop 
after a few steps, and rattle their spatulae on 
their gourds pretending to be too tired to go 
on. They are immediately given a present of 
food and begged to forget their fatigue and to 
remember only the sorrow of the village to which 
they are bringing relief. When they have 
received sufficient presents they proceed on 
their way. They are thus 'refreshed' two or 
three times every hour until they reach the 
outlying coconut trees of the village that is 
in mourning.71 
70 See above: SB-9. 
71 Seligman 19101 360, 
• 
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Later the chiefs would proqress in similar fashion, but even 
more slowly and with lengthy pauses, down the centre of the 
village street to the hosts' ~. The event proved very 
expensive to the hosts, who had to have many pigs and a 
large amount of game ready to present to the chiefs during 
their journey. In addition, the rest of the ufu apie was 
invited to dance and had to be richly rewarded in meat. 
The ufu apie were always the major recipients of food from 
a feast but on lesser occasions, which did not merit the 
same expense, matters could be simplified by sending the food 
to the ufu apie and not inviting their presence. 
The ufu apie continued to be invited to attend 
important feasts, but gradually the most extravagant element -
the procession of the chiefs - was omitted. 72 The oldest 
informants recalled that when they were boys and unmarried 
youths they had seen the ufu apie chiefs parade through 
their villages, though the practice had ceased by the time 
they were married men. Dancing and singing by tho ufu apie 
continued for much longer. The last occasions on which they 
danced in both villages were in the late 1940s - at the 
installation of the present chiefs of Afai clan in Inawi and 
of the chief of Apagoa clan in Aipeana. The ufu apie have 
not danced in either village since then, though at one or 
two feasts they have been invited to sing. 
The gradual diminishing of ceremonial life roughly 
coincides with the stepping up of government activity in the 
1920s and 1930s. The elders emphasize how much time they 
spent in government work as young men; some claim that tlw 
72 See aboves 58-9. 
203 
demands were so excessive that at times people had not even 
enough food to eat, let alone for feasts1 
They kept on carrying cargoes and because of 
this people in the village were starving and 
quarrelling broke out as people were stealing 
from each other because they were hungry.73 
It seems unlikely that people actually starved; nevertheless, 
the'new activities required by the tax, enforced rice growing 
and the constant drain on the village's labour force caused 
by carrying certainly disrupted the normal pattern of village 
affairs. Large feasts, which required months, even years 
of careful planning and husbanding of resources, must have 
been extremely difficult to organize under conditions 
prevailing in the 1920s and 1930s. People explain that the 
chiefs and the village constable always worked out between 
them the opportioning of time to government work and 
traditional tasks; but in practice this must have involved 
considerable compromise on the part of the chiefs. Since 
the early 1900s certain clans have reduced the number of 
clans they recognize as ufu apie: this is revealed by a 
comparison of Seligman' a list of ufu apie with contemporary 
74 
custom. In some cases the reasons given for the reduction 
are political but it seems economic considerations probably 
lay behind them. A well informed Inawi elder directly 
attributed the~ermination of an ufu apie relationship with 
his own clan to the effects of European contact: 
The old people used to have three ufu apie: 
one from Afai, one from Ina'oae and one 
from Aivea, Inauefae ikupu. When the Europeans 
came they started to ask for plenty of work, 
so we cut one off. Now there are only two. 
This happened when I was sma11.7S 
73 Lapu Aufe, Inawi1 22 Feb. 1971. 
74 Seligman 19101 369-72. 
75 Lapu Aufe, Inawi1 12 May 1971. 
! 
204 
A relaxation of the taboos and restrictions which 
formerly gave the chief full control over his clan's economic 
resources accompanied the gradual simplification of 
ceremonial life. Magic specialists (called fula ari by 
many informants and referred to as the kaivakuku by Seligman) 76 
once existed to enforce strict taboos which were placed on 
the use of coconuts and betel nut months before a large 
feast. Old people in Inawi and Aipeana claimed to have seen 
the fula ari in their youth, but most young people had never 
even heard of such specialists. An Inawi chief in his late 
forties recalled that one of the most frightening experiences 
of his early childhood was sitting with his grandfather on 
the ufu, watching the fula ari, who were disguised by weird 
masks and clothing, run through the village searching for 
those who had broken the taboos. These statements suggest 
that the fula ari had ceased functioning by the 1930s. 
Chiefs would have found it impracticable to impose severe 
restrictions on coconuts after the introduction of the tax, 
as most people earnt their tax money by making copra; by 
the 1930s betel nut was also being sold for cash. As 
circumstances made it increasingly difficult to organize 
large scale feasts there was, in any case, no longer any 
real need for the restraints that had applied in the past: 
fertile gardens always provided a surplus sufficient to meet 
the modest requirements of smaller feasts. Chiefly rights 
to conserve supplies of game and fish were retained for 
longer. Middle-aged people related that the strict controls 
made meat so scarce when they.were children that their 
mothers used to feed them with certain types of beetles. 
76 Seligman 1910: 314. 
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The process had not yet progressed far enough to 
attract people's attention, but a slow undermining of chiefly 
prerogative and prestige had already begun. Similar 
invisible processes of modification and change were taking 
place in other areas of the society. Under pressure from 
the mission, the patterns of family life and marriage were 
imperceptibly assuming different forms, and the observances 
relating to birth, marriage, death and mourning were less 
rigorously followed then before. 77 The grudging concessions 
made to external pressures seemed of little importance at 
the time. The fact that no faia clubhouse had been built in 
the village for several years, or that the ufu apie had not 
been invited to dance at a recent feast, were not in 
themselves matters for concern: it was only later, when 
people began to realize that no chief would ever again build 
a faia ufu - as the proper ritual had been forgotten and no 
one could muster sufficient resources to hold the grand 
feast necessary for its opening - that the accumulation of 
small, apparently insignificant changes made its impact. 
When people look back over their experiences it seems, 
therefore, that the years before the war represented an 
unbroken continuity with the pre-contact past, and that 
the old ways were suddenly swept away after the war. 
77 These changes could have been traced in detail by using 
a method similar to that applied to the decline of 
chiefly ceremonial, but because of limited time in 
the field I did not attempt to do so. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE WAR 1942-451 'Then came our hardest time' 
THE Second World War provides the most important chronological 
division of the Mekeo's contact history. When people are 
asked to date the changes they describe, they invariably 
do so with reference to the war: and indeed the majority 
of readily apparent changes have occurred over the last 
thirty years. The first fifty years of European control 
represented no sharp break with the pre-contact past: for 
five decades villagers were at least able to maintain the 
illusion that nothing important had been altered by the 
• arrival of the white man. The war marks the beginning of 
a new era, and of a new phase of relationships with the 
white regime. 
Though most Papuans and New Guineans were in one 
way or another affected by the war, their experiences were 
1 by no means uniform. The Mekeo region, as part of the 
Kairuku Subdistrict, was incorporated into the wartime 
Lakekamu District, which was classified by ANGAU as an 
'indirectly affected' area. According to an ANGAIJ report 
of 1943: 
••• in this [the Lakekamu District) and the 
other 'unaffected' Districts, except to the 
extent that the communities were deprived 
of the presence of numbers of able bodied 
men who were recruited for service with the 
Army, the native population were not subjected 
l Inglis 19691 512-19. 
'• 
4 
~ 
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to any hard•hip and at no time wa• there 
a shortage of native foodstuff•.2 
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In comparison with the occupied areas of New Guinea and 
Papua, and regions such a• Milne Bay and Port Moresby, 
the people of the Lakekamu District suffered littles they 
did not experience the dislocating effects of Japanese 
invasion, their territories were never battle fronts and 
their lives and property were not threatened by the enemy's 
bombs. Yet the Mekeo, for one, remember the war as their 
'hardest time' • 
The Lakekamu District was heavily recruited for 
labourers and carriers. In september 1943, 4,000 men had 
been recruited, a number which ANGAU considered to be the 
maximum labour potential of a population estimated at 33,000: 
at 12.1 per cent of the total population, the level of 
recruitment was just slightly below that of the highest of 
12.58 per cent in the Samarai District. 3 By the end of 1942, 
the Mekeo villages were reported to be 'practically drained' 
4 
of young men. A census check in December 1942 revealed 
that approximately 497 men were absent from their villages 
and that 'in a case of vital necessity' between sixty to 
100 extra labourers could be obtained, of which perhaps 
half would be fit for carrying. 5 
2 ANGAU Native Labour Section Statistics 1943. 
3 ANGAU Native Labour Section Statistics 1943. Appendix A 
of a 'Report ••• in respect to Native Relief and 
Rehabilitation ••• '. 
4 Patrol to the Mekeo 13-19 Nov. 1942. 
5 Patrol to Terapo via the Mekeo 19-30 Dec. 1942. 
• 
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Moat men recruited in mid-1942 were sent to the 
Bulldog trail, the supply route which provided a tenuous 
overland link with the small Australian force left to defend 
wau. supplies had to be transported by ship from Port 
Moresby to the mouth of the Lakekamu River in the Gulf of 
Papua, and from there taken by barge up river to Terapo. 
Goods were then loaded into canoes for a further two day 
journey up stream to the Bulldog labour camp: carriers 
covered the distance from Bulldog to Wau - a seven day 
6 journey on foot. Men were also conscripted as plantation 
labourers: some worked on the rice plot established by 
ANGAU in the Mekeo, 7 others on the copra and rubber 
plantations to the east of the district. 8 Later in the 
year, many were sent to Kokoda. 
The effects of the men's absence on village 
communities must have varied from group to group, depending 
on the requirements of the local subsistence economy. 
The Gulf people, for instance, depended on a staple diet of 
sago which necessitated the men's labour to fell, transport 
6 Ryan, 1972: 1215. 
7 In December 1942, ninety Mekeo were reported to be 
working in the Jesubaibua and Kubuna rice plotsr Patrol 
to Terapo via the Mekeo 19-30 Dec. 1942. 
8 According to ANGAU Native Labour Statistics for 1943, 
forty-four men from the Kairuku area were employed as 
plantation labourers. It is not clear whether this 
figure is inclusive or exclusive of the men working on 
the ANGAIJ rice plot. Possibly the urgent need for 
carriers had reduced the number working on plantations. 
Some informants stated that they had worked for six 
months or so on the Kanoaia plantations and then were 
sent to Kokoda as carriers. 
I , 
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and cut the •ago paim. to •ise, before the women could wa•h 
and prepare the 1ago •tarch. 9 In the ca•• of the Mekeo, 
whose rich alluvial land1 allowed crop• to be cultivated 
on the 1ame plot for ••veral ••••on•, and where the greater 
part of sub•i1tence labour normally fell to the women, 
the men'• ab1ence did not •eriou•lY endanger village food 
10 
supplie1. De•pite •eriou• floods in November and 
December 1942 
11 
shortage1 • 
and again in 1943, patrol• reported no food 
In fact •upplies were sufficiently plentiful 
to allow ANGAU'• rood Supply Section to -k• regular 
purcha1e• from villager• - a 1light 1carcity of local food 
crops reported in 1944 wa• attributed to exce••ive buying 
12 
on its part. Informant• recalled that American troop1 
also toured the area to buy food, exchanging tin1 of meat 
for fresh fruit and vegetable1. 
with virtually all able-bodied men ab1ent from 
their villages, field •taff did not expect much rice would 
9 Maher 19611 18-19. 
10 see aboves 38. 
11 A patrol to the Mekeo 22 Nov.-8 Dec. 1943 ob1erved that 
'the various food• which generally grow, such•• corn, 
sweet potatoes, cabbage, 1ugar cane, taro, pumpkin, 
tomatoe• etc. have all been wa•hed away [by the floods), 
and the people are practically living on taro alone. 
Paw Paw and bananas are plentiful.' Pieldwork in 1970 
and 1971 indicated that European-introduced fruits and 
vegetable• were item• grown primarily for trade, 
forming only a very unimportant part of the average 
villager'• daily diet. Since banana•, the 1taple, were 
plentiful and taro v .. al10 available, the ab••nce of 
the other crop• Mntioned in the report can hardly have 
constituted a food shortage in villagers' terma. 
12 Patrol to the Mekeo Di•trict 8-16 May 1944. 
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be planted for the 1942-43 aeaaon but patrol• were aent out 
•• uaual to auperviae clearing and planting. 13 The first 
patrol reported that only two or three village• had commenced 
work and that the reat declared they could manage only 
very amall plota aince all their men were 14 Le•• away. 
than two weeka later, a aecond patrol waa surpriaed to 
the women and old men hard at work clearing new areaa, 
and expreaaing their determination to produce more rice 
than ever before1 
The old men cut the large trees down, while the 
women and children do all the clearing and 
burning, and theae people are to be congratulated 
for the work they have done. The people are 
fully aware that thia rice cultivation is 
neceaaary to help the war effort, and theae 
old men and the women are certainly doing their 
bit to help on that effort, it ia hard work 
for them, but they are carrying on juat a• their 
sons are in other parts of the Territory, and 
their one idea ia, that this year their cropa 
will exceed thoae of the previoua yeara, •••• 15 
In a note attached to thi• report, Thompson remarked 
find 
with satiafaction that the Mekeo's efforts indeed repreaented 
a '100% war effort'. Patrol officer• praised the people's 
labours and streaaed to them the importance of growing u 
much rice as poaaible for the army, which had undertaken 
to pay grower• a penny per pound for their grain. Deapite 
damage to the crop cauaed by flooding, the women and old 
men succeeded in equalling the pre-war production f igurea 
13 Patrol to the Mekeo Diatrict 13-19 Nov. 1942. 
14 Patrol to Mekeo, J<unimaipa and J<aruama 2 Nov .-8 Dec. 
1942. 
15 Patrol to the Mekeo Diatrict 13-19 Nov. 1942. 
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16 with a harveat that realized £1,200. Thia poaitive 
response contraated with the reactions of the coastal Waima 
and Kivori people, who were not only the most inveterate 
deserters from the Bulldog labour lines but alao refuaed 
to co-operate in such amall matters aa supplying firewood 
17 and food for the police. 
By mid-1943 the effects of the men's absence 
were becoming more noticeable: field ataff observed that 
tracks and roads were 
were badly in need of 
overgrown, 
18 
repair. 
and that fences and houses 
After a patrol in March 
1943, one officer reported that some Mekeo and nearly all 
the Waima and Kivori women had approached him, aaking that 
19 their menfolk be sent back to help them make new gardena. 
Nevertheless, with the help of the old men, the hardy Mekeo 
women planted 118 acres of rice for the 1943-44 seaaon. 20 
Presumably because of the floods in late 1943, only 331;2 
21 tons of grain were harvested - approximately only one 
16 Thompson, Report 1944. 
17 See Patrol to the coastal villages from YI.Ile Island to 
Lesi 2-19 Jan. 1943: Patrel to Pinupaka, J'i<oea -
18 
19 
20 
21 
Apinaipi 9-20 Aug. 1943, attached note by W.H.H. Thompson: 
Patrol to Motu Motu villages and the coast 28 Aug.-22 
Sept. 1944, note attached by W.H.H. Thompson, The 
Waima's lack of co-operation was merely a continuation 
of their pre-war pattern of relationships with the 
government. See aboves 187, fn.39. 
Patrol to the Mekeo Diatrict 10-20 May 1943. 
Patrol to the Mekeo, Waima and Kivori 15-31 Mar. 1943. 
Patrol to the Mekeo District 8-16 May 1944, note 
attached by W.H.H. Thompson. 
Patrol to the Mekeo and Waima 9-14 Oct. 1944. 
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quarter of the amount produced the previou• year. The 
government rice mill had been moved to the Mekeo and ••t up 
near Jesubaibua village when the bombing of Port More•by 
commenced in 1942. In addition to supervising the village 
rice plots, ANGAU employed several indentured labourers 
on a rice plantation which was cultivated by mean• of a 
22 tractor plough. 
The scarcity of male labour made the problem of 
obtaining carriers far more acute than it had ever been in 
the past: mountain tribe•men now had to be per•uaded or 
forced to come down to the coast to carry supplies for 
23 
mountain stations. A patrol of the Mekeo and coastal 
villages 
as there 
in January 1944 had to employ female carriers, 
24 
were no men available. The situation was 
relieved a few months later when many native labourers 
were repatriated during the lull in hostilities which 
followed the fall of Madang in April. By August, many 
Mekeo men had returned to their villages. 25 TWO months 
later a total of 452 me~were instructed to each plant a 
26 half acre of rice for the .1944-45 season: presumably 
most if not all of this number were repatriated labourers. 
Apart from rice planting, there was plenty of work awaiting 
the men: houses had fallen into disrepair, pig fences 
22 Thompaon, Report 1944. 
23 Patrol to Goilala 8-22 Mar • 1943. 
24 Patrol to Mekeo and waima 17-28 Jan. 1944. 
25 Patrol to Mekeo, Jtivori and Waima 7-17 Aug. 1944. 
26 Patrol to Mekeo and Waima 9-14 oct. 1944. 
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needed rebuilding and new gardens had to be cleared. In 
some villagl8 patrol officers ordered that a complete, new 
set of hou1e1 should be built. 27 ~illagers enthusiastically 
set about the ta1k1 given to them and field staff were 
28 pleased with the results. When work conunenced on the 
rice plots in November, Thompson was able to report: 
' ••• an excellent start is being made by apparently most 
willing nativee•. 29 
wartime patrol reports paint an optimistic 
picture of relations between the Mekeo and the government • 
• 
No disruption of government authorit·' was noted. Thompson, 
the ARM, now became Major Thompson, an ANGAU district 
officer, but he remained at JCairuku and he and his officers 
continued to patrol the region as they had in the past. 
Villagers are reported as willing acceptors of the 
sacrifices required of them, the young men serving as 
carriers for the army and the women and old men labouring 
in the rice fields to feed the troops. Though people left 
in the village were obliged to undertake a far heavier work 
load than they were accustomed to in peace time, no one 
went hungry, and c011111Unities were not seriously affected 
by the absence of the men. In practice, the wartime 
government was compelled to employ harsh methods, but 
• patrol reports reveal a more sympathetic attitude and a 
greater appreciation of villagers' efforts. Whereas in the 
• 
27 Patrol to Mekeo, Kivori and Waima 7-17 Aug. 1944. 
28 Patrol to Mekeo 1-23 Sept. 1944: Patrol to Mekeo and 
Waima 9-14 Oct. 1944. 
29 Patrol to Mekeo and Paitana 21-30 Nov. 1944, note 
attached by W.H.H. Thompson. 
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past carriers on mountain patrols had been ridiculed for 
their complaints and unmanly behaviour, officers inspecting 
labour lines on the Bulldog trail readily admitted: 
The carriers employed on these sections are 
certainly doing a man's job, and don't get any 
comfort or assistance from the weather which 
as already mentioned is very cold, and 
invariably wet.JO 
The same attitude is reflected in comments on the rice 
industry. Previously villagers had been considered foolish 
not to have eagerly participated in an activity from which 
they would profit: now field staff were appreciative of 
labours which would help the 'war effort'. Government 
officers had always cast themselves in the role of 
benefactors: suddenly the situation was reversed. Ken 
Inglis observes that the carriers on the Kokoda trail were 
'needed as natives had never been needed before by white 
men in New Guinea•. 31 It seems that this need, which was 
dramatized in an inunediate and direct way on the Kokoda 
trail, also influenced situations far removed from the 
battle fronts. 
In many respects informants' statements substantiate 
the general picture presented in patrol reports. Villagers 
agreed that there were no food shortages. The Inawi 
wartime village constable, Isoaimo Opu, affirmed: 
Even during the war the food in the village 
was good and there was plenty of it. People 
continued to make new gardens, the boys who 
had just left school were asked to help chop 
down the trees and make new gardens. No one 
went hungry.32 
30 Patrol to !die Creek and Wau 26 .Apr.-13 May 1943. 
31 Inglis 19691 505. 
32 Isoaimo Opu, Inawi1 25 Feb. 1971. 
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The women, particularly, spoke proudly of their efforts 
to grow rice to feed the soldiers. Their determination 
to equal the pre-war production reflects the pride the 
hard-working Mekeo woman takes in her own physical strength 
and industry: it was a special sort of triumph for the 
\\Omen to prove that they could produce even more rice 
without the help of the men. They emphasize that they had 
to work very hard but they make no suggestion that they 
were forced to do so. When the men boast of their exploits, 
the women point out that they too made their contribution. 
Other comments, however, indicate that the 
picture has a darker aide which the documentary evidence 
tends to pass over. Many references are made in reports 
to recruiting labourers•and arresting deserters but few 
details are given: one gains the impression that these 
matters were merely routine and accomplished with a 
minimum of fuss. In contrast, informants' accounts suggest 
that the high-handed methods of ANGAU officers and the 
brutality of the native police caused disruption and tension 
in village communities. Patrol officers marched into the 
villages with their police, according to informants, 
handcuffed all available men and led them off to l<airuku 
where they were forced to sign on as labourers for the 
army. Often surprise raids were made at night. A carrier 
on the Bulldog trail recalled the circumstances under 
which he was 'recruited 1 1 
One night when all the village was asleep, 
police came and surrounded the village and 
went to each house and got out every man 
and handcuffed them and brought them to the 
middle of the village. They kept us there 
till daybreak and then walked us to Kairuku 
and forced us to sign on for two years.33 
33 o.o., Inawi1 17 Feb. 1971. 
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Within four or five months, each village had, in thie 
manner, been stripped of virtually every able-bodied man. 
The government's methods can hardly have inspired 
confidence. For those left in the village, this was a 
time of uncertainty and insecurity: people recall that 
when planes passed overhead the women would weep, thinking 
of their husbands and sons, and fearing they would never 
see them again. 
Maas desertions from the Bulldog carrying lines 
and labour camp occurred in 1942; in October one patrol 
arrested ninety deserters in the Mekeo and Waima villages 
34 
alone. The runaways usually returned to their villages -
informants recalled that it took nearly three weeks 
travelling by foot to complete the journey - and then 
attempted to avoid capture by hiding in the bush when 
patrols visited the village. People claim that the police 
did not waste time pursuing the fugitives but instead 
intimidated their families until the men allowed themselves 
to be taken. The police would raid the houses of suspected 
deserters, hitting the women and children, shooting the 
family's pigs and destroying or seizing property in the 
house, including the box of traditional valuables which 
each household carefully hoarded to make bride price and 
other traditional payments. Patrols usually recruited new 
1 b d . 1 1 35 d 't a our and arrested eserters simu taneous y, an i 
appears that in the confusion of a police raid the new 
34 Patrol to Mekeo and waima 12-25 Oct. 1942. 
35 See, for example, Patrol to Mekeo and Waima 12-25 Oct. 
1942: ninety deeertere were arrested by the patrol 
and 205 new labourers recruited. 
I 
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recruits were treated just as roughly as the deserters. 
A man who served on both the Bulldog and the Xokoda trail 
described how he had just returned home from a mountain 
patrol, when some carriers deserted from Bulldog: 
we came back to stay in the village and some 
carriers ran away from Wau and came back to 
the village also. Mr O'Malley came first to 
get carriers from this village and the police 
went to the houses of the men who had run 
away from wau. They took the boxes containing 
riches out, also they took other things in the 
houses, and they put handcuffs on us and they 
whipped us very hard in the village - also 
they spoilt the village. The village constable 
was calling out 'All the men who ran away, 
the police are going to spoil your property, 
so all of you must come out.' And so all of 
us came out in front of Mr O'Malley.36 
Desertions on a smaller scale than those of 1942 continued 
throughout the war: villagers declare that police raids 
similar to the one just described were a common occurrence. 
One Inawi man is said to have tried to spear a policeman 
because native police were 'always coming to the village 
and hitting and kicking the women and children'. Those 
Mekee police who served in the district are believed to 
have been punished later by the sorcerers for the brutality 
they displayed to their own people • 
The wartime village constable evidently found 
his position very uncomfortable. In the past it had not 
been an easy matter to balance the demands of the government 
and the interests of the people, but it had usually been 
possible to smooth matters over so that, at least on the 
surface, relations with the government appeared to be 
36 A.O., Inawi: 3 May 1971. 
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satisfactory. Now the situation had abruptly altered: 
patrol officers could no longer be put off with excuses, 
what they wanted they took by force. Under these 
circumstances the village constable could be powerless to 
provide any buffer against the government's demands, and 
he might find himself the target of the patrol officer's 
blows and abuse. An Inawi village constable was dismissed 
in disgrace, according to informants, because he was unable 
to arrest the deserters from his village. People avowed 
that this was the only occasion on which they had ever seen 
a government officer strike a village constable, The 
incident appears to have caused a considerable stir in 
Inawi. Isoaimo Opu, a chief of Gagai clan, who was 
appointed in the disgraced official's stead, explained 
that the other chiefs were not consulted as they had 'run 
off into the bush' and that Mr O'Malley, the patrol 
officer, had simply selected him on the recommendations 
of the village constables of Aipeana and Beipa. The 
flight of the chiefs, and the arbitrary appointment of a 
successor, represent an undignified departure from the 
former ideals of consultation and co-operation. 
Informants agreed that Isoaimo was selected 
because he was a 'big, strong man' who the patrol officer 
thought would be capable of dealing with the deserters. 
Though he is indeed a man of imposing physical appearance 
and powerful personality (in addition to being a chief), 
Isoaimo made it clear that he relied on diplomacy, not 
bullying, to achieve his ends: 
I didn't go and get the runaway carriers by 
force but I persuaded the men to come with me 
to Kairuku, telling them that if they stayed 
in the village the Government would punish 
their families, so after a while they would 
change their mind and go. One man [who is 
known to be very much under the thumb of his 
shrewish wife) ran away from carrying and I 
went to his wife and told her 'You must keep 
on asking him to go to Kairuku and telling 
him that if he refuses to go the police will 
come and raid your house. I will ask him, 
but you must help me to keep on asking him to 
change his mind.' So finally he agreed to go. 
When the men agreed to come I handcuffed them 
and took them to Kairuku.37 
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In this manner he was able to satisfy the government without 
bringing the wrath of his own people on his head. Tactful 
treatment also helped to avert the rages of patrol officers: 
.•• whenever officers came to the village 
I would look after them and give them fruit, 
vegetables and eggs. I did this just for a 
favour, not for payment. After I had looked 
after them like that when they came to the 
village, next time they came they were easier 
to get on with.38 
During the war officers were usually harsh and often abusive 
but, he declared, none dared to strike him for if they haa, 
he 'was ready to hit them back'. 
Villagers had felt that the government made 
heavy demands on them in the 1920s and 1930s but the 
experiences of these years did not prepare them for the 
ruthlessness of wartime measures. It is little wonder that 
people remember the war as their 'hardest time'. For other 
people of the district, for example the Nara and Kabadi, 
who were exposed to few pre-war pressures, the government's 
actions must have seemed even more alarming than they did 
to the Mekeo. 
37 Isoaimo Opu, Inawi: 25 Feb. 1971. 
38 Ibid. 
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THOSE left in the village were told that their hardships 
were necessitated by 'the war': but .ANGAU's propaganda 
can have given little understanding of what the white man's 
war involved to people w~o saw nothing of the fighting. 
It lay with the men, who left their homes to serve on the 
carrying lines and battle fronts, to give some perspective 
to events and to provide some overall interpretation of 
the war experience. 
Whatever the capacity in which the men participated -
as carriers, labourers, police or soldiers - the sights 
they saw, the things they learnt and the new relationships 
which they formed made a deep impression on them. The 'war' 
is a topic which even today arouses the most stolid 
individual to give an animated account of his experiences. 
In retrospect, events are seen in very clear cut terms and 
the men display a strong sense of the importance of their 
own contribution. The issue at stake, as informants saw it, 
was quite straightforward - Japan wanted to take Papua New 
Guinea from Australia. The New Guineans and the people 
of the Northern District believed that the Japanese would 
do more for them than the Australians had done, so they 
fought on their side, but the Mekee and other Papuans helped 
the Australians to win. Oaisa Aisa, who was a carrier on 
the Kokoda trail, explained: 
The Japanese wanted to get Papua New Guinea 
so they were fighting for it. Probably they 
had seen this place so they wanted to get it 
and use it as their own. The Japanese 
produced rice and this country produces rice -
this may be the reason they wanted this 
country. The New Guineans and the Northern 
District helped the Japanese but the Papuans 
helped Australia and America. I was expecting 
the Australians and Americans to win so we 
would be saved. But if there had only been 
f 
i 
the Australians and Americans they would not 
have won, but the Papuans helped them to 
win.39 
According to Auki Kua, a wartime policeman: 
The Australians were not treating us properly 
so the Japanese thought they could do better, 
therefore the war started. That's what some 
people thought, therefore the Northern 
District people were helping the Japanese. 
But the people of Mekeo didn't know the 
Japanese' ways or how they would treat us, 
so we didn't like them to control us and so 
we helped the Australians.40 
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These explanations are typical, though the reasons for 
Japan's desire to acquire New Guinea vary in different 
accounts. Informants made their sense of involvement 
explicit by the manl'l!r in which they described the alignments 
for and against the Japanese. In fact, villagers probably 
had little alternative but to assist the army that occupied 
their territory, nevertheless the alignments are presented 
as the result of deliberate choices and commitments. 
The Mekeo clearly grasped the idea that they were 
defending their territory against an enemy, even though 
their own lands and villages were never directly threatened. 
They feared that if the Japanese won, they and other Papuans 
would be killed for helping Australia. Auki Kua related 
that, in the event of a Japanese victory, the Papuan 
soldiers and police wanted the Australians: 
••• to send all 
to Australia. 
on fighting.41 
the Papuan women and children 
But the men must remain to keep 
39 Oaisa Aisa, Inawi: 15 Feb. 1971. 
40 Auki Kua, Inawi: 12 Apr. 1971. 
41 Ibid. 
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such attitudes at least partly reflect the success of 
ANGAU propaganda. Officers took pains to impress upon 
~he carriers and labourers that their contribution was an 
essential part of the 'war effort'. Investigating the 
desertions from the Bulldog trail in 1942, one officer 
claimed: 
The Mekeo natives are well aware that this 
fight against the Japanese is theirs as well 
as ours, and I explained to them that it was 
necessary to keep supplies up to the troops, 
as by their desertions from the lines they 
were causing a delay which might become 
serious. I had a good talk to them and 
afterwards had no trouble in obtaining many 
more new labourers for the lines. These 
deserters realise that they should not have 
deserted •••• 42 
It is impossible to say how convincing these arguments seemed 
in 1942; but they have since gained accd\:>tance. Today 
villagers do speak of the war as 'their fight', in which 
they suffered and to which they contributed. 
Men who were forcibly taken from their homes to 
fill ANGAU's carrying and labour lines - no less than those 
who served voluntarily with the police and the Papuan 
Infantry Battalion - describe their experiences with all 
the enthusiasm and fire of old soldiera. Though none of 
them were old enough to have par~icipated in pre-contact 
warfare, all must have heard first-hand accounts of it from 
the old men. Occasional outbursts of violence over land and 
other matters still occurred after contact: older 
informants had taken part in a fight between Inawi and 
Aipeana over land, in which three men were killed. 'l'he 
warrior traditions persisted; men still felt themselves 
42 Patrol to Mekeo and Waima 12-25 Oct. 1942. 
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to be warrior• ahould the need ariae, aa indeed they atill 
43 do today. Undoubtedly the whit~ man'• warfare proved to 
be very different from their own, but it was natural that 
they ahould tend to aee it, at least at firat, in their 
own terma. Informant• believed that certain exponents of 
faia maqic, who were recruited by ANGAU as carriera, played 
an important part protectinq the carrier• from harm, warning 
when the enemy would strike and predictinq the Australians' 
ultimate victory. One of the most powerful Mekco ..!!!! 
maqicians, Kelemo Aisa of Rarai, laboured as a carrier on 
the Kokoda trail1 the fact that no Mekeo carriers were 
killed on the trail is attributed to his powers, and he is 
also said to have correctly predicted when the Japanese 
would attack. Some informants admitted that they were 
friqhtened becauae the Japaneae killed ao many Auatralians, 
others stated that they were confident as the faia maqicians 
had said their aide would win. Lapu Aufe, who carried on 
the Bulldoq trail, recalled1 
We were very friqhtened if the Japanese ahould 
win. We thouqht the Japanese would kill us 
becauae we helped the Australians and Americans. 
Some Auatralian soldier• asked us who was 
qoinq to win and we didn't know ., we didn't 
aay anythinq to them. All my friends thouqht 
that the Auatralians and Americans must try 
hard to win or else we would be killed. Also 
faia men went after the soldiers and said 
they were qoinq to win. The Papuans said we 
are qoinq to win now. some soldiers heard 
that Papuans were aayinq that they were qoinq 
to win and they proved it. The soldier• said 
'The carriers said we are qoinq to win, ao we 
did.•44 
43 See above1 110. 
44 Lapu Aufe, Inawi1 16 Feb. 1971. 
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Men posaesaing aome knowledge of war magic took their own 
protective charma with them, One informant recalled that 
his father specially prepared a powerful charm for him. 
A sorcerer declared that the Europeans also carried charms; 
while he was working on the Bulldog labour lines some 
Australian soldiers had shown him locks of their relatives' 
hair: in return he had allowed them to see the hair and 
other ancestor relics on which he relied for protection. 
The carriers deeply resented the fact that they 
were not permitted to fight the enemy themselves and were 
strictly forbidden to handle weapons. 0pu Lala, a carrier 
on the Kokod~ trail, exclaimed: 
We wanted to shoot some of the enemy but we 
weren't taught how to use the guns. We were 
very angry and wanted to kill the enemy! 45 
According to Auki Kua and others, the European soldiers 
sympathized with the carriers: 
When they [the troops) saw the carriers they 
said, 'You are supposed to be carrying a 
shotgun or a weapon but now you are taking 
the place of horses carrying supplies.• 46 
Informants admitted that they were not capable of handling' 
guns; they blamed their ignorance on the Auotralians who, 
they felt, should have taught them, as they believed the 
Americans had taught the negro soldiers. 0pu 0pu, who at 
one time was a boaaboy on a barge transporting supplies from 
Terapo to Bulldog, illustrated the point with a story of how 
he had nearly shot down the 'Australian general's plane' 
because of his ignorance of the markings on planes. 
45 0pu Lala, Inawi: 28 Apr. 1971. 
46 Auki Kua, Inawi1 12 Apr. 1971. 
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While working on the barge he was given charge of a machine 
gun, but when he shot at an Australian plane, believing it 
was the enemy, the gun was swiftly taken from him: Thia 
story is, of course, calculated to elicit laughter from an 
appreciative audience, but the fact that the men can laugh 
at themselves does not make the moral any less plain. Many 
other Papuana, all of whom shared a similar warlike tradition, 
must have felt humiliated, as the Mekeo did, by the passive 
role they were compelled to play. 
The Mekeo's positive sense of commitment contrasts 
strongly with the reactions observed in the occupied areas 
of the Mandated Territory, where people had seen the Germans 
replaced by the Australians and them in turn driven out by 
the Japanese. some groups felt themselves to be simply the 
helpless pawns of vastly superior powers:
47 
others believed 
the Japanese were the returning spirits of the ancestors 
48 
and the bearers of cargo. Little has been published, as 
yet, concerning the attitudes of people like the Mekeo, 
. f . l 1 49 experienced an unbroken continuity o colonia ru e. 
who 
The 
government had never been discredited in the Mekeo's eyes; 
it continued to control their territory and though it was 
47 Burridge 1960: 12. 
48 Lawrence 1967: 102. 
49 A graduate student of the University of Papua New 
Guinea, Neville K. Robinson, has undertaken a study 
of the effects of the war in three separate areas of 
Papua New Guinea, including the Gulf District of Papua 
which, with the Kairuku Subdistrict, formed the wartime 
Lakekamu District. His unpublished paper 'Kukipi in 
the War', presents a preliminary survey of oral mat~·rial 
collei:tcd from four villages of the Mal01lau;i subdistrict 
of th•~ Gulf District. 
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clearly hard pressed by an external enemy, it was not 
defeated. Though their response can be explained in terms 
of a different contact history, it seems, on the other 
hand, that some Mekeo may have had just as much reason to 
welcome the arrival of the Japanese as, for instance, did 
cultists of the Madang coast. Early in 1941, prophets of 
the Inawaia cult spread the news of an imminent invasion 
of England by Hitler and his 'iron men': during the attack 
on the mission station, villagers announced that the 
Japanese had landed at Port Moresby, killing all the 
50 Europeans. Yet whatever the cultists' views may have 
been, there is no evidence to suggest that their overt 
reactions were any different from the majority, who had 
taken no part in the cult. They too served as carriers and> 
labourers for ANGAU, while their women grew rice for the • 
army: and subsequent events indicate that they shared in 
the new horizons and hopes born of the war. 
It is unlikely that in 1942 any villagers were 
as sure of the situation as they are now, thirty years after 
the event. It seems rather that their sense of involvement 
has grown out of their experiences. Few Mekeo gave their 
services voluntarily. No more than three or four men in 
each of the larger villages served with the police or 
the PIB, judging from informant•' statements. One man 
interviewed in Inawi, who had been working in Port Moresby at 
the time of the outbreak of war, was persuaded by his 
employer to voluntarily sign on as a labourer al the naval 
base: no doubt there were a few others who did likewise. 
The majority, however, were forcibly conscripted by methods 
50 Thompson, Report 1941. 
.. 
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which have already been described. Desertions from the 
labour lines were cOlllftOn, and many youths attempted to avoid 
recruitment by finding employment with .American troops 
stationed in Hiaiu and Port Moresby. 51 
Desertions from Bulldog were so frequent that 
the district office at JCairuku made investigations into 
conditions on the carrying lines. The runaways complained 
that they were given excessively heavy loads, that they had 
to carry seven days a week without being allowed a rest and 
that they often had to work all day on an empty stomach, as 
they were forced to leave camp in the morning before their 
food had been distributed to them. 52 According to Peter 
Ryan, the labourers on the Bulldog trail carried: 
••• under shocking conditions, up and down 
Afeci~itous mountain ridges over 7,000 fe~t 
high, mostly through dank rain forest, 
constantly wet. Temperatures at night 
dropped nearly to freezing point, and 
carriers were lucky if they had a cheap 
cotton 'trade' blanket apiece. In the 
daytime their attire was usually merely a 
loincloth or g-atring. Their main food was 
rice which they had to cook for themselves 
when they arrived tired at the end of the 
day, with sometimes a supplementary tin of 
meat or packet of army biscuits. Malaria 
and deficiency diseases ravaged them and 
sickness rates of 25 per cent occurred: 14 
per cent was regarded as acceptable.53 
In addition to these hardships, informants stated that 
they had to put up with constant abuse and beatings from 
51 Patrol to Terapo via the Mekee 19-30 Dec. 1942. 
52 Patrol to Mekeo and Waima 12-25 Oct. 19421 Patrol to 
Terapo via the Mekeo 19-30 Dec. 1942. 
53 Ryan 1972: 1215-16. 
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the native police. After a time, the backbreaking, monotonous 
labour and the police bullying bec11111e intolerable, so they 
decided to escape. Most were captured not long after they 
returned to their homes, given a good flogging and sent back 
tothe labour lines. A deserter from Bulldog described his 
punishment: 
we had court and then they showed us a 44 gallon 
drum - some police and some of the bossboys 
brought us to the drum and pulled us one by one on 
to it and held our arms and legs. They gave us 
a very hard beating with a cane stick - some 
got ten strokes, some got twelve.54 
The floggings did not, however, discourage them from running 
away a second time: most men interviewed had deserted from 
Bulldog at least twice. 
Fear was not given as a reason for desertion. 
Unlike Kokoda, the Bulldog trail was not a battle front, 
but merely a supply route to Wau, from where a small group 
of Australian troops made sorties against the Japanese 
55 based at sa111111aua and Lae. carriers stated that they saw 
little or no fighting and asserted that none of their number 
was killed or even wounded by the enemy. Later most saw 
fighting when they we~e moved to Lae and other areas. 
ANGAU officers investigating desertions in 1942 also denied 
56 
that 'war fear' played any significant part. In J\lne 
the following year, when Bulldog labour camp was bombed by 
the Japanese, the carriers, including hospital patients, fled 
54 L.A., Inawi1 16 Feb. 1971. 
55 McCarthy 19591 84-107: 534-90. 
56 Patrol to the Mekeo and Waima 12-25 Oct. 1942. 
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into the bush but they were soon rounded up and persuaded 
to return to the camp: since they had not previously 
experienced a bombing raid, no one was punished.
57 
It was difficult for men who knew nothing of 
modern warfare to understand the vital importance of 
transport and supply. Bulldog carriers had only the word 
of the Europeans in charge of them that their labours were 
necessary. They had little direct contact with the troops 
and saw nothing of what was happening on the battle fronts: 
they themselves were not allowed to fight and were employed 
merely as pack animals. It seemed, therefore, that their 
efforts had very little relevance to the war and its 
outcome. Their own hardships preoccupied them and when 
these became intolerable, they ran away as they had done 
in the past on mountain patrols. One deserter conunented: 
••• I heard when we were running away from 
carrying - the Japanese are trying to take 
this land so we a;e fighting them, so don't 
run away, you must help me by carrying food 
while we are fighting. At that time I was 
just thinking about carrying the heavy things 
and getting tired of it, and we didn't think 
about who was going to win the war.SB 
The position of the carrier was clearly sununed up in a 
remark made by AUki Kua, a wartime policeman: 
we [the police) didn't run away. We were not 
signed on as labourers so we didn't think 
of running away.59 
57 Patrol to Edie creek and wau 26 Apr.-13 May 1943. 
58 A.O •• Inawi1 3 May 1971. 
59 AUki Kua, 1nawi1 12 Apr. 1971. 
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A policeman, who was given weapons and responsibility, did 
not desert. In pre-contact times, according to the old 
men, one man always followed behind a party of warriors: 
if any attempted to run back through the others, he would 
spear them. such was the warrior tradition - a carrier was 
something of a different order. 
Though frequent references are made in patrol 
reports to deserters from Bulldog, and an occasional runaway 
from the Kanosia plantations, no mention is made of carriers 
returning home from Kokoda. The men interviewed who had 
been sent to Kokoda stated either that they simply had not 
thought of running away, or that they were too frightened 
to leave. Some said they were deterred by rumours they had 
heard of a party of Roro deserters being killed by Koiari 
60 
people as they attempted to make their way to the coast. 
These fears would account for the fact that few, if any 
Kokoda deserters returned to their villages: some, however, 
did take advantage of the confusion at the,battle front to 
escape to Port Moresby where they could find more congenial 
employment. one informant said that he had managed to absent 
himself from the labour lines, finding a job in Port Moresby 
with the American troops; another escaped to Port Moresby 
and worked as a labourer 'digging holes for telegraph posts' 
until ANGAU caught up with him and sent him back to Kokoda. 
Those who served on Kokoda were of the opinion 
that they were well treated and not unduly harried by the 
60 cf. Grahamslaw 1971: 117. My informants stated that 
the men attacked were Roro not Mekeo. It is still 
a connon practice to use the term 'Mekeo' to refer 
in general to people from the J<airuku subdistrict -
a usage which often leads to confusion. 
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native police, though specific examples of brutal treatment 
were not lacking. One carrier related that he had become 
very ill on the track and had finally collapsed: when he 
.. 
was unable to get to his feet, as he was ordered to do, the 
European supervisor of the line beat him senseless with a 
heavy stick. Later his companions carried him to a field 
hospital where he spent several weeks recovering from his 
injuries. such incidents suggest that the Kokoda carriers 
received no more consideration than their counterparts on 
the Bulldog trail, but certainly the overall situation was 
very different. In contrast to Bulldog, the Kokoda trail 
was not merely a line of communication but also a moving 
battle front. Bearers took supplies to the front lines, 
and carried back the wounded and the dying. They witnessed 
the Australian retreat before the Japanese and the desperate 
fighting to regain Kokoda: they were horrified by the 
of whom seemed to the 
61 boys'. Their own 
numbers of soldiers killed, most 
carriers to be only 'young school 
hardships paled into insignificance in face of the terrible 
suffering of the troops. Those who took supplies to the 
soldiers and assisted the wounded to hospital were made 
fully aware of the importance of the part they played and of 
the gratitude of the men they served. This sense of 
involvement and purpose, as much as anything else, probably 
accounts for the fact that few thought of deserting from 
Kokoda. As one carrier expressed it: 
61 The youth and inexperience of the Australian troops, 
which had been apparent to informants who were only 
young men themselves at the time, is commented on by 
Ryan 1972: 1213. 
.. 
Those who went to Kokoda didn't run away but 
the ones who went to Bulldog did - they were 
talking and not working, so they were beaten 
by the Europeans and they ran away.62 
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'l'he men freely admit that few of them volunteered 
their labour, that many served reluctantly and deserted 
when they could: but within the total context in which 
the wartime experiences are now seen, these actions are felt 
to be unimportant and in no way a contradiction of their 
present attitudes. When war broke out in 1942, villagers 
had no comprehension of what was about to take place: later 
they were to see things from a different perspective. 
Gradually the explanations of ANGAU, the response of the 
troops, and their own experiences brought to men, who 
had felt humiliated or simply indifferent to the role they 
were compelled to play, a realization that the services they 
performed were necessary and that they could make a significant 
contribution. Ken Inglis writes: 
For once, in the relationship between European 
and native people, there was partnership of a 
kind. It was not the partn~rship of equals. 
But white men would starve to death or be 
killed for lack of weapons or die of wounds, 
if the carriers did not get through. There 
were not enough white men to do the work of 
carrying: and they could not do it as well as 
the natives. 63 
It was precisely this fact - that the Papuans were needed 
by the Europeans - which gave meaning to events in Mekeo 
eyes. Villagers could see that in this context, their 
labours and hardships had not been pointless, and that 
62 A.M., Inawi1 21 Apr. 1971. 
63 Inglis 19691 505. 
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there had been qood reason for the harsh measures employed 
by ANGAU. 'It was war', they say, 'so we all had to 
suffer': and they are aware that others suffered far 
more. Likewise the women, who strained to qrow rice for 
the-army, do not complain of compulsion but boast of the 
efforts they made. Lookinq back over events, even the 
Bulldog carriers feel that they were not unjustly treated. 
Lapu Aufe declared: 
They [ANGAU) qave us rice, bread, meat and 
fish, tea and sugar - I won't tell lies, 
its true they gave us enough. It was the 
time for war, so they drove us very hard, 
also if we did something wrong they whipped 
us - but they didn't whip us for nothing.64 
One measure which informants felt could not be rationalized 
in these terms was ANGAU's confiscation of the clothing, 
tools and food which the troops, particularly the Americans, 
gave to the carriers. They spoke bitterly of ANGAU's 
destruction of these gifts, and of its attempts to keep 
the Papuans segregated from the soldiers who befriended 
65 them. 
The army's dependence on Papuan labour created 
a new basis on which relations between white and brown 
were to operate: moreover the egalitarian attitudes and 
behaviour of the vast numbers of Australian and American 
troops which flooded into the country soon broke down the 
barriers of caste previously maintained to preserve white 
'prestige'. Many Europeans believed that the new familiarity 
served to reduce their status in the natives' eyes. 
64 Lapu Aufe, Inawi: 16 Feb. 1971. 
65 cf. Mead 1961: 160. 
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Hogbin and Read, anthropologists who had the opportunity 
to directly observe villagers' reactions to the war, found 
that New Guineans were astonished by the contrast in 
behaviour between the troops and the pre-war officials 
66 
and settlers: some concluded that the newcomers must be 
a different race of men from the Europeans they had known 
67 before the war. Nearly a decade later, Mead observed in 
the stories the Manus told of their wartime experiences, 
the deep impression which their contacts with the American 
troops had made: 
"The Americans treated us like individuals, 
like brothers", which meant that the 
Americans took no responsibility for the 
preservation of the caste relationships which 
existed between Europeans and natives. 68 
The Mekee still recalled the friendliness of 
the troops - Americans and Australians - after the passage 
of more than three decades. They, however, contrasted 
the actions of the soldiers not with the attitudes of 
pre-war officials, but with those of ANGAU. In a sense, 
the two represented the opposite poles of the range of 
possible relationships with white men. The aloof ANGAU 
officers were far harsher and less considerate of the 
people's welfare than any pre-war government official: 
the troops, on the other hand, displayed greater generosity 
and friendship than had any Europeans since the arrival of 
'.he first missionaries and government officers. Informants 
said that they worked side by side with the soldiers, talked 
66 Hogbin 1951: 287-B. Read 1947: l0<>-11. 
67 Read ibid. 
68 Mead 1961: 149. 
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with them as friends and ate with them. Oft~n the troops 
attempted to take the Papuans' part against ANGAU. Opu Opu, 
a Bulldog carrier, related an incident in which some 
Australian soldiers quarrelled with the supervisor of the 
carrying lines: 
one of the Australian soldiers asked ANGAU, 
'Why are you treating your labourers likP 
pigs and dogs, if you keep treating them 
like that you should send them all home'. 
This started an argument between the ANGAU 
officer and the soldier, so the soldier said 
he would write a letter to the Government 
about the matter. we asked him whether he 
sent the letter but he said, 'No, I was just 
trying to scare him.•69 
Alongside the wealth and generosity of the Americans, however, 
the Australian troops took second place. some informants 
criticized the Australians for neglecting to share with 
the carriers the parcels of food sent by their relatives, 
in contrast to the Americans who always shared what they 
had with the Papuans, loading them with gif9i of food, 
clothing and money. Ame Maino, a Kokoda carrier, declared: 
The Americans were very good. They gave us 
tobacco, matches, and food and clothes -
especially clothes. ANGAU issued us with 
some clothing every six months, but the 
Americans gave us clothing every time we 
asked. The Americans were very kind to us, 
but ANGAU did not supply us with what we 
needed.70 
In the eyes of most informants, the Americans were not only 
more generous, they were bigger, stronger and better 
fighters than the Australians. Compared with the people of 
Manus, the Mekeo had only passing contacts with Americans; 
69 Opu opu, Jnawi: 21 Apr. 1971. 
70 Ame Maino, Jnawi: 21 Apr. 1971. 
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nevertheless most of what Mead writes of Manus reactions 
71 
might equally apply to them. 
Informants identified ANGAU as 'the one who 
looked after the carriers and labourers': and as such it 
was distinct from the 'Government'. Thompson, the former 
ARM who remained at Kairuku as an ANGAU district officer, 
was identified as the 'Government': the recruiting officers 
and those who supervised the labour camps and carrying lines 
were 'ANGAU' The precise relationship between the two was 
not made clear, though Thompson assumes an almost benevolent, 
protective role in many informants' accounts. The runaway 
carriers were brought to Thompson to have 'court'. One 
man stated that the second time he deserted from Bulldog, 
he explained to Major Tom he was worried about how his 
wife and seven children would manage without him: 
consequently he was allowed to return home to look after 
his family. According to another story well known in 
Inawi, one of the village's most powerful sorcerers, Maino 
Kauka, was recruited as a carrier by ANGAU and later deserted. 
When he was brought before Thompson, he explained that he 
was a sorcerer and should therefore be looking after affairs 
in the village. Thompson agreed that he should go home, on 
the condition that in future Maino would use his powers to 
deter any other deserters from returning to the village -
an agreement which, it is said, was honoured by both sides. 
Judging from informants' statements, the beatings which they 
describe were delivered at the labour camps, not at the 
district court - a circumstance which would tend to put 
Thompson's actions in a more favourable light. When the 
71 Mead 1961: 149-60. 
'~ 
t 
5 
~·I 
.~. 
l 
t ' ~ 
a 
' 'r: I. 
i 
• ' 
' ~ 
• 
• 
• ~. 
237 
war was finally over, Thompson is said to have sent letters 
to the various ANGAU officers in charge of the labour camps, 
asking them ·to send 'hie men' home. 
• 
In reality, Thompson was no less a part of ANGAl.I 
than the officers who came with their native police to 
round up the carriers, but in villagers' eyes he remained 
a representative of the 'Government' as they had always 
known it. The fact that such a representative existed 
allowed them to perceive ANGAU as a temporary institution 
which was justified by wartime needs. In the long run, its 
brutality and excesses were felt to have little relevance 
to the wider context of relations with the government. 
The presence of the troops was also only a temporary 
phenomenon, but one which was felt to have a lasting 
significance. The soldiers' disregard for the barriers 
which previously separated white and brown was welcomed as 
a gesture of friendship - a friendship valued not only in 
itself, but also for the moral relationship it implied. 
There was, however, no suggestion in informants' statements 
that the familiarity of the troops reduced the stature of 
the white man in their eyes. 72 The new relationship was 
not one of equality, as Inglis points out, though it had 
laid a basis for it. The soldiers freely admitted a 
72 Osmar White claims that the war was responsible for dispelling the white man's 'mystique of inimitable 
superiority' 1 White 1972: 135. The Mekeo example 
suggests, in the first place, that the white man was 
a superior being only in his own estimation - villacJl'rs 
saw his greater wealth, not as the result of some 
innate superiority, but as concrete evidence of his 
possession of a superior ritual, through which the 
physical world could be controlled. In this sense, 
the war gave new proof of the immense potency of 
this ritual. 
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dependence on their Papuan helpers1 their affability and 
generosity were positive demonstrations of their willingness 
to reciprocate. Moreover, public promises were made that, 
after the war, Papuans would be rewarded for their services 
by the government. 
Lawrence discovered that Yali, the Rai Coast 
cult leader, waa convinced by promises he heard in Brisbane 
in 1943 that the Australians would reward their native 
helpers with a large-scale distribution of cargo: for a 
time these hopes brought about a rapprochement with the 
white regime. 73 The Mekeo spoke most emphatically of the 
promises that were made to them in public addreaaea given 
at Bttlldog, :Kokoda, Lae and at the celebrations held at 
Port Moresby to mark the end of the war. They explained 
that no specific content had been given to the promises -
they were simply told that they would receive 'something 
good' for the sacrifices they had made and the help they 
had given the Australians1 
73 
After the war, before the labourers were sent 
home, the generals from America and Australia 
both made a speech and it was translated to 
us. The Australians and Americana said, 'You 
Papuana haven't been educated properly, ao 
you can't be paid aa much as the other 
soldiers - all the American and Australian 
soldiers will be given good pay and rations 
for working in the war - but you Papuana 
can't be paid because the Australian• didn't 
teach you to uae guns and other equipnent. 
But you will have the right to have trade 
atorea and ahot guns.' They didn't actually 
mention ahot guns but said, 'You will be 
given something later on.' 
Lawrence 19671 1241 1291 139. 
• 
We thought there would be changea - that the 
Government would give ua aome food or 
money. 74 
Another recalleda 
While we were working at Bulldog, one 
of the big Government men came to talk 
to us there. He told ua, 'The war. ia going 
to stop. We are chaaing the enemy back to 
Bun a and aoon we will chue them away. 
After the war ia finiahed, you'll aee 
something good - the Government will give 
you aomething.' He didn't say it out but 
he just auggeated that aomething good was 
going to happen. We didn't find out w.t 
it was. 75 
239 
• 
In t'he wider context of paat exp .. ience, theae 
promises came as the culmination of five decadea of 
unfulfilled hopes and expectationa. At last, it seemed, 
the Europeans had acknowledged their responsibilities 
and were ready to honour their original promises. In the 
past villager• had tried to co-operate with the white 
regime in the belief that it would untimately reciprocate, 
but their efforta had aimply been met with increaaingly 
harsher demanda. 'l'hen came the war and they were inflicted 
~: with greater hardahipa than ever before; but out of ~ilia 
' .. 
; 
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ordeal had come an unequivocal re-affirmation of the 
protestation• of friendahip and good will made at the time 
of contact. 
In one other reapect the war re-created a0111ething 
of the emotional impact of firat contact. What Mead terma 
the 'great technological achievement• of a modern army• 76 
74 O.A., Inawi1 15 reb. 1971. 
75 A.O., Inawia 3 May 1971. 
76 Mead 19611 146. 
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impressed a new generation of men no less dramatically 
than the trade goods brought by the first Europeans had 
impressed their fathers and grandfathers. Mead comments 
on how fascinated the Manus were by the Americans' machinery 
and equipment: 
The Americans did everything with 'engines': 
they had engines to cut down trees and 
engines to saw boards and engines to lift 
loads and engines to fire guns, and, so their 
American friends told them, at home they had 
engines to wash the dishes.77 
The Mekeo displayed no less a fascination and admiration 
for the equipment which the white troops had at their 
• disposal. They described excitedly, with graphic gestures 
and appropriate noises - much in the manner of small boys 
enthusing over some mechanical toy - the machine guns, 
grenades, bombs, planes, aircraft carriers, ships and 
submarines which the armies deployed against each other. 
They had seen roads blasted through the mountains with 
dynamite and bulldozers, airfields cleared and laid in 
what seemed a trice, men and supplies transported in a 
matter of minutes by plane over a distance that would take 
months on foot. Tasks impossible with man-power alone were 
easily and swiftly accomplished with the Europeans' machinery. 
People had coveted the trade goods brought by 
the first Europeans - steel tools, rice, clothes, blankets, 
mosquito nets - but by the 1940s many Papuans, including 
the Mekeo, had the means to satisfy their modest demands 
for such items. Now a new demand was created: people 
wanted their own machinery to work for them, though they 
had no idea of how they might acquire it or how they 
would learn to uae it unless the Europeans agreed to help 
them. Little adaptation was necessary to learn how to 
77 Ibid1 154, 
i 
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use a steel knife, or wear a 1hirt, but the men soon 
realized that machinery was useles1 without the necessary 
skills and knowledge to operate it. The carriers smarted 
under the knowledge that they had not even been taught how 
to handle a gun, It was in this respect that the American 
negro troops assumed a special importance. The black 
soldiers were dre11ed and equipped like their white 
counterparts: they carried weapons, drove trucks and 
bulldozers, and fought against the enemy just as the white 
soldiers did. SOme informants said that at first they had 
thought the negroes were Europeans, then they were told that 
the ancestors of the negroes had lived just like themselves 
until the Americans went to their country and taught them 
to live as Europeans: 
One of the white Americans told us, 'Can you 
see the black Americans? Well they were just 
the same as you - not them but their fathers 
and grandfathers. But not long after we 
controlled them, we had mixed marriage• and 
from that new race we got people who were 
very clever and they were able to build their 
own boats, truck1, 1hotguns and plenty of 
other things, Then we had a war and we asked 
the negroes to help u1 and they did help us. 
And during the war we were working together 
and fighting together. Not long after the 
negroes had a war and the negroes a1ked the 
white Americana to help them and they did. 
So you can 1ee that 98" they always work 
together a1 friends. 
Though other informant• did not 1ugge1t that mixed marriage• 
were respon1ible for the negroe1' abilitie1, the statement 
is interesting becau1e it identifie1 a war, in which both 
78 o.o., Inawi1 17 reb. 1971. 
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white and black helped each other, aa the baaia of friendship 
and co-operation between the two. The following comment 
ia perhaps more typical1 
We aaw the negro aoldiera and aome of ua 
worked with them, They told ua, 'If the 
Auatraliana had taught you like the 
Americana taught ua, then you would be 
working the aame aa ua, You have the 
aame akin aa ua. The Americana have 
taught ua and now we are working with 
them,' we were aurpriaed to aee the 
negroea - they have black akin, but they 
are clever and working the aame aa white 
people.79 
For the Mekeo, aa for the people of eua1111a 
village near Lae, the black auldiera were: 
••• convincing evidence,,,of the truth of 
the earlier contention that coloured peoples, 
if given the chance, could riae to the aame 
economic level aa whitea,80 
Moreover they provided a concrete example of what Papuana 
might expect from Australia. Informants claim that the 
Americana, both white and black, were constantly criticizing 
Auatralia'a failure to develop Papua properly. Theae 
criticiama might well have provided 11111111Unition for a new 
cult prophet to declare that the 'real' knowledge had been 
withheld: it aeema, however, that the Mekeo were impreaacd 
by the emphaaia put upon education and practical instruction, 
and that they had learnt from their own experience that 
practical, mechanical akilla, not ritual knowledge, were 
the firat prerequiaitea for uaing the machinery which 
79 A.O., Inawi1 3 May 1971. 
80 Hoqbin 19511 288 • 
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Europeans employed to such effect. The presence of the 
negro soldiers thus not only demonstrated that black might 
live like white, it also gave some insight into the manner 
in which this transformation was achieved - suggesting a new 
model of practical instruction and learning, while 
reinforcing the old ideal of mutual co-operation. 
In general the men had little to say of their 
contacts with other Papuana. When questioned they replied, 
rather indifferently, that they had worked together with 
people from many other places and that they usually got on 
well together, though sometimes fights occurred. At 
present, it appears that the Mekeo see the war primarily 
as an important episode in their relations with Europeans, 
and not as an event which brought some sense of identity 
with a unit broader than village or tribe. Perhaps in the 
future the emphasis will be different: 81 certainly the 
war did break down much of the former exclusiveness of the 
village conmi:nity. Distant places like Buna, Lae and Madang 
became familiar territory to people who had rarely travelled 
outside their subdistrict before the war. Whatever the 
terms 'Papua' or 'New Guinea' had previously signified, 
Bl Informant• appeared to have little comprehension of 
the war as part of a wider conflict, or of the strategic 
importance of New Guinea to Australia. Implied in 
their view of the war •• a struggle between external 
forces for the possession of New Guinea is a sense 
that the prise was especially desirable or valuable 
in some way. For ex1111ple, some informants reasoned 
that the Japanese, who•• staple diet was rice, wanted 
their country because it produced rice. Though the 
idea is only partly formulated at present, it may 
become significant in future interpretations. 
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they could now be interpreted against a background of far 
wider geographical horizons. 
The men returned to their villages in 1944 and 
1945 with new horizona, new insights and new hopes. They 
were happy to be reunited with their families and set 
enthusiastically about the many tasks that awaited them 
after their long absence. Many of the young men, however, 
returned to Port Moreaby immediately, signing on as labourers 
to clear up the war debris around the town. 82 Others soon 
joined them. 83 After the excitement of war, village life 
seemed, for the first time, flat and uninteresting. Men 
who were previously unwilling to take employment away from 
their villages, now eagerly sought jobs in Port Moresby 
and other towns. In 1942 they had been reluctantly 'flushed 
out of their ethnic backwater•: 84 now the wider world had 
at last engaged their interests and ambitions. 
several of the men interviewed stated that they had 
returned to Port Moresby to work immediately after 
their discharge by ANGAU. 
Figures provided by patrol reports indicate the rapid 
increaae during the late 1940s in the number of men 
working away from their villages as wage labourers. 
See below1 362-3. 
84 White 19721 137. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
GOVBRNMDIT PROGJWIMIS FOR ICONOMIC DIVILOPMDIT 1945-1959: 
'We thought that thi1 wa1 a way of having 
1omething for our1elve1 of the way 
of living in the future' 
THE carrier• returning to their village• in 1945 brought 
with them hope1 of in1tant riches and a bright new world 
which could not po1sibly be fulfilled, undeniably, 
irresponsible promi1e1 had been made, and with little 
realization of the 1ignif icance they held; 
the white man did intend to keep his word. 
administration wa1 confident that it could 
nevertheless, 
The po1t-war 
indeed bring a 
different and better way of life to the people of New Guinea. 
Over the la1t three decade1, the country has been developed 
at an unprecedented, from the white man's point of view an 
almost miraculou1, rate; for the Mekeo, and for others, the 
results have often fallen sQAsi..of what they themselves 
anticipated and de1ired. 
In 1948, during the first wave of post-war enthu1ia1m, 
the new admini1tration initiated a bold and co1tly developmental 
project in the Mekeo. 1 The failure of the so-called 'Mekeo 
1 The Mekeo rice project was one of the f ir1t po1t-war 
developmental project• initiated by the Department of 
Agriculturei see Belshaw 1952. ror convenience, the 
titles of admini1trative department• have been shortened 
in the texts the Department of Agriculture, Stock and 
ri1harie1 i1 referred to a1 the 'Department of Agriculture' 
and the Department of Di1trict Services and Native 
Affair• u the 'Department of Di1trict Services'. In 
quoting reference1, department• are denoted by their 
initial11 e.g. ~ and DDS • NA. 
• 
• 
• 
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Rice Scheme', and of all 1ub1equent 1cheme1 the 9overnment 
has attempted, are well known facts: althou9h the causes 
and conaequence1 have been lar9ely overlooked. It ia 
usually aa1umed that the Mekeo, presumably out of sheer 
perversity, rejected the administration' a help. Thia 
explanation was 9iven at the time of the event and later 
accepted by new 9enerationa of officials who dealt with the 
Mekeo: the notorious 'Rice Scheme' ha1 become a cherished 
part of the lore passed from one patrol officer to hi1 
successor, proving that the Mekeo are one of the most 
intractible and unresponsive groups to be found in all 
Papua. Yet the events that can be reconstructed from 
official correspondence and contemporary reports provide 
small justification for the long held assumption that 
government scheme• foundered in the Mekeo because villagers 
were uncooperative. Before discussing the Mekeo's response, 
it ia necessary to examine official actions and decisions 
in some detail. 
Though it offered a new solution to the problem of 
persuading the Mekeo to plant rice, the scheme initiated in 
1948 by the Director of .Aqriculture, w. Cottrell-Dormer, 
basically grew out of attempts to perpetuate the existing 
rice industry which Thompson started in the early 1930s, and 
kept in operation during the war. When civil administration 
resumed in October 1945, the new Department of .Aqriculture 
officially a1sumed responsibility for the future development 
of the industry but did little beyond 1ending agronomists to 
2 
report on tha economic potential of the reqion1 meanwhile 
2 Reports on the existin9 rice industry wer~ prepared by 
J.L. Pr099att in December 1945, C.A. Cockshoot in Jilly 
1947 and J.R. Vicary in October 1947, DASI' Pile l-2-6P 
Pt 1. 
• 
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Thompson and hi• patrol officer• kept villagers planting. 3 
Cottrell-Dormer visited the Mekeo in July 1948 
to asses• plan• made by his department to replace the old 
government rice mill left by ANGAU and e•tablish an 
agricultural •tation in the region which would produce rice 
on a commercial ba•is.4 He at once realized that if 
villagers were to grow rice voluntarily, a different approach 
was needed. During meetings held in several villages to 
discuss rice cultivation, he learnt that villagers had 
very definite ideas on the matter. 5 They complained bitterly 
of the primitive methods of hand cultivation which they 
were forced to employ, emphasizing that they were not 
prepared to increase production under these circumstances: 
the mechanically cultivated ANGAU rice plot had demonstrated 
that there were more efficient and far less laborious ways 
to plant rice and they felt it was time the government 
helped to lighten their load. The previous year villagers 
had expressed similar opinions to the regional agricultural 
officer: 6 and in 1946 a delegation of Mekeo village constables 
and councillors visited Port Moresby to ask the administrator 
for assi•tance in buying the rice mill and other agricultural 
7 
machinery left in the area by ANGAU. 
3 DDS & NA to Director DASI', 22 Nov. 1946: DDS & NA to 
Director DASP, 4 Dec. 1946, DASF File l-2-6F Pt 1: 
Patrol• to the Mekeo, 7-11 May, 28 Aug.-9 Sept., 28 Oct.-
6 Nov., 12-18 Nov. 1946. 
4 Cottrell-Dormer to the Aclninistrator, 26 Aug. 1948, 
DASP File l-2-6P Pt: 1. 
5 Ibid: DASI' Circular, 17 sept. 19491 1-2. 
6 vicary to Director DASI', 20 oct. 1947, DASF Pile l-2-6P 
Pt 1. 
7 DASF File l-2-6P Pt 1. 
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Cottrell-Dormer sympathized with the aspirations 
of people who, aa they themselves pointed out, had not . 
advanced 'beyond the digging stick and the village mortar 
and pestle' despite more than seventy years of European 
influence. 8 The function of his department, he believed, 
was not to impose any specific policy upon indigenous farmers, 
but rather to show them how to uae the resources available 
to achieve their own goals. The Mekeo seemed to provide an 
ideal test caae1 the people poaseaaed an abundance of arable 
land and had more than four decades experience growing rice -
a commodity imported into the Territory at the rate of 
apprdximately l0,000 tons a year: moreover they now desired 
economic advancement and looked to the government for 
guidance. 9 The region waa evidently well suited to mechanized 
cultivation and plans were already under way to use machinery 
on the proposed government rice plantation. If machinery 
could also be made available to village growers, Cottrell-
oormer was convinced that real interest in the crop could 
10 be generated. 
The administration had removed the penal sanctions 
formerly applied to rice growing (much against the advice of 
Thompson who firmly believed that the Mekeo would not work 
without compulaion), 11 but neglected to provide any effective 
8 cottrell-oormer to the Administrator, 26 Aug. 1948, DASF 
File l-2-6F Pt 1. 
9 DASF circular, 17 sept. 19491 7. 
10 cottrell-oormer to the Administrator, 26 Aug. 1948, 
DASF File l-2-6F Pt l. 
11 DDS & NA to Director DASF. 22 Nov. 1946, DASF File 
l-2-6F Pt l. 
' 
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incentive in their place. The Department of Agriculture 
continued to maintain the old mill as a market for growers, 
and a centre from which technical advice and assistance 
might be sought, but Cottrell-Dormer found (as an earlier 
report had indicated) 12 that these services were now performed 
more efficiently by the catholic mission. In addition to 
operating its own mill and carrying out extension activities 
such as distributing seed and advising when to harvest the 
crop, the mission paid growers a higher price for their grain 
and offered free transport from the villages to its mill. 
The government mill coneequently received only a fraction of 
the crop: Cottrell-Dormer estimated the mill would process 
no more than ten tons of rice that season, while his 
department would spend more than £1,200 in salaries alone, 
' ' . i 13 to keep it in operat on. ~ 
Under these circumstance•, there seemed little 
point in pursuing the original plan to erect a new mill. 
A more promising alternative was suggested by an old village 
councillor during a meeting held at Inawaia: when asked 
what he would like the government to do for his people, the 
old man replied, 'Help us obtain our own rice mill and run 
14 
our own rice industry.' It occurred to Cottrell-Dormer 
that instead of constructing an expensive network of roads 
to link villages with a central mill, each village might 
be encouraged to form a co-operative society to grow rice 
and buy it• own mill. In this way villagers would be able 
12 Special Report on Mekeo Rice Project, 25 JUly 1947, 
DASP Pile 33-1-11. 
13 Cottrell-Dormer to the Administrator, 26 Aug. 1948, 
DASP Pile l-2-6F Pt 1. 
14 DASP circular, 17 sept. 1949: 1. 
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to amass capital to purchaae the machinery they desired: 
a mill and engine serving aa the initial objectives around 
which the societies would be formed. Deciding to take 
advantage of the opportunity presented by the old man's 
request, he offered to provide Inawaia with a mill and 
engine on the condition that the people raised £100 towards 
the initial costs: the balance could be paid from the proceeds 
15 
of next year'• crop. Villagers accepted with alacrity and 
so the first Mekeo rural progress society was formed. 
On returning to Port Moreaby, Cottrell-Dormer 
outlined hia new scheme for the Mekeo in a report to the 
16 
administrator. Village rice production would be 
encouraged by the formation of co-operative rice growing 
societies, auch as that already started at Inawaia, and by 
the introduction of mechanized cultivation. The societies 
would hire machinery from the Department of Agriculture until 
they were sufficiently developed to purchase their own. 
The previously planned government rice plantation would 
become instead an experimental station, testing seed varieties 
and methods of mechanized cultivation, and providing technical 
assistance and machinery to village growers. lll'lllediate 
steps were taken to implement these proposals. The following 
month, an agricultural officer, c.s. Franke, was sent to 
. . 17 b embe 
organize the first village soc1et1es: y Nov r 
15 Ibid1 2. 
16 Correll-Dormer to the Administrator, 26 AUg. 1948, 
DASF File l-2-6F Pt 1. 
17 Special Report on Mekeo co-operative Scheme, 25 Sept. 
1948, DASI' File 33-1-37. 
• 
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work had ccaaenced on the lpo Experimental station.
18 
Though at fir1t referred to a1 1 co-operative1', the 
rice growing 1ocietie1 were never officially regi1tered a1 
1uch with the Co-operative &ection. 19 Believing that the 
Mekeo were not yet ready for the more complicated organization 
• 
thi• 1tep would involve, Cottrell-Dormer 1implified 
management a• much a1 po11ible1 and by taking personal 
control of f inanc•• - fund1 were held in a Trea1ury tru1t 
account - he hoped to avoid the credit giving, 1tealing 
and 1taff defection• which often accompanied the early 1tages 
20 
of co-operative operation•. The 1ocietie1 were able to 
start with very little in·itial 1hare capital by the 1imple 
expedient of allowing member• to capitalize their labour1 
profit• from rice 1ale1 were to be divided among llllllber1 
on the ba1i1 of work done and then put back into 1ociety 
21 fund• a1 1har1 capital aub1cription1. some initial 
inve1tment, such a1 the £100 rai1ed by Inawaia, wa1 con1idered 
nece11ary, however, in order to give member• a 1en .. of 
22 
C?WI1•r1hip and r11pon1ibility. 
18 1fale1 to Director DASI', l Nov. 1948, DIUSF File 1-2-6' 
Pt l. 
19 At thi• time part of DDS • NA, th• co-operative Section 
later bee_. a divi1ion of th• 1>epart111nt of Trade and 
Indu1try which wa1 created in 19611 •••Parker 1966(a) 
196-7. 
20 Report on 11ekeo Region, Aug. 1949, note attached by 
Cottrell-Dot111r, DASI' File 33-3-3. 
21 cottrell-Donier to Director DASF, 7 JUno 1952. DASr 
File l-2-6F (D) • 
22 DASI' circular, 17 aept. 19491 4-5. 
I 
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The rural progreaa aoc:ietiea, aa they -re later 
known, were not to be limited to agricultural development 
but would become agenciea of general economic and aocial 
advancement. Thia point waa emphaaized in an addreaa made 
by Cottrell•Dormer to a conference of diatrict officers 
23 held in 1949. The capital raiaed by the aocietiea, in 
addition to purchaaing agricultural machinery, would provide 
co1111111nity aervicea auch aa village water pumpa, electric 
light plant• and any other project• which people deaired 
in order to raiae their atandard of living. It waa eaaential, 
he atreaaed, that 
24 
' hand in hand' 1 
economic and aoc:ial developaent ahould go 
all department• of the adminiatration would 
have to work together to make the acheme a aucceaa. 
Aa in other parta of the Territory, few villager• 
poaaeaaed the baaic technical akilla to enal:>le them to 
operate and maintain .. chinery or to keep financial recorda. 
The acheme would have to prepare ita own trained worker• -
a taak which could only be accoaipliahed with the help of 
25 other department•. '1'fO younq men from each aociety were 
aelected to train aa mill handa or tractor operator• and 
arrange11enta W9re made with the Department of Education for 
th.. to receive aeveral month• inatruction at Idubada 
Technical school in Port Moreaby. other• were aent to the 
co-operative Section of the Department of Diatrict 81rvicea 
for traininq in book·keepinq and aimple accounting. The 
Department of Al)riculture had appointed one younq man with 
a good coanand of lnqliah aa a native agricultural aaaiatant. 
23 Ibid1 13. 
24 Ibid1 13. 
25 Ibid1 S.6. 
, 
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26 difficultiea in the Makeo. Y'Ule Ialand offered the only 
suitable port for coaatal boat•: all goods sent from Port 
Moresby were unloaded at Kairuku and then taken across to 
the mainland in amaller craft. supplies destined for the 
EpO Experimental Station or the West .Mekeo societi•• had 
• 
to be landed by whale-boat on an open beach. Ace••• to 
the East Mekeo was by launch across Hall sound to a small 
landing up the Ethel River: from there a road covered the 
fourteen mile• inland to the Mekeo villages. Road 
maintenance waa difficult because of seaaonal flooding, and 
the St Joseph River provided no alternative as it waa 
navigable only to very shallow draft vessels. TO complicate 
matters further, coaaunication• between the Mekeo and 
Yule Island had to be sent by runner to the coast and then 
by canoe aero•• to the island. Though eatablishing a 
satisfactory transport system for the project was clearly 
beyond the reaource• of the Department of Agriculture alone, 
Cottrell-Dormer was confident that it could be achieved 
by co-ordinating the effort• of all government agencies 
involved in the region. Having requested the Navigation 
Board to provide more frequent shipping services between 
Port Moresby and Kairuku, he negotiated with the Departlllent 
of Public work• to construct a road linking the !po 
Experimental Station with an inlet on the coast which would 27 
allow all--ather ace••• by launch from YUle Island. 
Arrangement• -r• also made to establi•h radio contact 
between the Mekeo and Kairuku. The Department of Diatrict 
Service• and the catholic miasion each operated a launch 
26 I~ J, 
27 Ibida J, 
I , 
I , 
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between Kairuku and the Arapokina landing, which gave access 
to the Bast Mekeo villagea1 and the Department of A13riculture 
was to purchase two truck• for use on the east aide of the 
river. 
. 
Cottrell-Dormer was anxious to gain the mission'• 
support for hi• project. Previously the mission had been 
able to buy locally much of the grain it needed to supply 
its boarding schools and other establishments. Realizing 
that the introduction of the rural progress societies had 
cut off this source, Cottrell-Dormer arranged for the 
mission to purchase 100 tons of paddy rice at 21/2d per 
pound after the first harvest in 1950. 28 He stressed the 
importance of the mission'• role in breaking down traditional 
superstition• which were blocking progress, and urged that 
the administration encourage villagers to incorporate 
chriatianity into their daily life. 29 At hi• suggestion, 
the people of Inawaia asked their pariah priest to ble•• 
their new mill, and a feast and procession was held in 
honour of the occasion, 
For twelve to eighteen months Cottrell-Dormer 
obtained the co-operation he needed and the project received 
full official support. After inspecting the rice harvest 
in June 1950, the Executive council congratulated the 
Department of Agriculture on ita achievements in the Mekeo.
30 
Plana were made to extend operations. TWO new extension 
28 Cottrell-Dormer to the Government Secretary, 10 J'Uly 
1950, DAii' File l-2-6F Pt 1. 
29 DASF circular, 17 Sept. 19491 6-7. 
30 The Administrator to Department of External Territories, 
26 J'Une 1950, DASF File 1- 2-6F Pt 1. 
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station• were 
and the other 
to be 1et up, 
at Inawaia: 31 
one at Beipa in the Weit Mekeo 
both were to be independent in 
term1 of machinery and 1taff from the Epo Experimental 
station. Determined to ••• hi1 idea1 properly carried 
out, Cottrell-Dormer announced that he intended to re1ign 
from hi1 po1ition a1 Director of Agriculture to per1onally 
supervi1e the development of the new Inawaia itation. 32 
De1pite the apparent 1ucce11 of the rural progress 
societie1, 1ome 1enior official• were now beginning to 
question Cottrell-Dormer'• method1. Originally the Mekeo 
scheme had been put forward 11 a po11ible 'blueprint' for 
developnent throughout the Territory: 33 1ince it wa1 an 
ambitiou1 proqraane, and in certain re1pect1 a radical one, 
it naturally attracted con1iderable attention. Ironically, 
two of it1 mo1t admirable feature• laid it open to critici1m. 
Cottrell-Dormer had not arbitrarily decided what would be 
good for the Mekeo: he had made a 1incere effort to 
understand their ambition1 and to help them achieve them. 
The fact that thi1 involved introducing fully mechanized 
agriculture to 1ub1i1tence farmer• did not deter him: but 
in the eye1 of many of his colleague•, thi1 1tep seemed too 
radical - the project wa. proving extremely expensive and 
might strain the re1ource1 of an admini1tration which had 
neither staff nor finance to spare: the practical ob1tacles 
were enormous and the long term effect• of mechanization on 
indigenou1 communities wa1 uncertain. Likewi1e, Cottrell-Dormer'• 
31 Cottrell-Dormer to OIC lpO, 25 July 1950, DA8P File 
l-2-6F Pt l. 
32 Ibid. 
33 DASF circular, 17 sept. 19491 2. 
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insistence on co-ordinating all aspects of development was 
to cause friction within the carefully compartmentalized 
system of administrative departments. 
The Department of the Treasury was one of the first 
to voice its disapproval. A Treasury official was sent to 
investigate the financial organization of the rural proqreas 
societies following the Executive council's official 
commendation of the project in June. 34 Treasury Inspector 
Duncan stated bluntly that the results of the scheme were 
hardly impressive in view of the expenditure of machinery 
and staff: the 1950 harvest was in fact the smallest on 
record - a mere thirty-eight tons of paddy compared with 
the 200 tons produced by hand in 1922, when the first 
government rice project was introduced. He considered the 
type of machinery which had been purchased underpowered, 
and deplored the lack of proper facilities for the maintenance 
and repair of equipment. He pointed out that the polished 
white rice produced by the societies' mills was unsuitable 
for Government Stores and compared unfavourably with 
imported white rice because of its high proportion of broken 
grain. Above all, he condemned the failure to establish a 
satisfactory supply route for the project. All supplies, 
includin<J heavy equipment, had to be transported to the Bpo 
Experimental Station under what he described as 'almost 
impossible conditions'. A road had now been made linking 
Epo with an all-weather inlet on the coast but bridges had 
not yet been built over the two cr .. ks it cros1ed1 goods 
had to be manhandled over the first atre .. , while th• second 
was negotiated by .. ans of a raft constructed of forty-four 
34 Report by Treasury Inspector cuncan on ... keo Rice Project, 
Aug. 1950, DASI' File l-2-6R. 
t 
I 
257 
gallon drums. Suppliea had to be handled ten time• in 
all between •hipping at Port Moreaby and landing at lpo, 
cau1ing delaya, expenae and d11111age to valuable equipment. 
Tranaport, in Duncan'• opinion, wa1 the moat 1eriou1 
i11111ediate problemr other difficultie1 were pre4icted for 
the future. 35 If the Department of Aqriculture continued 
to expand it• activitie1 in the Me'keo, it would eventually 
~a'ke over all but the judicial and police function• of the 
Department of Di1trict Service• and Native Affair1, thu1 
creating an anomalou1 aituation within the exi1ting 1yatem 
of departmental admini1tration. He al10 argued that the 
long-term effect• of introducing mechanization to the Me'keo 
would be unde1irable. Member• of the rural progre11 1ocietie1 
and watch the Department of Aqriculture would merely 1it back 
... 
grow rice for them: under these circum1tance1 the Me'keo's 
notorious di1li'ke of hard work would only increa1e and they 
would never gain the experience and 1en1e of re1ponsibility 
• 
nece1sary to run the indu1try them1elve1. 
Ccltrell-Dormer, who had not been informed of 
Duncan'• viait, considered that the1e criticism• were baaed 
CJ'lmisunderatandinga. 36 'l'he areas planted by the village 
societies had been deliberately limited to a few acres each, 
and would not be increased until further experience and 
37 
confidence had been gained. Though transport 1till posed 
35 Ibid. 
36 Cottrell-Dormer to the .Admini1trator, 18 OCt. 1950, 
DASP Pile l-2-6R. 
37 Special Report on Ma'keo Co-operative Sch-, 25 Sept. 1948, note attached by Cottrell-Dormer, DASP Pile 33-1-371 
Cottrell-Dormer to Diatrict Aqricultural Officer, Bereina, 
20 Jan. 1950, DASP Pile l-2-6P Pt lr Cottrell-Dormer 
to OIC !po, 25 July 1950, DSAP Pile l-2-6P (D). 
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many probl9111, the•• were gradually being overcome a1 the 
project developed. When he took up hi• po1t in the Mekeo 
in January 1951, Cottrell-Dormer expected that the 1cheme 
would continue to expand in accordance with it1 need1. 
As Director of Agriculture, he had negotiated in per1on with 
the head1 of other department• to 1ecure their co-operation 
and wa1 able to u1e the re1ources of hi• department to get 
what he wanted for the project: as an agricultural officer 
isolated in the Mekeo, he 1oon found his reque1t1 ignored, 
even by hi1 own department. During 1951, headquarter• 
cancelled plan• for road con1truction, bridge building and 
for the erection of 1torage ahed1 and a fully equipped 
38 work1hop. The Department of Di1trict Service'• launch 
broke down, leaving the project without water tran1port1 
39 
urgent demand• for a replacement brought no re1ult1. 
E11ential order• for fuel, oil and 1pare part• apparently 
received no attention at headquatera. Cottrell-Dormer 
warned the director in November that the project waa doomed 
to failure if 1upply could not be 1peeded up and tranaport 
40 facilitie1 improved: he empha1ized that the scheme wa1 aa 
yet only partially developed and that it could not po11ibly 
succeed unle11 Agriculture continued to develop it a1 
originally intended. 
Trea1ury, which con1idered that too much had 
already been inve1ted in the Mekeo, actively oppoaed further 
commitment1 1 financial e1timates for machinery in 1951 were 
38 cottrell-Dormer to Director DASr, 19 Nov. 1951, DAsr 
File l-2-6F (D). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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rejected on the ground• that they repre•ented approximately 
one quarter of the total amount 
agricultural machinery for that 
allowed for expenditure on 
41 financial year. Independent 
experts were now beginning to share Treasury's conviction 
that the Department of A9riculture was devoting a 
disproport.ionate amount of its resource• to the Mekeo 
project to little effect. 
An article by a social anthropologist, Cyril 
Bel•haw, publi•hed in oceania in September 1951, que•tioned 
the ability of the rural proqre•s •ocieties to fully •atisfy 
villagers' ambitions.42 He demon•trated that the ca•h return 
from the rice crop had so far been small and compared 
unfavourably with other available •ource• of ca•h income -
for in•tance wage laboUr. Obviously the societie• would 
have to improve their financial po•ition if they were to 
fulfil their original purpose of raising capital for 
community development. He further implied that the Mekeo's 
present enthusia•m might well be ba•ed on unreal expectations 
not su•pected by the European organizer•. 
The co•t of growing rice in the Mekeo wa• now 
the subject of wild rumour and gos•ip, which reached the 
column• of the I•land•' pre••1 
There ha• been a lot of critici8111 of the Mekeo 
agricultural experiments. TO a large extent 
the Adlllini•tration ha• brought this on its own 
head by lack of factual information on the 
41 'l'he Tre .. urer to Director OAS!', 2 Aug. 1951, OAS!' Fiie 
l-2-6r (D). In November 1951, Cottrell-Dormer repoi~ed 
that he had £20,000 worth of agricultural equipnent in 
th• Mlkeor DASr rile l-2-6F (D). 
42 Bel•haw 19511 16-17. 
t 
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venture. Becau1e no 1tatementa have been made 
on the co1t of producing the rice grown in 
the Mekeo, fanta1tic rumour1 have put the 
figure at almo1t ao much per grain rather than 
per pound.43 
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O.H.K. Spate, then Professor of Geography in the 
Research School of Pacific Studie1 at the Australian 
National Univer1ity, vi1ited several parts of the Territory 
in April 1952, including the Mekeo, aa part of an 
investigation on behalf of the Department of Territories. 44 
Having enumerated the many practical difficulties, e1pecially 
transport, faced by the Mekeo project, he observed that 
though they could probably be solved, the cost of doing so 
might prove beyond the present resources of the administration. 
Even if the venture succeeded, and this was by no means 
certain, it would directly affect only a fraction of the 
Territory'• total population. Would, he asked, the 
experiment have to be 'repeated over and over again until 
some significant proportion of the population has been 
45 brought into modern production?' 
An article by Jamel McAuley in the April id1ue 
of south Pacific condemned not only the practical and 
financial defects of the rural progre1a 1ocietiea, but warned 
46 
that the project could have 1eriou1 1ocial repercu11ions. 
Repeating an argument earlier put forward by Trea1ury, 
McAuley declared that the introduction of mechanization, by 
43 ~acific I1land1 Monthly, Dec. 19511 41. 
44 Spate 19531 153. 
45 Ibid1 166. 
46 McAuley 1952. 
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reducing the need for manual labour, gave villagers no 
opportunity to develop self-reliance or learn responsible 
management. Moreover, full mechanization would eventually 
deprive the nuclear f11111ily of its role in economic production. 
similar undesirable effects could be expected from the fact 
that the enterprise had been organized on a collective 
basis. Once individual incentive and responsibility were 
removed, problems related to work motivation would arise: 
in order to ensure that each member contributed his share, 
coercion of some sort would prove unavoidable. Collectivism 
would also tend to weaken the role of the individual f11111ily, 
whose stability, in a time of social upheaval and change, 
should be preserved at all coata. 47 
Thia mounting tide of public criticiam must have 
shaken the confidence even of those who continued to support 
Cottrell-Dormer. The venture was now becoming an embarrassment 
to the administration in more ways than one1 .Aqriculture 
was competing with the Department of District Services as 
the co-ordinator of administrative services in the Mekeo: 
production figures remained small, while the financial 
commitment continued to increase. The rural progress societies 
and the Epo Experimental station produced a combined total 
of only 100 tons of paddy rice in 1951.48 Plana to extend 
planting by seventy per cent in the 1951-52 season were 
cancelled when practically the whole crop was lost because 
47 McAuley seems to have opposed collectives mainly on 
ideological grounds. 
48 Telegram to Director DASF, 28 Nov. 1951, DASF File 
~~~(D). 
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49 
of severe lodqing. In vi.w of this new problem, cottrell-
Dormer informed headquarter• that planting• would probably 
be reduced in the coming aeaaon1 he warned that diaappointment 
reaulting from the poor harveat would probably dmnpen 
villagers' enthuaia9111 and reault in a temporary setback.so 
It aeema that Cottrell-Dormer'• opponent• were 
ready to aeize upon the f irat aiqna of a alackening of 
interest as portent• of the 1cheme's imminent collapse. 
The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative1, G. Morris, apent 
two weeks in the Mekeo in September, ostensibly at Cottrell-
Dormer' s requeat for assistance with auditing the rural 
progress society accounts: he returned to Port Moresby 
with the news that villager• were disaati1fied with the 
51 
societies and were likely to withdraw their support. 
Members were suapicioua because they had received no cash 
payment or wages for their work nor had they actually seen 
the money the societie1 were said to have made (1ince funds 
were held in a tru1t account): many feared that their money 
was being used to finance the Department of Aqriculture 
and Cottrell-Dormer peraonally. Inter-clan and inter-village 
friction waa reaultinq in continual bickering over work 
contribution1 and the connunal nature of the work aggravated 
matters. In general, the people 1eemed to feel not that the 
adminiatration wa• benefiting them, but rather that they 
were helping it by growing rice. 
• 
49 Cottrell-Dormer to Director DASF, 18 J'Une 1952, DASF 
File l-2-6F (D). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Morria to Regiatrar of co-operative1, 20 sept. 1952, 
DC File 17-7. 
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Revealingly, Morri•' aolution to the situation was 
to convert the exiating aocietiea into full co-operatives.
52 
After distributing the preae~t assets on a work done basis, 
member• would be invited to .aubacribe £S share capital each 
to form a co-operative1 sufficient capital would probably 
be raised in thia manner to purchase neceaaary tranaport 
facilities. C011111Unal production of rice would ceaae. 
Instead, each aociety would divide ita rice plot into several 
small blocks: member• who wiahed to grow rice would be 
required to subscribe £S per block to cover machinery coats 
and would be individually responsible for it. Any member 
who failed to complete his work on time would forfeit his 
£5 subscription. Thia ayatem would have the advantage• of 
allowing individuals to choose the size of the area they 
wished to work and of providing a single contiguous area 
suitable for mechanized cultivation. Undoubtedly it waa very 
satisfying for the co-operative Section to demonatrate that 
the trouble• of the much vaunted native societies set up by 
the Department of Agriculture could be solved by a conventional 
co-operative approach. 
Morria' obaervationa were accepted by the Treasurer, 
H.H. Reeve, aa proof of earlier predictions that mechanization, 
far from increaaing the Mekeo'a interest in rice production, 
would eventually reault in apathy and indifference.
53 
He 
disapproved, however, of the proposal to reconstitute the 
rural progreaa aocieti•• •• full producer co-operatives 
arguing that auch a achellle, in order to operate economically, 
S2 Ibid. 
53 Appreciation of aural Progre•• society Activity in 
Ric• Production in the Mekeo Area, undated, DASF rile 
l-2-6F Pt 3. 
2~ 
would require more initial capital than villaqers could 
raise. A more practical alternative, he auqqested, was 
to limit co-operative activity to millinq and marketinq; 
leavinq production the responsibility of the individual 
qrower. Since little mechanization was involved in these 
processes, and the societies already possessed their own 
mills, it would be possible to raise enouqh capital to 
make spot cash payments to qrowers. The administration 
would continue to provide machinery where necessary, but 
on a much 'lower level' than previously. 
If any doubts persisted that Cottrell-Dormer's 
approach was actually detrimental to the Mekeo'• best 
interests, they were swept away with a report from w. 
Tomasetti, the new assistant district officer, Kairuku. 54 
He established that connunal orqanization - condemned in 
qeneral by Mc:Auley - was unsuitable for the Mekeo as it 
clashed with traditional practice•: subsistence aqriculture 
was carried out by the individual household, not by the 
villaqe or even the clan unit. Since the Mekeo'• cash needs 
were limited and could easily be satisfied in other ways 
such as waqe labour, makinq copra or sellinq betel nut, 
they had little economic incentive to qrow rice but they 
would be more willinq to undertake the work, he arqued, if 
it were orqanized alonq lines compatible with the normal 
pattern of subsistence aqriculture. If villaqer• were 
permitted to choose their own unit• of production, he was 
convinced that the majority would prefer to plant by hand 
rather than meet the cost• of hirinq machir''ry out of their 
own pockets. Thouqh the roads, equipment and buildinq• 
established in the reqion by Aqriculture would become 
54 Patrol to the Mekeo 16-Jl Jan. 1953. 
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redundant a• far a• the village indu•try wa• concerned, 
they could be u•ed to •et up a government rice plantation. 
In the light of the•e argument•, Cottrell-Dormer'• •cheme, 
though well intentioned, •eemed entirely mi•conceived and 
misdirected. 
In July 1953, •ix month• after Toma•etti'• report 
was prepared, a CONnittee to consider the reorganization of 
: he Mekeo. project wa• convened by the n- admini•trator, 
Brigadier D.W. Cleland. 55 Its decision• clo•ely followed 
the earlier rec011111endation• of Reeve and Toma•etti and were 
ratified inlllediately. 56 Control of the revised •cheme 
was vested in the district commissioner for the Central 
District, while inlllediate re•ponsibility in the area was 
given to the assi1tant di•trict officer, Kairuku. 57 The 
Department of Aqriculture'• role would in future be limited 
to purely technical asi•tance on agricultural matter• only, 
though it would continue to provide machinery. Cottrell-Dormer, 
at his own reque•t, wa• transferred to another di•trict. 
The rural proqr••• •ocietie• would be converted into full 
co-operative •ocietie•, under the control of the Co-operative 
Section of the Department of Di1trict Service•, and would 
SS The reorganization took place again•t a background of 
change• at the hi9he•t level• of policy malting - the 
coming to power of a Liberal government in Au•tralia, 
the appointment of Ha•luck a• Mini•ter for Territorie• 
and the replac ... nt of J.K. *1rray by Cleland in Pebruary 
19S3 (Cleland 19691 213). Until further re•earch ha• 
been done on the period, it i• very difficult to .. •e•• 
what influence th••• event• had on the fate of Cottrell-
Dormer' • •cheme. 
S6 Di•trict C011111i••ioner to ADO Kairuku, 7 July 1953. 
S7 Propo•ala for the reorganization were outlined in 
Reeve, Hender80ll, llliot-llllith to the Adllini•trator, 
3 July 1953, DASP Pile l-2-6P Pt 3. 
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limit their operations to the milling, proceaaing and 
marketing of rice. Production would become the 
responsibility of the individual grower, who would be 
required to meet the co1ta of hiring machinery if he chos~ 
to have hia land mechanically cultivated. Cash payments 
for grain would be made to growers by the new 1oc1'.:iea. 
Meetings were held in each village to close down 
the rural progreaa societies and di1tribute fund1 to members 
on the basis of work contributed. Though Tomasetti reported 
that people were much dissatisfied with the amounts they 
received and that the meetings were 'fairly stormy', field 
staff had little difficulty in persuading villagers to 
invest more money in the new venture. 58 Glowing accounts 
of the Mekeo's ready acceptance of the revised scheme, 
and of their ren.wed confidence in the adminiitration,
59 
seemed justified by a good harvest in J\lne 1954 - eighty 
tons of paddy rice were 1old to the co-operative societies 
and planting wa1 to be increased for the coming ieason.
60 
Toma1etti attributed thi1 1ucce11 to the fact that 
villagers were now free to adopt 
harmonized with traditional work 
unit• of production which 
61 patterns. Other reports 
58 Patrol to the Mekeo 19-30 Sept. 1953: Aa1i1tant Regi1trar 
to Registrar of Co-operatives, 20 Aug. 1953: Toma1etti 
to District coa111iaaioner, 11 Sept. 1953, DC File 17-7. 
59 Benated to Director DDS • NA, 23 Dec. 1953J Conroy 
to Director DASI', May 19S4, l-2-6F Pt 3: Toma1etti to 
District coaaiaaioner, 8 JUly 1954, DC File 17-7. 
60 Administration Presa Release, Alil\iniatrator'• Statement 
on the Mekeo Rice Project, 27 Aug. 19S4, DASF File 
l-2-6F Pt 3. 
61 Tomasetti to Diatricl C011111ia1ioner, 8 JUly 19S4, 
DC File 17-7. 
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indicate that the new ayatem of work organization had far 
more importance in official eyea than it had to the Mekeo. 
only two villagea, Beipa and Aipeana, choae to divide into clan 
groups: lnawi, Inawaia, Jesubaibua and Eboa all cleared one 
contiguoua area for 
62 into clan plots. 
the whole village, which waa then divided 
Field ataff attempted to inaiat that the 
clan unita were further divided into family plots, though 
Jesubaibua, for one, refused to comply with thia instruction. 63 
Officials alao oppoaed deciaiona made by Inawi and Jesubaibua 
to divide the crop according to status within the clan. 64 
• 
Evidently villagera were free to choose their own pronuctive 
units only when these correaponded with the district office's 
idea of traditional practice. 
Experience proved that the reorganizer• had also 
misjudged the significance of mechanization to the acheme. 
Tomasetti emphatically atated in 1953 that machinery could 
have no real economic significance 
satisfy their aubaistence needs in 
to people who could easily 
65 
other waya; a year 
later he waa beginning to realize his miatake. Villager• 
made it clear that any expansion of planting for the 1954-55 
season depended upon the neceaaai·y machinery being made 
available to them. Deapite hia earlier convictions, Tomasetti 
was now forced to justify the need for more equipment1 
If the mac:hinery ia not aupplied it aeema likely 
that the normal expansion of the Project will be 
fruatrated. Thia will p.it the Adminiatration in 
the poaition of having tried to intere1t a native 
62 Tomaaetti to Diatrict Commiaaioner, 11 Sept. 1953, DC 
File 17-7; Kairuku Patrol Report 1, 1954-55. 
63 Kairuku Patrol Report 1, 1954-55. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Tomaaetti to Diatrict Conmiaaioner, 11 Sept. 1953, 
• DC Pile 17-7. 
' 
people in mechaniaed agriculture, achieved some 
1ucce11, and then ignored the logical need for 
expansion. Thia, of course, will be 
incomprehenaible to the natives concerned,66 
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Though the recoamendationa for reorganizing the 
rural progrea1 1ocietie1 made much referen~to 'native 
c • 
attitude' in general, it aeems that officials saw in the 
Mekeo's responae what they wanted to aee. They were anxious 
to reduce expenditure on the project and to counter public 
criticism; thi1 meant reducing mechanization and altering 
the collective organization; and they could argue, on the 
basis of traditional practice, that these changes would 
make the scheme more acceptable to the Mekeo. In fact, 
the reorganizers had produced little evidence to support 
their contention that villagers were no longer interested 
in the rural progreaa societies. Both Reeve and Tomasetti 
accepted Morri1' account without question, though it is 
possible he overestimated the importance of the complaints 
he heard. When reviewing the situation in January 1953, 
Tomasetti limited his comments on villagers' dissatisfaction 
to the following brief paragraph: 
Agricultural officers attribute this decrease 
i~ area [of rice planted that 1ea1onl to waning 
native interest •••• Aqricultural officers in 
the Mekeo also state that the rice i1 commonly 
referred to a1 'Govt. rice'. The patrol found 
few signs of native enthusiasm for the scheme 
and in addition received a couple of vague 
hints that 'before the war we carried stores 
to Goilala and now we grow rice - growing rice 
is the ea1ie1t. 067 
66 Tomaietti to Di1trict Commi11ioner, 13 June 1955, 
DC File 17-7. 
67 Patrol to the Mekee 16-31 Jan. 1953. 
.. 
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He iqnored the fact that Cottrell-Dormer had predicted a 
. . 
setback followinq the poor harvest in 1952 and had instructed 
that plantinqa were to be reduced. Villaqera had not 
refused to qrow rice and the societies were not bankrupt. 68 
It could be arqued, in the liqht of villaqera' subsequent 
reactU>na 50 the revised scheme, that their initial ready 
acceptance of it indicated that they were not ready to 
abandon the rural proqre•• societies so easily and were 
still determined to persevere with rice. 
The rural proqre•• societies were disbanded 
before any crisis was reached: the revised scheme, on the 
other hand, ended in unequivocal failure. A total of 235 
acres was cultivated for the 1954-55 season and further 
increases were anticipated in 1956. 69 Field staff 
optimistically hoped for an area of between 400 to 50o70 
acres but by January 1956 estimate• had been reduced to a 
71 
mere 150 acres. In July, the district commissioner 
instructed the new assistant district officer J<airuku, 
K. Brown, that thouqh the scheme had suffered a aliqht 
'recesaion'1 
Thia year every effort should be made to plant 
up the maximum area of suitable country which 
can be properly handled.72 
• 
68 Morris to Reqiatrar of Co-operatives, 20 Sept. 1952 
DC File 17-7. 
69 Tomasetti to District Coa111iaaioner, 13 June 1955, DC 
File 17-7. 
70 Timperley to Director DASF, 13 Aug. 1955, DASI' File 
23-3-2 (J). 
71 Patrol to the Mekeo 19 Jan.-2 Feb. 1956. 
72 Actinq District C011111iaaioner to ADO Kairuku, 9 J\lly 
1956, DASP Pile 23-3-2 (J). 
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If the district commiaaioner was as ignorant of the real 
situation in the Mekeo aa theae instructions suggeat, 
Brown's reatrained, but devastating apecial report of 
August 1956 muat have cauaed some embarrassment at 
headquarters. 
The aituation 
complete adminiatrative 
deacribed by Brown was one of 
73 . 
chaoa. He advised that no 
preparations for the 1956-57 crop could be made until rice 
from the two previoua aeasons had been milled, sold and 
removed from the area. The 1954-55 crop had not been 
milled because all the co-operative societies' mills were 
inoperative and the officer in charge of Epo Experimental 
Station refused to process village rice for fear of mixing 
the grain with hi• experimental varieties. Though it had 
been purchaaed from growers by the co-operatives, the 
administration had not yet removed the crop from the area 
or paid the Kairuku Aaaociation of Co-operatives for it: 
meanwhile the grain lay deteriorating in storage at Beipa and 
Aipeana. The 1955-56 crop had yet to be bought from growers 
who had left the rice unharvested in the fields or stored 
it in their house•: nor could it be purchased until the 
previous season'• crop waa removed from the only available 
storage. To make matter• worse, road• throughout the region 
were impaasable and virtually all vehicles and machinery were 
in urgent need of repaira. 
Brown recommended that effort• should be concentrated 
on making the Epo-Beipa road traff icable - a taak which he 
estimated could be completed in two week• if the Department 
of Agriculture agreed to make available the tractor• at Epo 
73 Special Report Mekeo Rice Scheme, 15 Aug. 1956, DASP 
Pile 23-3-2 (J). 
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and the Beipa Bxtenaion Station. Aqriculture's co-operation 
was also neceaaary to provide transport to remove the two 
outstanding crop• from the area and have them milled at Epo. 
Payment for rice ahould be made at once and village debts 
settled. Once these immediate task• were completed, more 
adequate storage should be built and the area mechanic given 
time to carry out repairs and put all equipment into good 
working order. 
Not only was it physically impossible to put 
matters to rights in time for the coming season, but villagers 
had declared that they had no faith in the Department of 
Agriculture'• promiaea and would not begin clearing their 
land until they had seen the machinery with their own 
74 eyes. Brown learnt that field staff had previously 
encouraged growers to clear as much land as posaible and then 
had been unable to meet their commitments to provide machinery. 
Difficultiea were also created because plots were too small 
and too scattered: time waa wasted and numeroua mechanical 
breakdowns occurred while attempting to move heavy equipment 
long diatancea. Evidently official• had only made a rod for 
their own backs by inaisting, in the falae hope that villagers 
would no longer want machinery, that rice be planted in family 
plots. Brown concluded hi• report: 
In my opinion to 90 on under the exiatin9 conditions 
is only aigning the end of the scheme altogether. 
Concentrated effort• to rectify the miatakea of 
past year• will do much to regain the waning 
confidence of the Mekeo people.75 
Headquarters waa forced to agree with him. 
74 Ibid. 
• 
75 Ibid. 
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• 
Brown' a report clearly depicts the situation he 
found in August 1956, but it does not explain how such a 
complete administrative paralysis overtook the project. 
There is little evidence to suggest why the district 
conunissioner, who had been given ultimate authority for 
the scheme three years earlier, did not know what was 
happening in the Mekeo, or why the administration had failed 
to pay for the 1954-55 crop, or why field staff had been 
unable to cope with the processing and transporting of the 
rice. The reluctance of the officer in charge of the Epo 
Experimental Station to mill the village rice or provide 
transport facilities suggests friction between Agriculture 
and the Department of District Services. Headquarters' 
unawareness of the actual situation suggests that field 
staff may have deliberately attempted to cover up their 
blunders, though undoubtedly many of their difficulties 
were created by the failure, at a higher level, to effect 
payment for the 1954-55 crop. A later report indicates 
that the inferior quality of the Mekeo grain made it difficult 
76 to market. Six years earlier, Treasury had drawn attention 
to the poor grade of rice produced by the rural progress 
society mills: for some reason this defect was overlooked 
when the project was revised. 
The co-operative societies, which had never been 
financially stable, were fatally weakened by the collapse. 
When the co-operatives were first introduced, officials 
warned that difficulties in meeting spot payments for the 
rice ~Q~d be expected because capital was too low in relation 
76 Report on Jllkeo Rice Project and Epo Experimental Station, 
8 Jan. 1957, DC Pile 17-7. 
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77 to the asaet• which the aocieties had purchased. Following 
the successful harvest of 1954, it was decided to incorporate 
the Mekeo and coaatal aocieties into the Kairuku Association 
f t . 7B o Co-opera 1vea. Preaumably this move was intended to 
strengthen co-operative activity in the region, yet in June 
1956 the financial position of the Association was reported 
79 to be 'border line'. According to the Co-operative 
Section's annual report for 1955-56, investment in hulling 
equipment, expenditure on transport and the cash outlay 
necessary to buy copra, and in particular a seasonal crop 
such as rice, had reduced the 'financial safety margin' 
of the Association to the .'barest minimum'. BO Credit giving 
by certain societies' store managers had consequently led 
to disaster: in April 1956 two East Mekeo societies, Eboa 
and Inawaia, had to be liquidated. 
The effects on an already insecure financial 
• 
organization of the delayed payment for the 1955 rice crop 
are obvious; having extended itself to purchase the crop, 
the Assor~on was then left with practically no funds to 
buy copra and continue store trading, let alone pay for the 
1956 crop. Though the Mekeo societies marketed copra and 
ran retail atores, they were expected to make moat of their 
profits from rice; turnover suddenly dropped when officials 
decided that the societies ahould not buy the 1956 crop. 
Thia combination of circumatances reduced the Mekeo societies 
77 Co-operative• Annual Reports 1948-56, T & I File 20-2-3. 
7B Norri• to Chief of Diviaion (Development and Welfare) 
DDS & NA, 19 JUne 1957, T & I File 21-4-1. 
79 co-operative• Annual Reports 1955-56, T & I File 20-2-3. 
BO Ibid. 
-
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to the point of 
considered that 
81 bankruptcy by mid-1957; field staff 
the fate of the whole Kairuku Association 
hung in the balance as a result. 
A9ainst the advice of ADO Brown, 82 and despite 
the co-operative societies' decision to stop marketing 
rice altogether, the rice scheme now entered its third and 
final stage. Only the two large West Mekeo villages, Beipa 
and Aipeana, chose to continue. In 1957 the Department of 
Agriculture 
. 83 
at Beipa; 
planted eighty-two acres by mechanized means 
the following season a total of 82.61 acres 
was cultivated for several grOW'ers from Beipa, Aipeana and 
the Roro village of Bereina. 84 Arrangements were made for 
Aqriculture to purchase the crop. By assessing the costs 
and returns from individual rice plots, field staff proved 
that the majority of growers were now actually producing 
rice at a financial loss. 85 The few who continued to plant 
presumably did so because they could not understand that 
once they paid for machinery costs, and the feast which 
custom demanded for the relatives and friends who assisted 
86 
with the harvest, they had lost money on the venture. 
81 Morris t·1 Chief of Divi1ion (Development and Welfare) 
DDS & 1-·1', 19 June 1957, T & I File 21-4-1. 
82 Report on Mekeo Rice Project and Epo Experimental 
Station, 8 Jan. 1957, DC File 17-7. 
83 Ibid. 
84 summary of work done on behalf of Native rice growers 
1957-58 season, 21 Mar. 1958, DASF File 23-3-2 (J). 
85 Xairuku SUbdistrict Annual Reports 1958-59. 
86 xairuku Patrol Report 6, 1957-58. 
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Officials impatiently waited for villagers to finally 
realize for themselves the futility of persevering with 
the crop - an ironic ending indeed to a project which 
had been pushed so long and so hard by the administration. 
Not one grower requested mechanical assistance for the 
1959-60 season: ADO Brown announced with relief: 
It seems that the Mekeo Rice Scheme as such 
has closed down. Fortunately, increasing 
interest in copra, coffee and cocoa is taking 
the place of rice •••• 87 
The co-operatives followed a separate, though 
equally disastrous course after 1956. The acting district 
officer, D.R. Marsh, was convinced that the Mekeo would be 
better left to themselvee and opposed attempts to prolong 
88 the co-operatives' struggle. The co-operative Section 
' 
was nevertheless determined to save the Kairuku Association, 
which depended largely on the survival of the Mekeo societies. 
The societies which had weathered the crisis in 
1956 were now beset by transport difficulties.
89 
In the 
wet season floods brought all transport to a halt for 
approximately five months of the year: the large amount of 
copra accumulated during this period had to be cleaned and 
rebagged when it finally reached Kairuku, thus increasing 
costs: and in order to buy sufficient stock to keep their 
stores operating, societies built up large debts to the 
Association. When the roads were opened in the dry season, 
87 Kairuku subdistrict Annual Reports 1958-59. 
88 Marsh to Registrar of co-operatives, 12 Sept. 1956, 
T & 1 rile 21-4-1. 
89 Pyne to Registrar of Co-operatives, 29 Aug. 1956, T & I 
rile 21-4-1. 
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the West Mekeo societies and three inland Roro societies had 
to hire vehicles, at exorbitant cost, from local traders. 
Transport costs were so high that between April and September 
1956 the West Mekeo societies grossed a surplus of only two 
per cent on a copra turnover of £4,425. 90 The problem, as 
Pyne pointed out, was hardly a new one: since the inception 
of the rice project in 1948, transport had been one of the 
most serious obstacles to development. Yet, once again, 
nothing had been done to improve the situation when the 
project was revised in 1953. The changing of the course 
of the St Joseph River during the floods of 1956 disrupted 
local transport, cutting off canoe access to Hall Sound and 
Yule Island, but it did little to aggravate the co-operatives' 
problems as they relied principally on road transport. 
The Department of Agriculture, which no longer had 
any responsibility for the Mekee societies, was not prepared 
to continue hiring vehicles to them, as it had done in the 
91 past. Pyne attempted to persuade members to subscribe new 
share capital to purchase their own vehicles: their poor 
response did not surprise him as ten societies in the 
Association had been liquidated recently and members had lost 
92 most of their money. In JUne 1957 he reported that unless 
transport was made available, the West Mekeo societies would 
93 
have to atop marketing copra. 
90 Pyne to Registrar of Co-operatives, 2 Nov. 1956, T & I 
File 21-4-1. 
91 Pyne to Registrar ·Of Co-operatives, 18 JUne 1957, T & I 
File 21-4-1. 
92 Pyne to Registrar of co-operatives, 2 Nov. 1956, T & I 
File 21-4-1. 
93 Pyne to Registrar of co-operatives, 18 June 1957, T & I 
File 21-4-1. 
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The only aolution, in the opinion of the Regiatrar 
of Co-operative&, waa to apply for a loan from the Native 
Loan• Board. 94 Despite opposition from DO Marsh, who argued 
that the Mekeo were deriving a good caah income from their 
betel nut trade in Port Moresby even though the co-operatives 
f d . 95 were oun ering, applications were made for loans totalling 
£4,900. 96 The Association was to receive £2,500 to erect 
a bulk store, office and ataff quarters at Kairuku. Aipeana, 
financially the most stable society, was to apply for £1,500 
to purchase a tractor and trailer to provide tranaport for 
the West Mekeo societiea: Beipa needed £900 to forestall 
liquidation. 
Administrative procedures delayed the granting of 
the loans until June 1958: meanwhile, a tightening up of 
restriction& by the Copra Marketing Board resulted in the 
rejection of moat of the Association's copra 
dropped from £56,000 in the previous year to 
and turnover 
97 £23,000. 
The loans, in 
and by August 
any case, proved only a temporary palliative, 
. . . . 1 98 1959 the situation was again critica • 
94 Registrar of co-operatives to Chief of Division 
(Development and Welfare) DDS & NA, 19 June 1957, T & I 
File 21-4-1. 
95 Marsh to Registrar of co-operatives, 27 June 1957, 
T & I File 21-4-1. 
96 Morris to Chief of Division (Development and Welfare) 
DDS & NA, 25 sept. 1957, T & I File 20-2-3. 
97 co-operative& Annual Reports 1957-58, T & I File 20-2-3. 
98 co-operative Officer's Journal, Aug. 1959, T & I 
File 20-3-5. 
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Though the Aipeana tractor and trailer helped reduce tran•port 
costs by nearly fifty per cent, societies continued to suffer 
99 losses because of freight overheads. co-operative officer 
Pyne, still firmly convinced of the potential of the Mekeo, 
claimed that constant supervision could overcome difficulties 
stemming from the people's inability to use transport 
economically, inefficient stock ordering for the co-operative 
stores, the exceptionally high cost of local casual labour 
end the Mekeo'• apparent inability to work together. 100 
Not surprisingly, headquarters remained unconvinced by 
Pyne's arguments: if it required the full time attention of 
a European officer, the operation of the five remaining Mekeo 
societies must certainly have been a delicate business. 
Villagers were auspicious of demands for more money 
and Pyne could not persuade them to subscribe additional 
share capital. Beipa and Aipeana, the two societies which 
were now operating on government loans, would not be able 
to meet payments on the loans out of available funds unless 
101 
something was done quickly. eeipa's position was 
particularly precarious. Suspicion of the credit notes 
issued by the Association in return for copra had prompted 
members to deal directly with the copra Marketing Board: 
the Association therefore stopped supplying store goods on 
credit, and the society found itself without ready cash to 
purchase goods or copra, since payments from the Copra 
99 Ibid. 
100 Pyne to Deputy Registrar of co-operatives, 6 May 1959, 
T & I Pile 21-4-1. 
101 co-operative Officer's Journal, Aug.-Sept. 1959, T & I 
File 20-J-5. 
••• 
279 
Marketinq Board took aeveral weeka to arrive. An outbreak 
of credit qivinq acc0111p&nied the drop in atore turnover; 
liquidation waa clearly inninent if member• ~fuaed to 
subscribe more capital. 
Official• iaaued an ultimatum in Auquat1 the 
members of Beipa and Aipeana aocietiea were each to contribute 
£5 additional ahare capital, and Inawi member• £3, by 
31 October: if they did not, the aocieties would be cloaed. 102 
Beipa made no effort to raiae the neceaaary capital, while 
Aipeana and Inawi contributed leaa than half. Preparation• 
were made to liquidate Beipa aociety and atore tradinq waa 
suspended in the two other aocietiea until the full amount 
was raised. 103 Early in 1960, Beipa and one of the two 
remaininq 
d 104 own. 
Eaat Mekeo aocietiea, Inawabui, were finally cloaed 
Aipeana and Inawi were allowed to reaume atore 
tradinq: moat reaident member• had paid their aubacriptions, 
thouqh many abaent from the villaqe had not. 105 With only 
three societiea left functioninq, hopes of eatablishinq a 
viable co-operative orqaniaation in the Mekeo finally died. 
By 1960, the adminiatration had experienced more 
than a decade of fruatration in the Mekeo. A qreat deal of 
money had been inveated and many dedicated officer• had 
laboured to brinq the achemea to fruition. Certainly failure 
had not reaulted from lack of effort on the adminiatration'• 
part, but rather throuqh lack of foreaiqht. The co-operatives 
102 Jbid. 
103 Ibid1 Nov. 1959. 
104 Ibid1 Jan., Mar. 1960. 
105 Ibid1 reb. 1960. 
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had been financially un•table from the •tart, while the rice 
scheme repre•ent• a veritable kaleido•cope of a~ini•trative 
blunder• and mi•judgement•. In view of the numerous 
practical ob•tacle• to development officials were unable 
to solve, it appear• that regardless of the Mekeo'• response, 
the •chem•• would have foundered. There is, in fact, 
con•iderable evidence of a very determined per•everance by 
villager•. Cottrell-Dormer's rural progress •ocieties were 
reorganized in 1953 becau•e oificial• feared members had 
lost intere•t, yet they were easily per•uaded to invest 
their energie• and money in a new venture: whatever the 
immediate cau•e• of the collapse in 1956, it stemmed not from 
the Mekeo's refusal to grow enough rice, but from an 
actnini•trative failure to di•pose of what they produced: 
in 1959 field •taff could barely contain their impatience 
with the f~w ob•tinate villagers who still wanted to plant 
rice. overall, the documentary evidence support• the 
Mekeo's claim• that they were keenly interested in the 
project• and did their be•t to carry out the government'• 
instruction•. 
A COMPLEX background of uncertainty and anticipation on 
the part of the Mekeo provided the setting in 1948 for 
Cottrell-Dormer'• project. Three years earlier, the men had 
come home from the war deeply impres•ed by their experiences: 
they had been dazzled by the technological achievements of 
the white man, encouraged by the example of the negro 
soldier• - black men who, they were told, had been taught 
by the white Allerican• to live like EuropeMns - and clat~d 
by the friendly advance• and assurances of the All•tralian 
troop• that 'thing• would be better' after the war. Official 
promi•e• were .. de to them at public addre11e1 given by 
the 'ALl•tralian and Allerican general•' that their labour• 
would not 90 unr.warded. 
281 
The carriers were not certain what their 'reward' 
would be, though they hopefully speculated: 
••• the Government might supply us with food, 
give us our own stores and supply us with 
trucks and ahotguns.106 
Their comments revealed that they expected some immediate 
recompense in the form of a free distribution of goods 
01 money. Informants believed that the Americana were to 
receive either money or land for the assistance they had 
given Australia; they considered that their services though 
less than the Americans', merited formal recognition. They 
.resolved not to help a second time if they were overlooked. 
we said, 'Probably they will give us a 
shotgun for suffering here. If nothing 
is given to us after the war, we will not 
help them with the next.•107 
In traditional warfare, the victors were obliged to pay 
their debts to their allies with a lavish feast and large 
distributions of pigs and vegetable foods; evidently 
the Australians were expected to act in a similar way. 
Informants stressed that they thought they would receive a 
free gift; though they agreed that today they had such 
things as stores, shotguns and trucks, these had b~en 
achieved with their own efforts and bought with their own 
money - they had not been given anything. For people whose 
social relationships are based on reciprocity, mere 
i;rotestaticns of gratitude or friendship are not sufficient; 
the/ must be expressed concretely in the form of gifts 
or serviccD. An outright gift was presumably necessary 
in the carriers' eyes as a ratification of the Australians' 
106 Opu Opu, Inawi: 17 Feb. 1971. 
107 Ibid. 
: 
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verbal declarations of friendship: once this had been 
made, relations could begin on a new footing. Yet despite 
the most sanguine hopes, the eagerly anticipated 'reward' 
was not immediately forthcoming. 
After the excitement and turmoil of war, village 
life quickly resumed its former familiar pattern. When 
the labourers returned home in 1945, they found their houses, 
gardens, livestock and other property still intact: some 
work was necessary to clear new gardens and rebuild the houses• 
and fences that had been neglected in their absence but 
things were quickly put to rights. In contrast, those areas 
of Papua New Guinea directly affected by the fighting 
experienced a sharp physical break with the past: bombing 
raids forced people to flee from their homes, taking only 
W!at possessions they could carry with them: when they 
returned there was nothing left - new villages were built, 
new livestock purchased and new household equipment acquired 
. h . d b h dm' . . lOS with t e war compensation money grante y t e a inistration. 
some Mekeo bitterly observed that compensation had been paid 
even to groups that aided the Japanese, though they themselves 
received nothing: in their opinion, those who received large 
sums of money from the government, enabling them to build 
new houses with corrugated iron roofs, replace their livestock 
with larger and healthier European-bred animals, and buy 
trade store goods in place of the clay pots and rough implements 
of traditional manufacture, were far better off than 
themselves, who returned from the war only to find things 
just as they had always been. 
The wartime experiences had raised hopes of ~ new 
relationship being formed with the white regime, yet it seemed 
108 Mair 19481 219-26: Hogbin 1951: 19-23. 
~· 
. 
i 
l 
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that the governm~nt waa bent on reimposing its former demands. 
During the war, when labour was unobtainable, ANGAU 
maintained the mountain stations in the Kairuku ~bdistrict 
by means of mule trains and occasional air l~ts of supplies; 
when civil administration resumed, it was forced once again 
to rely on local carriers. The rice industry had been kept 
going by the women and old men: as soon as the able-bodied 
men returned, they too were instructed to work in the rice 
fields. Though rice planting was no longer compulsory, 
Thompson was determined that the industry would survive: 
clearing, planting and harvesting continued to be supervised 
by patrol officers and their police. 109 Floods and the 
lack of supervision during the take over by civil 
administration, resulted in a small harvest in 1946
110 
but the following season villagers were persuaded to plant 
200 acres and this was increased to 300 acres in 1948.
111 
Carriers for mountain patrols continued to be required in 
large numbers until the opening of the Tapini airstrip 
in 1948. 112 
109 see above1 247, fn 3. 
110 DDS & NA to Director DASF, 22 Nov. 1946, DASF File 
l-2-6F Pt 1. 
111 Special Report on Mekeo Rice Project, 25 July 1947, 
DASF File 33-1-11; Wales to Director DASF, 22 Apr. 1948, 
DASF File l-2-6F Pt 1. 
112 Patrol to the Mekee 28 Oct.-6 Nov. 1946 notes that 319 
carriers from Mekee and Paitana were necessary to 
transport atorea to Goilala. Patrol to Goilala, Ononge 
and Mondo 11 AUg.-3 Sept. 1947 notes that 150 Mekeo 
carrier• were used. Thompson observed, ' ••• unless the 
Tarpini "drome" service is brought into operation, we 
shall not be able to keep our present mountain 
Adminiatration in being •••• This compulsory human 
porterage will not be possible to enforce in the future, 
and I am convinced of this.' 
• 
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Previoualy villagers had accepted, if grudgingly, 
the necessity of the labours imposed on them by the 
government: now they were aware, as an Inawaia councillor 
informed Cottrell-Dormer in 1948, that there were 'better 
113 
ways'. Rice did not have to be planted by hand, it 
could be planted much more quickly by machinery. In 1947, 
village official• protested against the renewed demands 
for carriers, pointing out that during the war the government 
had managed to supply the mountain stations without the 
114 help of carriers. Villagers expected that the post-war 
government would be prepared to lighten their burdens. 
These hopes were outlined in a petition presented to the 
administrator in 1946 by a deputation of Mekeo village 
officials: 
Dear Governer Murry, 
St Paul's School 
8eipa'a 
2.12.46 
Just aguring amongst ourselves in the villages 
of Mekee District, We are demanding your help' 
to assist us in our work, It is impossible for 
us to carry on a job like this, so it would be 
very good if you give us a hand. 
we have a lot of work to do besides the planting 
of rice. 
we bring her I banboos for fencing, 2. wants 
for flora, canes, sago kipes [?] for walls Etc. 
we came to Kairuku at list 30 or 40 times in a 
year, And at present there is a lot of carven 
line [carrying lineal going on in our villages. 
But if could be possible that this Mekee carven 
lines should be cut off, that we may have less 
work to look after. 
113 OASF circular, 17 Sept. 1949: 1. 
114 Patrol to Kivori, Waima-Paitana 3-11 Mar. 1947. 
• 
• ' . 
• l ~ 
i 
' 
You've quite well know: because you've been 
here, and visited our Mekee villages and our 
rice mill. 
we are aaking now to.see the price of our 
rice, and aay where the mistake is? Now in 
these daya it is very hard for us to get the 
tools from the store: and we are using 
oarm [?) tools too. (1) we clean the bush, 
(2) then cut it to dry (3) when dried we burn 
and plant it. (4) When it grows we have to 
look after it and cut the wheads [weeds), (5) 
when it beres seeds and dry, we start 
harveserting, and it take us for atlist a 
month before we finish harveserting. 6) when 
it is baged. 7) we bring it down by raft or 
a canoe, and in this way, sometimes we lost some 
of our rice. 
our fathers had starded to plant the rice, and 
we boys are still going planting. During the 
war we boys were joined to the army, and our 
wives were still planting the rice for the army 
while other villagers were doing nothing, but, 
still the price of our rice is penny a lb. we 
would be agree if you, could arange it up to 
atlist 3 pence a lb. 
It would be very good if you do agree to our 
request. What we want is this, we want to buy 
the rice mill for ourselves, or lend it till we 
pay it all. 
If you are not agree to our wishes it dose not 
matter: if you agree it: here is our v.c. 
Alano saguta [?I and 2 counselors to see you 
about it. 
You are the only man who is minding us and so 
we are giving our report, 
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As we cannot do anything for our selves. There 
is a tractor at Mou, we would like you to give us 
that old tractor to help us. And the old [?) that 
are at J<airuku, that are doing nothing there, if 
you want ua to buy it: we will buy it slowly by 
and by with our rice money. There is a boy named 
J<avo Ameua who know• how to repeare it for us: 
He ha• been saw how to repeare the tractor by 
Mr sageant Edned [sergeant Edwards of the ANGAU 
rice plantation): we will try to buy what is 
needed for it. 
<· 
-...... If you help ua aa our wiahea, or if not, we 
like you to take our report peper in front 
of our V.C. and our Counselors. 
That ia all. 
Yours Counaelora of Mekeo oistrict. 115 
286 
Possibly villagers could have approached the white 
regime with as much aaaurance five years earlier, but it 
seems unlikely. 
some subtlety: 
responsibility 
The petition puts the people's caae with 
their faithful service, the government's 
to them and their dependence on it are stated 
confidently. In the context of this relationship, people 
naturally expected that the government would not wish to 
impose unnecessary labours on them. If the government 
insisted that they continue to produce rice, it would 
surely be prepared to assist them. The village constables 
asked the administrator to raise the price of the rice and 
to help them acquire the agricultural machinery left by 
ANGAU, but they did not, as officials later assumed, ask 
to run their own rice industry. 
Officials in Port Moresby attempted to discourage 
the petitioners' ambitions, believing that they lacked the 
h . h' 116 capital and experience to operate t eir own mac inery. 
The following year, a visiting agricultural officer discussed 
with East Mekeo villagers the possibility of running the 
government rice mill themselves but no further action was 
117 
taken. 
115 DASP Pile l-2-6F Pt 1. 
116 Cottrell-Dormer to Spate, 19 June 1953, DASF File 
l-2-6P (D). 
117 vicary to Director, DASF, 20 Oct. 1947, DASF File 
l-2-6F Pt 1, 
2~ 
Hope• of the anticipated 'reward' had been briefly 
raised when the chiefs of each village were granted permits 
to own ahotguna. Informants recalled that they were 
disappointed and indignant on discovering that only the 
chiefs, not thoae men who had served in the war, were to 
be allowed permits. Lapu Aufe of Inawi declared: 
They told ua that when the war f inisheJ we would 
see good things - perhaps they meant they wo~ld 
give us guna or stores in our villages. They 
just told us that after the war you will see 
something good but they didn't say what it was 
we would see. When the war finished and we came 
back it wasn't long before the chiefs only got 
shotguns. We had been carriers and we saw the 
chief a buying shotguns - we started to think 
back to the hard work we did - but we didn't get 
anything, so we were very unhappy when we saw 
the chiefs buying the guns.118 
An Aipeana elder, Aufa Kauka, expressed the same opinion: 
After the war the King sent a message [to the 
government), saying 'In the war we gave the 
people very heavy things to carry, and hit 
them and put them in gaol. So when the war 
finishes, we will give them guns and stores and 
all aorta of things to make them happy •••• 
[Later) the chiefs got guns, even though some 
of them did not serve as carriers, w~yij this 
happened the others were very angry. 
If this was the promised reward, it was a paltry one: even 
the chiefs were not given the guns but had to buy them. 
Against this background of rebuffs and disappointment, 
it is not difficult to imagine the emotions aroused by 
Cottrell-Dormer'• visit in July 1948. People recalled that 
everyone wanted to join the new societies. According to 
Aua Vi'i of Aipeana1 
118 Lapu Aufe, 1nawi1 16 Feb. 1971. 
119 Aufa Kauka, Aipeana1 23 Nov. 1971. 
t 
I 
We thought it would be a good idea to work with 
him [Cottrell-Dormer) so we would have a store 
in the village instead of having to go so far 
to buy things. He told us that if we had 
plenty of rice he would help us get a store in 
our village. 
He told us we would get a rice mill and iron 
roofs for our houses, so we thought it would be 
a good idea to work with him.120 
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Cottrell-Dormer envisaged a simple, practical means of 
enabling villagers to amass capital for community projects: 
villagers interpreted his proposals in their own terms. 
People expected that Cottrell-Dormer would either 
give them the machinery he promised or at least allow them 
free use of it. Kavo Laua of Aipeana explained: 
The only thing we knew was that he would plough 
the fields without us paying. This was how he 
helped us so we felt like working with him.121 
Other informants indicated that they did not understand at 
• 
the time that the administration would deduct from the rural 
progress society funds costs for hiring machinery: some 
continued to believe that no charges for machinery were made 
in the early stage of the scheme. 
People also expected that machinery would remove 
what Belshaw termed 'the pain of labour'. He observed in 
1951: 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the 
d h 
• . • 
5ocieties are expected to re uce t e pain 
of labour. This is a hope that may possibly 
not be fulfilled, and as it is so ever-present 
in the minds of the peo~le it may turn out to 
be the critical point. 1 2 
120 Aua Vi'i, Aipeana: 31 Oct. 1971. 
121 Kavo Laua, Aipeana1 27 Oct. 1971. 
122 Belshaw 19511 23. 
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compared with the mechanized production villagers had seen 
used by ANGAU, the methods of hand cultivation on which they 
relied seemed ludicrously time-consuming and laborious. 
Cottrell-Dormer was told frankly in 1948 that people were 
not prepared to produce more rice under the old methods.
123 
If the government needed more grain, it should help people 
to employ the 'better ways' they now knew existed - this 
was the essence of the village constables' demands of 1946. 
undoubtedly, ideas of what machinery might accomplish were 
far from realistic: very few villagers knew anything about 
its actual working or operation. Only experience would give 
a more practical assessment of its value. 
When Cottrell-Dormer introduced his scheme, few, 
if any villagers fully understood that in planting rice 
they were working for themselves, not the government. The 
crop had always been regarded as 'government rice': they 
had supplied the government with rice for two generations 
and continued to do so. There was nothing new in Cottrell-
oormer' s request that they produce more grain: what was 
• 
different was his immediat~ offer of machinery to lighten 
their work load, and the promise that, in the future, they 
would have their own trucks and tractors, stores and whatever 
else they desired to improve their way of life. His proposals 
were seen in terms of a simple exchange of services: if 
people grew sufficient rice for the government, it, in return, 
~.ould help them obtain the things they desired. Whereas in 
the past, they had received only a little money, most of 
which the government had taken back as tax. 
123 Cottrell-Dormer to the Administrator, 26 AUg. 1948, 
DASF File l-2-6F Pt 1. 
I 
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Informant• firmly denied any auggeation that they 
themaelvea ever aaked to run their own rice induatry1 
they streaa that the government alone was responsible for 
introducing the project. They explained that when the 
rural progress societies were started, people knew nothing 
of 'business' and of making money. According to A'oae Ufai, 
who was one of the young men Cottrell-Dormer sent to Idubada 
Technical School for training as a mill operator: 
••• at that time people didn't know how to start 
a business on their own or how to get money, ao 
they didn't bother about money [i.e. about being 
paid for their work on the rice), they were just 
happy working.124 
The majority of villagers did not realize that they could 
earn seemingly unobtainable things such as machinery through 
their own efforts: they believed they were solely dependent 
on the largesse of the white regime - a point emphasized in 
the 1946 petition. Villagers' understanding of the rural 
progress societies was clearly indicated in the attitude, 
were 'assisting 
This feeling 
observed by officials in late 1952, that they 
. . d f . ' 125 the Administration instea o vice versa • 
had not grown out of dissatisfaction with Cottrell-Dormer's 
societies: the Mekeo had always regarded rice as a sort 
of tribute exacted by the government. 
Misconceptions of what Cottrell-Dormer was offering 
naturally led to disappointment. At first, all worked happily 
and willingly: 
It was new to them so most people were working 
hard: because it was a kind of game they were 
playing there were no quarrels. They were 
happy and sang while they worked. The old 
124 A'oae ufai, 1nawi1 15 Apr. 1971. 
125 Morris to the Registrar of co-operatives, 
20 Sept. 1952, DC Pile 17-7. 
• 
t 
f: 
' ; 
t 
' 
women prepared food for the young people so 
they could keep working.126 
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Enthusiasm was still high when Belshaw inspected the project 
in 1951. 127 The initial impetus was gradually lost as people 
discovered that the much vaunted machinery fell far short 
cf their expectations. They had joined the rural progress 
societies believing that the tractors and ploughs would 
remove the necessity for long hours of toil in the rice 
fields: they found that they still had to clear the land 
and weed and harvest the crop by hand, only the ploughing 
and sowing was done mechanically. In contrast to the claims 
of some critics of the rural progress societies, informants 
asserted that a great deal of effort was required of them. 
Opu Vi'i, who was a co11111ittee man in the Inawi society, 
recalled: 
We worked very hard clearing the land. All 
the men and girls and women went t.o cut down 
the trees and cleared up the place and burnt 
the stumps. The land was ploughed by machine 
and the machine planted the rice. It was 
harvested by hand.128 
After the second or third season, people were growing tired 
of the demands made by the new societies. According to 
Kalama Kalama, today one of Aipeana's prominent business men: 
They didn't say openly that they wouldn't work 
but in their minds they were sick of the work.129 
126 A'oae ufai, Inawi: 15 Apr. 1971. 
127 Belshaw 1951: 21. 
128 0pu Vi'i, Inawi: 20 Apr. 1971. 
129 Kalama Kalama, Aipeana: 14 Nov. 1971. 
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It ia very difficult to judge juat how far thia 
diaaatiafaction had progreaaed by late 1952. Moat informant• 
tended to confuae the varioua atagea of the scheme1 in 
particular attributing the events of 1953 to the collapae 
in 1956. Cottrell-Dormer is so cloaely identified with events 
that many informants at first denied rice was grown after 
his departure: many did not remember that the co-operative 
societiea dealt in rice for two seasons. The details given 
were often contradictory, nevertheless certain important 
points of agreement emerge, and there is a clear interpretation 
of events as a whole. 
Informants' attitudes to Cottrell-Dormer are 
illustrative of the contradictions which occurred in their 
accounts. On the one hand, he is remembered as a 'good, 
kind man' who came1 
••• becauae he wanted to help us, because at that 
time we had no money, nothing at all. The poor 
fellow felt aorry for us so he came to help. 
Those who went to war had some money, though not · 
much - we who stayed in the village had no money, 
so for the sake of the village people he came.130 
People recall how he used to sit with them in the .!:!,!!! 
discussing matters: he spoke their language and even chewed 
betel nut - a symbol of hospitality and friendship commonly 
despised by the white man. some warmly defend him and deny 
that there waa ever any hard feeling towards him1 
Mr Dormer stayed here four or five years. He 
knew our language. I don't know why he left: 
I think he waa told by headqUarters to leave. 
No one here told Dormer to leave, headquarter• 
told him to go. People weren't angry with him, 
they were happy with him becauae he was doing 
something good for the people. 131 
130 Thoma• Ine'e, Inawi1 5 Apr. 1971. 
131 Opu Vi'i, Inawi1 20 Apr. 1971. 
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But the majority, when preaaed, concede that 'he waa a 
European so he might have known the way to trick ua': and 
finally confeaa they suspect Cottrell-Dormer and other 
agricultural officers of stealing their money. Thi• 
ambivalence ia largely the product of hindsight: in 1952 
villagers did not know that Cottrell-Dormer's scheme would 
be a failure. Several informants atated that it was only 
after the rural progresa aocieties cloaed that their 
suspicions were arouaed. Au• Vi'i of Aipeana made this 
distinction clear1 
Dormer waa telling ua lie• but we 
with him. He was telling us lie• 
didn't apend enough time with ua. 
angry with him while he wa• here, 
left we aaid, 'Dormer waa telling 
not staying with us long enough.' 
we forgot all about it.132 
were not angry 
because he 
We were not 
but once he 
ua lies for 
But later on 
The aaine point waa underlined by Ete Kua, another con111ittee 
man in the Inawi rural pr~gress society1 
we didn't know why Dol"lll~r left. W• only heard 
he left but we didn't know why. Mhen he left, 
we thought he gave ua the work but left before 
we really underatood it. So we aaid, 'Mhy did 
he leave when he hadn't ahown ua the work 
properly?•l33 
There were, however, a few hint• that before the 
cloaure of the rural progres• aocietiea, aome educated men, 
working for the adllliniatration •• clerk• and agricultural 
asaiatanta, apread accuaations that Cottrell-Dormer was 
misuaing member•' funds. According to one Inawi informants 
People didn't talk about Dormer atealing their 
money until the young men who had been educated 
132 Aua Vi'i, Aipeana1 31 Oct. 1971. 
133 Et• Kua, Inawi1 4 May 1971. 
r 
r 
told their parenta about the money and aaid that 
Dormer and A. Cone of hia Mekeo assistants) were 
stealin9 their money. Then the old people be9an 
to talk about it.134 
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Othera explained that aince the majority of people had no 
idea how a buainesa enterprise was run, they did not think 
about their money until the matter was raised by a few 
sophisticated young men: 
••• they told us that if anyone works they should 
be paid with money. Because they heard this some 
people refused to carry on. It was one of our 
own people, not Europeans telling us that.135 
such comments give some context to Morris' assertion that 
members of the rural progress societies feared that Cottrell-
Dormer had misappropriated society funds. 136 The comparatively 
well educated, English-speaking Mekeo working for the 
administration were the individuals most likely to be called 
upon by visiting officials to interpret local opinion: the 
suspicions these men voiced represented a minority opinion 
which later gained wider acceptance when Cottrell-Dormer 
suddenly left the area and his societies were disbanded. 
one point waa clearly made in all accounts: 
whatever the actual situation at the time of reorganization, 
villagers were by no mean• ready to reject a scheme to which 
such fervent hope• had been fixed. Official• aasumed that 
villagers had little to lose if they withdrew from the 
scheme. The monetary investment in the village societies 
134 A.u., 1nawi1 15 Apr. 1971. 
135 A.v., Aipeana1 31 Oct. 1971. 
136 Morria to R99iatrar of Co-operativea, 20 Sept. 1952, 
DC File 17-7. 
295 
was certainly 111all, as Morris pointed out 1137 but much 
more than the few pounds contributed to them was at stake. 
Abandoning the societies at this stage would have meant 
abandoning the hopes which people were convinced could only 
be realized with the government's help. This dependence 
was emphasized in the reasons informants gave for joining 
the co-operatives. An educated, younger man exclaimed: 
We arc like empty boxes~ What would w .. know 
about something new? Whal.ever is nl'w, w .. will 
be happy about it. We wanted a business and we 
wanted a good way to live. We worked with 
Mr Dormer, then he stopped and gave our money 
back. We wanted to do something and they 
explained to us about the co-operatives, so we 
put money to buy shares and start a co-operative.138 
The revised project was welcomed, not because villagers found 
.. 
it in any way more acceptable than Cottrell-Dormer's scheme, 
but simply because they were relieved to be offered an 
alternative. Kalama Kalama described how the co-operatives 
were received by Aipeana: 
We had a meeting and the co-operative officer 
told us how to start new societies. He told 
us the whole village would have to pay $10 
each and then they would build a store and get 
a profit from it. We are not educated people -
one told us to grow rice and we were too lazy 
and so that work collapsed, and now another 
came to help us so we thought we should listen 
to him.139 
Lapu Aufe of Inawi reiterated the same point: 
We didn't compare the co-operatives with 
Dormer's societies but because we were asked 
• 
137 Ibid. 
138 Andrew Isoaimo, Inawi1 10 May 1971. 
139 Kalama KallllllA, Aipeana1 14 Nov. 1971. 
to join the new eociety, we joined it to do 
something instead of sitting around doing 
nothing. We were thinking that this was 
another way of having something for ourselves 
of the way of living in the future.140 
296 
Villagers did not, as Lapu explained, concern 
themselves with the details of the respective schemes 
(even if they could have understood them): mechanization 
proved to be the one thing of rL•al importance, The demand 
for machinery increased under the new scheme, even though 
the individual grower was now required to meet the costs 
out of his own pocket, Mechanization had always been a 
crucial issue: the rural progress societies lost their 
initial support because villagers felt that the government 
had not lightened their labours sufficiently. This concern 
did not stem from a simple distaste for hard work. 
Mechanization represented the only concrete difference 
between the pre-war rice 'companies' and the new projects: 
it became a sort of pledge of the government's good faith. 
In villagers' eyes, the 'Rice Scheme' .!!!!, mechanization, 
Matters which loomed large on the official horizon 
were evidently of minor importance to villagers. Informants 
dismissed the question of work organizaticn, saying that 
the system followed under Cottrell-Dormer and that introduced 
under the revised project were both 'good': even when 
pressed, they would not concede that one had the advantage 
over the other. Their assertions 
141 
choices actually made in 1953. 
are justified by the 
The effectiveness of 
introducing cash payments to growers for their grain is more 
• 
140 Lapu Aufe, Jnawi1 10 Apr. 1971. 
141 see aboves 267. 
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difficult to evaluate. It may h 'd d ave prov1 e a more concrete 
incentive at the time, though informants did not regard 
the payment• a1 an out1tanding feature of the revi1ed 
project. Certainly in the long run, the payment• were not 
successful in di1pelling rumours that the administration was 
taking the people's money. Villagers openly accuse the 
agricultural and co-operative officers that succeeded 
Cottrell-Dormer of deceiving them: 
I think the Government must have taken the 
money - Mr Dormer, Mr Lamrock, Mr Willis, 
Mr Bell and Mr Lawrence all got big money and 
then went away. I got £8 for working at Epo 
and no rations but I think they got more than 
us: The agricultural officers got big money.142 
Despite the confusion surrounding the crises in 1953 
and 1956, informants clearly recalled that most people 
finally stopped planting rice when the Department of Agriculture 
failed to plough their land. Opu Opu of Inawi heatedly 
described the closing stages of the reorganized scheme: 
The Government was asking us to grow rice. 
For a start we were going all right but finally 
the Government asked us to clear a new place so 
we could have better rice. SO each clan cleared 
a place but once the land was cleared the 
agricultural officer didn't bring the tractor to 
plough the land. The people had put a lot of 
effort into clearing their plots, so they went 
to the district office and asked them to ask 
Agriculture to provide the tractor and plough. 
But Agriculture refused, so the people refused 
to carry on with the rice work. Clearing the land 
is a big job and each clan had spent at least £6 
buying food for the other clan people who came to 
work with them. so they had spent quite a bit of 
money to clear that land and yet nothing was done 
on it.143 • 41 
.... , 
142 o.v., 1nawi1 20 Apr. 1971. 
143 Opu Opu, Inawi: 4 Apr. 1971. 
298 
Opu firmly states the moral responsibilities involved: 
villagers believed that they had played their part by 
following the agricultural officer's instructions but the 
government refused to meet its obligations. People were 
angered and puzzled by this apparent volte-face. Its 
sudden withdrawal of assistance could only mean that the 
administratio~ despite what it said, no longer wanted 
their rice. Alla Vi'i of Aipeana reasoned: 
When harvesting we just picked the rice with 
our hands and this took a long time. Because 
of this there was a lot wasted in the field 
and that's why we didn't get much money. If 
the header was used we could have paid off the 
field machinery and still get enough money for 
producing the rice. I thought that because the 
Government didn't want us to work with them they 
didn't provide us with the header. so we didn't 
want to grow big fields - just enough for the 
family.144 • 
It is inconceivable to most villagers, even today, that the 
administration's actions were anything other than deliberate.• 
i 'd 145 h I The Mekee universe adm ts no acci ents. T e government s 
'power' is obviously such that if its schemes fail, they 
are intended to do so. Levels of understanding vary of 
course: there are now people whose experience and education 
allow them to see matters in a different light. An Inawi 
informant reflected: 
I didn't know myself when the co-operatives 
started, but now when I look back at it I 
understand. I realize now that the rice scheme 
and the co-operatives were just experiments -
144 Aua Vi'i, Aipeana: 31 Oct. 1971. 
145 See above: 14. 
.. 
the governm.nt didn't really know what would 
happen,146 
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But those capable of thi1 realization are, a1 yet, only a 
minority. 
Once it waa apparent that the government had lost 
interest in the project, most people 1aw little point in 
continuing. A few optimi1t1 were still convinced that 
they would 'make a profit' out of rice: after one or two 
seasons they were finally di1c0\o::aged by the expenae of the 
d:lligatory feast• held for relatives and friends who a11i1ted 
with the harvesting. 
Interest had now turned to copra as a cash crop. 
Following the decision in 1955 not to market rice through 
the co-operatives, officials attempted to persuade members 
to plant coconuts and increase copra production. Villagers 
regarded copra not as an additional crop, but as a replacement 
for rice: when the Department of Agriculture failed to 
plough their land, many disappointed growers decided to 
convert their rice plots into coconut plantations. According 
to Opu Opu of Inawi1 
The people didn't aell any rice to the 
co-operative1. As soon as the agricultural 
officer came to the village they had an 
argument with him. He 1aid that he only had 
one tractor to do the work for many people. 
146 A.O., 1nawi1 18 Apr. 1971. Informant• who were consulted 
on the war and the pre-war period had had much the same 
work experience and education. The situation abruptly 
changes when one com•• to the 1950• and later events. 
Not only do levels of education and experience differ 
widely, but many people, in cOlllllOn with the informant 
just quoted, now look back with a new und~ratanding 
on events in which they themselves participated ten, 
fifteen or twenty years ago. 
The people ••id, 'You •hould have more than 
ten tractor•, one is not enough. so you are 
telling us lies, you are asking us to grow 
rice but you can keep the rice, we are going 
to plant coconuts instead of rice. You didn't 
plou~h the land so we could plant rice, •o now 
we will plant coconuts'. Mr Pyne kept asking 
us to make copra to sell to the co-operative 
store, as in this way the store could get 
gooda.147 
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The co-operatives are so firmly identified with copra that 
many informants, like Opu, denied that they had ever dealt 
in rice. Copra, the co-operative society and the co-operative 
store were seen as a 'new way' offered by the government. 
After 1956 coconut planting increased: many areas of 
established palms around Beipa, Aipeana and Inawi are said 
. 
to have been planted at this time. Hot air copra driers 
were built in moat villages in the late 1950s. 148 
Although Pyne and other field officers were able 
to generate interest in copra and the co-operatives, villagers 
had no clearer understanding of the new organizations than 
they had of the rural progress societies. They were told that 
the co-operatives would do two things: set up village •tores 
and make a profit for members. While the former wa• quickly 
achieved, the promised 'profit' proved to be a mysterious 
and elusive entity. Moat informants recounted the history of 
their society in the form of a long recitation of the occasional 
profits and frequent losses made by it, and the changes in 
store keepers and office bearers which were made following 
each loss. No mention was made of other matters such as the 
rejections by the copra Marketing Board and the excessively 
147 Opu 0pu, Inawi: 4 Apr. 1971. 
148 Patrol to the Mekeo 4 JUne-4 JUly 1958: SUbdiatrict 
Annual Reports 1960-61. 
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high transport coats. Evidently all that was visible of the 
societies' financial operations was this enigmatic sequence 
of profit and .iu!ss. Members were jubilant when the 
co-operative officer announced that there was a profit to 
distribute: when he announced a loss they were angry and 
puzzled. At the outset, the co-operative officers had 
spoken only of the profits they would make: 
The government told the people that if they 
joined the co-operative society they would 
get a profit, but it didn't explain that if 
the society made a loss the people would make 
a loss.149 
Villagers could see no connection between these failures 
and their own actions: it was as if the society were some 
complex but erratic piece of machinery which occasionally 
functioned correctly but more often broke down. 
The only intelligible explanation offered by the 
co-operative officer was that the store keeper and other 
society off ice bearers were stealing funds or giving goods 
on credit. consequently each time the accounts failed to 
balance, the store man was dismissed and new office bearers 
v.·ere chosen. The losses, nevertheless, continued. The real 
cause of the trouble obviously lay elsewhere. Informants 
agreed that many of the store men, secretaries and treasurers 
were either incompetent or dishonest but were not convinced 
that they were primarily responsible for the losses: some 
suggested that it seemed far more likely that the co-operative 
officer himself, who made up the accounts, was to blame: 
I think there were good store keepers but the 
officers came to do stock taking - they might 
steal the money when they had stock taking. 
149 A.O., Inawi: 18 Apr. 1971. 
It might be happening that way also. we think 
that way. It was not the store men but the 
co-operative officers atealing.150 
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Observing the frequency of defections by society officiala, 
field staff theorized that the aanctiona againat theft which 
existed in other groups were absent in the case of the Mekeo. 151 
The belief that the co-operative officers were the real 
culprits partly explains why people might have been reluctant 
to take action against defaulters, though this is only one 
side of the coin. 
Schwartz's study of the Manus co-operatives led 
him to believe that behind the people's conscious disapproval 
of thefts from the societies was a 'collective vicarious 
participation by all in the holding and use of the missing 
152 
money.' The Mekeo, far from feeling any collective 
responsibility for the losses, were intensely jealous, and 
therefore suspicious, of the officials they elected. Pyne 
and other officers were apparently not aware of undercurrents 
of intrigue against prominent office bearers. A former 
secretary of the Aipeana society described how he had been 
removed from office, without the knowledge of the co-operative 
officer, after members accused him of stealing the society 
funds; no court case was made againat him but he wa1 aick 
for several months with a severe illness which doctors in 
Port Moresby could not diagnose. Similar accounts of jealouay 
and revenge were given in Inawi. These actions were not 
prompted simply by anger that the society funds were missing, 
150 A.U., Inawi: 10 May 1971. 
151 co-operatives Annual Reports 1956-57, T & I File 
20-2-3. 
152 Schwartz 1967: 43. 
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but rather by fears that the officiala were using their 
position to increase their personal wealth and influence. 
The Aipeana secretary, on the basis of his own experience, 
explained: 
••• according to the custom the people often 
direct their jealousies towards the person who 
has been appointed in the society. The people 
are jealous because the storeman is getting 
paid.153 
A rare piece of contemporary documentation in the form of 
a report prepared in 1959 by another Aipeana society secretary, 
Kuekue Kavana, vividly describes the people's reactions: 
Look at that man [a co-operative official): 
look at him: He ought to be ashamed of himself -
trying to do the work which British people do: 
He's trying to be Higher than us. Ha-Ha-Ha 
that never will be: Shame on him: His skin 
and our skin is one: We mustn't obey his 
orders anymore. Because if we keep on obeying 
him, he will become a great man in the end and 
we will be nothing.154 
Villagers were suspicious of the co-operative officers but 
above all, they were distrustful of the ambitions of their 
own leaders. A former secretary of the Inawi society 
admitted: 
If they had had good leaders they would have been 
o.K. In their minds the people thought the 
leaders were stealing their money and that's why 
they were afraid of it. That's why they didn't 
. h . t 155 want to put money in t e socie y. 
153 s.A., Aipeana: 17 Nov. 1971. 
154 The underlining in this section is my own. Pyne to 
Registrar of co-operatives, 3 Feb. 1959, report 
attached, T & I File 21-4-1. 
155 T.I., Inawi: 3 Apr. 1971. 
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The Mekeo's difficulty in graspinq the basic 
principles of co-operative activity stemmed from what Morris, 
then the Deputy Registrar of Co-operatives, identified as the 
lack of a 'capital concept' - 'an understanding that capital 
in itself and of itself can be a productive medium' •156 
Just as the members of the rural progress societies had not 
realized that they could earn money through their own efforts 
to buy seemingly unobtainable things like agricultural 
machinery, members of the co-operatives did not understand 
that they could use money to earn money. The society's 
assets were not. regarded as capital investments which would 
make money, but as purchases to provide members with certain 
services. People were therefore indignant when they were 
asked to pay for goods from their 'own store' or were 
charged to use their 'own tractor'. Kuekue's report of 
1959 clearly describes these attitudes: 
This is our own store! We've put in a very 
big money for an establishment! Therefore 
the prices should be very low! Even if we 
have no money, we should be given store-goods 
freely! 
Because this is our own store! the storeman 
is unfair! He's stealing our money! One of 
these days, I'll jump over the counter and hit 
him! If he hits back, I'll plunge this knife 
into him! Shame on him! He thinks he's a 
whiteman! Cheek of him! 
Do you see now? Another lie? see! We've 
bought the Tractor and Trailer with our own 
money, and yet we still have to pay for it doing 
our work! This sort of work is not good! The 
storeman is deceiving us! We've thrown away 
a very big money on it for nothing. 
156 Morris 1958: 32. 
Because we've bought it with our own money, it 
should do our work freely:l57 
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Villagers' inability to follow the workings of the 
~a-operatives made the whole affair seem an elaborate 'lie'. 
Though they did not wish to lose their store and other assets, 
•:hey became reluctant to invest further money or effort in 
their society, believing that in doing so they would only 
be lining the pockets of the European supervisors and increasing 
the prestige of the office bearers, without benefiting 
'.11cmselves. When the societies were eventually liquidated, 
:he stores closed, the stock and all assets sold, they were 
finally convinced of the government's perfidy. An educated 
'"an who has had long experience with the co-operative 
'"°' ·2men t stated bluntly: 
Those villages in which the co-operatives were 
closed feel that the Government told them lies 
as they gave their money but got nothing in 
return - in fact they lost the money they had 
invested.158 
While the failure of the government's schemes 
.a:u~ot be attributed to the Mekeo' s lack of support, it is 
:):wious that their responses were often negative and 
»str•1ctive, if unintentionally so. PeoplM' s distrust of 
· ':•.· cidministration and of their own leaders would have 
·'ated serious obstacles to development even in the absence 
all other practical and adninistrative difficulties. 
Flee id staff also had cause to complain of villagers' apparent 
1c.ability to work together at the village unit, and below. 
l'/ne, for example, found it almost impossible to organize 
'S7 Pvne to Registrar of co-operatives, 3 Feb. 1959, report 
attached, T & I File 21-4-1. 
'')8 A.O., Inawi: 18 Apr. 1971. 
306 
efficient use of the Aipeana tractor, which was intended to 
provide transport for all the West Mekeo societies: Beipa, 
presumably out of pique, preferred to pay a higher rate to 
hire a mission tractor rather than use its neighbour's 
h . l 159 ve ic e. A pattern of self-defeating behaviour, which 
was to emerge clearly later, is already discernable. 
Villagers were as unaware of the results of their 
own negative responses as they were of the effects of high 
transport costs or the financial consequences for the 
co-operatives of the collapse of the rice scheme in 1956. 
They had wanted the rice scheme and the co-operatives to 
succeed - their perseverance over more than a decade attests 
to the truth of their statements. Their actions had not been 
deliberately obstructive. On the contrary, they believed 
they had carried out their part to the best of their ability: 
they had planted rice, made copra and joined whatever 
societies the government had seen fit to devise. 
The rural progress societies and the co-operatives 
had left few concrete achievements, nevertheless much had 
been learn~d from them. An Aipeana entrepreneur acknowledged 
this debt: 
Yes, I think the co-operative society has helped 
this village. We didn't know how to run 
businesses but the co-operative officers came 
. bu . 160 and now most of us are running our own sinesses. 
Even informants who condemned the government for not rewarding 
them for their services during the war admitted: 
159 co-operative Officer's Journal, Jan. 1959, T & I 
File 20-3-5. 
loo Kalama Kaiama, Aipeana1 14 Nov. 1971. 
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The government gave ua good ideaa to atart 
busineaaea and atorea.161 
People had begun to realize that they need not be dependent 
on the government for the things they wanted: they could 
earn money for themaelves, start their own busineaa ventures. 
several of the younger men, who had benefited from various 
training courses in Port Moresby and had gained experience 
through the village societies or worked with the administration 
as agricultural assiatants and clerks, were keen to put the 
new ideas they had gained into action. 
The late 1950a witnessed a modest floreacence of 
small village enterpriaes. only a few months after the 
liquidation of the Inawaia co-operative society in 1956, 
a group of Inawaia people had raised £1,087 towards buying 
162 
a tractor. The Inawaia Transport Company, as it was 
later known, purchased its first tractor early in 1959 with 
the assistance of a government loan: by December of the 
same year, the loan had been 
163 
to buy a second tractor. 
repaid and another applied 
This success soon prompted 
for 
others to try similar ventures. Another group from Inawaia 
and a number of people from the neighbouring village of Eboa 
. . 1959 164 applied for loans to purchase vehicles during • 
b 'bu 165 In 1961 loans were sought by Beipa and Jesu ai a. By 
161 A.E., Aipeana: 29 Nov. 1971. 
162 co-operative Officer'• Journal, 1957, undated entry, 
T & I File 21-4-1. 
163 subdistrict Office File 25-3-4. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
• : 
' 
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1963, seven of the fourteen Mekeo villages owned between 
them seven tractors, two trucks and one utility. 166 
The tractor• and other vehicles were used primarily 
to transport pa•senger• and goods to and from the coast 
and Bereina, which in 1962 became the subdistrict headquarters. 
The need for transport arose from the rapidly increasing sale 
of betel nut and garden produce in Port Moresby. Prior to 
the war, many villagers raised their tax money by selling 
betel nut to workers on the Kanosia plantationsi some even 
travelled as far as Port Moresby. A regular trade in Port 
Moresby sprang up after the war and was well established by 
167 
the early 1950s. By 1958, an estimated two tons of betel 
nut was taken by air weekly from Bereina and another six 
168 tons by sea. Despite the increase in the volume of 
trade, it continued on an individual basis, each seller 
travelling to Port Moresby with his produce. Field staff 
complained that betel nut brought villagers such a high 
cash income that they had little need of other crops such as 
rice and copra which required far more time and effort for 
169 
a smaller return. 
In addition to the transport businesses and the 
betel nut trade, many small clan ventures, usually called 
clan 'clubs', were started at this time. The 'clubs', 
166 Kairuku SUbdistrict Annual Reports 1962-63. 
167 Patrol to the Mekeo 29 Aug.-8 Sept. 1950 notes that 
•frequent trading ventures' to Port More•bY may bring 
'£60 or £70 for the leader with lesser sum• 1br hi• 
assistant•.' 
168 Kairuku subdi•trict Annual Report• 1958-59. 
169 see, for example, Patrol to the Mekeo 10 reb.-1 Mar. 1954: 
PP.trol to the Mekeo 9-22 July 1954s Report on Mekeo 
Rlce and EpO zxperimental Station, 8 Jan. 1957, DC File 
17-7. 
l 
i 
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modelling themselves on the co-operatives and often competing 
with them, made copra to raise money which they usually 
invested in a small store: many also built hot air copra 
driers. 
The fact that the final stages of the aaninistration's 
developmental schemes coincided with the first flush of 
successful independent enterprises, naturally blunted the 
edge of people's disappointment. Despite the frustration 
of projects which had absorbed much of the villagers' 
interests and energies for more than a decade, the 1960s 
opened on an optimistic note. People were too busy with 
the new activities to brood on events. But it would be 
false to imagine that the administration's failures were 
~ 
easily passed over or forgotten. 
/ 
I 
• 
• 
• 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 1960-711 'Whatever the Government 
says now - I don't believe it' 
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DESPITE initial optimism, the 1960s saw a worsening of 
relations between the Mekeo and the government, and a mounting 
frustration within village society itself. The introduction 
of local government was to prove as unsuccessful as earlier 
programmes for economic development, destroying any remaining 
faith in the government's good intentions; while the better 
standard of living which villagers had striven for, and which 
had seemed to be within easy reach by the early 1960s, still 
eluded their grasp ten years later. 
Officials had observed with relief the signs of an 
independent interest in economic activities apparent by the 
early 1960s; it seemed that the debit sheet of the 1950s 
was balanced by a new optimism and prosperity. Now convinced 
that large scale community projects for economic i.ievelopment 
were unsuited to the 'highly individualistic' Mekeo, officials 
were confident villagers would succeed through their own 
individual efforts. 1 A policy, initiated by ADO Brown, of 
encouraging small, independent village enterprises through 
the granting of government loans provided the guide for the 
future. Brown's foresight in recognizing that the rice scheme 
and the co-operatives were already moribund by 1957, and that 
the seeds of future development lay in enterprises like the 
Inawaia Transport company, probably did much to forestall 
1 Marsh to Registrar of Co-operatives, 27 June 1957, 
T & I File 21-4-1. 
' 
' . 
,. 
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the complete disillusionment which might easily have resulted 
from the collapse of the government's projects. Beginning 
with the Inawaia Transport Company, he arranged loans for 
several groups, gave them practical advice and followed their 
progress with keen interest. 2 The effectiveness of his 
approach was demonstrated by the many small transport 
businesses in operation by the early 1960s. 
Most of these ventures operated on a modest scale, 
transporting passengers and goods to and from the coast and 
undertaking road work contracts offered by the administration. 
The Inawaia Transport Company, however, indicated that such 
ventures had far greater potential. Its assets in 1961 were 
worth £5,316 - two tractors, two trailers, a plough, a harrow, 
a hot air copra drier, an office building, a launch, a canoe 
and outboard motor, a garage and an engine and fittings for 
3 
a water reticulation system. This was a notable achievement 
for a group consisting of ssventy men and their wives. 
In addition to transporting passengers, carrying out road 
work contracts and making copra, the company usea one of its 
~ractors and the farm implements to cultivate members' gardens: 
plans were made to install a reticulated water supply for 
members and to build them European-style houses at the rate 
of fifteen per year. It had already gone a long way towards 
achieving the goals set but never fulfilled by the rural 
progress societies and the co-operatives. 
The betel nut trade - now a flourishing concern in 
most villages - was seen by officials as further proof of 
2 Subdistrict Office File 25-3-4: Kairuku SUhdistrict 
Annual Reports 19'>8-h l. 
Kairuku Subdistrict Annual Reports l9b0-61. 
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the Mekeo's success as individual entrepreneurs. 4 Although 
most of the co-operative societies were closed, copra production 
was increasing and by 1961 hot air copra driers had been built 
in most villages. 5 The Department of Agriculture had even 
been able to arouse interest in two new cash crops - cocoa 
and coffee. In 1958 Inawauni village planted its first cocoa 
and small areas of coffee were started by several planters from 
Inawauni, Aipeana, Beipa and Inawi. 6 Plantings increased in 
the early 1960s: there were 1,000 mature and 4,800 immature 
coffee trees in 1963-64, while two northern villages owned 
561 mature and 2,186 immature cocoa trees. 7 
Headquarters was anxious to see the Mekeo's commercial 
successes matched by progress in other fields, in which they 
were now lagging behind other economically less developed 
areas. Local government councils were first introduced to 
Papua New Guinea in 19508 but though the Mekeo were reported 
to be ready for local government as early as 1953, 
9 
it was 
postponed first because of staff shortages and the preoccupation 
with the rice scheme, and later because of hostility created 
when the scheme was brought to a halt in 1956.
10 
A Mekeo 
4 See above: 308. 
5 Kairuku subdistrict Annual Repcrts 1960-61. 
6 Ibid, 1958-59. 
7 Bereina subdistrict Annual Reports 1963-64. 
8 Parker 1966(b): 249. 
9 Patrol to the Mekeo 16-31 Jan. 1953. 
10 Kairuku SUbdistrict Annual Reports 1956-57. 
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council was fina~ly procltlmed in 1961 and the first elections 
-were held in January t~e following year. Local response to 
the elections was feltj, to be satisfactory, even encouraging. 11 
An ambitious five year programme, covering many aspects of 
community and rural development, was announced by the new 
· 1 12 h . . . 1 counci . T e initia enthusiasm was short lived. Not one 
of the proposed projects had even been started twelve months 
later. Increasing local dissatisfaction was evident in the low 
tax return for the second year; of an estimated £4,437 little 
more than half was actually paid. 13 By the end of the year, two 
important projects supplying four villages with water had been 
completed and the assistant district officer was convinced 
that the council was at last 'on the road to success•: 14 
but the future pattern of bungling management, failure to meet 
tax estimates and reduced works programmes, had already been 
set. 
The council area was extended in 1965 to include 
several villages to the north of the Mekeo formerly known as 
15 the 'Bush Mekeo'. The new constituents responded with 
some enthusiasm at first but were soon discouraged. Less 
than thirty per cent of the works programme for 1965-66 was 
16 
carried out and tax came in very slowly. According to patrol 
11 Mekeo Local Government Council Estimates 1962. 
12 Ibid. 
13 t 14 1962 63 • Mekeo LGC Estimates Bereina Patrol Repor , - • 
1964. 
14 Bereina Patrol Report 12, 1962-63. 
-15 See above: 1. 
~ 
16 Mekeo LGC Advisor's Report, Sept. 1966. 
,. 
officers conducting them, the elections early in al.967 
evidence of a growing 'frustration' amongst voters. 17 
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gave 
A 
number of villages expressed their desire to withdraw from 
18 the council altogether. 
Little attempt was now being made to disguise the 
fact that the council was as great a disaster as earlier 
schemes. In August 1967 local attitudes to the council and 
its financial position were reported to be 'very disturbing' •19 
A tightening of regulations against tax defaulters and an 
effort to improve council management was ordered by the 
, . . t . . 20 . 
aistric commissioner. Tax registers were to be revised, 
all people absent from their villages being recorded to allow 
a more accurate tax estimate. A more realistic works programme 
based on the new tax estimate was to be drawn up, the council 
being duty bound to include in it any project promised but 
:-:cit completed the previous year. Above all, tax collection 
was to be made more efficient, early notification of tax 
?atrols were to be given and penalties imposed on defaulters. 
These measures produced a higher tax return in 1967-68, but 
otherwise no improvement. Once again, many projects were 
2ancelled and achievements for the year were not impressive -
an aid post was built in the North Mekeo, two outboard motors 
were purchased for North Mekee and a gift of $500 waa made 
17 Bereina Patrol Report 8, 1966-67. 
:B Bereina Patrol Report 6, 1966-67. 
1 ') 
20 
Hayes to District commissioner, 4 Aug. 1967, Subdistrict 
Office File 41-7-4. 
District 
Officer, 
commissioner to Regional Local Government 
5 Sept. 1967, subdistrict Office File 41-7-4. 
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to the Beipa mission hospital. The council advisor complained 
of the 'amazing' lack of interest villagers displayed, while 
conceding that this was reinfcrced by a council which had 
'no concrete platform or plans•. 21 
The situation seemed hopeless to field staff and 
headquarters alike. The district commissioner admitted that 
the crux of the matter seemed to lie in the nature of Mekeo 
society itself. He believed that villagers were not interested 
in local government because it offered 'little opportunity for 
monetary gain' and because the councillors' role conflicted 
with that of the chiefs. 22 Not only were councillors faced 
with a complete lack of interest on the part of their fellows, 
they had to work in a society in which there was no community 
co-operation beyond 'the extended family'. The Mekeo's reputed 
'individualism', which in retrospect provided officials with 
a convenient explanation of the misfortunes of the 1950s, 23 
offered a ready made excuse for the council's difficulties. 
It was tempting for officials to overlook their 
own short-comings, and certainly villagers' reactions were 
exasperating at times. Several villages refused to sell land 
for council projects which were to benefit them; one 
village refused a water supply, claiming that underground 
water was 'poisoned': plans for a school had to be cancelled 
when people insisted that the mission should continue to 
21 Mekeo LGC Advisor's Report 1967-68. 
22 District commissioner to Regional Local Government Officer, 
5 Sept. 1967, subdistrict Office File 41-7-4. 
23 See, for example, 'Amendments.to 
Dept. of Territories on the Rice 
DASF File 23-3-2 (J). 
a paper prepared by 
scheme'. l May 1959. 
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take responsibility for education in the area. 24 
Poor business management appears to have been the 
main reason for the council's inability to implement a 
satisfactory works programme. Reluctance to pay the tax on time 
no doubt hampered activities, but lack of funds was not the 
council's main cause of embarrassment. The first year's tax 
was paid in full, yet not one project was completed until the 
end of the second year. Even later, when tax collection was 
becoming difficult, carry over figures from one financial 
year to the next revealed that the council was unable to spend 
the funds it had in hand, let alone the amount it estimated 
it should receive. 25 Some officers attributed inefficiency to 
councillors' over reliance on the advisor but it was unreasonable 
to expect that the councillors, who by Australian standards 
have only a very limited education and little experience of 
council or government procedures, could ensure proper 
management. Constant changing of advisors - as many as five 
different officers filled the position in one year - did not 
h . . 26 elp the situation. The administration must take most of 
the blame for the council's failure to provide taxpayers with 
satisfying community services: villagers clearly have ample 
cause to complain of its record of achievement, though how far 
this has conditioned their negative response is another question. 
Tax payment and management showed 
with the appointment of a permanent advisor 
24 eereina Patrol Report 12, 1963-64. 
some improvement 
in 1968. 27 
25 Hayes to District Commissioner, 4 Aug. 1967, SUbdistrict fi' 
Office File 41-7-4. 
26 --Mekee LGC Advisor's Report 1966. 
27 Bereina Patrol Report 5, 1970-71. 
• • • 
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Council prestige was enhanced by the completion in 1969 of 
the council chambers at Bereina - an impressive complex of 
brick buildings shared with the Kairuku Local Government 
Council. The new advisor took pains to establish friendly 
relations with his councillors and the people of his area; 
his optimism and enthusiasm alone was an improvement on the 
fatalistic view formerly taken, though it perhaps led him to 
confuse his good relations with villagers on a personal 
basis with a change in attitude towards the council in general. 
The SUbdistrict Annual Report for 1970-71 tempered the 
26 
over-confidence of the advisor's reports. 
The council's struggles coincided with a slump in 
the village enterprises which had appeared so promising in the 
early 1960s. Many transport groups were experiencing 
difficulties by the mid-1960s; the expense of maintenance and 
repairs to vehicles often proved prohibitive and 
cases, vehicles were left inoperative for months 
in some 
29 
on end. 
The Inawaia Transport Company, which had earlier enjoyed such 
spectacular success, fell upon hard times (for reasons not 
explained in the reports) and 
. . 1 30 loan only with difficu ty. 
managed to repay its final 
The coffee and cocoa trees 
planted in the late 1950s now stood neglected; copra 
production remained more or less static. 31 Only the betel 
nut trade continued to flourish. The 1965-66 Subdistrict Annual 
Report observed: 
28 Bereina subdistrict Annual Reports 1970-71. 
29 Ibid 1964-65; 1965-66; 1966-67. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
Generally apart from transport organisations 
there is little striving for economic 
development amongst these people.32 
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Despite major road works in 1968 and 1969 which 
linked most of the larger Mekeo villages to Bereina with 
all-weather roads, and the finance for village enterprises 
made available by the opening of the Rural Development Bank, 
the situation had improved little by 1971. Aipeana, a 
village which previously relied on its co-operative tractor 
for transport and had taken little part in the early 
developments, showed the most initiative. Since 1967 several 
transport groups have been formed in Aipeana33 but the most 
surprising development has been a renewed interest in rice as 
a cash crop. A partnership was formed in 1967 between an 
Aipeana transport group and a European to grow rice; fifty 
tons of paddy were produced in 1968 and 120 acres were planted 
34 for the next season. The partnership broke up in late 1969 
but its success was sufficient to prompt others to follow 
its example. Eight groups from Aipeana and one from Beipa 
planted a total of 150 acres of rice in 1970-71. 35 
The future of this new interest is uncertain. One 
of the most serious problems faced by the rice farmers in 
the 1970s, as in the 1950s, is the difficulty of obtaining 
labour. The secure cash income flowing from the betel nut 
trade means that few people are willing or feel the need to 
32 Ibid 1965-66. 
33 See below: 342-51. 
34 Bereina DASF File 23-3-2; Bereina subdistrict Annual 
Reports 1968-69. 
35 Bereina DASF File 23-3-2. 
' ~ 
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work as paid labourers. Until 1971 the problem had been 
partly eased by the Department of Agriculture hiring its 
harvester (used on the experimental station at Bereina) to 
local growers but for some time plans have been underway to 
disband the station and move all heavy agricultural equipment 
36 from the area. Without this assistance the rice farmers 
would be in a very awkward position as they cannot afford to 
buy their own harvesters and, on the basis of past experience, 
a co-operative association of rice farmers seems unlikely to 
be supported by the administration. Up to 1971, all the grain 
had been disposed of locally but the market was already becoming 
saturated and, if the industry continues to expand, marketing 
37 
will become a problem. Unless these difficulties can be 
overcome, the renewed interest in rice is likely to suffer the 
same fate as the rice project of the 1950s. 
Apart from rice planting, the only new activities 
were cattle and pig raising projects sponsored jointly by 
t'.1e Department of Agriculture and the Rural Development Bank. 
The concerted efforts of the council advisor and the rural 
development officer had generated some enthusiasm for these 
projects, which were designed on a small scale and intended to 
be managed 
f ·1 38 
-ami y. 
by an individual farmer assisted by his nuclear 
several villagers had completed farmer training 
courses and inspection tours of similar projects in other parts 
of Papua New Guinea but only a few projects were actually 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 ·1 14 2 5 14 2-4· Bereina Patrol .?.~port Bereina DASF Fi ea - - • - • -
11, 1971-72. 
r 
,. 
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operating by 1971. One Aipeana farmer had received his first 
livestock - ten heifers and a bull loaned by the Department 
of Agriculture - while six other cattle projects in six 
different villages were in preparation. Four pig breeding 
projects had been started in three villages and another 
three were still in preparation. There is a ready local 
market for pigs as villagers prefer to buy pigs, if they can, 
rather than use their own animals for feasts and bride price 
payments; · thouylr"'1n certain circumstances, purchased animals 
are not acceptable. The cattle projects, planned with the 
r 
completion of the highway to Port Moresby in mind, are intended 
\ to provide meat for the town market. Whether the Mekeo 
can adapt to the demands of careful animal husbandry is yet 
~o be seen, for their .treatment of village pigs and other 
livestock is extremely casual; if people are to raise animals 
for sale, they will have to radically change their present 
attitudes to the care and feeding of stock. 
Throughout the 1960s villagers continued to buy 
vehicles; in 1971 they owned 
which only twenty-six were in 
a total of forty-one, of 
. d 39 h t working or er. Te recen 
improvement of roads has meant that trucks and utilities 
are now more efficient means of transport than the tractors 
and trailers which were necessary to negotiate the rough 
~racks of the mid-1960s. Many people are therefore looking 
for new ways to employ their tractors; Aipeana, for example, 
had five tractors in good working order in 1971 which were being 
used mainly on the new rice plots. Lack of proper facilities 
for the maintenance and repair of vehicles, difficulties in 
obtaining spare parts (which often have to be ordered from 
39 Bereina Patrol Report 11, 1971-72. 
l 
I 
I 
I 
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overseas), the ignorance and carelessness of drivers and the 
condition of roads which, though greatly improved, are still 
rough particularly in the wet season, result in vehicles having 
only a short life. Inawabui, for instance, had one truck and 
a tractor in working order in 1971, though at least six other 
vehicles lay around the village, rusting and in pieces. 
Transport businesses provide an important service for their 
communities but, under existing conditions, they are not likely 
to be very profitable ventures. 
The proliferation of small, village retail stores 
also continued during the late 1960s. The average village 
store is a very modest affair, often conducted simply from the 
owner's residence: such ventures have a short life expectancy, 
' but since little outlay is involved, a1 soon as one closes 
another opens. The thirty-eight village stores operating in 
the Mekeo in 1971 had an average stock on hand worth $85 
40 
and a monthly turnover of $72. A few larger stores have been 
started with Rural Development Bank loans and one Eboa villager 
• had opened a large trade store in Bereina, though he was in 
' 
serious financial difficulties by 1971. 
copra 1till ranked second to betel nut as the most 
important ca1h crop but though planting was increasing, 
production had dropped - compared with an estimated 180 tons 
produced in 1961, the 1968-69 total was 164.2 ton1. 41 
Coconuts are, of course, an important it .. of domestic 
consumption: nevertheless the proportion of i111111ature to mature 
trees counted in 1971 - 51,216 to 38,949 - sugge1t1 a cOllllercial 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kairuku subdiitrict Annual Reports 1960-611 Bereina 
DASF Annual Report• 1968-69. 
• 
• 
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interest in the crop over the previou1 five to ieven year1•42 
In 1967-68 the Department of Agriculture counted 6,000 new 
plantings, mostly around the villaqe1 of Beipa and Aipeana. 43 
Since the late 19501, many individual1 and clan group1 have been 
establishing their own 'plantation1' yet little copra ii 
produced, even by individual1 who own 1,000 or more tree1. 
The indifference 1hown to other ca1h crop1 is u1ually 
attributed to the aucce11 of the betel nut trade, which dominates 
the region's economy. A faintly disapproving attitude is adopted 
towards it by the administration, largely because betel nut 
is not an export crop and its 1ucce1a discourages villaqer1 
from exploiting th~ region's potential for other crops. 
Because of the danger of flooding local markets and thu1 
bringing down the price, no attempt has been made to encourage 
villagers to incr~ase plantings or to as1i1t the trade· in any 
way. 44 It seems also that white resident• and officials 
have other leas rational objections to the trade: fir1tly, 
because betel nut can be qr;;.,n, harvested and sold with very 
little effort compared with other crops, it fails to satisfy 
i the ethic of hard work adv&:aieJ by McAUley and others in the 
) 195os45 and still firmly e1poused by many expatriatesr secondly, 
the chewing of betel nut is con1idered to be a harmful, if 
not disgusting, habit, though presumably the cultivation of 
~obacco would not be oppo1ed on these grounds. 
42 Bereina DASF Annual Report• 1970-71. 
43 Ibid 1967-68. 
44 Personal conmunication, Mr J • cooper• DASF Bereina • 
45 See aboves 257, 260-1, 263. 
\ 
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The total volume of the trade, which ia still conducted 
on an individual baaia, i• very difficult to measure accurately. 
some 1eller1 airfreight their produce from Bereina to Port 
Moresby but most ia taken to the coaat and transported by sea 
in locally owned launches and canoes: reliable figures are 
therefore available only for the amount airfreighted. In 
addition to betel nut, some fruit and vegetables are al10 
taken to market. In 1958-59 two ton1 of betel nut and other 
• 
produce were taken by air weekly from 
six tons were taken weekly by iea. 46 
Lereina an1 an estimated 
In 1963-64, 6,000 pounds 
of produce were airfreighted from Bereina each week, while 
an estimated 500 tons left the district annually. 47 A survey 
made 
that 
by the Department of Agriculture in 1967-68 indicated 
48 a total of 600 tons of betel nut was sold that year. 
The growth in the 1ize of Port Moresby over the last twenty 
years, the expanding population of the Mekeo, together with 
improved transport facilitiea in the area, might be expected 
to have increased the volume of the trade but available f igurea 
do not suggest a dramatic increase. The weekly average of 
oroduce airlifted from Bereina in 1~71 - approximately 6,000 
pounas49 - represents a forty per cent increase on the figures 
quoted for 1958-59, but only a marginal increase on the 1963-64 
• figure. The rate of growth, however, may not be accurately 
represented by the amount airfreighted, and estimate• of the 
total taken by 1ea are not •ufficiently accurate to be uaed as 
a firm guide. 
46 Kairuku subdistrict Annual Reports 1958-59. 
47 Bereina subdistrict Annual Reper ts 1963-64. 
48 Bereina DASI' Annual Report• 1967-68. 
49 FiguDea provided by Trans-Auatralian Airlines and Ansett 
Airline• of Papua New Guinea. 
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The 1960s gave little justification for the confidence 
officials had placed in the entrepreneurial akilla of the 
individual Mekeo; over the decade, little if any economic 
?regress was made. Official reports offer no explanation of 
the fact beyond the people's dislike of hard work, the easy 
money provided by betel nut and the indifference to progress 
in general. Indeed, any observer is likely to form much the 
same opinion, whether watching the Mekeo nonchantly boarding 
the plane in Bereina with their loads of betel nut, or driving 
into a village at midday, as the sun bakes the dusty village 
street and the pigs lie motionless in the shade under the 
long, huddled rows of thatched, grey huts, to find a few men 
gossiping and smoking desultorily on the verandas. The slO'<f 
pace of village life, at least at first acquaintance, leaves 
the impression that people are content with their lot and see 
r.o reason to change it. 
AFTER more than a decade of grandiose promises and few results, 
'iillagers listened warily to the administration's proposals 
for a local government council. Unlike many other groups, so 
the Mekee did not welcome it as the first step towards local 
autonomy. Not one informant questioned on the topic referred 
to the council's role in political development nor was this 
often raised in general conversation. Evidently villagers 
regarded local government primarily as another means of achieving 
the social and economic advancement outlined by Cottrell-Dormer 
in 1948; they explained their acceptance of it purely in terma 
of the material benefit• they hoped to receive. A'oae Ufai, 
twice elected as a councillor by Inawi, declared1 
50 For example, the Tolai 
Salisbury 19641 232-3; 
and the people of J<arkar Island1 
Mcswain 19711 281. 
' 
' 
'i 
• 
I thought it would be a good thing to get roads 
and hospitals and schools for the people.51 
Aipeana's councillors shared the same hopes; 
When I stood aa councillor they told me that 
when the people paid their taxes they would 
get water supplies and other things for the 
tax money.52 
The performance of the council was judged on this basis. 
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People were prepared to give the government another 
chance to prove its good intentions: at the same time, they 
had no intention of persevering with a project which i::ore the 
obvious earmarks of earlier failures. When the council had no 
concrete achievements to its credit after twelve months, the 
initial spark of interest quickly died, An Inawi informant 
observed disgustedly: 
The money they collected, I thought that money 
would be used for ua - to help us - but the 
clerks have been stealing the money. We thought 
this money ia going to help us - bu~he people 
who are looking after the money •lie stealing it. 
So how can they help us if they keep on stealing 
the money?53 
Disillusioned by this fresh proof of the government's perfidy, 
villagers wanted no part of the scheme. Lapu Aufe described 
Inawi's reaction: 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Before bringing the council, they told ua it 
would be a good idea - 'It will help moat of you 
in some ways and give you some new ideas', they 
said. When we did get the council, we found 
that nothing was happening. Therefore when the 
next election came, moat people didn't feel like 
having a council in this village. 54 
A'oae Ufai, Inawi: 29 Sept. 1971. 
K.R., Aipeana1 Nov. 1971. 
M.M., Inawi: 5 Oct. 1971. 
Lapu Aufe, Inawi1 1 Oct. 1971. 
• 
• 
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To their dismay, they found the administration waa not going 
to give in on this issue: the council was there to stay 
whether they wanted it or not. The line of passive reaistance 
taken in face of this situation is clearly outlined in 
government reports.SS 
The opinions aired in Aipeana, Inawi and other Mekeo 
villages in 1971 left little doubt that, despite the optimism 
of the council advisor, there had been no improvement in 
local attitudes. Villagers bitterly condemned the council for 
taking their tax and giving them nothing in return. Aipeana 
was one of the first villages to receive a motorized water 
supply, but this was in 1963: 
The work the council does now is seeing that the 
people build new houses and pig fences and clear 
the roads. The water is the only big thing the 
council has done for this village. We got that 
the first year •••• S6 
In a sense, this initial achievement has only served to underline 
the council's subsequent inactivity. For villages like Inawi, 
which had received no water supply or similar service, projecta 
completed in other villages serve as an invidioua comparison: 
In 1962 it started, in 1963-64 Inawaia, Eboa, 
Aipeana and Beipa got water supplies. In 1964 
I was a councillor. I wanted an aid poet for 
this village, but they said we were too cloae to 
Beipa so we didn't need one. Later other village• 
got aid posts and schools and water suppliea. 
Here the water supply ia still not working. Other 
villages have got things but not ua.S7 
55 See above: 313-17. 
56 K.K., Aipeana: 14 Nov. 1971. 
57 A.U., Inawi: 29 Sept. 1971. 
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People claim that the councillors cannot perform 
effectively the tasks formerly carried out by the village 
constables. Young and old alike shared the opinion expressed 
by a former village constable: 
In those days the VC and the councillors kept 
the village clean, the roads clear and got the 
people to build better houses. Now the 
councillors are supposed to do that but time 
has passed and nothing has been done. I don't 
really know what the council is supposed to do 
but it seems that the councillors have nothing 
to do.58 
Whilst villagers deplore the fact that the council is not a 
more forceful institution and blame the administration for its 
lack of achievement, they are well aware that its ineffectualness 
at the village level is the consequence of their own choice 
and actions. Their determination that the council will 
impinge on their lives as little as possible is revealed in 
their choice of representatives, in the limited role they 
allow them and in their attitude to council work. 
One of the first two councillors elected by Aipeana 
succinctly describe~the type of candidates preferred: 
The people iick weak men so they won' t have to 
work. If they pick a strong man and he makes them 
work, they won't pick him again.59 
Most Inawi and Aipeana councillors have been educated, younger 
men who can speak English: three out of the six Aipeana 
councillors elected between 1962 and 1971 (one of whom has 
been re-elected five times) fall into this category, as do 
' Whilst it is six of a total of nine Inawi councillors. 
understandable that these men are considered beat able to deal 
58 I.O., Inawi: 25 Feb. 1971. 
59 K.K., Aipeana: 14 Nov. 1971. 
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with the administration, they are also the men who have least 
influence in their own connunity. Even if he poaaeaaea 
traditional status, the opinion of the educated younq man holds 
little weiqht. The absence of the chiefs from the council ia 
very noticeable after their active participation aa villaqe 
constables and as office bearers in the rural proqrea1 
societies and the co-operativea. 60 Up until 1971, Aipeana had 
elected only two men of important status, neither of them 
chiefs: while Inawi had elected only one younq chief whose 
position is in dispute. Chiefs apparently have not stood as 
candidates and people assert that they would not vote for them 
if they did: 
In the past the Government was at Kairuku. It 
was far away so it needed someone strict to look 
after the village. SO it picked chiefs to be 
vcs - they were hard on the people, they beat 
them and put them in gaol. Now the Government 
is close - also it is for the people to do thinqa 
for themselves so they pick a man who will not be 
too hard on them. 61 
The councillor i1 allowed the functions but denied 
the power of the old village constables. His duty is to see 
:hat the village is kept clean and roads and tracks kept clear. 
one day a week is set aside for 'council work', which is seen 
as no different from the day previously set aside for 'Government 
work': activities are at no time expected to impinqe on village 
60 
61 
See above: 176- 7• senior chiefs, along with commonerai, 
• . in the rural progress aociet ea 
served as off ice bearers . f are said to have always 
and the co-operatives. The c:~~lsthe introduction of the 
supported government policy uhead chief of Inawi, Maino 
council. In particiula1~72~h:igured aa a staunch champion 
Peafuau (who died n ' , nta 
of the administration in informants accou • 
A.U., Inawi1 29 Sept. 1971 • 
• 
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affairs except on the 1et day. Aipeana t d d en e to reqard the 
council day as a re1t from their other pursuits; 1 wai 
instructed to vi1it people on this day or on Sundays as these 
were the times when they were to be found jn the village and 
would be free to talk to me. 
Occa1ionally councillors hold courts and even 
impose fines, though this i1 not strictly in conformity with 
their official 1tatus. Such 'courts' were previously held 
by the village constables and councillors and are now part 
of the expected functions of the local government councillors; 
evidently the chiefe &r6 content to leave these matters to 
62 
them. People cannot be compelled to accept their mediation 
and they can only act when all partie11 involved are willing. 
The councillor's position is neatly shown of 
authority by two circumstances: the office is conferred by 
democratic election, and the successful candidate rarely 
possesses traditional rank or is backed by those who do. A8 
an elected official, he must use circumspectly the power given 
by the government if he wishes to be re-elected. Lacking 
traditional status, he cannot act freely in the knowledge that 
no commoner or man with leaser powers would dare cross him. 
Few councillor• are raoh enough to antagonize men of high 
status. The audacity of one Inawi councillor in daring to 
prosecute a ienior chief of the village for failing to perform 
council work in 1970, icandalized Inawi and surrounding village1. 
A former councillor who took a much feared 1orcerer to court 
in 1967 over a serioui caie of a11ault still live1 in fear 
One Of the f ir1t two councillors elected of the con1equence1. 
62 See aboves 25. 
--------- -------------
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in Inawi gaoled a senior chief renowned for his possession 
of a very powerful magic to cause incurable sores; not 
long afterwards, the councillor' a eon contracted an ulcer 
which spread until his leg had to be amputated. 
r 
Even councillors who attempt to assert their authority 
in more minor matters are quickly put in their place. An 
intelligent and progressive young councillor elected in 1971 
stated, only a few months after coming to office, that he 
despaired of making any impression on people; no matter how 
often he requested things to be done, he was ignored and 
he felt ashamed to expose his weakness by asking yet again. 
Men laughed at him, in a good-natured way, when he warned 
them about illegal gambling in the village, were reluctant 
to attend meetings and took no notice of advice to attend 
important meetings in other villages. With neither the chiefs 
nor the people who elected him behind him, he could achieve 
nothing. Moat councillors stated that though the chiefs 
spoke in favour of the council when it was first introduced, 
they now give it no support whatsoever. 
The negative response to the council - which contrasts 
with villagers' determination to perservere with earlier 
schemes and the chiefs' former role aa ~ctive supporters of 
the government- ia in part the consequence of government 
failures. It has proved the turning point in relations with 
the white regime. Ironically, the ideal of a conununity of 
interests between government and people survived the heavy-
handed paternalism of the pre-war era, only to be abandoned 
at a time when villagers were being given greater responsibility 
for their own affairs. People make no secret of the bitterness 
of their feelings towards an administration which, they bel~eve, • 
'has rewarded their obedience and service with trickery and 
deceit. A middle-aged man stated quietly, but with cutting 
emphasis: 
,, 
Whatever the Government eaye now - I don't 
believe it. 
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The government'• power ie still respected but people avoid 
dealings with it ae much ae possible, believing that they will 
~nevitably be at a disadvantage. They often remark, however, 
that the government ie no longer ae 'hard' on them ae in the 
past, that it now makes very few demands on them and rarely 
intervenes in village affairs, except in cases of violent 
crime: they seem to accept this change ae tacit recognition 
of a new, neutral relationship involving few mutual commitments. 
The Mekee Local Government Council'• inability after 
nine years to function even as a body capable of providing 
useful community services indicates that its problems are more 
deep-seated than those recorded elsewhere. Though many 
difficulties were met when local government was first 
introduced into the Highlands - mainly because of villagers' 
confusion over the nature and procedures of the new institution -
t~ese have been sorted out and people have now adapted 
' l 'l 63 T bl th successfully to the multi-racia counc1 s. rou e on e 
Gazelle Peninsula ete11111ed from a desire for greater political 
Tolai councils have achieved far autonomy, 
1lore than 
never the lees 
64 the Mekee. 
the 
Even if the council's success had not been prejudiced 
· f other government scheme•, it eeeme by the miscarriage o 
unlikely to have gained easy acceptance. Villagers acknowledge 
· gi'ven the choice, they will not elect a man the fact that, if 
Their desire to belittle their capable of asserting himself. 
63 Langness 19637 Reay 1964 and 1970: Brown 19731 95-100. 
64 Salisbury 19641 A.L. Epstein 1969: 256-92. 
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councillors is not merely an attempt to foil the administration, 
they enjoy taking down any man who has airs above his 
station. The very idea of providing a council president 
(or any other elected official) with a fine house, servants, 
private transport and posts for his supporters - as is not 
unconunon in other parts of New Guinea65 - would be offensive 
to the Mekeo, who will not tolerate a conunoner setting himself • 
above his fellows. The1e attitudes extend to national politics. 
A division of votes between two or more Mekeo candidate1 has 
so far prevented the election of a Melceo to the House of 
66 
Assembly. Like many of their countrymen, they are 
sufficiently parochial to prefer a local candidate: 67 yet 
the Mekeo who have stood for election have been unpopular and 
disliked, even in their home villages - because they have been 
comparatively successful businessmen, or simply because they 
aroused jealousy by standing for public office. Villagers' 
intense suspicion and jealousy of ambition is seen even more 
clearly in relation to aspiring business leaders. 
Having rejected the council, and with it the former 
dependence on the government'• guidance, villagers have found 
the way ahead more difficult than they anticipated. In 1971, 
after a decade of experimentation, they felt that the better 
standard of living they had been striving for wa1 as elusive 
d h it an easy matter to set up their as ever: an thoug was 
own businesses, they had found unexpected obstacles looming in 
their way. 
65 
66 
Salisbury 1964: 235. 
Ep tein Parker and Reay 19711 309. The Mekeo were part 
fsth i..Jc Jcamu Electorate in the 1964 election (Ryan ~964); inel968 they became part of the Hiri Open 
Electorate. 
67 Jc and Reay 19711 315-60. Epstein, Par er 
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'l'houqh Aipeana wa• probably the moat economically 
progressive Mekeo villaqe in 1971 and Inawi one of the least 
active, both have followed a •imilar pattern of development. 
Like several other villaqea, 
in the late 1950s to produce 
Inawi beqan to form clan 'clubs' 
copra, build copra drier• and 
68 
open small stores. Some clans used money they had earned 
from rice sales to buy stock for a store: others ct~Vlized 
themselves into workinq parties which could be hired to do 
building or garden work. Rice growers in other villages often 
employed these clubs to help with the harvest and at other busy 
times: they represent an interesting attempt to convert 
services normally exchanqed on a reciprocal basis into cash, 
fulfilling the need for a labour supply larger than could be 
sustained by traditional obligations. 
Four clubs, involving all but one of the important 
clan sections, had been formed in Inawi by the early 1960s. 
Their composition varied but reflected traditional divisions 
and clan alliances. 69 The Gagai Club consisted of two ikupu -
Gagai, an independent clan, and Lalae, a section of Oaiaaka 
clan. The two sections of Ogofoina clan formed the Ogofoina 
Club: the Iso section of Oaisaka started its own separate club 
and three clans - Paisapaisa, Afai and Ipage - combined in 
the Paisapaisa Club. Leadership did not lie in the hands of 
any one clearly identifiable individual: office bearers were 
chosen, in imitation of the co-operative society, but were 
periodically changed. When the clubs began to close, it seemed 
68 
69 
The following account of developments in Inawi i• baaed 
on information provided by the individuals concerned and 
leading members of the clan clubs. 
See diaqram following: 3. 
f 
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ominously significant that the clan section of the senior 
chief of the village had not been involved in any of the 
ventures. 
Disputes hetween members and a quarrel over land 
with another clan led to the disbanding of the Gagai Club in 
the early 1960s. The Ogofoina group survived until 1969, 
when the clan chief, who had charge of the club store, was 
accused of stealing goods and money. Rumours that one of the 
clan leaders had registered the Iso Club's communal copra 
plantation in his son's name led to the suspension of club 
activities in 1971. 
A dramatic series of three deaths associated with 
t,e Paisapaisa Club significantly influenced the present 
attitudes towards business ventt1res. Formed in the early 
l960s, the club made copra and built a hot air drier. After 
the drier had been in operation for a short time, the president's 
/oung daughter died and members reasoned that the clan chiefs, 
who had not joined the club, were angry because the men spent 
:heir leisure time at the copra drier instead of going to the 
~· A new president was elected and shortly afterwards his 
ir.fant son died. Following the death in 1966 of the youngest 
child of the third president, members were convinced that 
:~eir chiefs opposed the club and were too frightened to 
;:>ersist with it. 
Another series of deaths accompanied the attempts 
'.)f an educated young man from Ogofoina clan to start his 
'.)wn busim.ss. Returning to the village in 1968 after several 
i·ears working in Port Morea y, e us . ..,, b h ed his savinna to build 
a European-style house about two miles away from the village 
on the main road to Sere na. _,.,, i ·~-ut a year after he completed 
his house and set up a retail store and a poultry farm, his 
infant daughter died. Despite relatives' insistence that he 
-
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give up his business before worse misfortune befell him, he 
was determined not to give in. some months later his 
paternal uncle died and then hi's father. Now unable to bear 
the social pressures upon him, and burdened by his own 
guilt, the young man abandoned his house and st9re and killed 
all his livestock for his father's funeral feast. 
Another independent businessman, Charlie Maino, 
has experienced similar discouragement. The first Mekeo to 
purchase his own vehicle, Maino featured in government reports 
of the early 1960s as one of the district's most successful 
entrepreneurs. His aAsets in 1964 included two trucks, a 
tractor, farm implements, a motor bike and a store70 - in fact 
these had been bought with savings and did not represent 
profits from hi• busineas ventures. AB a skilled welder, he 
found he could earn better money working away from the village. 
The transport business proved unprofitable because of the 
extremely poor conditions of roads in the early 1960s; he 
tried rice growing and started a small coconut plantation. 
Then in 1966 his youngest brother was lost at sea; the 
village attributed this death also to chiefly retribution. 
Disheartened by his bereavement, Maino neglected his business 
interests for three years. In 1969 he planted four acres of 
rice but difficulty in obtaining land prevented h1m from 
planting the following season. Though improvements to roads 
in the late 1960• had made transport venture• more profitable, 
his vehicles were becoming very old and he found it difficult 
to keep them running. 
Since the lat• 1950• numerous B111all stores have been 
started by individual• or groups, and have failed. Usually 
70 Bereina ~bdistrict Annual Repcrt• 1964-65 
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boasting only a few dollar1 worth of 1tock, they are brought 
to an untimely end by mi1management and the 1emand1 or 
dishonesty of relative1. TWo privately owned 1tore1 were 
operating in 1971, both larger than the average Mekeo village 
store. Charlie Maino's store i1 now owned by several •hare 
shareholders from two clan1; it1 1tock was comparable to the 
co-operative store and turnover in 1971 wa1 $90o. 71 The other 
store, owned by two prominent familie1 of the 1enior 1ection 
of Oaisaka and started in 1967, had a turnover of $1,20o. 72 
By 1971 all the clan clubs had clo1ed, there wa1 
not one copra drier operating, only two of the many 1mall 
stores had survived, no new entrepreneurs had establi1hed 
~hemselves, and the village'• one tran1port busines1 limped 
along, maintained largely by the owner's dogged per1everance. 
If some people were content with the situation, they were a 
~inority - intrigue and discontent underlay the outward 
indifference to economic development. 
Though little is said openly, the matter i1 heatedly 
c'ebated in private. Villager• are convinced that their 
· ff or ts to achieve a better way of life for themselve1 and 
'heir children are being deliberately thwarted. Every attempt 
~o start a busine1s venture in Inawi ha1 ended not only in 
failure, but in perional tragedy for tho1e concerned. The 
reason, people confide, i1 plain - the chief1 oppo1e the new 
jevelopments and punish through 1orcery any man who trie1 to 
go against them. Even the moat ambitiou1 man ii held back by 
conviction that he 
children. It mu1t 
may endanger the lives of his wife 
be 1tre11ed that the1e fear• are very 
71 Bereina Patrol Report 11, 1970-71. 
72 Ibid. 
1 
" 
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real and very intense, and that they influence even the 
best educated and moat proqre11ive members of the community. 
No matter whether the chiefs deny the accusations made 
against them or •imply remain silent, commoners are convinced 
they are concealing their real intention - to prevent 
commoners from usurping their position of privilege and 
authority. Economic proqre11 in itself ie not opposed; the 
lopia want to control the new developments just as they 
controlled the traditional sources of wealth. One of the 
leaders of the ill-fated Paisapaisa Clu~ a commoner, reasoned 1 
Anyone who has tried to have a business in this 
village has failed. Everyone is expecting the 
chief to lead his clan people. ·If the chief says 
' I want every one of nv people to have so much 
money to share with me and we will start a 
business' - then the people will be willing, but 
an ordinary man can't start a business with the 
rest of the people.73 
No such fears and anxieties are associated with the 
betel nut trade or with the production of small quantities 
cf sun dried copra: these are activities in which everyone 
'.a:..es part an w ic o no d h . h d t set one man apart from the rest. 
V.ost Inawi households made some copra in 1971, drying the 
·:0conu t meat on the veran as o e d f th l·r houses and selling it 
a few pounds at a time to the village co-operative society. 
' estimate that the average income per household for the 
j'ear was less than $20; only two families, one of which 74 
~ade $100 and the other $120, earned more than $30 from copra. \ 
d With the copra purchases recorded These estimates correspon 
73 °A.u., Inawi1 15 Apr. 1971. 
74 Figures baaed on 1971 household ceneue. 
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by the Inawi co-operative aociety. 75 Not one hot air drier• 
was operating in 19;~ or 1971. Yet several families possess 
over 500 trees each and many people stated that they are 
establishing coconut 'plantations' as a aource of future 
wealth for their children - an attitude which presumably 
reflecta the emphasis the administration has put on copra 
production. At the present price of four cents a pound, 77 
copra does not compare favourably with betel nut as a cash 
crop and it is not surprising that villagers do not care to 
produce more copra, even though they possess the resources 
to do so. Moreover, production on a larger scale and the•uae 
of hot air driers is associated with the aeries of deaths 
occurring in the mid-1960a among the members of the Paiaapaiaa 
Club; such activities constitute 'business', while the 
Taking of a few pounds of copra per year by an individual 
family does not. 
The betel nut trade, like small-scale copra production, 
is carried out on the basis of the individual family and is 
Tore or leas regarded as an extension of subsistence activities. 
Each household harvests and markets the crop itself. A man 
• Tay undertake to sell a bag of betel nut for a relative, along 
·,.1th his own produce, and in some cases families have relativea 
:1ving in town who sell produce for them: but the usual 
practice is for each man (or his wife) to travel to Port 
k every day until his nut is aold. ~Gresby and to attend mar et 
75 
76 
77 
Subdistrict Office, Co-operative rilea record that the 
Inawi co-operative aociety purchaaed $1,237 worth of 
copra in 1969-70. 
Five houaeholda poaaessed over 1,000 trees. 
The price in 
Co-operative 
i to SUbdiatrict Office, 1971, accord ng 
Piles. 
•• 
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sometimes husband, wife and children make the trip together, 
though more often, becau•e of the difficulty of finding 
acconunodation in town and the necessity to leave someone in 
the village to attend to gardens and livestock, husband and 
wife take turns. The average Inawi family makes two to three 
visits to Port Moresby a year to sell betel nut. Undoubtedly 
villagers, in particular the hard-working women, enjoy the 
break from domestic drudgery and the excitement of shopping 
sprees in town. 
In addition to betel nut, other garden produce is 
sold - mainly bananas, taro and some seasonal fruits such 
as pineapples. Inawi people usually take roughly equal 
quantities of betel nut and fruit and vegetables when they 
go to town. The food itemi;-"which command much lower prices 
oer unit weight and volume than betel nut, help feed the 
seller and his family while in town or else a substantial 
amo'Jnt is presented as an obligatory gift to the family 
providing him wit accommo a J · · h d ti' on the remainder is sold at 
:rdrket, usually bringing enough cash to meet the coats of 
fa1es and freight for the trip. 
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In 1971 the average income earned by an Inawi 
household from betel nut was $308. 78 Of a total of 108 
families, eleven earned from $500 to $1,000 and five earned 
over $1,000. Ten families made leas than $100 and two 
families derived no income at all from betel nut. All 
those families earning less than $100 were either disabled 
by sickness or old age or consisted of a widow confined 
to her house for mourning and Her children. Income from 
the trade is thus fairly evenly distributed throughout the 
village. Since it is a traditional crop, everyone has his 
own trees and is familiar with the techniques of cultivation 
and harvesting. Though the chiefs formerly imposed taboos 
on betel nut to ensure sufficient quantities for feasts, 
~hese testrictions are no longer applied and no rights are 
claimed over its sale. The desires and energies of each 
family are the main factors which determine their income. 79 
People tend to regard the trade not so much as an enterprise 
from which they should earn as much as possible, but rather 
78 
79 
Information concerning the betel nut trade was collected 
as part of the 1971 household census. The head ol each 
nuclear family (husband, wife and children or widow and 
children) was asked how many times a year he (or she) 
visited Port Moresby and how many bags of produce he took 
with him each time. Proceeds from the sale of betel nut 
were regarded as clear profit, while proceeds from the 
sale of food items were estimated to cover the expenses 
of the journey _ the coat of fares for one seller and 
several bags of produce was approximately $60 in 1971 
(cf. Patrol Report 11, 1970-71). 
owns. 
Appendix II demonstrates that income has little 
relationship to the number of trees a household 
Very few people appear to be planting betel nut on 
any large scale. 
' t 
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as a u•eful re•ource which will provide for th i 
BO e r ca•h 
needs a• they occur. People make trip• to Port Moresby 
when they need cash for a particular purpose - for a feast, 
a bride price, clothe• and books for school chi.'ld ren. 
This is one reason why there is a great concentration of 
sellers in town in December when people need ca•h for the 
coming Christmas and New Year festivities and to prepare 
their children for the new school year. 
No one fear• any evil consequences from selling 
betel to earn cash: every family participates in the trade 
to satisfy its ca•h needs just as it produces its own food. 
A certain accepted level of cash needs exists - each family 
needs money for clothes, tobacco, tea, sugar and occasional 
food items, kero•ene for lamps, cooking utensil•, knives and 
simple tool•. Many families have an income which is more 
than sufficient to meet the•e comparatively mode•t needs, yet 
there is no sign of the fact in the clothe• they wear, the 
food they eat or the hou•es in which they live. There is 
no visible difference in the standard of living of families 
earning over $1,000 and tho•e earning le•s than $100. Many 
Inawi families cou!a afford to build more sturdily con•tructed 
and more comfortable hou•!• - fear, not indifference, prevent• 
them from doing •o. over the la•t decade, each of the few 
families which have built house• with galvanized iron roofs 
in place of the traditional thatch ha• •uffered a death 
shortly afterward•. Once again the chief• are blamed. Since 
the lopia have traditional right• to •pecial building material• 
BO A8 T.s. lp•tein (1970 1 23) ob•erve•, d•and in Port More•by 
for betel nut and food produce greatly exceed• the •upply. 
Though mo•t Mekee hou•ehold• could produce llK>re produce 
to meet thi• demand, th8y did not attempt to do •o. 
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and styles, a COlllllOner who builds h' lf h imae a ouae with an 
iron roof or other European materials is considered to 
challenging the chief's pre-eminence, Any COllUllOner who 
be 
attempts to distinguish himself in any way is thought to 
risk provoking the chief's jealousy. It is obvious, however, 
that people avoid conspicuous behaviour as much out of fear 
of their neighbours as of their chief. Each household 
watches the other, ready to condemn the first sign of 
ostentittion. In blaming the chiefs for opposing business 
enterprises and progress, the people of Inawi project their 
own resentment of the man who attempts to set himself above 
his fellows: and in doing so they have unconsciously erected 
a barrier which will be very difficult to overcome. 
Development 
1 . A' 81 sea e in ipeana. 
has come later and on a more ambitious 
In 1965 two groups began saving to buy 
their own tractor: four years later five new tractors and 
one second-hand tractor had been bought by four clubs and one 
individual businessman. From 1958 until 1965 the co-operative 
society tractor provided the village with a transport service: 
when it broke down in 1965 and spare parts could not be 
obtained, Aipeana was left dependent on the tractor owned by 
Inawi businessman, Charlie Maino. The idea to start a tractor 
club was born when the Inawi tractor failed to arrive to take 
t~ Aipeana women and their produce to the weekly market held 
at Bereina. Furious that they would have to carry their heavy 
loads of vegetables the ten miles to Bereina, the women 
decided on the spot to form a club to buy their own tractor. 
81 The following account of recent developments in Aipeana 
is based on interview• with the business and club leaders. 
Details they gave of finance, loans and the areas of 
l t d ld ..._ checked against SUbdistrict Office crops p an e cou ..,. 
and DASF files. 
--------------------------------------------------------------.-
t 
( 
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Originally the other tractor club 1 . • were a ao started with 
the intention of conductinn trana t bu i ~ por • neaaea. 
clubs 
Both the leader1hip and compo1ition of the Aipeana 
differed from thoae of Inawi. In each caae, the group 
centred around an easily identifiable leader or leaders. 
Membership waa not determined by simple clan affiliation but 
by multi-lateral ties with an individual leader: maternal 
and affinal as well aa agnatic relatives were included, 
spreading membership acro11 several clan1• The first of 
these ventures, the Women' a Club, was the moat truly communal: 
all the married women in the village participated and 
contributed towards buying the tractor. When the club 
finally broke up, no one person was considered 'to have any 
real right to the tractor, which was finally appropriated 
by the husband (a powerful sorcerer) of the president of 
• the club and used for more than two years to run a private 
business. 
The other clubs gathered around leaders who initiated 
the venture and who have been left in control of the club 
vehicle when the group breaks up, aa it inevitably doe1. 
Shortly after the Women'• Club was formed, a prominent man 
from the Iso section of Aivea ikupu, Kalama Kape, in partner1hip 
with his clo1e friend and affinal relative, Simon Imamaiva, 
decided to start a fund to buy a tractor. Kalama, Imamaiva 
and their cloae relatives formed the core of the group and 
are said to have made the large1t contribution1. A number 
of other member• were drawn from several clans in Aipeana and 
a few distant relative• of the leader• from t1110 other villaqe1 
also contributed money. When the club wa1 abandoned in 1969, 
Kalama took the 1econd-hand tractor belonging to it for hi1 
own u1e 
Despite 
and Imamaiva wai left in po11e11ion of the new tractor. 
much bitt~ne•• and complaint over the 1ituation, the 
other members were left with nothing. 
f 
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The importance of the leaders' personalities in the 
formation of clubs is indicated by the fact that not all the 
people from Kalama'• admittedly very large clan section 
joined his group and that another club was 
started in the 
same clan section. A former employee of the Department of 
Agriculture, Fagau Maino, who had been given a medical 
retirement, believed he was to recei've · · compensation in a 
lump sum and planned to use the money to buy a tractor. 
He persuaded several men from his own clan to form a separate 
club and a number of people from other clans joined them. 
When the group, which called itself the Iso club, disbanded, 
Fagau and his half-brother were left in control of the 
tractor. 
The third club was started by Oaego Apau, a prominent 
sorcerer of Apagoa ikupu. Himself, his two adult sons, his 
brother and brother-in-law contributed most of the money and 
smaller sum8 were given by several other Apagoa clansmen. 
Following the pattern established by the other clubs, the 
vehicle purchased by this group is now regarded as Oaego's 
personal property. 
In contrast to Inawi, most of the Aipeana business 
leaders also have important traditional status or are backed 
by close relatives of high status. Kalama'• exact status is 
not clear: he is called lopia eke by many people, though his 
genealogical position in the clan suggest• that he is merely 
lopia akina, the younger brother of a chief. Imamaiva's father 
was a sorcerer and his father'• brother, who is now the head 
sorcerer of Meauni clan, is said to support Imamaiva. Oaego 
Apau is the uquaqa lopia or head sorcerer of Apagoa clan. 
Simon Aluofo, an individual businesPl&n, i• the younger 
brother of the chief of Meauni clan and the paternal nephew 
of a renowned sorcerer of the same clan• ragau Maino has no 
... ____________ ------ _______________ ..... 
j 
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traditional 1tatu1 but wa1 able to th 
1ecure e 1uppcrt of Alto 
Fafine, the loeia eke of hi1 clan section. Even in the caie 
of the Women' a Club, the offi be 
ce arera were wive1 of chiefs 
and other important men, mo1tly of Inawefae clan. 
The four clubs have followed much the same pattern. 
Each was able to raise sufficient initial capital to secure 
a bank loan within a comparatively 1hort time - u1ually leis 
than twelve months. Sometimes the group1 worked coanunally, 
as in the case of the Women's Club, producing copra for sale; 
but in general, money was raised by members making cash 
contributions to the club fund on an individual baai1. Thia 
is described as 'paying shares' to the club, in imitation of 
the village co-operative society. In fact, the so-called 
·~hares' merely represent donations to the club Ii.nee no system 
has !:w>~n devised of dividing profits in accordance with the 
investment made by each member. Members usually raised their 
contributions by selling betel nut and copra. 
Initiating a club and raising money for a particular 
purpose seem to pose no problems, and the wealth of the 
region, particularly in betel nut, means that large auma can 
be quickly amassed by fairly small groups of people. Problems 
develop when the tractor ia obtained and members begin to 
wonder whether they are going to receive any return from the 
venture. They become 1uspicioua of the leaders when no profits 
are forthcoming; quarrels break out and the group filially 
splits up, leaving the leader in possession of the club's 
assets. The Inawi club1, though on a smaller and lea1 
i il fate three out of four ambitious scale, suffered a 1 m ar : 
groups were cloied becauie of 1uspicion of the leader• and 
resultant quarrel• among the member1. 
Only one 
worked on hi1 own 
Aipeana bu1ine11111an, Simon Aluofo, has 
to buy a tractor. A well educated ffilft'I now 
( 
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in his mid-thirties, Aluofo decided to .•tart .1is own 
business in 1963, when he was forced to · · 
resign as secretary 
of the Aipeana co-operative. He raised sufficient money to 
open a small store by selling copra and l>fitel nut1 later 
he began to charter planes to transport his stock from 
Port Moresby to Bereina, making a handsome profit by 
backloading planes with sellers taking produce to Port 
Moresby. Though he was eventually forced to close his 
store, 
partly because of mismanagement on the part of close relatives. 
he had saYed enough capital to obtain a loan to purchase 
a tractor in 1969. Since acquiring the tractor, he has 
grown sweet potatoes and rice commercially, and was able to 
pay off his loan quickly. He planted fifty acres of rice 
in the 1970-71 season. 
Though only this one businessman started 
independently, the closing of the tractor clubs has left 
several men working on their own. In 1971 Kalama and Imamaiva 
were working independently, each on his own rice farm. 
Fagau and his brother were planting rice, as was Oaego Apau. 
Individual farmers were being encouraged by the Department 
of Agriculture to start cattle and pig raising projects. 
Several individuals were establishing small coconut plantations. 
The road of economic progress has been far from 
smooth for Aipeana: and though individuals appear to have 
had more success, and current trends indicate that future 
development will be in this direction, it is evident that the 
Aipeana busines8lllall, like his counterpart in Inawi, faces 
severe obstacles which not only limit his activities but 
which could make them impossible. Difficulty in obtaining 
land and labour are two important practical problems1 more 
intangible but perhaps even more significant, is the envy 
of fellow villagers and the social pressures it creates. I 
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Though there ia no lack of rich, arable land, 
the individual wiahing to engage in cash cropping is hampered 
by the system of land tenure. 82 Aipeana businessmen have 
manipulated both maternal and agnatic ties in attempts to 
obtain the use of more land, and at least one has iucceaifully 
appealed to rights which are not based on kinship. In 1971 
Aluofo had planted rice on aeveral acres of land belonging 
to Afai clan which had been lent to him in recognition of 
Afai' s debt to Aluofo' 1 forebears, the chiefs of Meauni clan, 
who had given land to Afai on which to build hou1e1 when the 
group settled in Aipeana seventy or more years ago. Most 
people, however, 1ay that they find it difficult to persuade 
even kin to lend them land. Jealousy i1 said to be the 
cause: people do not like to see even their own relatives 
using their land to make a profit. Even the most powerful 
men, who might well be considered too dangerous to refuse, 
complain that their activities have been curtailed becauae 
they could not obtain more land. 
The individual also ha1 problems in securing 
sufficient labour if he needs more a11istance than can be 
provided by hi1 immediate family. He can call upon hi1 
clansmen, relatives and friends to form a work party but he 
must feed them well w e e wo ~ hil th rk ii in Pronre11, and when 
the task ii completed he must kill pigs and hold a small 
feast. Not only is this 
means of securing help: 
expensive, it i1 
many will attend 
also an unreliable 
to go11ip and 
enjoy the free hospitality, a few will work. Envy of the 
man who is 'making good' creates unwillingness to a11i1t 
him. One Aipeana entrepreneur attempted to ensure a supply 
.everal f amilie• to make their gardens of labour by allowing 
82 See above: 36-7. 
• 
• 
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in the area he cleared for rice the previous season. 
Villagers from both Aipeana and Beipa accepted his offer and 
in return assisted him with the 
current rice crop. Another 
rice farmer regularly hired women's clubs from coastal 
villages to weed and harvest his crop. In respect to both 
land and labour, the group enterprise obviously has an 
advantage over the individual. 
There have been no deaths associated with the recent 
developments in Aipeana: nevertheless the aspiring businessman 
is acutely aware of working in a P:Otentially explosive 
situation. He well knows that his success arouses the envy 
of others, particularly the chiefs; he takes pains to avoid 
infringing the chiefs' traditional rights or neglecting in any 
way his duties to them. This applies, no leas, to holders of 
traditional status. A number of people starting rice farms 
or cattle projects had built temporary houses at the site and 
spent moat of their time away from the village; they are quick 
to insist that their permanent dwellings remain in the 
village and that they have built only temporary shelters 
on their farms. Chiefs are opposed to their clansmen living 
away from the village for a number of obvious reasons. 
The family concerned is removed from the chief's direct 
control and supervision and he suspects that the head of the 
family may intend to set himself apart from his authority. 
He further suspects that the family will ignore his rights 
to certain fish and game. Perhaps more importantly, the 
chief knows that he will lose control over the family's 
labour and resources. People who spenci much of their time 
away from the village are conscious of the need to allay such 
suspicions. An Aipeana entrepreneur, who himself has 
traditional status, explained the precautions he must take: 
The chiefs do not mind the people moving aw:y 
from the village as long as they return to o 
the chiefa' work - ipa gava work and every death 
mu at be taken to the chief• The chief a will be 
very angry if even a tiny baby ia buried away 
fran t~e village, Alao in the caae of a wild bo~r with tuaka - thia llUat be taken to the 
ch1efa. If they hear you have killed one and 
eaten it youraelf they will be very angry, 
Alao the other thinga I have mentioned 
Ccaaaowary egga and certain typea of fiahl muat 
be taken to the chiefa firat. Even if I am in 
the middle of ploughing my fiele and the chief 
calla me to go to the village and help him with 
his feaat, I will atop my work and go, 
The people muat keep the chiefa happy. If the 
chief wanta to build a new house, then all the 
people will buy at leaat one sheet of iron and 
give it to the chief, Then when his house is 
finished he will aay, 'You are very good, my 
people, to help me make auch a good house, ao now 
you should build yourselves good houses.' The 
chiefs have no rights over iron because that waa 
made by Europeana - they only have the right to 
,!!.! and opogo. But if a peraon builds a tin 
house, he ahould kill a pig for the chiefs to have 
and then they will be happy.Bl 
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Many Aipeana people claim that the chiefa are not againat them 
starting busineaaes; othera say they are not really aure 
what 'is in the chiefa' minda'. According to one entrepreneurs 
In thia village aome chiefa are for busineaa and 
some are againat.... In thia village we might 
be frightened to start businesses because some 
one will die but if we don't, we will die any way. 
If we ait doing nothing, we will have nothing, ao
84 we must try to work like !uropeana to get money. 
The uncertainty in people'• minda is clearly revealed 
in the neceaaity felt to reapect the chiefs' traditional 
rights, An educated, young man aciaitted1 
83 S.I., Aipeana1 23 lloV. 1971. 
84 J<.JC., Aipeana 1 19 Oct. 1971. 
t 
t 
.. ~ ,, 
' 
I don't like the chief1 keeping the1e thing1 for them1elve1 but •till I mn frightened of it.85 
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It is al10 indicated in the belief that it ii e11ential to 
'keep the chief happy• • People might"claim that the chief1 
have no.right• over 1uch things as iron roofs and money, 
nevertheles1 they recC>alllend that commoners should fir1t build 
their chief a hou1e with an iron roof before thinking of 
their own. Another bu1ine11111an, who is also a clan chief, 
insisted that the Aipeana chiefs do not oppose any one who 
wishes to get ahead, iamlediately adding the following condition1 
After •tarting hi1 work, he [the bu1ines1manl may 
feel like making a fea1t for the chiefs to come 
and 1it with him becau1e he has started a job in 
the villaqe.86 
The Aipeana entrepreneur, whatever his own rank and power, 
realize• that hi1 po1ition i1 a delicate one and that 1ucce11 
largely hinge1 upon hi1 ability to avoid any rivalry or 
direct confrontation with the lopia. lie attempt• to find 
ways to placate them, in the hope that they will tolerate 
those aspect1 of hi1 role which fit unea1ily into the 
traditional 1y1tem1 
It is alright for u1 to live away from the village 
and grow a lot of food and rice and make 11e>ney 
but when the chief come• and a1k1 for help for hi1 
feait I muit give a lot of food - more than any 
one ei1e. Then the chief will 1ay, "l'hi1 man i1 
doing qood work, 10 here i1 ple3~y of food for my 
fea1t. ~ Then he will be happy. 
Chi.fl are feared - entrepreneur• are Not only the 
equally afraid of the jealou1y of their fellow villager• 
85 S.A., Aipeana1 14 Nov. 1971. 
86 o.A., Aipeana1 16 Oct. 1971 • 
87 S.I., Aipeana1 23 lov. 1971. 
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including their cloae frienda and relati ., 
vea, ft4peana people 
say that poiaoning ia now even 1110re c---- t~-
...... ..,n nan aorcery •• 
it haa the advantage that any one can uae it without any 
special training or knowledge. Battery acid ia aaid to be 
commonly employed. The aucceaaful buaineaaman ia therefore 
very wary of whoae hoapitality he accepta 1 
••• everyone at Aipeana is frightened to go at night 
and eat and drink at other people's placea. They 
are all warned againat it, Usually the peraon 
will be killed by a cloae friend as he ia the only 
one he would be likely to eat or drink with. 88 
Another buaineemnan believed that a severe illneaa he had 
suffered recently had been cauaed through aorcery by hia 
;: close relatives who were envioua of hia achievementa: 
I am the only one in thia village who haa had 
trouble becauae of buaineaa. They don't worry about 
about the man who juat haa a amall trade atore or 
is starting some little business but only the one 
who ia 8~eally making a lot of 1110ney and ia getting ahead. 
The opinions expressed by the Aipeana entrepreneurs -
all those quoted are men of traditional atatua or are backed 
by powerful relatives - reveal the uncertainty and danger of 
the role they are attempting to play. In terms of facts and 
figures, the number of vehicles owned, the variety of new 
projects being started, Aipeana preaenta a comparatively 
f d 1 ent ye t it ia only necessary impressive picture o eve opn • 
to scratch the surface to aee that the difference betw.en 
Aipeana and Inawi ia far from being aa great aa it aeema. 
In both connunitiea th• .... tensions, fear• and preaaurea 
BB S.A., Aipeana1 14 Nov. 1971. 
B9 Ibid, 
3~ 
surround !1lropean-atyle enterpriae1; 
the hiatory of bu1ine11 •• 
ventures over the laat decade reveals the existence of a 
complex web of aocial pre11urea which conatricta and threatens •-
to strangle the development which villagers themselves desire. 
• 
• 
• 
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CHAJITn BIGHT 
'1'HE OBSTACUS TO DIVILOPMENTa 'Thinga 
a 11'ttle better now but • • • •• 
are 
STUDIES publiahed over the laat two decades of economic and 
social change in New Guinea have on the whole presented a 
• highly optimistic picture of the adaptibility of Melanesian 
. . 1 R 
societies. ecent studiea by Finney and Brown of the 
Highlands, and by Saliabury and Epstein of the Gazelle 
Peninsula, 
2 
emphasize the ways in which traditional institutiona 
and values have assisted change. The only shadows on this 
otherwise bright horizon are the regiona where development ia 
hampered by recurrent cargo cults. 3 Lawrence and Meggitt 
maintain that a basically different orientation prediapoaea 
the 'religioua-minded' coaatal aocietiea to cultiam, while 
the 'relatively aecular-minded' Highlandera eachew ritual in 
4 favour of more practical meana of obtaining the new wealth. 
Finney arguea that the variation in development between the 
. ' 
1 Belshaw'• In Search of Wealth, publiahed in 1955, and 
Mead's New Lives for Old, publiahed the following year, 
appear to have initiated the trend. Moat aubaequent 
studies have been of aocietiea which have experienced 
rapid developnent, it ia not aurpriaing, therefore, that 
the trend haa continued. Yet, as Finney (1973: 124) 
points out, the stereotype of an economically backward 
New Guinea r•aina 'generally true'· 
2 Finney 1973i Brown 1973i Saliabury 1970; A.L. Bpatein 1969. 
3 
4 
Mcswain (1971) challenge• the optimiatic view exprebaaetd t-A 
t ti g how cargoiam haa o a rue ..... by other acholara, d .. ona ra n 
development on J<arkar Ialand. 
Lawrence and Megg,itt 19651 5-25 • 
J 
• 
,j 
• 
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coast and the Highlanda can be better expl i d b h 
• ne y t e nature 
of European contact, the effectiveneaa of 
government aid and 
the natural reaourcea available 5 The Mekeo' i 
• • exper ence 
adds a further epiaode to thia debate, providing little 
support for either eide. Many of the preeent obetaclea 
to development clearly lie within Mekeo eociety iteelf, but 
these are not the reault of cargo cult thinking: and though 
the Mekeo might be conaidered a claeeic caee of a eociety 
whose initiative had been broken by stultifying government 
policies, in fact people are eager for advancement. 
The Mekeo, no leae than the Gorokane, the Chimbu and 
the Tolai, aapire to the 'better way' of life they eee around 
them, particularly in the towne. In the early 1960• it eeemed 
that they were on the brink of a new stage of economic 
development yet they have bfen unable to move beyond what 
6 Epstein terms the 'inveatment trial period'. Like other 
7 ~ew Guineans, the Mekeo lack bueineee ekills and experience, 
but this inadequacy hae been only one of many difficultiea. 
~o simple single formula can be given to explain the probleme 
encountered over the laet decade. The nature of Mekeo society, 
the modifications it hae undergone eince the war, relations 
~ith the white regime, have all combined to create the preaent 
situation, and to form the attitude• which will influence the 
immediate future. 
Traditional Valuea and Social Cleavaqea 
While arguing that moet New Guinea eocietiee are 
'pre-adapted' for economic change, Finney adde that the 
5 Finney 1973. 
6 T.s. Bpetein 19701 171 19681 45-8. 
7 Ibid, 
{ 
• 
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response of •ocfietie• po••e••inq hereditary 
an 'open que•t:llbn•. 8 
leader•hip remain• 
Clearly many of the ob•tacle• encountered 
by aspirinq Mekeo bu•ine•• and political leader• ~ve been 
created by the •ocial value• a••ociatetl with a •Ystem of 
strictly ascribed •tatu•: others are produced by the 
ambivalence underlyinq kin relationship• and the concept of 
authority • 
• ,, The aaninistration's claim that the Mekeo's 
'individualism' is the main stumblinq-block to proqress 
obscures rather than explains the situation. Far from 
experiencinq unqualified success, individual enterpri•e• 
have encountered pressures from all sides. The businessman's 
role conflicts with the important social premises that each 
individual has equal opportunity to satisfy his material needs 
and that rank and privileqe are conferred only by birth. 
The ambitious, acquisitive man who attempts to set himself 
above the rest offend• all sense of dignity and propriety: 
sorcery provides a most effective way of dealinq with his 
anti-social behaviour. At the first siqn of illness or 
misfortune, he will tind a •tream of solicitous vi•itor• at 
his door, each confidentially aclvisinq him that some important 
chief or sorcerer oppo•es hi• activitie• and that it would 
be best to abandon them before •eriou• trouble befalls him 
or his family. The an~iety built up by the•e in•idiou• 
be · tolerable Thouqh the entrepreneur pressures soon come• in • 
who has traditional statu• i• in a lea• vulnerable po•ition 
than the commoner, he i• by no means shielded completely as 
d by the ••peana business leaders reveal. the fears expresse ..... 
8 Finney 19731 187. 
356 
The local government councillor meeta little 
opposition providing he accepta the very limited role 
aacribed 
to him. The ambitioua councillor, on the other hand, or the 
man who conteata higher political office, ia likely to arouae 
the anger of his community. Like the buaineaaman, he flouts 
the convention that authority is the prerogative of birth 
and he becanea the victim of similar p:eaaurea. By their 
own admiaaion, villagers uae the system of democratic election 
to control ambition, deliberately selecting docile officials 
who will not attempt to capitalize on their position. In 
areas like the Gazelle Peninaula, praninent men have refuaed 
to stand as councillors, diamiasing its functions .. beneath 
their dignity, 
9 
but there seem to be no recorded ex1mpleaof 
New Guineans intentionally selecting ineffectual candidate• 
when more able men stood for election. studies of the Houae 
of Assembly elections have been based on the assumption that 
the successful candidate was regarded by electors •• the 
10 
man best able to represent them. In the Mekeo caae, auch an 
assumption could be misleading: they are likely to prefer 
the man whom they feel ia the least enterprising, and therefore 
the least dangerous. 
While thia reaponse can be partly attributed to a 
cesire to give as little power as poaaible to the adminiatration, 
it is also apparent that elective authority lacks any real 
legitimacy in traditional terma. 11 Authority is not aomething 
which can be conferred by the simple volition of one'• fellowa 
9 Salisbury 19641 232-3. 
lo Epstein, Parker and Reay 19711 8. 
11 See above: 12-18. 
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since it depend• on the po'9 i 
••• on of •upernatural power8 , 
Whatever poeition the councillor8 and other elected official• 
may have, they gain through the """--r of the 
9 r-"~ overnment, not 
by virtue of the people'• choice which in iteelf can confer 
nothing, 
Providing the leadere have traditional statue, 
group enterprises do not offend the social ethic; they 
break up because of internal pressures. The pattern they 
follow is already familiar from responses to government 
projects: ignorance of business principles give rise to 
suspicions that members of the group are not receiving a fair 
share of the profits and finally the venture is abandoned 
amidst quarrel:Jlng and intrigue, Finney observes that 
Gorokan entrepreneurs also feel threatened by jealousy and 
that their activities may be hampered by the necessity to 
appease their supporters. 12 The Gorokan situation, however, 
seems far less tense and critical than the Mekeo, where 
business leaders are never able to retain support for long. 
The Mekeo's intense suepicion and jealousy of each other 
and of their leaders - whether these be government officers, 
elected officiale, conunonere or chiefs - reflect the 
ambivalence underlying the traditional concept of authority 
and existing in moet eocial relationehips. 
The careful divieion of authority into its benevolent 
and destructive aepects13 reveals an acute awareness of the 
dangerous potential of political power. The eenior chief 
acts as a safeguard againet the mieuee of authority, controlling 
the holders of deetructive powers: yet in order to enforce 
12 Finney 1973: lllff, 
13 See above: 16, 18, 54-6. 
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• 
his will on the war chief• and the aorcerera, he muat have 
coercive powera of hia own, Thia apparent contradiction in 
his role is disguiaed by the aecrecy aurrounding the real 
nature of his powera and the emphaaia laid on hia benevolent 
nature. The only limit on his power, in fact, ia his moral 
obligation to his people: though this obligation ia more 
compelling that it at first appears. The ideal concept of 
chieftainship provides a standard by which cOlllllOners can 
judge the chiefs. Aa long as a chief's actions do not stray 
too far from the ideal, people will support him but if he 
fails to live up to it, they will suspect him of using his 
powers against them. A subtle system of checks and balances 
exists: clansmen cannot eaaily get rid of a chief, because 
of his supernatural power•, but it is obviously in hi1 beat 
interests to maintain their aupport and co-operation. 
The ambivalence of relations between chief and 
people is paralleled in close kin relation1hips. Jealousy 
and suspicion permeate all levels of the society. The 
relationship between brothers (male siblings) displays an 
open ambivalence. In one sense, it is symbolic of unity and 
solidarity, providing the theoretical foundation on which the 
14 
clan system is conatructed: 
considered to be bound by the 
yet though brothers are 
closest bonds of kinship and 
affection, they repreaent to each other the most inlllediate 
and most feared rivals. 
The syatem of inheritance, whereby brother• are 
15 
often placed in the poaition of sharing land and other 
l year. before it is divided up on the property for severa 
14 See aboves 5. 
15 See aboves 31-2, 36. 
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death of their father naturally 1 d ' ea • to friction, It 
appeared, however, that most Inawi familiea came to fairly 
amicable agreements over such matt · 
ere. Strife was more 
likely to occur over leaa tangible property - magic, ritual 
knowledge and statua. Even though primogeniture eucce11ion 
is strictly followed, the eldest son often fears that hie 
father may have withheld certain powers from h' d im an passed 
them to a younger brother. If the eldest son i1 known not 
to have been the father's f · avour1te,or if he has been away 
from the village for several years while the younger brother 
has stayed home and tended the father, such suspicions are 
naturally heightened. Though a younger brother rarely 
actually challenges the position of the chief, he ia often 
felt to be competing with him. Should the younger brother 
prove to be more intelligent, his magic more 1ucce1aful, 
and his popularity with the rest of the clan greater than 
his brother's, he becomes a thorn in the side of the chief, 
who must put up with the praise heaped upon his rival and 
the inuendos that he would make the better chief. When I 
first arrived in Inawi I had the opportunity to observe a 
classical example of such a conflict in the head chieftainahip 
of the village. Both the chief and his younger brother were 
men in their sixtiea: the younger brother was a very popular 
figure and was constantly praised for hie wisdom, knowledge 
dnd generosity, while the elder brother, the chief, was 
feared and dialiked. About a month after my arrival the 
younger brother, who had been seriously ill for some time, 
died: his death was at once attributed to his elder brother 
· lo s of him I expressed who was conaidered to be very Jea u • 
surprise that a man would uae sorcery against his own brother, 
no matter how jealous he might be of him1 nonplussed by my 
naivety, people in1i1ted that in any case of sorcery one 
always looked first to one's brother as the protagonist. 
I 
• • 
' 
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Their statements were to be borne out by the innumerable 
fears and suspicions I was to hear expressed of brothers 
during my stay. 
Even in mythology, the archetypal conflict is 
between brothers. The A'aisa cycle of myths closes with 
the story of how, after he had conferred chieftainship, 
sorcery and other things on human beings, A'aisa quarrelled 
with his brother, Isapini, who took revenge by killing 
through sorcery A' aisa' s son, named Isapini after his uncle. 
A'aisa retaliated by killing his namesake, A'aisa, Isapini's 
son. A'aisa then took the dead body of his son and travelled 
along the coast until he came to a place called J<ariko where 
he lives toda~, with the spirits of the dead. The closeness 
of the two brothers, the enormity of the crime, is of course 
16 expressed by each brother killing his own namesake - in a 
sense, himself. The theme of fraternal conflict is one which 
appears in many other less serious tales, such as the story 
of Popopo and his brother, Lainapa. 
Close agnatic kin, brothers, cousins and uncles, 
and affinal relatives are always the ones suspected of 
wanting to do one harm. All but one of the eight deaths 
that occurred during my field work in Inawi were attributed 
to sorcery and in each case the suspected protagonist was 
16 hi i said to exist between an A special relations P 8 f lose relative named after 
individual and the child 0 • c 
him (or her). 
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a close agnatic Or affinal relative Of the victim,17 
The 
individual's heavy obligations to his affines - ipa qava 
work, the bride-price and the payments made when children 
reach the age to 'wear clothes• 18 - cause much friction and 
often serious conflict: one death and several illnesses 
occurring during my stay were attributed to failure to 
complete a bride-price or to make payments for coildren. 
Hostile and jealous in-laws figure frequently in myt1!.ology. 
One well known story of how Afai clan obtained the right to 
build a particular type of ~ relates that the knowledge 
was given to a woman married into Afai clan by supernatural 
beings who live under the ground (faifai). Because the 
woman passed on the secrets revealed to her by the f aifai 
to her husband's clan, instead of sharing them with her own 
clan, her relatives took revenge by killing one of her 
children through sorcery. 
The leas formalized relationships with maternal kin 
d 1 tensi'on A man (or woman) interacts appear to pro uce ess • 
most often with his agnatic and affinal kin and his greatest 
obligations are to them. Within each of the two most significant 
kin relationships, therefore, there exists an almost formalized 
17 
18 
Only a few recognized sorcerers can practise the art, 
is believed to be able to hire 
nevertheless, anyone the• rotagoniat', I 
their services. In referring to . P . th 
'ble for commissioning e 
mean the peraon.responai . h as those describe!!.. 
sorcerer. Public accusations, ~uc . (Ma' 1969) do 
. 965) nc:l other Africanists ir by Marwick (1 a k nor is the sorcerer 
not take place among the Me ~ugh the whole matter is 
himself openly challenqed. ura always leak out and 
supposed to be kept secredt, ~goniat is a matter of 
before long the suspecte pro 
public knowledge. 
See above: 33-5. 
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polarity. The po•itive and negative aapects of theae 
relationships - their potential for rivalry and hatred, as 
well as solidarity and affection - are equally emphaaized 
and expected. 
The Direction of Change Since the war 
During the period of European contact, but 
particularly over the last thirty years, the ambivalence 
existing within Mekeo social structure has been intensified, 
Though in 1971 it essentially retained the features possessed 
at the time of contact, there have been many internal changes 
which, indirectly and unperceived py the people themselves, 
have subtly shifted the balance of the structure, weakening 
its cohesiveness. These changes have undermined its capacity 
to handle the new developments. 
• 
Prior to the war, the village conmunity was a 
tightly knit, exclusive unit which ha4 little concern with 
the outside world. 19 Few villagers travelled beyond the 
boundaries of the subdistrict or could be persuaded to accept 
employment far from home. The war, and the events that •• 
followed, quickly broke down this isolation, bringing new 
experience and new goals. In the late 1940s, while the 
government was attempting to give positive direction at the 
village level to the newly felt desire for economic development, 
the physical horizons of the village were also being expanded 
by increasing travel and a trend towards employment in urban 
centres. 20 In 1946 an estimated eighty Mekeo were employed 
19 See above1 192-7. 
20 Occunation Analysia - Inawi Village See Appendix III, r-
1921-70, 
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as wage labourers away from their villages: 21 by 1949 the 
22 
number had risen to 249 and in 1953 patrol officers expressed 
concern that of 1,040 able-bodied men, 319 were absent from 
h . '11 23 i h 
t eir vi ages, e t er working or attending boarding school. 
According to Belshaw, it had become customary by the early 
1950s for the average Mekeo youth to spend a period working 
in one of the urban 'fleshpots', usually Port Moresby or Lae, 
before settling down to village lif,! and marriage. 24 Trading 
expeditions 
also became 
to sell betel nut and vegetables in Port Moresby 
25 
conmon in these years. The trend towards 
semi-skilled employment in toWns continued in the late 1950s. 
The 9.ibdistrict Annual Report for 1958-59 noted: 
Very few natives seek employment in the labouring 
field. They have a marked tendency to prefer 
domestic service in the larger centres. Although 
plantations offer unlimited work, only a few 
locals work under agreement. These are usually 
in the higher wage bracket. 
In contrast to apathy displayed towards education in 
the pre-war years, missionaries state that parents are now 
eager for their children to attend school and are inconsolable 
when told a child lacks the ability to proc·ied to higher grades. 
Most villagers see education as the key to better and higher 
paid jobs for their children and are keen for them to achieve 
a high standard: their chances of doing so are now much greater 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Patrol to the Mekeo 7-11 May 1946 • 
Patrol to Mekeo, Paitana and Waima 18 Aug.-5 Sept. 1949. 
Patrol to the Mekeo 16-31 Jan. 1953 • 
Belshaw 1951: 18. 
See above: 308. 
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than in the put. Both miaaion and government have become 
much more active in education since the war. The sacred 
Heart Mission maintains several village and central primary 
schools in the subdistrict, two secondary schools and a 
teachers' training college. TWo vocational schools have been 
established in the area by the administration but the real 
importance of government activity in education lies in the 
increased opportunities for secondary, tertiary and vocational 
training now available in Port Mor~sby and other centres. 
The mission has also established seminaries and other training 
institutions in town centres which are open to students from 
its elementary schools. 
Since there is little opportunity for employment 
in the village or even in the subdistrict, rising standards 
of education have swelled the flow of workers to urban 
26 
centres. Many people now live away from the village on a 
more or less permanent basis, occasionally visiting kin 
during their holidays. Also many young men and women are 
away from home undertaking vocational training and higher 
education of various types. The demands of the betel nut 
trade create a stream of sellers constantly travelling to and 
from town: many men who have no employment there spend much 
of their time in Port Moresby, selling their produce and then 
living off the proceeds. The 1970-71 SUbdistrict Annual 
Report estimates that at any one time twenty to twenty-five 
per cent of the total population of the Mekeo is absent from 
the village. Moreover the population of the average village 
community has increased by approximately 1eventy-five per cent 
26 i 1 Standards of Adult Male1 -See Appendix IV, Educdata~penandix V Educational Standards Inawi Village 1971 an nr ' 
and Occupations of Inawi Men Under 30• 
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?ver the laat twenty-five yeara. 27 The previously compact, 
close-knit, homoqeneoua village unit has become a milch 
larger, more amorphoua entity, divided by wide differences • 
in education and work experience and by new residence and 
employment patterns. 
Accompany!ng these changes, and perhaps the natural 
result of them, has been a growing emphasis on the role of 
the nuclear family at the expense of larger units, in 
particular the clan. Sin~e the war, the importance of two 
central foci of clan life - the ~ and the gove - has 
waned. Previously married men spent most of their leisure 
time at the ~: wives would prepare their husbands' food 
and carry it to the ~ where it would be shared with friends. 
Though each family had its own house, this was essent"ially 
the domain of the wife and children. Men preferred to 
remain at the.!!!!:!.• even sleeping there to 'avoid the noise 
of the children'. TOday moat men eat their meals at home 
with their wives and children, social contact takes place 
mainly in the form of visiting between houses (as in European 
communities), and the.!!!!:!. may remain deserted for days. 
Feasts are still held there but lt has ceased to be the 
principal centre of social and communal life. The neglected, 
delapidated condition of Inawi .!!!!:!. gave eloquent proof of 
this: at least two clans had let their clubhouses partially 
collapse. When 
1971, relatives 
a death occurred in one of these clans in 
could not place the body on the .!!!!:!. for the 
customary few hours of public mourning before burial because 
the shaky edifice was likely to give way under the weight of 
the mourners. 
27 See aboves 46. 
, 
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While the ~:1 functioned aa the centre of the clan'• 
social life, tiea between clan8111en and their chiefa, their 
mutual obligationa and reaponaibilitiea, were conatantly 
being reinforced and atreaaed; but aa the role of the 
nuclear family baa grown in importance, and the focus of 
activities haa shifted away from the~. ao the former 
emphasis on clon ties baa weakened. By creating a situation 
in which contact between ~lanamen ia far less frequent and 
less intimate, this shift intensifies the strain already put 
upon intra-clan relationships by new residence patterns and 
the growth in the size of the group. 
Another aignif icant change in family life is the 
virtual disappearance in many villages of the gove, special 
houses set aside for bachelors. 28 Formerly unmarried boys were 
strictly segregated from the rest of their family and lived 
together in the one or more gove maintained by their clan. 
Today widowers, who are in the main old men, each have their 
own separate house, which is called a gove, but young 
bachelors usually live with their family. People say that 
nowadays young men spend most of the time up until they are 
married at school, only coming home for holidays; thus they 
are still thought of as 'children'. The change haa taken place 
over the last fifteen years in Inawii men in their late 
twenties and early thirties state that they spent their 
adolescence in the gove. Like the shift away from the .!!£!!, the 
of the individual family while new practice stresses the role 
weakening the former solidarity of the youths of the clan 
as a group. 
• 
28 Some East Mekeo villages, moat noticeably ~a, cont~7e 
. al gove When, however, a arge pai: 
to maintain sever . • late 1960s, no effort was of Inawaia burnt down in the 
made to re-build the gove. 
• 
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The mi••ion ha• encouraged and, at lea•t in part, haa 
probably helped to create the•e new trend•. It• influence 
has perhap• been •tronge•t and mo•t perva•ive in the areas 
of marriage and f1111ily life. Since one of ita moat 
important taaka baa been to explain the church' a ideal of 
christian marriage and family life, it baa done ita best to 
stress the r~!e and interests of the nuclear family above those 
of the clan. With the quickening tempo of change after 
the war, young people, moat of whom have been educated by 
the mission, have no doubt been more ready to adopt the modes 
of behaviour it advocated in relation to marriage and raising 
children. 
The attenuation of bonds between clansmen has, of 
course, equally affected people's relationships with their 
chiefs - the clan heads. Though rank appears to be meticulously 
stratified, this relationship is not in any way institutionalized 
in the form of courts, taxes, tributes or the like. The 
workability of the •Y•tem depends on a situation of familial 
• intimacy and trust, in which clan members can be sure that 
their chief ia acting in the best interests of the whole 
ikupu, or family. As the unit becomes larger, and blood ties 
between members and their chief become further removed, as 
'$Pe opportunity for clansmen to interact with each other 
becomes less and many members spend most of their time away 
.... 
• 
29 
~ 
Dupeyrat l935i 369-72r 440-1. Implicit in the concept 
of chriatian marriage ia the importance of the nuclear 
familyi mi•aionarie• who have had long experience in the 
area have observed the shift away from the ~ and 
themselves attribute it to their efforts to impress 
upon parishioners their responsibilities to the nuclear 
family • 
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from the village, the former truat and aolidarity ia loat 
and positive co-operation becomea more difficult. Those 
distantly related to the chief will be certain that he 
favours his closer relatives above them; those who live away 
from the villaqe, and therefore have neqlected to provide 
food and labour for feasts, fear his anqer; since the Ell! 
is now usually deaerted and the clan rarely functions as a 
whole, people claim that the chiefs hide themselves from 
them and iqnore their responaibilities. 
• Many circumstances have combined to undermine chiefly 
prestiqe. Traditional ceremonial life has shrunk to a pale 
shadow of its former splendour over the last thirty years. 
After a brief revival in the late 1940s, the simplification 
of ceremonies and the relaxation of ~hiefly riqhts, which 
new pressures had forced even before the war, 30 rapidly 
accelerated. A number of important feasts held just after 
the war incorporated features which have since been omitted 
from ceremonies held by Inawi and Aipeana. One Aipeana clan 
• 
held a feast to celebrate the building of a chief's house 
decorated in the traditional manner - the last of its kind in 
this villaqe; three other feasts were the last occasions 
on which the ufu apie were invited to dance at the installation 
of a chief and sinq at the openinq of a new]!!!. TwO large 
feasts held at rouqhly the same time by Inawi, were the last 
occasions at which the ufu apie danced. The position in the 
h th ame Inawabui people East Mekeo appears to have been muc e s • 
recalled that there had been only one feast held in their 
h f 'e danced, nor had villaqe since the war at which t e u u ap1 
there been such feasts held in other villaqes in the area 
30 See above: 197-205. 
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during the 19501 and 19601, Villager1 explain that they 
ceased to hold large, elaborate fea1t1 in the 19501 becauie 
of their preoccupation with the admini1tration'1 developmental 
projects. The rice culture al10 required it1 own feasts 
for clearing the land and harvesting which no doubt absorbed 
resources that otherwise would have been directed into 
traditional celebrations. 
The rarity of large feasts today is attributed by 
the chiefs to their people's reluctance to donate pigs that 
can now be sold for high prices: commoners accuse the chiefs 
of laziness and lack of interest. Both, however, stress 
that the old ceremonies have not been forgotten and can be 
held at any time provided a sufficient number of pigs are 
killed. After an interval of twenty years, a grand feast 
at which the ufu apie danced was held in 1970 by Inawaia to 
mark the opening of an .!!!!! built and decorated in the old 
31 
manner. 
Important feasts formerly served to ritualize and 
dramatize the chief's role. Chiefs acted little differently 
from commoners in the normal routine of everyday life: 
like other men they had to provide for the subsistence needs 
h · f ·1· only on ceremonial of themselves and t eir am1 ies. 
be Ch1'ef and conmoner, and occasions was the distance tween 
the grandeur of chiefly office, displayed in full. As the 
31 The isolated northern villages, Ififu and Imounyai life 
t i ed many features of ceremon a however, have re an 'llages· personal 
long since abandoned by other vi Th ' small northern 
i f Mr I Hau'ofa. ese communicat on rom • t off from the main stream 
villages have in general been c:; appear to have largely 
of development 1ince t~e war ~ion in the pre-war years. 
avoided the government s atten 
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opportunities for ritually underlining chiefly power have 
become fewer and less impressive, Illich of aura and prestige 
surrounding the lopia have been stripped from th · 
em, causing 
people to remark that the chiefs are now 'acting just like 
ordinary men'. Moreover, a1 fea1t1 began to be held on a 
diminishing scale, the chief'1 actual control over the 
resources of his clan and his ability to mobilize them have 
been gradually limited. Though in theory he still po8188191 
rights over the economic re1ource1 of hie clan, it has been 
so long since he has insisted on them that, for all practical 
purposes, they have lapsed, and it is impossible today to 
extract the large number of pigs and vast quantity of vegetable 
food which were demanded in the past. 
Along with this unintentional and largely unperceived 
loss of chiefly stature, there ha1 been a deliberate 
relaxation of chiefly rights since the war. During the 19501 
Inawi chiefs gave permission to commoners to use the building 
materials and styles which they had formerly reserved 
exclusively for themselves; re1triction1 over fishing and 
hunting (except those relating to wild pigs) were also removed. 
It is said that Aipeana chiefs still retain these rights, 
though some modifications have obviously been permitted. 
Most houses in Aipeana, for example, in fact employ a narrow 
band of _!!!,a type of timber allowed only to chiefs, at 
the base of their walls: though it is true that it is not 
used to build the full lower half of walls as is done in 
Inawi. 
Though the Aipeana chiefs insist more strongly on 
their traditional rights than those of Inawi, they have 
recently taken the remarkable step of doing away with the 
One Of the senior chiefs, an educated ufu apie relationship. 
from the village at the time, suggested man who was working away 
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the chanqe: people felt that inviting the ufu !pie to all 
feast• and preaentinq them with moat of the food waa a 
waste of time and reaourcea ao it waa d ·d d 
• ec1 e to atop the 
practice. Thia ia a remarkable move since the ufu !pie 
relationship repreaenta the idea of reci·proci·ty 
uaually found 
in all Melaneaian feasta and food exchanqea. It ia too early 
yet to know what the reault will be but one wondera how 
ceremonial life ia to continue functioning once thia 
relationahip ia completely abandoned, aa it neceaaarily adda 
a different character to feaats. The in1i1tence on chiefly 
rights today can be expected to vary from village to village, 
cepending on the peraonalities and relative strength of the 
chiefs concerned. 
Villagers uaually explain the giving up of such 
rights in terma of the chief'• goodwill towards his people: 
being 'sorry for his people', who had little meat to eat, he 
allowed them to hunt and fish without restriction: becauae 
he was 'sorry' to see his people building poor houaea, he 
allowed them to uae A!! and other building materiala. 
Essentially theae conceaaiona were made under preaaure from 
patrol officers, who ordered that villagers must build more 
solidly constructed houaes: or under pressure from clansmen 
who wislied to hunt at a time when it was no longer neceasary 
to keep strict control over game. This new leniency, 
though formally preaented a~ the result of the chiefa' 
generosity, has 
area of village 
acted against them by removing 
life from their control, while 
yet another 
contributing 
to the qrowing feeling that they themselves no longer care 
about their position and are neglecting to carry out even 
those limited function• left to them. 
The off iciala aet 
have had a similar effect. 
up by miaaion and government 
The church cOlllllittee and the 
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local government councillor• offer no direct challellCJe to 
the chiefs' po•ition, but their presence and activities adQ 
to the impr•••ion that the lopia now play a lesser part in 
village affair•1 
The chief• are not powerful now. Before there 
were powerful chief• and •orcerer• and the people 
were afraid of them, Before the chief• ran the 
village, now all they do i* hold a few fea8 t 8 -death fea1ts and umu pua, That'• all the work 
they do. 32 
The parish council•, which have come to be known a• 'church 
committees' in the Mekeo, were created by the mis•ion in 
1947 in the hope of gaining more influential representation 
for the church at the village level than could be provided 
by the catechists and teachers. 33 The intention wa• not to 
alter the existing hierarchy of authority, but rather to work 
through it. Whether or not the •Y•tem works effectively for 
:he mission, it appear• to have made little difference to 
the existing structure of power. 
Probably the mo•t damaging blow to the chieftainship 
has been the frustration of villagers' independent efforts 
to achieve economic advancement. Since the lopia are 
expected to guarantee by •upernatural mean• the welfare and 
success of the community, 34 the failure of busine•s ventures 
over the last decade, and the deaths associated with them, 
are regarded as irrefutable proof that the chiefs are 
withholding their powers to spite the people or, in the case 
to serve their own ends at of Aipeana, are using the•e powers 
the expense of the people's welfare. 
32 A.U., Inawi: 29 Sept. 1971. 
33 See above1 175, 
34 S• e above: 28. 
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A8 the chief' 8 role hlid been eroded by the .. ny 
chanqe• takinq place •ince the var, it• latent llllbivalence 
ha• been brought to the •urface. Now thlit chief• are no 
longer able to ••ti•fy the ideal, •u•picion• thlit they are 
misu•ing their llC*er• COiie to the fore. Very few, if any, 
villager• realize that even the be•t intentioned chiefs 
have been forced into thi1 position by circu••tance• beyond 
their control: they accu•e them of deliberately neglecting 
their re•pon•ibilitie•1 
• The chief• them•elve• are letting the cu•tom. 
go, They are not keeping the CU•t0111• properly. 
Now when they make a new chief they do not 
follow the rule• properly - before if the ruig• 
were not followed exactly, people would die, 
The gap between the ideal and pre•ent reality i• •o great 
that some •ee no future for the chieftain•hip1 
35 
Now young men are taking their father•' place 
a• chief• and they don't care about the old 
cu1toms.... When the old men die the young 
one• will not feel like keeping the old 
custom• of the chief1 and then it will come 
to mean nothing. The people feel that the 
chief• are no longer doing their work prop.rly. 
If any •tranger or traveller come1 to the 
village, the chief mu•t give him food and 
whatever el•e"1e need•. 
This wa• the re8 pon•ibility given to the chief• 
and as long a• he carrie1 it out, he would 
i hi f but now the chief• are ju1t 1itting rema n c e 
1 
ything 
in their hou•e• and not caring. A •o an 
the chief had he •hould take to the .!!.!!! ~o •hare 
with hi• ulalu people but now the chief• •on• 
i and buy a ca1e of beer and sit in 
go to sere nda d ink it by them•elve•, and then 
the hou•e an r b d But the 
the people •ay that thi• i• very a • 
old people are •till there keeping the 
chieftain•hip. 36 
T .I., Inawi1 17 Jan. 1971. 
36 S.I., Aipeana1 23 Oc:t. 1971 • 
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Fear of the coercive power• the old chief• an·• 
u •orcerer• 
are believed to wield continue• to C'·01>1-.a ~· and obedience where 
tru•t and affection have been lo•t. 
While not de•troyinq traditional value• or radically 
altering the character of village •ociety, the proc••• of 
change •ince the war ha• widened it• exi•ting line• of 
cleavage. The •u•picion• exi•ting between brother•, 
neighbour•, affine•, clan•, have been aggravated by the 
loosening of tie• of c on intere•t, kin•hip and re•idence 
which once unified the village community. Likewi•e, chiefly 
prestige ha• been -atened to the point where the 10:,ia, 
though they •till hold .way through fear, cannot give po•itive 
direction to the new developnent•. 
In the ordinary day-to-day affair• of the village, 
co-operation i• achieved, though often not without 
considerable arguing and wrangling. In traditional 
situation•, the ten•ion• which are likely to divide people 
are allayed by the fact that every individual know• hi• 
rights and entitlement•, and tho•e of hi• neighbour• as 
well. 37 Aa long a• the traditional •tandards of behaviour 
are followed, occa•ion for jealousy and rivalry i• minimized 
In most of the new •ituation• created by Buropean economic 
activitie•, villager• have no idea of their right• and no 
standard by which to judge whether they are receivinq a fair 
share of the profit•. 'ftleir latent fear• of each other and 
0f their leader• - which are now aggravated by difference• 
in education, the g=owth in the •ise of the cOlllllUnity and 
the empha•i• on the role of the nuclear fa11ily - become 
intolerable under th••• conditions. ror example, th• educated 
37 See aboves 35-6r 59-60. 
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man returning to hi1 Yillege after •everal year1 "OrkillCJ in 
town and determined to u .. hi1 experience and aavillCJ• to 
start a bu1ine11. ia 110re likely to be r8'arded by hia elder 
brother1 a1 a threat to their poaition than the f .. ily 
benefactor. If he doe1 .. nege to per1uadc hia brother a 
to join him. they feel at a diaadvant99e becauae of their 
lack of education, the firat aigna of financial difficultiea 
are therefore 1ufficient to confini their doubti. Other 
relative1 and friend1 who •ight be talked into contributi119 
money to the venture have even lea1 confidence in the leader. 
who ia a virtual 1tranger to th .. after hia many yeara away 
from home. Yet if he triea to •trike out on hia own. he 
will meet even atronger oppo1ition. 
The betel nut trade. however, fita eaaily into 
a potentially exploaive aocial 1ituation. While the 
administration haa argued that the trade ia proof of the 
Mekeo's individualia111. it in fact clearly demonatratea the 
points just made. Since all may participate freely in it 
and the income is fairly evenly distributed over the village 
community. it offends no social valuea1 and aince it is 
conducted on an individual basis. it does not aggravate latent 
~uspiciona and rivalries. 
The old social values peraist, having bec<>11e all 
the more important now that many of the bonda formerly 
unitinq people have been weakened. They cannot be diacarded 
as if they had ornamental value only: they function aa 
guards aqainat the tenaiona and frictiona which at any 
time threaten to divide people. The ethical baaia of the 
i ed• the lopia are condemned chieftainship ha1 not been queat on 
explicitly for their failure to uphold the traditional 
standards. 'l'hu1 the diecrediti.nq of the traditional leader• 
1 dera no eaaier. YOQnger people makes the acceptance of new ea 
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•en•• that the old wya are holdi"" • ..._ ... __ ._ 
• ...,. -- ...,,.. !19t even if 
they could •illply do .,.y with the chief•-i hi 
- na p at will. 
thi• would not 80lve the Probl• of finding an acceptable 
replacement. The fierce pride which will not allow a 11a11 
to accept any other indivicklal'• claia8 to 8Upmriority or 
authority unl••• the•• are ba•ed on U"'"'•••tio -'-1 
--.- n.., e •upmrnatural 
power•. vould raain even if the loeia were depo•ed. Before 
the old patterna of behaviour can be di•carded. a new ba•i• 
for •ocial co-operation and leader•hip mu•t be found. 
Relation• with the White l!!gille 
J'Ud9in9 frOll external evidence only. the ... keo •ight 
well appear to be a cla••ic ex•ple of an apathy toward• 
Levelopment created by adllini•trative •i•handling. Their 
case clo•ely parallel•. at lea•t on the •urface, that of 
the Orokaiva of northern Papua, who•• pre••nt indifference 
to ca•h croppinq and other c0111ercial enterpri•e• i• 
attributed to a pa•t hi•tory of unpopular and unprofitable 
38 government •ch..... In the 1920• and 1930s the Orokaiva 
were compelled under Native Regulation• to plant coffee. 
The plantation• were abandoned for a time during the war but 
in 1944, when an AllGAU officer wa• po•ted to the area, 
compulsory labour on the plantation• was re-introduced. 
Variou• un•ucce••ful attempt• were made by the ~ni•tration 
after the war to extend the coffee indu•try and to pr0110te 
new crops. 39 It i• t•pting but fal•e to ••Mime that the 
results of th••• very •illilar experience• have been the •ame 
for the Mekeo a• for the orokaiva. Th• period of c:ompul•ory 
rice planting before the war, unpopular •• it wa•, did not 
38 Waddell and JCrink• 1968: 2961 crocombe 1964: 3&. 
39 crocombe 1964. 
.. ' 
• • 
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prevent the Mekeo frOlll eagerly welcoming Cottrell-Dormer'• 
proposals for .a n- rice scheme in the 1940s: nor have 
subsequent government failures discouraged them from striking 
out on their own or frOlll experimenting with new ventu1'es, 
however unsuccessfully. 
Useful comparisons cannot be made on the basis 
of a purely external view of the contact experience. The 
Mekeo's unexpected reaction to a familiar set of circu1119tances 
becomes understandable in terms of their particular framework 
of reference. They place their whole history of relations 
with the white regime in the context of the traditional 
relationship between the holders of authority and their 
subjects. The authority of the government was accepted from 
the outset: the legitimacy of its claims to rule were 
validated by its undeniably superior supernatural powers 
(demonstrated by its terrifying weapons and amazing possessions) 
and its protestations of friendship and help. During the first 
few decades of contact it was possible, or at least not 
impossible to accept the white regime as it represented 
itself - a benevolent power which could confer desirable 
goods and knowledge. Villagers treated it as an extension 
of the traditional hierarchy of authority and expected it 
to respond in kind; in return for the material benefits it 
offered, they were prepared to give their obedience and 
service. By the 1930s the government seemed to be demanding 
~ore than it had ever given but the war renewed hopes that 
it would at last honour its original promises. People 
d lopmental schemes but eagerly welcomed the post-war eve 
. 't' The failure of these were mystified by the new acti.vi ies. 
. h had been fixed, could projects, to which such high opes 
l.'n terms of deliberate intent on the only be understood 
With t he introduction of the local government's part; 
Vl.'llagers were finally convinced government council, most 
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that the government Wb indifferent to their lf 
we are and wu 
only taking advantage of their attempta to co-operate, 
The government'• actiona and policies have 
discredited it in the Mekeo'a eyes: its failures are 
interpreted as a deliberate evasion of its responsibilities 
but they have not created apathy towards development in 
general. Certainly villagers did not enjoy compulsory rice 
growing, nevertheless they recognized the government'• right 
to demand certain aervicea just as the lopia have righta to 
certain goods and aervicea. The collapse of the poat-war 
schemes did not convince people that cash cropping waa 
unprofitable, but that the government had appropriated tHe 
profits which were rightfully theirs. 
In view of the prevalence of belief in magic and 
ritual today and the outbreak of a violent cult movement in 
1941, it seems surprising that the final discrediting of 
the government has not led the Mekeo to seek refuge in cultism, 
claiming like the people of Karkar Island and the Madang coast 
that the administration is withholding the 'key• to progress 
40 
from them. In laying the blame on their own leaders, the 
Mekee clearly recognize that the source of their present 
problems is internal not external. Despite the frustrations 
of the last three decades, villagers have persisted with 
practical rather than ritual means of obtaining the new 
wealth. 
A cult of sorta 
leader of the movement, a 
sprang up in the late 1950s. 
self-styled wonder worker from 
The 
Amoamo village in the West Mekeo, attempted to raise money 
40 Mc9olain 1971: Lawrence 1967. 
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in all the Mekeo villagea to buy a ahip which would bring 
good a from Port Moreaby. According to Inawi infonianta, 
claimed he could make 110ney out of newapaper1 
He cut the n-apaper into piecea the aize of 
£1 notea and then he took a piece and rubbed 
it between hia handa and out c-. a £1 note 
This ia how he got the people to wpport hi~. 
Because of this the people thought he had 
aome kind of power so he would be able to 
help them.41 
Though most villages preferred to 'wait and see' before 
contributing any money, he obtained considerable support in 
the three villagea which had been itrvolved in the 1941 cult -
Inawaia, Eboa and Inawabui. A large atore to receive the 
expected cargo waa built at Inawabui. After several montha 
had passed and there waa no sign of t~e ship or cargo, 
-people began to loae faith in the leader's powers. Rumours 
of the affair first reached the aubdistrict office in May 
1958: 42 a few montha later further complaints were received 
from villagers who claimed that their money had been taken 
43 
under false pretences. In September 1960 the leader was 
finally taken to court but charges against him had to be 
dismissed for lack of evidence as villages were very reluctant 
44 
to testify about their part in the matter. 
This rather desultory cult, which was accompanied 
by none of the hysteria and emotionalism characterizing the 
earlier movement, appeared at a time when villagers were just 
41 M.A •• Inawi1 25 Oct. 1971. 
42 subdistrict Office File 7-3-2. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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beginning to explore the poaaibilitiea of buying their own 
vehicle• and aetting up their own village atorea.45 Inawi 
informanti atatementa that only the older people were 
interested in the cult are aupported by the fact that one of 
the f irat to report the matter to the adlliniatration waa an 
educated younq leader of one of the Inawaia tranaport groupa. 
No doubt the aliqnment for and againat the cult waa alao 
influenced by clan rivalriea and politica of the aort 
discussed in relation to the Inawi cult of 1929.46 By the 
time the cult leader waa taken to court, the tranaport 
ventures were going from atrenqth to atrength: if cultiam 
had ever been regarded aa a aerioua competitor to more 
practical means of economic advancement, it was only for a 
short time and for a minority. The !)re-war cults, which were 
very different in nature and which I have argued were abortive 
attempts to throw off the reatrainta of the traditional order 
rather than a meana of obtaining 'cargo', were liltewiae 
47 
confined to a minority and abort lived. 
The Mekeo'a perception of relationahipa with the 
white regime help• to explain why carqoiam ha• played only 
a secondary role in their contact history. Lawrence arque• 
that 'cargo' aaaumed auch importance for the people of the 
Rai coaat becauae it waa aeen aa the mean• of eatablishing 
relationship• with tht white man on a proper footing: without 
'cargo' villager• could never hope to deal with the new-comer• 
48 
on a basis of reciprocity and equivalence. Deacribing the 
45 See above: 307-09. 
46 See above: 153-4. 
47 See aboves 168-70. 
48 Lawrence 19671 232 • 
• 
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complex interaction of cargoi .. and contact hi•tory on the 
Rai Coar. Lawrence •how• hov villeqer•' attitude• 
'alternated between expre••ion• of friend•hip and ho•tility 
according to whether it wa• believed that white men were 
likely to uphold or repudiate the principle• of 
and equivalence.• 49 Mekeo hope1 that the white 
reciprocity 
regime would 
honour it• obligation• to them waxed and waned in a 1imilar 
manner, but in contra•t to the Madang people they had not 
expected to approach it on •trictly equal ground•, a• a 
friendly but independent people, rather they regarded it a1 
an extension of their own •ocial and political •Y•tem. In 
return for their allegiance, villager• expected material 
benefits but 'cargo' did 1.ot become the 111ean1 of e•tabli•hing 
their own identity nor the 'index of their 1elf-re1pect' a1 
it did on the Rai coa•t. 
worsely ob•erve• that the 1tudie1 of t.wrence and 
Burridge have convincingly demon1trated that the acqui1ition 
of 'cargo' is: 
••• more than a con•umer itch. It i1 a 1earch 
for self-re•pect, identity, and meaninq in 
l 'f 50 i e' • • • • 
This search for identity vi•-A-vi1 the white man and the 
x not only of culti111, colonial order i• surely the very cru , 
but of the Melane•ian•' role in the history of contact. 
cargo cults are only one a•pect, which itielf may tlke a 
Of Melanesians' attempts to e1tablish multiplicity of form•, 
d ·n those of the white man. their identity in their own eyes an 1 
1 warn us •against assuming a Lawrence and Burridge not on Y 
49 Ibid: 232-3. 
50 Worsley 1970: 336. 
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1imple and univeraal conflict llOdel for the culta',51 they 
demon1trate it1 inadequacy to explain the ca11plexitiei of 
the whole contact aituation, Whil1t it ii illportant for 
historian• to evaluate the moral illplication1 of our 
re1pon1ibilitie1 for the colonial order, thii ihould not 
become the excu1e for perpetuating l!Uropean ethnocentri1111 
under a new gui1e. In a more confident age, we held the 
stage as conquering heroe1 bringing civilization and 1alvation 
to the benighted heathen: there 1eem1 1ome danger that we 
might continue to dominate the hi1torical 1tage, though 
this time a1 the villain1, while 1till relegating to the 
~elanesian1 a pa11ive and 1econdary role. 
The 1imple 1tereotype of oppre11or and oppre11ed 
ignores completely the role the Mekeo 1ee the1111elve1 &1 
having played. The average villager would be highly indignant 
to be told that he belonged to a conquered, oppre11ed people. 
The Mekeo's confidence in themselve1 and in their right• i1 
illustrated in the comment of an old clan chief, I1oaimo 
Opu, who when a1ked whether in his twenty years' service as 
a village con1table he had ever been struck by a guvernment 
officer, replied fiercely: 
They never tried to hit me becau1e they knew 
I'd hit them back! 52 
Perhaps it is not 1urpri1ing that pre-war official• alway1 
~ 53 _ the confidence of their felt so uneasy about the MeAeo 
~earing must have 1eemed very di1concerting in a people 
t Clal.111. ed to have subjugated. In terms ·..-horn the governmen 
f which still ho.ds of the traditional framework of re erence, 
• 51 Ibid: 339. 
52 Isoaimo 0pu, Inawi: 25 Feb. 1971 " 
53 See above: 133-5. 
t 
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it• validity, the Mekeo have lo t di • no 911ity in their 
relation• with the goyerrment ........ __ 1 ......... the government by 
it• harah treatment and refuaal to t 1 ' ... ta obli9ationa to 
its subjecta, uaumea a 110rally indef ibl •n• • poaition now 
tacitly rec"'""i&ed in it li ' -~·· • po cy of non-intervention in 
village affaira. 
Th• deaire cc en to the Mekeo, the Tangu and 
the people of the Rai coaat - deapite the variation in 
their reapon•••• their cultural difference• and the divergence 
in their contact experience - to eatabliah relation• with 
the white regime on a morally acceptable baais, suggest• one 
direction in which we •i9ht look !or a th ... COllDOn to all 
New Guinea contact hiatory. 
WHILST it is impoaaible to predict long term trends, the 
Mekeo's immediate future will continue to be influenced by 
existing value• and aasumptions. A aort of impasse has 
been reached at preaent. Villager• deaire economic and 
social advancement but truat neither the government nor their 
own leaders to guide them, and the persistence of traditional 
values prevents the emergence of new leaders. 
It seem• unlikely that the Mekeo will play a much 
more positive role in local or national politic• in the near 
future. Apart from the difficulty of adjusting to elective 
authority, villagers regard both the local government council 
and the national aaaemblY aa agencies of an aaninistration 
which is indifferent to village welfare. Nor is the creation 
of an independent national government likely to inspire any 
greater confidence: ;illager• are apprehensive at the 
thought of aelf-goverl11119nt, and though th•Y have little faith 
in the goodwill of the preaent administration, they have even 
less in the ability of their countrymen to rule. The governnent, 
like the loeia ... y ~been dUc:redit .......... t i 
-· .... t •till bu 
an unqueationed pow9r to Mintain control .... i-~ i 
•
11 
""" ta replac-nt 
lacks. In 1971 people wre already talkinCJ of how they 
would settle by violence diaputea with neiC)hbouriftCJ tribea 
when the white r99iM withdrew. The volatile and fiercely 
parochial Me'keo are acarcely likely to accept the elected 
representativea of other qroupa when they cannot accept their 
own. 
Proapecta for economic development appear better. 
The succea• of the betel nut trade, where allloat every other 
communal or individual venture haa failed, dellonatratea 
that development• in which all m.-"9ra of the CC111111Unity can 
share more or leaa equally are likely to encounter little 
opposition. With th• openinq of the new hi9hway to Port 
Moresby, market gardening offera a promiainq alternative, 
54 • 
or addition, to betel nut. tower tranaport coat• ahould 
encourage villager• to produce more freah veqetablea and fruit 
for the Port Moreaby market and official• hope that eventually 
the area will become one of the main auppliera of food for 
the town. Like the betel nut trade, urket gardeniftCJ ia 
an activity in which everyone could participate and which, in 
its early atagea, would require only an extenaion of preaent 
activities and not the introduction of a whOle CQ1Plex of 
d ti It. develo....,.nt aeema likely new technique• an prac cea. r--
not only to raise the average caah incOll8, and therefore the 
accepted standard of living, but alao to increaae the already 
noticeable trend for people to apend moat of their time 11tt1aY 
54 
leted and I am told that 
The highway ha• now been c~ truck• aince I left the 
Inawi haa purchued three 
village in December 197l. 
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from the vill&CJ•• living at the iite of t"'-i i 
... r r ce or cattle 
farm. A sub1tantial mov rnt of population away fro. the 
villaqe, brincJing an entirely nw pattern of local i group ng. 
would facilitate the breakincJ of old bondi and the formation 
of new typea of aocial relation1hipi. 
The •i11ion i1 the one repre1entative of inatituted 
authority which ha1 not been di1credited and which aay 
become more influential in the future than it ha1 been in the 
past. It i1 often 1tated - by goverl'llent official1, white 
resident• and the mi11ionarie1 them1elve1 - that the ai1aion 
holds little eway over the Mekeo. ~twardly, con1iderable 
deference i1 paid to it1 people attend church, participate 
in church fe1tival1, 1eek the advice of their pari1h prie1t 
on many matter1 apart frOll religion, they value the health 
services offered by the ai11ion and, above all. the education 
which it provide• for their children. Yet the church and 
christianity 1eem to r .. ain external1. There are very few 
signs of the qenuine conviction and piety observed by Van 
Rijswijck among1t their clo1e neighbour• and convert• of 
55 the same mi1sion - the Kuni. In contrast to the Kuni, 
christian values and teachinq1 1eem to play little part in 
the everyday affairs of the Mekeo; people'• action• and 
Judgements are quided by traditional conaideration1. In 
•imes of trouble, few find comfort in prayer; 
busy identifying the aorcerer or magician who 
of the calamity and attemptinq to placate him. 
they are too 
ia the cauae 
Amonq younq people under twenty-five, many of whom 
i i boardinq school•, mi1aion have spent aeveral year• in m 11 on 
influence appear• to be 1troncJ and on• gains the impreaaion 
SS van Rijewijck 1967. 
' 
' 
' I 
' 
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that many of thm are •inc:ere catholic11 though whether 
thi• i1 becau.. a white face tend1 1Ut011atically to condition 
a certain re1pon .. froa tlMll i1 very difficult to iay. The 
older people, particularly tho11 over forty, !lake no eecret 
of their viev1 once out of ear1hot of the •i•iion1 
Th• 111i11ionarie1 1ay that A'ai1a i1 the Devil, 
but ~ 1tnov that he i1 really God. 
They a11ert that A' ai1a and the chri1tian God are one and 
the same, and that the ethical teaching• of the church .. rely 
confirm the 1tandarde alvaye upheld by their anc11tor1. 'ft\• 
~issionarie1, lilt• the government, taught that people aa1t 
not kill, 1teal, lie or comait adultery - the11 had been 
~he law• of th• chief• 1inc1 time tnr1r2rial. The following 
comment is typical of the ccmpari10n1 drllWll between chri1tian 
and traditional belief 1 
[if you do "orong) tha ai11ionarie1 will 1ay Banta 
Maria will puni1h you in the ••e way u our 
grandfathers and father• 1aid that A'ai1a and 
Isapini know what you are doing. 11hat will th• 
chief 1ay? He will 1ay that A'ai1a and I1apini 
are watching you and therefore your work will 
either succeed or fail. 
'The mi11ionarie1 aay ••• ve say ••• ' is a COlllllOn foraala 
suggesting the way in which villagers relate the two 11t1 of 
beliefs - one is simply the whit• man'• v1r1ion of th• amne 
~eachings and truths. The traditional belief•, therefore, 
orovide the 1tandard1 mo1t suitable for village life. Since 
· . ably ~ term• with the people ~i•h to re11111n on reason .,.,.,-
heed to itl like• and di1lik•• even ~.ission, they pay IOIDI 
convinced that practice• condoned by 
Villager• ac'knOVledge ~hough they are not 
tradition could be morally reprehlniible. 
the have given up variou• 
this attitude when they ••Y that ~6 f 1 avi i The pattern o n 
customs 'to pl••••' the 111i11ionar ••· 
56 See above1 144. 
• 
,., 
church attendance reflected tJae .... t i 
a t tudea. On a&ndays 
when the pariah pri .. t vu able to - f 
---- roll the leipa •i11ion 
station to hold aervice1 the whole ill 
' Y &CJ9 turned out in iti 
best clothe• to attend aa11. Villaneri 
-.. respect and adaire 
their pari1h prieat and enjoy hii lel'llOni, his viiit ii 
therefore reqarded &1 80Mthi119 of an occ&1ion. On other 
sundays, when one of the vill119e 1Chool teachers leads 
prayer• and hymna, only 1chool children and a handful of 
adults, mo1tly women, will be found in church. 
It appeara that the •i1sion hu never been able 
to bring traditional belief1 into que1tion. 1y per1iitent 
opposition or 1Upport of particular prac:tice1, it baa been 
able to influence people'• behaviour, but not the underlyir19 
belief•. The practice of 1orcery, which lie1 at the heart 
of people'• belief in the 1upernatural, pre1ent1 an 
interesting ex111ple. Thou9h belief in the efficacy of 
destructive ma9ic r ... in1 &1 1tror19 a1 ever, vill194trs claim 
that its practice i1 declini119 and attribute this decline to 
the mi1sion. Many ex•ple1 ai9ht be qiven of aiddle-aqed and 
older men who refu1ed, on the qroundl of the mission's 
teachinqs, 
sorcerers. 
to follow in their fathers' foot1teps to become 
Other exmaples could be qiven of •n who endured 
the sorcerer'• arduous 'apprenticeship' but later refu1ed 
to use the power1 they had acquired. People claill that many 
chiefs, fearinq that they were passil'ICJ on evil powers to 
their succe1ior1, de1troyed their maqic relics and stone1, 
and refused to in1truct their ions in the necessary rituals 
On. Chief, for ex111Ple, confided that his father and .opell1. 
had possessed a 1pecial type of aaqic to 'kill infants by 
stoppinq their mother•' flow of ail'k but he had not diwlqed 
the secret of thi1 pow9r to hi• 10n, sayinCJ that it wu 
better that 1uch evil 'knOWledqe ihould die with hill. ' 
• 
oe1tructiv• 1N9ic hu, of COllrH alwav. ....___ ... _ ... 
• 1• ......., regar.,... with 
fear and horror 1 the •iaaion baa •rely had to build on 
existing c:onvictiona. 
A sorcerer liv .. an arduous and dulJeroua lifer 
he i• ahunned by the r .. t of the ~nity aa a creature 
of utter .. li4)11aney and mat deal with terrible aupematural 
power• which will turn against and deatroy him ahould he 
lose control of them. lo doubt •i11ion teaching provided 
a welcome juatif ication for many to abandon a car .. r which 
they had no inclination to follow, Other factors beaide1 
the mi11ion'a influence diacourage you119 •n frofl' undertaking 
the len9thy training neceaaary to becOlle a aorcerer: they 
are much more anxioua to acquire the 1kill1 that will equip 
them for employment outaide the village than to learn 
complicated bodiea of traditional lore. Today the aorcerer' 1 
son i1 more likely to be an electrician, an agricultural 
officer or a clerk in Port lloreaby or running a trucking 
busine11 in the village, rather than follOlling his father'• 
callin9. 
Young people often clai• that when the elders die, 
the old cuatoma, including the chieftainahip, will be 
abandoned aa there will be no one left to enforce th•. 
The tranaition ii not likely to be a1 1imple a1 they i .. gines 
as lon9 a 1 the belief in aorcery exi1t1, there will be 
those who will exploit it. Whether or not there are 
individual• who retain the old kn011led9e and rituala, people 
the unung Mn who today 
will still 1u1pect that there are: 1 --
t f uch matters, will be are conaidered to be ignoran o 1 
severthele11, the 
the knowled9eable elder• of tomorrow. 
hemlelve• questioning the 
fact that young people today are t 
value of exi1tin9 aaaumptiona 9ive• the mission a new 
it. influence. The educated young .. n opportunity to extend 
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wishinq to carve out a new life for himnlf and hie children, 
the emerqinq bueineee and political l•adera are in need of 
guidance and reuaurance. The lliaaion, which up until 
the preaent hu been .tile to make little illpreaaion on 
villaqera' thinkinq, .. y well play a vital role in the 
search for new aoc:ial values and new typea of social 
relationahipa. 
Ultimately, the future liea with the Mekee> alone. 
If they are to achieve their present desires for a 'better 
way of life', they may have to jettison the social values 
which up to the present have qiven diqnity and purpose to 
life: or they may succeed in qivinq new atrenqth and content 
to the exietinq eocial ethic - .a task which should not be 
beyond the capabilities of a n~ qeneration of educated 
chiefs better equipped to handle the llOdern world. Whatever 
path villaqera choose, they have their eye1 fixed firmly 
ahead. Echoinq the coment1 of many, an Inawi elder mused1 
Ah, you would have been very sorry to ••e how 
we lived before the var. We had no clothes, 
no match••, no saucepans - nothing. Thinq• are 
a little better now but •••• 
Like many of their countrymen, th• Melteo complain not of 
1 t Of the Old culture, but of how little what they have oa 
chey have qained of the new. 
unk 
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'E7Cll gr ou•w mzru (llale deeeent line) 
IPri 1971 
ICey to !J:!breyiation1 
unknown 
not ~ yet 
male 
• chief 
W or lW 
2W 
0 
wife 
2nd wife 
f .. le 
The first letter in bracket1 before a wife'1 n ... indicates 
her clan, and the 1ec:ond letter indicates her village of 
birth accordinq to the followinq table. 
Clan1 Vill!Se! 
A Afai A Aipeana 
F Lopia Fa'a B Beipa 
G Gaqai ! Bebeo 
I Iso ! Ibo• 
IP Ipaqe Pai1apai1a G Imounqa 
IU Ipaqe Uqo I Inawi 
L Lalae ! Inawae 
N Ogofoina J Jesubaibua 
NL Ogofoina Lc>pia Fa'a M Amoamo 
0 okope N Inawauni 
p • Paisapaisa 0 oriropetana 
R .. R&r•i u OU90 
x Ugo u Inawabui 
w Inawaia 
x Other village 
• 
A Maino Fi' i. 
w (--) ounl< ----..i 
t,Ofoi Fi'i 
W(--)ounk-----1 
60pu911 Ogopai. 
W (AI) 0A11fe 
Ai•a'au 
OMaino Ogopai 
AI.ala Opuvue --{Allaino 1oa1ae Ofoi Maino 
W(D)ft•--· __ W(YA)oltuai Avaiaa oAvaiaa Maino 
-.--.... ---ol..ALala Maino® 
ollaria Lala W(LI)oA< 
ounk H Maino 
Allaino Ofoi 
W(XA)oOaike Jufoina---oOfoi Oini 
A-a Maino 
W(YB)oAuf; 
0pu Maino 
W(YB)oAufo 11 
AAufe Ofoi 
W (XW)oPeafuau Apini---..1 
oAuai Ofoi 
OOini Ofoi 
AMaino Vagake 
oOgopai Allf• 
Allaino Peafuau 
lW(PI)oAipu llaino---ol 
2W (YA) <>Aha llaino APukari Maino 
W(YA)oKinomo 
6Maino Maino 
oOgopai Opu 
60pu Peafuau oPeafuau Opu 
W(lI)oLaoma Apini----4oKeoka Opu 
oOfoi Opu 
oAufe Opu 
oAiao Opu 
6Lala Apia oAiaa 0pu 
W( )oOpu Ofoi----aMaino Lala 
W (XA) oAuva Ine' e ---'-oApia Lapu lW(YA)oAiv< · 
2W(PI)oLaom, 
AOpu Apia 
W (--) ounl< --,.,AI.ala Ke..,..u 
W(Xl)oApia Aqelo---~(oApia Opu 
oAdelaide 
AMaino Ama' a 
t.Ake Ai'i 
W(XJ)oAme Gagao 
W(XB)oO'oqo Keale---oOpu Aioa 
AMaino Ke1111111u 
W(PI)oAba Ame---AAme Maino 
AOfoi Ame W(YO)oKavo Magepa----l(APule llme 
oOpu llme 
W(PI)oOpu Ofoi AOfoi Ame 
4 Aina' au Ame 
W(XJ)oOpu 
OO'oqu Ame 
4Aiaa'au Ame 
oAme Akiafu 
Kaiao oOae Aina' au 
oMary Aina' au 
ti.Ake Aina' au 
W(YA)oOfoi Maino----l(oAme Ake 
AAke Ake 
tiOfoi Iaau 
W(Xl)oine'e Pieni---oMaino Ine'e 
4Isau Elaka 
W(YA)oA'ape Kab----rAKola Isau• 
W(!I)oAo"- 1 
Ais 
oAme Gaqao 
A0pu Ai'i 
W(--)oALla Allla'a-oAua Ani'ia oMaino !laka 
110pugu Kola 
W(--)ounk---1 
AKola Foame 
w (l-1 oMaino !laka ---< 
AOfoi roame 
W(PI)oAvaiaa Koqopu 
tiMamae Ia au+ 
W(YI)oOfo1 
2W(IPil"A 
(
a Maga Ai 
/ W(OI)oAmeua Kcamau---~t-.Aisu 1 1 
__________ 1_ -- - - - Jt.Aisaga Evi -------------·~- ------------------------ __ __ " _____ _J 
AOfoi Fi' i 
W(--)ounk----4 
A Kola ri' i 
W(--)ounk:----1 
r Maino Uq(lf-J.:ll 
W{--)ounk----+t.Lala Keamau 
ti.Maino Ama. • a 
AAke Ai'i 
W(XJ)oAlne Gagao 
60pu Ai'i 
W{XB)oO'ogo Keale---oopu Aioa 
AMaino l<eomau 
W(PiloAioa Ame---t.Ame Maino 
40foi lime W(YO)oKavo llllgepa----<{6Pu!e .·, 
oOpu k'-1; W(PI)OOpu Ofoi 40foi Ame 
A Aina 1 au Alie 
W(XJ)OOpu 
OO'ogu lime 
AAiaa• au Ame 
oAIMI Akiafu 
Kaiao ooae Aina 1 au 
ollary Aina' ou 
ti.Ake Aina 1 au 
W (YA) OOfoi Maino----r"{oArne !V< · 
l!Ake Akt 
AOfoi I~ 
W(Xl)olne'e Pieni.----oMaino Ine'e 
oAlne Gagao 
6Iaau Elal<a 
W(YA)oA'ape Kah----.r4Kola !.".• 
W(.!_I 
W(--)ol\Ua Ama'•-oAua Ani'ia oMaino Elal<a 
AOpugu l<ola 
W(--)ounk---l 
Al<ola Fomne 
w <1-) oMaino Elal<a ---1 
40foi roome 
W(PI)oAvaioa Koqopu 
AEVi Fomne 
6.Kavola I 
t:.Mamae I'-
W(YI I. 
oMaino A: 
ll Hamae El aka -f oFuafuau 
W(YJ)oApia Ameke oAqu Api. 
oElaka A1 
61aau At-.>1, 
lW(AI I• 
2W(IPI I ., 
[
oMaqa A1~ 4~~~:~a Keomau•-----1 6Aioaga '' 
W(Al 
W(-A)ollaga Ame 0Ai10 !Vi 
oUVel• Foae 
oAiH Foae 
o.Api roame 
6IHU Kola ollaino IHll 
w(--)ounk--{ollaino Apia 
60foi Evi , oAilo Of 
W(OI)oAIMNa keamau1----~0Aiaa u: 
Married after 
Aioaga died 
• 
• 
.... 
Jc;,, 
11 
a ! · 
A; 
Ofoi llaillD &Joafe Lala 
oAvaiea llaillo &Opa Lala 
61.ala llaillo. i Lala 
W(LI)- ·---+,UM'• wa 
O°'fOpM llaillo llaiJID Lala 
6-a llaiDO ._ Lala 
•<nl-fa Ufai ocarla Lala 
60pll llaino ---t•ino Opa 
W(Ya)-fo I-illo - Opll 
... ,. fir'" 
&Opll l'Ukari 
-va IPUkari 
6Pukari llaino &Maino IPUkari 
w(YA)olUncmo llOpio---+,alki l'Ukari 
&Maino Maino 
OOqopai Opll 
oPeafuau Opll 
OOgopai l'Ukari 
6.llllva IPUkari 
6AiH•O Pukari 
onny 
•
t----1oJ<aoka Opll 
•c A ' OOfoi Opll 
I I ., . 
Of 
U! 
oAuf• Opll 
oAioo Opll 
oAioa Opll 
l---6Maino Lala 
lW(YA)oAiveke 
11Uali---6V119eke Maino 
2W(PI)oX-. A'oae W(AI)oI .. Maino 
Maino V-ke 
o11119aiva VlllJ•k• 
oAivek• V-k• 
6111lfe VlllJ9)te 
uala v-u 
6Aie119a V-ke 
o~ va99ke 
o- V119eke ...---roApia Opll 
oAdelaide 
---r4fUl• -ovpu,.. 
___ 1 oAlne Al<• 6Ake Al<• 
60foi l•AU 
ti Kola Iaau+ 
W(II)oAoka 
- Ai•ua'• 
~Kavola Iaau+ 
t.Mamae Iaau+ 
W(YI)OOfoi A'oae 
oMaino Apia 
oFuafuau Apia 
---·Lo11qu Apia 
oElaJc.a Apia 
6Ilau Apia 
lW(AI)oVavina 
A'oae-6Ai••9• Iaau 
2W(IPI)oAufo Alneua~oApia Io .. 
~aqa A1saga 
· ,\ 1saga A1saga W(PI)oA'oae i olne'e Aioaqa 6Efl Aisaqa w (AI) oAk i Aopo 6A1saga A1saga 0A1 " A1saga t iauka A1saga 
• 
-i60foi Efi oAki Ef i A1ne ol<ape Efi 6 Ailaqa Efi t.Maino Efi 0A1so Efi 
'A)oAiveke 
Auali---t.Vaqeke Maino 
PI)oLaocna A'oae W(AI)olma Maino 
t.;iia Opu 
Adelaide 
lPule -
OOpu -
oAme Ake 
~Ake Ake 
1 t, Kola I•au+ 
W(lI)oAoko Ai•-·· 
1
- "Kavola l•au+ 
~: ~amae I•au+ 
W(YI)OOfoi A'oee 
0Maino Apia 
::iFuafuau Apia 
oAgu Apio 
oElaka Apia 
lllsau Apia 
lW(AI)oVovino 
A'oM-6Ai•~a ll• 
2W(IPI)oAufo Allleu•~oAr>i• 1 ... 
o~aga1va •;<lqcKe 
oAiveke Vaqekt: 
l/VJ fe Vaqeke 
•Lalo V119eke 
Uio1190 V1199ke 
o'-8 VO<Jeko 
o-v..-. 
oMago AiH9• iolno'e Aioogo lAOfoi lfi 
Uf i Aioogo oAki lfi 
'Aio•g• Ai•"9• W(Pl)oA'oee - ....... lfi 
W(AI)oAki Aopo AAi•09• Aiaoga IAiaoga lfi 
oAiao Ai•ll9• Allaino lfi 
APi.,ke Aiaoga oAiao If i 
0Aiao Ofoi 
oAiH Ofoi 
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BY 
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*Taken from hou•ehold cen•u• •tati•tic•, Inawi Village, 1971. 
Income i• e•timated on an aver~~· return of $50 per bag of 
betel nut sent to Port More•by. • 
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APPIDIX 111 J92 
OOCUPATIC* MW.YI If - IWI VU.IHI 
1921-1970 
• 
0 C C U p A T I 0 Ill PL AC B 
1 
c 
0 
o'4 .. A 
EMPLOYED ..... u 
o'4 • ... 
.... ...... 
... .. ~ ~ ::s 
DURING .... ... c ~ ::s .. 
... . ... 
... ::s • • I .8 ... ~ • I i~ ... ~ PERIOD • • .c ~~ Ii ... ,, .., ... > ~ .. 
.. 0 .. 
! .. • • ... 0 .! 
. ... ... 
t: ~ .. t. • 
... . 
Q ... ... c ... 8; II) 0 ... .., 
1921-25 3 3 
1926-30 5 5 
1931-35 6 1 7 
1936-41 11 2 1 1 11 4 
SECOND W 0 R L D WAR 
1946-50 14 7 3 3 2 1 7 23 
• 
1951-55 2 5 6 5 3 5 2 13 15 
1956-60 3 5 7 7 3 2 7 20 
1961-65 1 8 2 1 2 2 4 12 
1966- 70 2 1 3 2 4 4 
Figures, taken from the houaehold cenaua, repreaent the job• 
previously held by Inawi men reaident in the village in 1971. 
i 
3 
5 
7 
15 
30 
28 
27 
16 
8 
! 
' 
I 
' 
I 
I 
I 
AGE RANGE 
IN YEARS 
18 - 25 
26 - 30 
Jl - 35 
36 - 40 
41 
-
45 
46 - 50 
51 - 55 
56 - 60 
Over 60 
APPIDIX IV 
IJM:ATl!!Nr ITNl>A_'U> °' ADULT MAr.11 
lllalfl VILLAO& 1971 
]9] 
HIGHIST IOOCATIOllAL STANDARD ATTAllllD 
• • . ), . ), o'4 ~ ), ~ ), ~ ~ ~ ~ ), • ~ ti ~ ... !J ~ 'g ~ 'g ... ... I M! ,,.g "' g ... ... I "4 
"' ct 
I e 
.Ji I ~ o'4 Ao o'4 Ill 
5 15 
-
3 5 1 
3 11 6 2 - 5 
8 6 1 - - -
16 5 - - - 1 
16 
-
1 - - -
8 2 - - - 2 
- - -11 1 -
- -
-4 - -
- - -9 - -
full-time student• not resident in the This table includes -
villages. 
• 
APPllDIX y JM 
EOO£ATll!'U S'l'AllDA m NIP QCWPATia.s or 
DIAlfI m Ull>p JO tftlUDIG •AY 
PR<Jt 'ftll VILLAGE Ill 1971 
1 Year• of 
Education 
Primary Secondary 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
Unit. unit. 
.liq• 
24 
24 
18 
22 
26 
28 
18 
19 
21 
27 
17 
17 
16 
20 
22 
28 
17 
18 
18 
26 
28 
24 
28 
25 
21 
occupation 
Unknown 
Weldinq 
..... Boy 
Unknown 
Welding 
Ag. Labourer 
Unknown 
Aircraft 
Refueller 
Unknown 
Power St. ~p. 
Unknown 
carpenter 
Unknown 
clerk 
Unknown 
Electrician 
carpenter 
Unknown 
Clerk 
Unknown 
clerk 
unknown 
Plumber 
Trainee Pilot 
clerk 
Information talten from 1nawi eouaehold cenaua. 
Place 
Bouganville 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
JCer ... 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
Kundiawa 
Port Moreaby 
Goroka 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
eulolo 
Mt 11&9en 
Port Moreaby 
La• 
Port Moreaby 
Port Moreaby 
A'AISA 
AFA 
AIVA AUGA 
AU 
EFU 
EKE 
EKEFA'A 
F'A'ANIAU 
FAIA 
FAIA 
0
LgPIA 
FAIFAI 
FALAIA 
FAOGA 
FUA 
FULA ARI 
GAKU 
GEVA 
GOPE 
GOVE 
IAUA 
I!(lJPU 
IMA 
I MALA ' 
IMOI IPAPEPE 
PEN IA 
Jt5 
GU>llUY OP W10 tlORDI 
the deity reaponaible for inatitutinq 
the traditional aocial order 
type of tillber reaerved for the chief' a 
uae 
one of the chief'• cere11e>nial functionariei 
un 
traditional valuable• 
junior, younger 
friend: term alao u1ed to refer to 
maternal 'kin 
aenior, elder 
war magic: cinnamon bark 
war magic chief 
harmfUl apirit1 that live underwater or 
underground 
war chant 
the ceremonial lime pot of the fa'aniau 
chief 
aubatances - u1ually plant• - uaed in 
the preparation of aorcery and other 
magic 
magic apecialiata who enforced food 
taboo•: alternate nllllll for the 'kaiva kuku 
feast 
traditional dancinq 
faat undertaken by practiaing aorcercr 
and magician 
houae• for widower• or bachelor• 
platform 
clan, fa11ily 
to nurture, loo'k after 
a'kin abed by a 1na'ke 
a type of magic u1ed to 'kill inf anti 
IMOU 
IMU AUGA 
IPA GAVA 
I SAGE 
ISANI UGO 
ISAPU 
ISO 
ISO AUGA 
ISO LOPIA 
ISONIONI 
KAIVA KUJ<U 
KEPO 
KUR IVA 
LEKELEKE 
LOP IA 
LOPIA AKINA 
LOPIA EKE 
LOPIA FA'ANIAU 
MAFE AFI AUGA 
~GA 
:.IINI FA'A 
oru 
O'OAE 
• OPOGO 
PAGUA 
PAN! 
UFU 
UFU APIE 
UGAUGA 
a type of leaf 
rain •9ician 
in-laws 
apirit 
a type of 9arden •aqic po11eaaed only 
by apecialiata 
aupernatural power, heat 
a pear 
war 11&9ic apeciali1t 
war chief 
myth 
magic apecialiata who enforced food 
taboo a 
atone 
type of war dance 
one of the ceremonial lille 1ticka of 
the fa'aniau chief 
chief1 good 
chief'• younger brother 
a1aiatant or junior chief 
1enior chief 
one of the chief'• ceremonial functionariea 
apell, incantation 
1mall child 
dirty, contaminated 
bachelor 
the central poet of the ufur type of timber 
village 
type of war dance 
clan clubhoU•e 
a reciprocal ceremonial relationahip 
between twO clan• 
1orcery 
UGAUGA U>PIA 
ULALU 
UMA PA'O 
t:MU PUA 
L'NIA AFA 
U"E AUGA 
vouvou 
Jt7 
80rcery chief 
~c· .. : -ner 
an orn•1nt ~ of pi9' • tu•k• worn by 
the fa'ani.u chief• 
a fe .. t to tei.J.nate mourni119 
payment Nde on the death of an individual 
to hi• •ternal kin 
one of the chief'• functionarie• 
a type of tillber re•erved for the chief' 1 
U•e 
• 
• 
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